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Abstract 
This thesis presents the findings of a comparative analysis between the neoliberal 
sustainable development narrative and the fast-emerging Chinese ecological civilization 
narrative from a political ecological perspective. The contradictory role of the 
‘sustainable consumer’ that the narratives employ is used to draw conclusions on the 
extent of convergence and divergence between the two potentially competing discourses. 
This allows for original contributions on how subjects are created and governed in 
discourses of sustainability transitions. 
 
As sustainable development increases its reach as a mode of governance, covering new 
spaces and even ‘future generations’, it brings into being new kinds of citizens: the 
‘sustainable consumer’. This citizen type reconciles the contradictory demands on the 
citizen to be both a consumer and an environmentalist. Environmental citizens are thus 
incorporated into market architecture as ‘sustainable consumers’ to assume the role of 
the privileged agent of change whose political possibilities are limited. This paradox is 
analysed from a poststructuralist perspective, where the consumer subject performs the 
market-sanctioned role of sustainability while contributing to its ongoing 
depoliticization. The extension of market logics into the governance of crises, transition, 
and imagination is arguably challenged by a Chinese narrative that promotes a ‘different 
form of development’. Some have argued this offers ‘hope’ for a counter-narrative to the 
dominance of market logics.  
 
This thesis, however, shows such arguments are flawed in two ways. First, the treatment 
of ecological civilization as a singular discourse fails to account for the opposing 
articulations of it between domestic and international audiences. Second, the role of 
consumerism in absorbing care for the environment is fundamental to both ecological 
civilization and neoliberal sustainable development: neither discourse offers a different 
form of environmental citizenship beyond the consumer. Markets continue to mediate 
human-nature and socio-nature relations, with implications for considering China’s 
emergent role in global environmental governance. 
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Note on Language 
Where possible, and unless otherwise stated, the thesis has used official English 
translations of the various resources included in the analysis of Chinese discourses. 
Where a specific point of analysis has required recourse to the original Chinese, simple 
translations of no more than a few words have been carried out by the author unless 
otherwise stated. In such instances these were confirmed by graduate volunteers from 
the Sun Wah International Business School at Liaoning University, to whom thanks are 
due. Earlier stages of the research benefited from translations of larger texts carried out 
by qualified translators, for which a certificate of translation is provided in Appendix D. 
I am also grateful to several qualified interpreters during field work in China.  
 
Where Simplified Chinese (Mandarin) is used, it is accompanied by its pinyin (the system 
of Latinisation), and its English translation. The original Chinese is included in these 
sections for transparency, such as where the analysis is informed by differences between 
the officially translated English document and its original Chinese.  
 
Unless explicitly asked otherwise, Chinese names are rendered family name first, given 
name second, such as in Xi Jinping.   
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Jacques Chirac said [in 2002] that our house is burning down, and we are 
blind to it. We are no longer blind, but the house is still burning. 
French diplomat Laurent Fabius, 2017 
 
As we become increasingly mindful of our own health, the wellbeing of our 
family and that of the planet, we’re reshaping how we shop … Welcome to the era of 
the mindful consumer. 
Managing Director Rob Colins, Waitrose and Partners, 2018 
 
 
This thesis investigates what links these two observations in the context of the 
globalising political economy of neoliberal sustainable development, and whether it is 
challenged by the self-defined ‘new development paradigm’ of China. As the spatial and 
temporal reach of the neoliberal sustainable development (NSD) agenda expands, it 
brings under its governance new subjects and new places. It brings into being future 
generations and regulates their needs and potentialities in the present. It regulates what 
knowledges and what socio-nature relations matter, and which do not. The agenda 
determines which socio-environmental struggles are made visible and which are left 
invisible, while sanctioning particular modes of environmental expression and activism 
and delegitimising others. The NSD agenda is propelled by urgency but confronted by 
contradictions and paradoxical claims on and about citizens, whose governance is 
contained not only in the formalised architecture of the state, but in the minutiae of day-
to-day interactions, in particular with the market.  
One such paradox is highlighted by French diplomat Laurent Fabius who led the 
diplomatic effort in bringing about the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement at the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP21). Speaking at COP23 in Bonn, 2017, he remarked that 
‘Jacques Chirac said [in 2002] that our house is burning down, and we are blind to it. We 
are no longer blind, but the house is still burning.’ He captures succinctly the paradox of 
the yawning gap between knowledge of environmental crises and actions to mitigate 
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against them. Making sense of this worsening contradiction, and how it might be 
challenged, is the base issue to which this thesis contributes. Not only is the house still 
burning, but it has intensified: air pollution kills over 6.5 million people, or 11.6% of 
global deaths, every year (UNEP, 2017: 7), and disproportionately affects women and 
children in the global south; climate change worsens hurricanes and floods (Reed et al., 
2015); and plastic pollution in the sea increases by around 8 million metric tons each year 
(Chen, 2015) and has already entered our food and water supplies (Seltenrich, 2015). This 
plastic is predicted to outweigh all fish by 2050 (World Economic Forum, 2016). Species’ 
extinction rates are accelerating; one million species are at risk of extinction, and the 
‘health of ecosystems on which we and all other species depend is deteriorating more 
rapidly than ever. We are eroding the very foundations of our economies, livelihoods, 
food security, health and quality of life worldwide’ (IPBES, 2019). Trisos, Merow, and 
Pigot (2020) have shown that marine ecosystem collapse is likely, without immediate 
and drastic cuts in GHG emissions, in the 2020s, whilst land ecosystems could collapse 
in the 2040s (Trisos et al, 2020). These collapses will have colossal and unequal impacts 
on food and energy systems.   
Moreover, the barriers to putting out the fire are not technical or scientific, but 
political, social, and economic – the inertia of our systems and institutions. This research 
grew out of a basic question that, by a small contribution, it helps answer: Why does the 
fire continue to burn when we know how to extinguish it? From this, it is possible to identify 
a general paradox in global environmental governance. On one hand, knowledges and 
lived experiences of environmental degradation have increased in diversity and 
intensity, and this has been met, through organised political struggle, with the 
emergence of environmental issues at the heart of global governance. On the other hand, 
things have worsened in every metric of defining a liveable planet, and in local and 
Indigenous accounts of Nature. The exponentially increasing production, movement, 
consumption, and wasting of commodities lies at the heart of each of these issues – 
consumerism connects these crises across and through geographies. At the same time, 
the consumer has emerged under neoliberal governance as the sovereign agent and 
expression of citizenship. More things are commoditised, and more is consumed – 
though the distribution of consumption remains highly unequal and overwhelmingly 
concentrated in global minorities in wealthy areas. As will be shown, this is also where 
the power to commoditise, as a violent epistemology, is concentrated.   
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Political ecological study often begins and ends with contradictions (Robbins, 
2007; 2012), and within its broad discipline the study of narratives and subjects enjoys a 
diverse set of approaches and applications. Agrawal (2005), for instance, developed the 
term ‘environmental subjects’ to describe those ‘for whom the environment constitutes 
a critical domain of thought and action’ (2005: 16). But how are environmental subjects 
brought into being and how are they governed in the liminal space between the 
quickening collapse of one system and the slow emergence of a new system? Can 
‘sustainability transitions’ reimagine environmental citizenship beyond the market?  
To help answer this, this research looks at the social construction of agency and 
the socially available tools for actors to identify with. This brings into question the role 
of the consumer, and the way this category of citizenship absorbs the responsibility, 
agency, and hopes of the sustainability transition. A sustainability transition in this sense 
is conceived of as the discursive possibilities and limitations constructed by a hegemonic 
regime for imagining and bringing into being a liveable future. This is discussed further 
in section 2.1.2 as it relates to political economy and political ecology. Consumerism, as 
argued here, is a cornerstone of neoliberal imaginings of transitioning to a liveable future; 
indeed, it is a key practice in need of ‘greening’ and itself a contributor to greening. It is 
seen as capable of accommodating a new environmental awareness, and even as 
essential for finding sustainability: the new, mindful consumer will put out the fire.  
Environmental awareness looks for expression in the market, which responds by 
enlarging its offering and co-constructing the aesthetics of environmental activism. 
However, in campaigning for change, the most radical thing the ‘mindful consumer’ can 
do is consume differently: the horizon of change is narrowed to the individual and the 
performative. The discourse legitimises a particular avenue for sustainability transition 
that privileges minor reformism and occludes transformist practices (cf. Cox, 1981).  
This research investigates and critiques the discourses of global sustainability 
agendas, how they manifest, and to what extent they are challenged in the emergent 
discourse of China which, according to some (Foster, 2017, Pan, 2016, Zhou 2017), marks 
a counter-narrative capable of challenging a Westernised economic orthodoxy – the 
neoliberal regime of environmental governance. This research asks to what extent this 
counter-narrative creates different environmental subjects, or indeed sees beyond the 
individual subject and creates environmental communities. To do so, it first lays the 
foundation of the environmental subject (what I term the ‘sustainable consumer-subject’), 
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before considering the discourse of China’s ‘ecological civilization’, and emerging and 
comprehensive framework for transitioning to a sustainable future, as defined in section 
1.3. 1  both in its deployment domestically and in the global fora of environmental 
governance.   
1.1.  The Spectacle: The Historical Moment and its Contradictions   
Guy Debord first detailed the characteristics of the Society of the Spectacle in 1967. Writing 
in 1988, he summed up the Spectacle as: 
the autocratic reign of the market economy which had acceded to an 
irresponsible sovereignty, and the totality of new techniques of government 
which accompanied this reign. (Debord, 1998 [1988]: 2.) 
The intervening years, he argued, had reaffirmed his analysis. The interpretive research 
presented in this thesis contends that such a reign is discernible in the extension of the 
Spectacle into new domains: into the planetary crises which have been subsumed by it. 
One key result of this is epistemic – the ‘spectacle’ of the market economy provides a 
privileged mode of explaining the crisis and its solution. Debord’s insights, though 
valuable, cannot offer a complete theoretical framework, or a complete means of 
identifying the problem. For both, it is necessary to turn to the analyses of the ‘post-
political’ (Mouffe, 2005). Debord’s Spectacle as ‘autocratic reign’ gains analytical depth if 
it is considered as the expansion of technocratic, neoliberal modes of consensus-based 
governance, and the retreat of political identities from the spaces of governance (cf. 
Mouffe, 2005). The depolitical here is not understood as the absence of politics per se, 
but of political identities and political oppositions. In place, appeals to ‘common sense’ 
obscure the political and power-laden histories of such sense-making. We do not witness 
an ‘end of history’ but an outcome of it, one which can seem fixed and total, but is fluid 
and changing as new political identities are formed and reformed to confront it. It is in 
 
 
1  Throughout, I use ecological civilization – a widely-used anglicisation of 生态文明  (shēngtài 
wénmíng) in Western and Chinese academic literature. It is also sometimes anglicised as Eco-
Civilisation, both with and without capitalisation. As covered in Chapter 6, 生态文明  has 
sometimes been officially translated as ‘ecological progress’, though this is taken as a highly 
contextual instance of ‘appropriate’ language in global fora. 
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revealing contradictions, and lack of consensus, therefore, that a return to the political, 
and to the democratic, might be possible (Rancière, 2001). 
The broad approach of this research is informed, among others, by Debord’s 
outline of what might be considered an early adoption of the situated approach to 
critique: 
IN ORDER TO DESCRIBE the spectacle, its formation, its functions and whatever 
forces may hasten its demise, a few artificial distinctions are called for. To analyze 
the spectacle means talking its language to some degree — to the degree, in fact, 
that we are obliged to engage the methodology of the society to which the 
spectacle gives expression. For what the spectacle expresses is the total practice 
of one particular economic and social formation; it is, so to speak, that formation's 
agenda. It is also the historical moment by which we happen to be governed. 
(Debord, 1992 [1967]: 15, emphases original.) 
As interpretive research, the situated researcher is an inherent part of the studied world. 
The lived experiences, elite knowledges, and local and Indigenous knowledges offer 
reflections on the state of unsustainability. The privileged mode of understanding this 
as a crisis, that of neoliberal sustainable development, is a totalising narrative whose 
historical moment also governs researchers who study it. (I offer a reflexive account of 
the research journey in Annex I.) The tools available emerge, at least partially, from the 
subject of study to reflect its structures of power and knowledge. For a study of socio-
environment discourses in the context of crisis and transition, it is necessary to be able 
to highlight what is in crisis, yet in doing so it is necessary to predetermine what 
knowledges are most appropriate and whose experiences are most valid. Indeed, the 
epistemic claims of neoliberal sustainable development to know and to interpret crises 
and their fixes is part of the critique offered in subsequent chapters. To highlight the 
contradictions and paradoxes of the discourse is, to a great extent, to rely on the tools it 
also deploys, from empirical science to language of ‘environmental issues’ abstracted 
from the holistic lived experience.  
Debord’s outline provides some of the grammar employed in the thesis, and the 
sustainable development agenda that has emerged as a key organising principle in global 
environmental governance (and governance more generally) is taken as the imperfect 
and politically contingent extension of the spectacle into the latest contradiction of 
capitalism. It is therefore necessary to outline what is meant by neoliberal sustainable 
development, though this question is returned to throughout the thesis in relation to the 
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analysed corpora of texts through the lens of the construction of the sustainable 
consumer.  
While a full account of neoliberalism is not possible here, it is possible to outline 
how the term is deployed both here and in political ecology; in fact, it is necessary given 
the wide and often inconsistent use of the term. Harvey’s (2005) basic summation of 
neoliberalism as the insistence that market exchange should guide human action is a 
good starting point as it is here that the fundamental role of the market and the 
individual are sketched out in relation to one another. Going further, a general 
characterisation from critical geography is offered in the introduction of the special issue 
of Geoforum on ‘neoliberal nature’ wherein neoliberalism reflects a  
complex assemblage of ideological commitments, discursive representations, 
and institutional practices, all propagated by highly specific class alliances and 
organized at multiple geographical scales (McCarthy and Prudham, 2004: 276). 
The generality of the description is not accidental: in overly defining a specific 
‘neoliberalism’ in local practice, the emphasis on the globality of the project and the reach 
of its central tenets into new areas of life risk being lost (ibid.; Peek and Tickell, 2002). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to define the term operatively for the purpose of this study.  
Salleh writes that it is the material dependence between the global North and 
South that is central to understanding the global project. For Salleh, this ‘extractavism’, 
‘with attendant ecological and humanly embodied debts, is also the basis of neoliberal 
‘sustainable development’ models like the ‘green new deal’ and UNEP’s ‘green economy’ 
favored by transnational business’ (Salleh, 2015: 432).2 Salleh argues that for ‘critical 
political ecologists’, the point is ‘to interrogate this new form of technocratic 
management’ because ‘profit-oriented industrial provisioning in the name of progress is 
materially incompatible with global ecological health and democratic futures’ (ibid. 432-
433). Whilst questions could be raised of the newness of such a form of management, or 
governmentality, the principle remains. As such, this study deploys ‘neoliberal 
 
 
2 It should be noted the ‘green new deal’ here refers to a specific framework emerging from the 
2007/8 financial crisis and is not comparable to the much more recent activist-led calls for a green 
new deal. 
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sustainable development’ to frame an agenda of global(ised) proportions with particular 
local spatial and temporal impacts and implications that can be characterised as: 
• A techno-managerialism in which particular knowledges are deployed by which 
to govern and that serve to delineate an elite class capable of understanding 
nature, its crises, its fixes, and its future.  
• A primacy of market exchange and the sovereign economic individual as a 
political-economic ‘common sense’. 
• An emphasis on the ‘win-win’ of economic development as a function of 
economic growth and the protection, conservation, and restoration of non-
human nature. 
This thesis engages with these core characteristics whist, particularly in Chapter Four, 
expanding on their meaning and implications through analysis of the sustainable 
consumer. For now, the latter of these three is turned to in order to explore the 
sustainability crisis and the crisis of developmental approaches.   
At its most fundamental, the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union (EU), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank, among others, all present sustainable development not 
merely as necessary for the environment but beneficial for the economy as it is. Especially 
since 2012, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) have offered a broad consensus and 
commitment to ‘green growth’ (e.g. OECD, 2011) as the ex machina of ’greening’ 
capitalism within sustainability transitions.  How ‘sustainability’ is to be interpreted, by 
whom, and for whose gain are therefore increasingly important questions for policy and, 
more importantly, finding the political.  
The starting point for such an approach is the recognition of two paradoxes. First, 
that of the prevalent sustainability discourse: the increase of sustainability ‘talk’ has 
coincided with a worsening of ecological crises, such as those symbolised by the terming 
of the ‘Anthropocene’3, the surpassing of 400 parts per million (PPM) of atmospheric 
CO2, and the increasing attention given to air and (especially marine) plastic pollution, 
 
 
3 To replace Holocene in official geologic time from about 1950, the adoption of ‘Anthropocene’ 
was formally recommended by an official panel (the Working Group on the Anthropocene), in 
2016. 
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to name just a few. At the point of surpassing the 400 PPM of CO2 threshold in 2013, 
NASA’s then Global Change and Energy Manager, Dr Michael Gunson, commented that 
the ‘world is quickening the rate of accumulation of CO2, and has shown no signs of 
slowing this down. It should be a psychological tripwire for everyone’ (NASA, 2013). 
The current data from the Mauna Loa Observatory (31 March 2020) indicates 415 PPM 
CO2 (NOAA, 2020). This psychological tripwire has yet to materialise. Similarly, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in its most recent assessment4, warns that:  
[h]uman influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic 
emissions of green-house gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes 
have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems. (IPCC, 2014: 2.) 
Elsewhere, the IPCC (2019) has pointed to the centrality of distributional justice in 
mitigating climate change. It notes, ‘with high confidence’, that the large majority of 
modelling studies that constructed pathways characterised by inequality could not limit 
global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2019: 22). Confronting climate change, in other 
words, must also tackle global inequality. However, as Kütting (2014) makes clear, the 
dominant assumption that simply providing evidence of the scale and severity of climate 
change and other environmental issues will institute the change needed to mitigate them 
is demonstrably flawed; a greater account of genealogical processes and hegemonic 
structures is needed to account for the failure of significant action.   
Outside of policy or scientific discourses, news media, the blogosphere, think 
tanks, and other domains have provided numerous labels and frames for citizens to 
occupy or be placed in; alarmists, radicals, eco-terrorists, contrarians, deniers, green 
consumers, and so on. Mass media provides us with visual renderings of climate 
catastrophe and environmental destruction in box-office hits; narratives that tap into a 
latent awareness of human-induced crises. In the UK, for instance, David 
Attenborough’s Blue Planet Two (BBC, 2017) sent home the shocking images of plastic 
pollution in the marine environment, stirring up a wave of voices that announced a new 
awareness and energy for change.5 Advertisers and marketers provide consumer spaces 
 
 
4 The IPCC reports on a 7-year cycle as a metanalysis of relevant literature. 
5 The ‘Food and Drink Report 2018-19’ (Waitrose and Partners, 2019), for instance says that: 
‘Our research found that 88% of those who watched the programme have altered their 
behaviour as a result. Since the episode aired at the end of 2017, our customer services team has 
seen an 800% increase in questions about plastic.’  
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of safe ‘green’ consumption; tokens of distinction that focuses this new energy on the 
individual and calls on them as consumers to ‘save the planet’ through a minor change 
in purchasing habits. Sustainability ‘talk’ has profusely organised responses to 
environmental crises; new categories for civil society to engage with and identify what 
can be changed and what must remain the same. The first paradox, therefore, is the 
divergence between sustainability agendas and sustainability outcomes. This project’s key 
critical impetus is the deconstruction of these fault lines and the political constructions 
of permanency and change. 
The second paradox is implicit within the sustainable development discourse as 
it is typically invoked: that sustainability can be attained alongside, indeed depending 
on, exponential economic growth in quantitative terms. The potential conflict in the 
discourse around ‘sustainable development’ has been talked about regularly, 
particularly in literature focusing on ecological economics: steady-state economy, 
degrowth, dematerialisation, redistribution, and so on. Such approaches concentrate on 
the problems of insisting on exponential, quantitative economic growth, and associated 
material throughput, within an ecosystem of finite resources and sinks. 
Bioenvironmental perspectives, to borrow from Clapp and Dauvergne’s (2011; see also 
Dryzek, 2013: 34-37) categorisation, have also pointed to the importance of planetary 
boundaries and inherent complexity: nuances which are rarely captured in mainstream 
policy making. The key concern here is the institutionalising of the role of the ‘consumer’ 
in the production of innovation, and how central this is to the response to environmental 
problems: that ecological limits represent a failure to innovate technically, and continued 
(indeed, increasing) mass consumption of the ‘right type’ is part of the solution, rather 
than part of the problem. This Promethean response represents a specific instance of the 
second paradox: citizens are encouraged to identify both with commodification and 
consumption, and with ‘acting sustainably’.  
The contradiction between the economic system’s need for exponential growth 
and the ‘limits’ of physical material to feed this are not new. At least as far back as the 
Club of Rome’s highly-debated publication Limits to Growth (1972), an early computer 
modelling of exponential economic and populational growth on Earth as a closed 
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thermodynamic system 6 , the profound dilemma of economic growth as both the 
guarantor of improving the human condition and a fundamental danger to the 
ecosystems that underpin our way of life has been a fault line among environmental and 
ecological economists (Neumayer, 2013; Daly 1996). Most recently, high-level events 
have projected the ecological economists’ key line of ‘redefining prosperity’ (see 
especially Jackson, 2013a; 2013b) to audiences far beyond fringe academic circles. For 
instance, an EU parliamentary conference, the Post-Growth Conference for Europe (CUSP, 
2018) took place between 18-20th September 2018, and an article in Foreign Policy entitled 
Why growth can’t be green by anthropologist Jason Hickel (Hickel, 2018) reached far 
beyond the economic core with 20,216 social media shares (Foreign Policy, 2018). 
Ecological sustainability and, to a lesser extent, social sustainability are the key limiting 
factors in such discourses, which point to widely-cited scientific frameworks, such as the 
Planetary Boundaries framework, to help discern a ‘carrying capacity’ and ‘safe 
operating space’ for humanity (Steffen et al. 2015; Rockström et al. 2009). 
Sustainability is talked about in particular ways that are politically determined. 
In Foucauldian terms, the radically contingent constellations of meaning are historically 
determined; they are outcomes of inherently political power-struggles, and in emerging 
as dominant from such struggles, their status is privileged and taken for granted. 
Differing discourses are implicated in political practices and power relations; they 
provide a filter through which complex problems are reduced, communicated, and acted 
on. As Dryzek (2013: 10) highlights, ‘[d]iscourses can themselves embody power in the 
way they condition the perceptions and values of those subject to them, such that some 
interests are advanced, others suppressed, some people made more compliable and 
governable’.  The critical project is therefore the deconstruction of such narratives that 
assert themselves as inherent to the problem at hand and mask particular interests as 
general interests.  
This research, then, begins with the assertion that the sustainable development 
discourse serves to depoliticise the concept of sustainability. This follows closely the 
 
 
6 Earlier literatures in particular called on the laws of thermodynamics as a means of explaining 
how increases in material throughput cannot be sustained beyond the ability of those materials 
to replenish themselves. A ‘closed’ system, like Earth, has no significant inputs or outputs of 
material, but does have inputs of energy (from the Sun). The natural conclusion being material 
throughput cannot grow exponentially or indefinitely. 
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emergence of the ‘post-ecological era’ with its defining ‘politics of unsustainability’ first 
defined by Blühdorn and Welsh (2006), and later developed by Blühdorn (2011a, 2011b, 
2013). This locates the issue alongside similar theoretical arguments of the post-political 
and post-democratic. On the emergence of post-democratic cities, for instance, 
Swyngedouw observes that ‘the ‘political’ is retreating while social space is increasingly 
colonised by policies (or policing)’ (Swyngedouw, 2010). This helps frame the paradox 
this research begins with: the proliferation of sustainability agendas without 
sustainability outcomes, and it locates the political project in the need to recapture what 
sustainability means; a largely privately-led effort to sustain the means of capital 
accumulation under a broad neoliberalisation, or as a need to transcend it. 
This occurs not in a universal sense or, as Foucault’s epochal interpretation of 
discourse might assert, according to a shared logic that varies according only to time. 
Instead, various sustainability discourses exist that each seek to imbue common 
signifiers with particular meanings. The point of the critical discourse approach, 
therefore, is the deconstruction of these meanings and the revealing of their contingency 
(Howarth, 2010). Moreover, adopting a normative stance in the research, the impetus 
lies in revealing the points of contestation between different discourses. In doing so, a 
broader project of re-politicisation becomes apparent whereby the political frontier, 
obscured by a dominant or hegemonic discourse, is revealed by different articulations 
and investments of meaning of particular phrases. In short, the question of what is being 
sustained is often obscured and taken for granted.  
1.2. Sustainably Consuming or Consuming Sustainability? 
Owing to the vastness of the sustainable development discourse(s), this thesis is 
primarily concerned with consumerism. This offers a specific instance with definable 
limits within a broader discourse, providing a limited scope for a discourse analysis for 
methodological more than analytical reasons. This is because the process of 
commoditisation is inherently without end. The construction of new markets, new 
commodities, and new consumers – a simultaneous intensification and extensification 
of consumer demand – mediated through cultural production and the colonising and 
co-opting of public space, from cities (Swyngedouw, 2010) to the internet (Castells, 2010), 
are simultaneously drivers and conditions of the expansion of capital. The discourse 
analytical approach (Howarth, 2010; Jacobs, 2018) aims to explore the embeddedness of 
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such conditions within sustainability transitions: in effect, what remains the same when 
new futures are imagined, proposed, and implemented.  
Commoditisation and consumerism are thus central elements to the thesis; such 
a focus does not serve to limit the analysis along disciplinary lines, but to provide a more 
limited body of discursive resources whose genealogy can be more tangibly traced and 
whose counter-hegemonic articulations better identified. It is in these discourses that the 
individual is brought into being as an agent of change, not as a citizen but as a consumer. 
The thesis considers this from two angles: The neoliberal lens which considers the 
constitution of the sustainable consumer in both marketing and political institutions; and 
the performative lens where sustainability is spectacle – a mode of identification wherein 
the commodity serves as a representation of an ideal. This theoretical basis, and its 
reflexive application to the institutionalisation of consumerism in sustainability 
transitions, is a key original contribution this thesis seeks to make.  
It is therefore necessary to better define consumerism, both in a wider social 
sciences context and in terms of its relationship to the sustainability crisis. For its broader 
frame, the research begins with Zygmunt Bauman’s widely cited definition of 
consumerism: 
We may say that ‘consumerism’ is a type of social arrangement that results from 
recycling mundane, permanent and so to speak ‘regime-neutral’ human wants, 
desires and longings into the principal propelling and operating force of society, 
a force that coordinates systemic reproduction, social integration, social 
stratification and the formation of human individuals, as well as playing a major 
role in the processes of individual and group self-identification and in the 
selection and pursuit of individual life policies. (Bauman, 2007: 35). 
Consumerism can thus be separated from consumption. While consumption can be 
simply rendered ‘a permanent and irremovable condition and aspect of life…one of the 
inseparable elements of biological survival’ (ibid: 25), consumerism can be considered an 
attribute of society. A dominant arbiter of inter-human and human-environment 
relations, consumerism and its related practices of transport, storage, waste, and 
production colonise and manage space.  
How this definition of consumerism relates to sustainability is both ecological 
and social, and it is important to distinguish between often deployed terms relating, 
broadly, to nature. Ecological in a-political usage generally relates to the relationships, 
state of (dis/) equilibrium, and coexistence between species and their environment. 
Political ecology as explored further in section 2.1. (re)inserts the social: it ‘is a field 
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within environmental studies focusing on power relations as well as the coproduction 
of nature and society’, while global political ecology is further concerned with the 
globalization of environmental problems, burdens, and benefits, and the formal ordering, 
mobility, and prevalence of knowledges about nature. A central aim of this research is 
to demonstrate the analytical limits of the term ‘sustainable’ by showing the often 
purposeful disconnect between socially accepted sustainable actions and the biophysical 
‘reality’ of sustainability. As such, sustainability in this thesis has two definitions relating 
to environmental sustainability: a ‘performative’ social dimension in which people act 
out the regulated actions of the sustainable consumer, and the ‘functional’ dimension 
that is the biophysical restraints on maintaining a given system indefinitely. The former 
of these is inherent in the widely deployed term ‘green’, which takes on a multitude of 
meanings while alluding always to the idea of something environmentally good. 
Consumerism, it is shown, is frequently prefixed by a range of related terms, though 
most commonly ‘sustainable’ and ‘green’.   
In environment we have a related but broader term that commonly relates to the 
surroundings external to oneself – the physical environment of the living world, its 
chemical properties and so on. While ecological degradation can refer to the decline in 
equilibrium, loss of species, interactions, and functions (and in anthropocentric views, 
the loss of ‘ecosystem services’ derived from this, such as pollination), environmental 
degradation can refer more broadly to physical issues, such as air pollution and climate 
change7 . In practice, these issues overlap and co-evolve, and as such the terms are 
sometimes used indiscriminately when talking of impacts. Human geographers and 
political ecologists also often distinguish the subjective environment as the complex 
production of the environment through the perception of the environment by people 
and society. Chapter four details how this distinction can relate to ‘types’ of 
sustainability outlined above and how it can resolve an ontological tension in how 
sustainability is understood as something that ‘exists’ and something that is acted out 
quite apart from its materiality.  
 
 
7 It should be noted however that Chinese use of the English term ‘ecology’ (Chinese: 生态 
Shēngtài) in translated documents and speeches often reflects a broader use, and often describes 
aspects of both the living and physical world. Ecological civilization should be understood in this 
broader way.  
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The tremendous environmental impact of mass consumerism is so fundamental 
that constituent elements of it are primary reasons given for the adoption of Anthropocene 
as the modern geological era (Zalasiewicz et al., 2017). This generalised area of 
investigation is of central concern to ecological economics for whom the aggregate of 
consumption at the planetary scale represents a key constituent of sustainability (Jackson, 
2013). However, this research problematises primarily the social aspect. The particular 
social modality of the sustainability crisis is, if not predominantly then at least 
substantially, mediated through consumerism. This mediation is twofold:  First, ‘natural 
resources’ are understood in terms of function, availability, demand, and price: their 
exploitation is driven by the need for surplus. ‘Nature’ is thus itself commoditised, 
quantified, and in these and other ways only understood through an ever-expanding 
human agency. Second, the mainstream ‘fixes’ of the crisis work with rather than against 
this system: to paraphrase, the masters’ tools are called upon to bring down the masters’ 
house (Lorde, 1984). Green consumerism and green growth emerge to save the consumer 
system at the point it fails most spectacularly. 
Tim Jackson, an ecological economist, characterises the problem as an ‘iron cage 
of consumerism’: ‘On the one hand, the profit motive stimulates a continual search for 
newer, better or cheaper products and services. On the other, our own relentless search 
for social status lock us into an escalating spiral of consumerism’ (Jackson, 2013a). The 
needs of a ‘life without shame’ (Sen, 1984) evolve with society. Adam Smith, in his 1776 
Wealth of Nations, points out that a ‘linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a 
necessary of life’, but also that one would not dare to leave the house without one for 
fear of being associated with a lower socioeconomic status (Smith, 1936 [1776]: 821). The 
‘shame’ of the under-consumer is not new, but its exact social configurations are. The 
socially constructed ethics of a ‘life without shame’ have come to include the need to 
consume sustainably, not just through the traditional tools of the advertiser, but the tools 
of state and mechanisms of global governance, and more broadly in the meaning-making 
symbology of consumerism: the green version of Smith’s linen shirt.    
The commodity, therefore, is viewed as that which ‘arrogates to itself everything 
that in human activity exists in a fluid state so as to possess it in a congealed form’ 
(Debord, 1995: 26). Following more orthodox critical literatures on the commodity as 
sign (for example, Baudrillard, 1968), the commodity must perform its primary function: 
to communicate and reinforce a set of ideals which it makes manifest not in substance 
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but in representation. The commodity has no autonomy in doing so; only as a nodal 
point of a system of signs – the privileged sign around which meaning is organised – 
does the commodity achieve this social function. This has a simple but significant 
implication for the ‘green’ commodity: the performance of the commodity’s ‘greenness’ 
lies in its ability to represent and communicate a set of ideals, not in its more objective 
utility to tackle a given crisis of sustainability. ‘Green’ consumerism has gilded the crisis 
but is incapable of transcending it. 
It is possible to extrapolate from a more orthodox reading of the commodity that 
green consumerism is merely a form of environmental consciousness whose expression 
has been legitimised by bourgeois elites and capital interests. Green consumerism can 
thus be viewed as a sanctioned form of environmental care. Whilst this thesis begins 
with the importance of the commodity as signifier, it shows how this extrapolation from 
orthodox critical theory is, whilst a necessary precursor, an insufficient explanation of 
the present moment. For instance, it fails to account for the emergence of alternative 
articulations or to locate the political moment between these developing discourses and 
their hegemonic blocs and those of the hegemonic order. By locating the conflict at the 
level of language, that is, at the level of signification, this shortcoming is resolved.  
Sustainable consumerism is thus conceptualised as a passive revolution in which 
the crisis of unsustainability has emerged as sufficient to challenge, but presently 
insufficient to displace, the dominant economic imaginary. The institution of sustainable 
consumerism, therefore, is determined, rather than determining. Its ability to present a 
new, challenging hegemonic bloc is undermined by its incorporation into the machinery 
of neoliberal economics, along the lines argued by Cox (1988) in which characteristics of 
international organisation include representing and furthering hegemonic interests, and 
absorbing challenges and intellectuals. 
Owing to this, the role of IGOs, national banks, states, and international regimes 
is central to identifying the political moment: the articulation and re-articulation of 
sustainability and imagined futures. China is presented as a possible counter-hegemonic 
bloc to a Westernised hegemonic order wherein the imagined futures that are brought 
into reality via sustainability transitions are invested with normative, power-laden 
assumptions of the ideal make-up of society. 
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1.3.  China: (Re)Emergence and (Re)Articulation  
China has been suggested as both a point of radical departure from an 
internationalised/Westernised set of norms (cf. Carter and Mol, 2006; Humphrey and 
Messner, 2008; Grumbine and Xu, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Gu,; Papa and Gleason, 2012; 
among others) as well as a place where the dominant interests of global capital have 
become consolidated with an outwardly-revised image. The re-emergence of China as a 
globally important actor remains a central question for the study of international 
relations and global politics in a wide variety of subdomains. Not least, environmental 
and climate change governance literatures have grappled with the issue of norm 
transference, knowledge and technology transfer, and consensus building in the context 
of a (re)assertive China (Carter and Mol, 2006; Tourney, 2015.) 
This research takes a fresh look at the debate through a discourse theory lens. 
Doing so can help illuminate taken for granted assumptions that manifest as common 
sense, and thus gain a deeper appreciation of the extent of convergence on base issues 
of power in the global system. This process of mapping extant discourses can reveal 
where fault lines appear between competing discourses. The creation of subjects through 
what Agrawal (2005) called an ‘environmentality’, drawing on Foucault’s (1979) concept 
of governmentality, is a key theme within political ecology. Governmentality, and its 
more specific variants of environmentality and eco-governmentality, offer a means of 
analysing the governing of the conduct of human behaviour, even at the minutiae of 
mundane practices, beyond the state. As McKee points out,  
recent commentaries on neoliberal (or advanced liberal) governmentality have 
highlighted how endeavours to devolve autonomy and responsibility from the 
state to an active citizenry represent a form of ‘regulated freedom’ in which the 
subject’s capacity for action is used as a political strategy to secure the ends of 
government (Mckee, 2009: 470). 
This is important for considering how the citizen is regulated even as they enjoy the 
‘freedom’ of consumerism, and especially of ‘green’ consumerism. Discourse theory 
offers an analytical approach of engaging with power-knowledge structures whereby 
what emerges as ‘common sense’ (for instance, to the consumer looking for an ethical 
choice) is a product of power, rather than of an objective application of technical 
knowledge or ‘best practice’. To examine this in closer detail, this research concentrates 
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on a comparison between neoliberal sustainable development and the discourse of 
ecological civilization in China.  
 Ecological civilization is often traced back to 2007 and Hu Jintau at the 17th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2007 (Heurtebise, 2012). 
By 2011, it was included in the 12th Five-Year Plan, the comprehensive blueprint by 
which China plans, to a great extent, its socioeconomic development, touching on all 
facets of government. By 2013, it had become one of five national objectives. Under Xi 
Jinping, it has been more coherently codified as a framework for constructing a liveable 
future. Importantly, it has most recently entered into global environmental governance 
spaces, as in 2019 with the announcement that the ‘theme’ of the most important United 
Nations biodiversity talks, the China-hosted fifteenth Conference of the Parties of the 
UN Conference on Biological Diversity (UNCBD COP15), will be ‘ecological civilization’. 
Ecological civilization is becoming solidified in domestic governance and increasingly 
present internationally.   
Though 2007 is often cited as the emergence of the term, articulations of 
ecological civilization by the state apparatus, in fact, predate this. In one of the earliest 
comprehensive outlines, Pan Yue, Vice Director of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration, wrote an ‘Expert’s View’ article in 2006 in the Beijing Review titled 
‘Evolution of an Ecological Civilization’. This often-overlooked articulation is important 
for its culturally deterministic lines of meaning between Taoism, Confucianism, and the 
promise of ecological civilization. Most interestingly, the articulation is constructed in 
opposition to a Westernised interpretation of nature: 
We live with Chinese culture, but our modernization drive is based on Western 
logic. However, it's not a wise choice to copy the Western model of industrial 
modernization, especially in China, because that model will result in serious 
conflicts with the environment and resources in such a developing country as 
China. In this sense, it's necessary to turn to the traditional Chinese culture for a 
correct guideline in our modernization and our cultural structure and to make 
the ecological wisdom in the Chinese civilization an important component of the 
ecological civilization. (Pan, 2006.) 
As will become apparent, there is no single definition of an ecological civilization, and 
in fact its articulation by the Chinese state varies across time and space in often 
fundamental ways. Nor can it be said that its early equivalences with Taoism, 
Confucianism, and the rejection of the ‘Western model of industrial modernization’, are 
consistent qualities of the discourse across space. It is these possible articulations, 
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nevertheless, that suggest the development of a counter-hegemonic agenda for a 
sustainable future – one in which connection to and within nature function outside the 
regulation of market exchange, the institutions of consumerism, and the 
commodification of nature. It is therefore an essential line of inquiry. 
Ecological civilization, its pluralism notwithstanding, is treated as an 
environmentality, or eco-governmentality, in the tradition of Agrawal (2005), wherein 
the regime functions as a regulatory framework in which subjects are brought into being 
(in this case, the ‘sustainable consumer’). Regulation, in this sense, is decentred – the 
subject takes on part of the task of regulating their behaviour in relation to capital, the 
environment, and their purchasing habits. In Foucault’s original concept, he explored 
how prisoners regulate their behaviour beyond the formal architecture of the prison – 
how they internalise and subsequently perform the actions of a ‘prisoner’ as a subject. 
Political ecology, and many other disciplines and subdisciplines across the social and 
political sciences, build on this mode of analysis – governmentality – as a way of 
analysing and revealing the boundaries of governance beyond its formalised institutions, 
and the ways in which it creates subject positions. This is the means by which neoliberal 
sustainable development and ecological civilization are analysed.    
Political ecological research, and studies of subject positions, often begin with 
paradoxes, inconsistencies, or, as I argue here, a state of discursive dissonance in which 
two irreconcilable pursuits are reconciled in a fantasy which, despite its impossibility, is 
deployed as a means of governing. China has concentrated on the importance of 
growing its domestic consumption markets and growing the middle class. The 
aspirational GDP is a key part of the government’s legitimacy. At the same time, the 
government has taken significant steps in trying to tackle the problems of climate change 
and pollution, in many respects ‘learning’, in its own language, from the EU’s leadership, 
and in other respects maintaining a unique blend of intervention and market-focused 
mechanisms. In addition, much of China’s external economic policy is dominated by 
‘sustainable development’ as part of its Belt and Road initiative (BRI), which was 
recently pledged an extra $124 billion dollars amid revelations that outward investment 
overall is slowing. This represents a particularly interesting context: the dire need for 
environmental action, the campaign to be a global ‘leader’ rather than merely a global 
‘player’, and the related need for economic growth. 
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The BRI represents an especially important policy through which to examine the 
role of ecological civilization and wider ‘greening’ language as recent pledges of BRI 
increasingly allude the need for sustainability and living in harmony with nature. The 
BRI, according to the World Bank, includes a third of world trade and over 60% of the 
global population (World Bank, 2018). Projects have concentrated on the construction 
the physical infrastructure facilitating global trade, including ports, roads, and 
processing centres. Between 2013 and 2018, the BRI has been bolstered by 170 
agreements with 125 countries, doubling from its original agreements with 64 countries 
(OECD, 2018: 9). According to President Xi Jinping,  
China will actively promote international co-operation through the Belt and 
Road Initiative. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, 
financial, and people-to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for 
international co-operation to create new drivers of shared development (Xi, 2017). 
Nevertheless, more recently the BRI has attracted criticism for likely environmental 
impact and the perception of ‘debt diplomacy’, leading to some economies withdrawing 
(Kuo, 2019).   
As such, China, represents a congruence of factors that make it increasingly 
central to both global environmental governance and global development. Since Xi 
Jinping took power, China has contended with multiple domestic and global challenges: 
the need for development, globally significant domestic oversupply, and environmental 
pollution, complicated by the likely impacts of climate change and ongoing impacts of 
desertification. This has produced a particular ‘sustainable development’ path. At the 
same time, the fast-increasing middle classes in China emulate Western consumer 
behaviour, spurred by an eclectic mixture of transnational brands and domestic 
companies, themselves increasingly looking internationally.  
China’s size and growing influence, particularly among the global South, means 
global environmental crises cannot be solved without it. With a post-Copenhagen EU 
and Trump-era US both lagging in global environmental leadership, China’s 
responsibility to provide normative leadership, already partly realised in its energy 
policies, is largely externally imposed rather than internally propelled. For this reason, 
the rhetorical platform China adopts, as well the more fundamental discursive resources 
available to its 1.3 billion citizens is the key application of the theory developed here: the 
performativity of sustainability. 
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1.4. Research Agenda and Structure of the Thesis  
Poststructuralist discourse analysis provides the qualitative data that informs this 
normative research. It builds three corpora of documents (Annex II, figs. 10-14) whose 
content and context are critically analysed. The research proceeds from two research 
questions: 
1. How are ‘green’ consumers brought into being in narratives of sustainability 
transitions? 
2. Does China’s ecological civilization represent a counter-articulation to 
neoliberal sustainability narratives in its global engagement? 
The research aims to make three main contributions. First, a discourse-theoretical 
account of the emergence of the green consumer as green performance, situating this in 
the depoliticization literature of post-Marxism. In doing so it identifies the logics by 
which the ‘sustainable consumer’, as a subject of sustainability transitions, is governed. 
Second, the potential for China to represent a counter-hegemonic bloc with its 
articulation of ecological civilization does not fit neatly into hard/soft power, or state/non-
state agency. Instead, ‘green power’ considers the ability of a discourse to shape the 
global transition to a sustainable system; or, in other words, to offer a social, political 
and economic imagined future: the system of governance which (re)creates 
environmental subjects. Finally, the research offers an analysis of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) and its increasing role in global fora. This assesses the degree to which 
China’s ecological civilization is embedded within the initiative, how its articulations 
change as a result, and the state of convergence between these embedded norms and 
that those of more Westernised articulations of sustainability. This is spurred by the first 
paradox this thesis began with: environmental and climate ‘talk’ have increased while 
in all significant respects these areas are worsening, and even accelerating (UN, 2020).  
By beginning with the individualisation of responsibility via the formal and 
social institutions of ethical and sustainable consumerism, this research project offers a 
theory of sustainable performativity that helps explain this first paradox. This is the act 
of sustainability as identity that is grounded in the social practices of consumerism, 
marketing, aspirations, and distinction-making. With this model, the approach offers a 
new analysis of the constitution of the ‘consumer’ as the privileged agent of change in 
sustainability transitions by focusing not just on the interface between consumer, 
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consumed, and producer, but the co-option and reproduction of this construct in 
international regimes. By analysing the global institutional discourses of the UN, its 
agencies, the World Bank, and others, the research contributes a greater understanding 
of the ways in which consumerism is constructed not just in the socio-political domain, 
but the formal domain of politics, where I argue it emerges as a form of common sense: 
an outcome of the system’s inertia more than a process of democratic deliberation.  
Within the discourse of sustainable development, consumerism arises not simply 
as a specific arena of human activity in need of ‘greening’, but in its own right as a 
facilitator of sustainability transitions. The exponential growth in consumerism will be 
both sustained and sustainable. This second paradox, therefore, arises where calls for 
environmental sustainability and consumer society are presented as not just mutually 
deliverable objectives, but mutually reinforcing – what must be consumed to deliver 
sustainability, and what must be sustained to deliver consumerism. This brings into 
sharper focus the normative research problem tackled here: the depoliticising of 
sustainability transitions through the discourse of ‘sustainable consumption’.  
I posit that these two paradoxes are not unrelated phenomena. There is clearly a 
disconnect between what is talked about and more concrete outcomes; and there are 
contradictions between the identified complicity of mass consumerism in environmental 
crises, and the construction of consumerism as a mechanism for environmental fixes. 
Discourse theory presents a way of drawing links between these two phenomena whilst 
providing a lens through which to analyse the discursive resources drawn on that help 
sustain them. Environmental crises gain social meaning through language, broadly 
defined. The kinds of narratives, and the way they are communicated and by whom, 
play determining roles in how crises, solutions, and actors are understood. In such an 
approach, language is constitutive of social relations, rather than constituted by them. 
The wider networks and systems of meaning, the ways in which consent is organised, 
are fundamental not just to understanding crises, but formulating responses to them. 
Which aspects of social and economic relations are taken for granted shapes how 
responses to crises are seen as legitimate. Consumerism represents one such set of social 
and economic relations. It therefore becomes a key discourse that seeks to fixate a specific 
understanding of sustainability which benefits its particular modes of existence. This 
ranges from the role of consumers in the production of technical innovation to the 
importance of maintaining exponential economic growth.  
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However, consumerism is at the same time a socially constructed, transient, and 
politically contingent set of norms, expectations, relationships, identities, and so forth. 
This hints at one of the problems in early Marxian literature whereby consumerism has 
a more or less fixed function within a grand theory of economic relations. Such 
assumptions serve to universalise a set of social behaviours and afford them a 
misleading sense of permanency. Instead, building on poststructuralism, this research 
looks into the local discourse of consumerism where the subject positions, the 
discursively constructed means of identification, contradict one another. The growing 
domestic markets, income, and global prominence of China represents such an example 
where sustainability and development concerns are both of key importance and 
continually in flux.  
Following this introduction, the thesis is divided into six further chapters. 
Chapter Two contains the literature review, divided into subsections that represent the 
three strands of literature that are brought together (political ecology and critique, 
sustainable development, and global politics, with an emphasis on the role of China) and 
details the gaps in knowledge that lie at the interface of these disciplines, wherein I 
situate a performative theory of sustainable transitions and the varying articulations of 
the consumer subject between a Westernised and Chinese discourse.  
Chapter Three details the theoretical and methodological framework. In broad 
terms, I use discourse analysis to analyse corpora of primary sources, situating this 
approach within the umbrella of critical discourse studies (CDS). In particular, the thesis 
uses poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT), building on the seminal works of Laclau 
and Mouffe (2014 [1985]), and the wider, more recent contributions of the ‘Essex School’ 
of discourse analysis (Howarth et al, 2016; Howarth and Griggs 2012; Howarth 2010; 
Townshend, 2004; Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 2000).  
Laclau and Mouffe’s formulation of hegemony requires that ‘the two conditions 
of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of 
the frontiers which separate them’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 136). In the case of 
sustainable consumerism and the occlusion of alternative imaginaries, there exist 
various floating signifiers and the possibility of their articulation by opposing camps. 
This discursive arena is the focus of analysis here, and the existence of multiple ways of 
articulating nodal terms like sustainability and development, as well as other elements 
such as nature, value, and resource, constitute competing hegemonic articulations. 
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In determining a specific methodology, this chapter also considers the ethics and 
practicalities of conducting research in China. This presented particular challenges, as 
well as opportunities, that shaped the research and imposed external limits on what was 
and was not possible in the field. In particular, issues of translation, researcher 
embeddedness and reflexivity, and the highly-politicised context are discussed in 
relation to how these shaped the research journey, while a fuller account of the 
researcher’s reflections are included in Annex I to make more transparent the situated 
interpretation of these discursive resources.  
Chapters Four, Five, and Six form the analytical segment of the thesis. Chapter 
Four concerns the globalised, neoliberal discourse of sustainability, with a focus on the 
emergence of the ‘sustainable consumer’ as a social category. The aim of this chapter is 
to evaluate the discursive resources of this globalised sustainable development 
paradigm. In the broader research project, this provides a benchmark for analysing the 
discursive resources of the ecological civilization framework in China, and the extent to 
which these converge or diverge, and how China challenges or re-articulates a globalised 
discourse. This section therefore illustrates the characteristics of a hegemonic economic 
imaginary in the way of sustainable development. Hegemony is derived from a 
radicalising of Gramsci’s original formulation by way of Laclau and Mouffe, as although 
‘we may recover the basic concepts of Gramscian analysis…it will be necessary to 
radicalize them in a direction that leads us beyond Gramsci’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001: 
136).  
With this basis, the chapter follows by detailing and situating sustainable 
consumerism within the broader literature, before referring to the study’s findings to 
illustrate the construction of the sustainable consumer-subject. This section details the 
results of an interpretive discourse analysis of resources from governmental and inter-
governmental sources, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), and 
private enterprises. Governmental archives are drawn on to investigate the 
characteristics of sustainable consumerism as an economic imaginary and regulative 
ideal, and the ways and extent to which the consumer is called upon as the agent of 
change. The analysis of private enterprise discourses, using examples from hybrid and 
electric vehicle manufacturers, considers the construction of the sustainable consumer 
subject and the aesthetics of spaces regulated by the sustainable consumer agenda. The 
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section concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the following 
chapters. 
Chapter Five concerns the discourse of ecological civilization in China. This chapter 
builds on a quickly expanding literature that considers China’s capacity to articulate a 
different form of sustainability. However, critical, especially political-ecological, 
analyses of this remain lacking. Chapter Five therefore considers more fundamental 
areas of convergence, especially that of the role of consumers and consumerism, to show 
that base convergences are more significant than the proximate divergences in policy. 
The deconstruction of this is not to show a ‘hidden reality’, but to consider the power-
laden assumptions embedded in the inertia of the system of governance.  
Chapter Six is the final analytical chapter and is effectively the obverse to Chapter 
Five – it considers the influence of China’s counter-articulation of sustainability on a 
regional and global basis. This primarily draws on China’s flagship economic policy of 
the Belt and Road Initiative as an economically, politically, and spatially significant 
undertaking where China’s hard and soft power influence is called upon and expanded. 
‘Green power’ is the main theoretical tool employed to analyse the extent to which 
China’s strong domestic narrative carries over into the regional and global sustainability 
transitions, helping establish global consensus in environmental governance. 
Consumerism and commodification, and the wider development framework these 
contribute to and rely on, remain the key focus to build a comparison with conclusions 
from previous chapters. Finally, Chapter Seven offers conclusions and considers the 
implications of the analysis for the identified knowledge gaps in Chapter Two.    
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2. Literature Review  
The thesis is located at an intersection of disciplinary literatures, themselves often lying 
transdisciplinary. Three broad themes characterise this: political ecology, international 
politics, and sustainable development and consumerism. Alongside this thematic 
literature, too, is the considerable theoretical canon of critical theory, critical discourse 
studies, and poststructural discourse theory (PDT). A complete analysis of these schools 
is not possible. Instead, the literature review concentrates on that literature which has 
itself bridged the relevant disciplines or tackled more directly the research questions this 
thesis answers.  
The second section reviews the relevant background literature that helps 
formulate the subject of study and provides the normative dimension. This is crucial in 
locating the study within its broader context. Because political ecology itself represents 
a diverse field, the review helps clarify where in this mixture a definition can be 
delimited and helps to distinguish what is traditionally thought of as a subfield of 
geography from the ‘environmental politics’ field. As such, the significance of this 
section is also in highlighting ‘the political’, and setting the groundwork for the research 
which is, ultimately, political rather than geographical. Here, I also review the debates 
in the nature of social critique, and especially where these intersect with political ecology.  
Thirdly, consumerism, environmentalism, and performativity arise out of this 
broad interpretation of the political; as such I draw on literature that highlights the 
inherently political nature of an otherwise taken-for-granted paradigm. I begin by 
introducing the key literature on sustainable development with a concentration on 
revealing its changing nature since the 1987 Brundtland Report mainstreamed the term. 
I follow this with a detailed analysis of more critical works: refutations of sustainable 
development per se, but also the broader theoretical works along the Marxist/critical 
stream which provide a more political-economic critique. A key aim here is to further 
refine and locate the subject of study in the literature and reveal the gaps to which this 
study contributes; ultimately it grounds the concept of ‘one-dimensional sustainability’. 
The final section, China, Hegemony and Ecological Civilization, reviews the 
literature that has concentrated on the ways in which nature, the environment, and 
sustainability have been understood, conceptualised, and interacted with in realm of 
global politics.  A secondary aim is to establish which actors have emerged in the 
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literature with a prominent position in determining how environmental issues are 
managed. This sets the groundwork for this research’s key analytical question of the 
extent to which China emerges as a counter-hegemonic bloc with a fundamentally 
divergent articulation of ‘sustainability’ that opens up new spaces and subject positions 
for society; or the extent to which to which it rearticulates what amounts to the passive 
revolution and depoliticization of the environmental movement. Ecological civilization 
is also reviewed, whilst these discussions are picked up again in Chapter Five.  
Due to the continual reflections on theory and therefore the theoretical canon, the 
literature review cannot fully close the discussions that take place; instead, these are 
revisited as they are ‘used’ in the subsequent analysis. In particular, discussions of the 
consumer subject grounded in works by Bauman, Marcuse, and others, are revisited as 
they are applied in the analysis of sustainable-consumer subjects in Chapter Four. 
Nevertheless, the literature presented here marks the initial engagements with key texts 
and debates that inform the research project to 2017. Because the research sits at the 
intersection of a number of disciplines, I have structured the literature review according 
to these broadly defined categories: critique and political ecology (taking account of the 
discourse theoretical literature); consumerism, environmentalism, and performativity 
(focusing on the consumer subject); and international politics (with a focus on the re-
emergence of China and hegemony/counter-hegemony dynamics). Throughout, the 
focus is on the common ground between these areas. This captures the background and 
rationale for the study including its underlying assumptions as well as the more specific 
elements of the study (unique characteristics of environmental governance in China and 
emergence of politically contested spaces).  
Below, the intersections between these three areas are simplified and rendered 
in a Venn diagram (figure 1). This is an indication of the cross-over in subject area, either 
by what the discipline is typically concerned with, or by what it critiques. For instance, 
ecosystem services are often central to attempts to create markets out of ‘nature’. 
Sustainable development, particularly in the management of commons, adopts the 
framework to economise ecosystem functionality. Political ecological approaches often 
critique this process along critical-theoretical lines. Figure 1 therefore approximates 
relationships between the disciplines by what is argued, countered, and often 
synthesised. Sustainable development has become a ubiquitous framing of the 
sustainability transition in intergovernmental organisations and is frequently 
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synonymous with ‘environmental care’ in neoliberal institutionalist approaches. Global 
political ecology, by contrast, focuses on the marginalised, colonised, suppressed, and 
disadvantaged of such approaches and frameworks. International politics, focusing on 
China, identifies the broader questions of international relations, whilst the discursive 
turn has helped challenge the supremacy of the approach of ‘great power politics’, 
opening space for cross fertilising knowledge production. 
 
Figure 2 builds on this by showing the overlap in theoretical tradition. This is 
important for identifying the approach articulated in this research, but also the strong 
relationship between, on the one hand, positivist, liberal-institutional theories of 
governance and the emergence of a techno-managerial approach to sustainability, and 
on the other hand more critical approaches and their focus on wider systems of power, 
Figure 1: Venn diagram to show intersections of the main disciplines by topic. 
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knowledge, and agency. Sustainable development, as detailed later, forecloses 
possibilities of radical change, and suppresses local and Indigenous knowledges 
through the hegemonic imposition of its epistemic claims on nature. By contrast, political 
ecology seeks to amplify diverse knowledges and practices, and destabilise the 
knowledge-power structures that suppress them. Meanwhile critical approaches in 
international politics, such as international political economy (IPE), Marxism, and 
World-System Theory (WST) have focused on processes of globalised capital 
accumulation and suppression, drawing attention to the ways in which the movement 
of goods, capital, people, and other species, have led to highly unjust and inequitable 
distributions of the benefits and burdens of environmental issues throughout the world. 
Overall, the broad traditions of sustainable development and political ecology 
vary considerably in what is problematised, which determines the point of intervention 
necessary, and the scale and degree of change required; indeed, what it is legitimate or 
illegitimate to change. Liberal institutional approaches tend to problematise proximate 
causes or impacts either side of a given arrangement. For instance, car emissions are 
problematised in the issue of unsustainable transport. Electric cars emerge as a technical 
fix to the consumer emissions problem. The wider conditions remain the same while the 
proximate cause is identified and managed by existing institutions arranged according 
to existing power relations. Critical approaches, on the other hand, problematise wider 
systems of power and knowledge, production and consumption, organisation, and 
marginalisation. In the same problem of unsustainable transport, the cultural meaning 
of car ownership, the globally distributed impacts of manufacture, assembly, and use, 
and the vested interests of maintaining the status quo are problematised. Theory thus 
has a central role in the identification and construction of a problem and a crisis, the 
framing of which is important in not simply identifying fixes, but in constructing and 
determining validity and legitimacy.     
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2.1.  Critique and Political Ecology 
This section outlines the key elements that situate the research in the field of political 
ecology. In doing, the aim is to outline the key tools of critical political ecology, how they 
have developed in the literature, and how this study has employed them.  
The earlier writings on ecology as an emergent area of scientific interest hinted 
at the inherently political nature of the discipline. As Sears highlighted in 1964, ‘[b]y its 
very nature, ecology affords a continuing critique of man’s [sic] operations within the 
Figure 2: Venn diagram to show intersections of the main disciplines by theoretical tradition. 
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ecosystem’ (1964: 11-12). Indeed, as has proved an interesting question, he postulated 
whether the study of ecology would ‘endanger the assumptions and practices accepted 
by modern societies’ (ibid.). The ‘subversive subject’, as Sear’s paper was entitled, might 
thus be understood as an inherently critical project that emerged alongside a new 
political agenda of the 1960s and 1970s that questioned the ‘destructiveness of human 
behaviour’ (Forsyth, 2003: 5). However, as Robbins (2012) argues, the continuing 
development of ‘ecology’ as a subject means it is now possible, indeed necessary, to 
delineate an expressly political ecology from an apolitical one. Robbins (2012: 13) argues 
that the difference between these two approaches is:  
the difference between identifying broader systems rather than blaming 
proximate and local forces; between viewing ecological systems as power-laden 
rather than politically inert; and between taking an explicitly normative 
approach rather than one that claims the objectivity of disinterest. 
This ‘explicitly normative approach’ is not consistent among the numerous contributors 
to political ecology, however.  
In an important early work on the subject, Blaikie and Brookfield8 stated that 
political ecology ‘combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political 
economy’ (1987: 17), which seeks to treat environmental change as an outcome of 
productive forces and choices in a local context (Robbins, 2012: 15). Greenberg and Park 
similarly sought to ‘link the distribution of power with productive activity and 
ecological analysis’ (1994: 1). Such approaches are instrumental in revealing the 
inherently industrial basis that forms the dominant human-nature relationship, wherein 
the former exploits or comes to ‘dominate’ the latter. Such political ecologies point back 
to the means of attributing ‘value’ to ‘nature’ and provide a useful vocabulary for 
problematising mainstream approaches to, for example, as expanded on in Chapter 5, 
the ecosystems services framework in which ecosystems ‘provide’ for human need and 
want, and their ‘value’ thus is external to them. Despite outlining many of its features, 
Brookfield, nonetheless, demonstrates a weariness to prescribe a top-down ‘structural 
 
 
8 Accepting that, for most of his career, Harold Brookfield avoided the title ‘political ecologist’; 
he later admitted that his work has indeed contributed to the field after all, especially in the 
1987 work with Blaikie. His earlier works stand as a helpful testament to the underlying 
political dimensions of ecological research, even when this is not explicitly mentioned (e.g. 
Brookfield, 1962). 
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determinism’, and cautions against Marxist political economy becoming the default 
explanation for ecological degradation and environmental burdens.   
In Blaikie’s and Brookfield’s conception of political ecology and its relationship 
to political economy, poverty and wealth relations can induce environmental 
degradation (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 48). ‘Marginalisation’ therefore points to the 
society and ecology nexus, whereby the marginalisation of people leads to those people 
inhabiting marginalised land, which becomes a positive feedback loop (Martinez-Alier, 
1989). The ‘result is hypothesized to be a degraded landscape that returns less and less 
to an increasingly impoverished and desperate community – a cycle of social and 
environmental degradation’ (Robbins, 2012: 91). Such an approach has clear implications 
for the importance of development. Following this line of thought, sustainable 
development seems an essential part of any ‘fix’ for ecological degradation. Because 
social relations are integral to environmental problems, a clear agenda for critiquing 
‘apolitical’ ecologies and bioenvironmental approaches emerges in which ‘pure science’ 
is revealed at the very least as insufficient, and arguably power-laden in its omission of 
social and political struggles. 
Similarly, Peet and Watts begin with the principles of political economy, but they 
take this approach further in their attempt to explain local movements as responses to 
‘the tensions and contradictions of under-production crises’ and understand ‘the 
discursive character of their politics’ (1996: pp.38-39). In such work, a strand of thought 
within political ecology that pays closer attention to the role of discourse and narratives 
is clear. As Watts (2000) further elaborates, ‘knowledge, power and practice’ become 
central categories of analysis ‘to understand the complex relations between nature and 
society’. This resonates clearly with a more explicitly critical social approach in which 
the deconstruction of the power-knowledge nexus lies at the heart of the political-
analytical method. 
Authors such as Sullivan (e.g. 2017) further delineate a ‘critical political ecology’, 
whereby the operation of revealing the role of power in the formation of policy, via the 
ways in which ‘power structures the ontologies’ of environmental and economic 
governance, is central (Sullivan, 2017). Stott and Sullivan (2000) capture this orientation 
of political ecology as ‘the political circumstances that forced people into activities which 
caused environmental destruction in the absence of alternative possibilities’ (Stott and 
Sullivan, 2000: 4). In such an approach, the normative drive becomes about:  
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illustrating the political dimensions of environmental narratives and in 
deconstructing particular narratives to suggest that accepted ideas of 
degradation and deterioration may not be simple linear trends and tend to 
predominate. (Ibid.: 5). 
Here, the emphasis is squarely on the role of narratives in normalising particular modes 
of relating to nature, and thus legitimising means of destruction and exploitation; or, 
conversely, conservation, value investment, and so forth. The transience and 
contingency of these narratives is central; indeed, Sullivan remarks that the site of 
‘politics’ lies at the borders of the power-structured ontologies. However, the benefits of 
discourse analysis are often occluded from even those perspectives which privilege the 
role of narratives and the manner of representing nature, the environment, crises, and 
other such concepts.  
I argue that such an approach cannot afford to occlude discourse theory as a 
means of understanding and organising critique. Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
(2014, among others), and the Essex School more generally, provides a different 
grammar for understanding essentially similar processes - the location of the political 
frontier; the emphasis on deconstruction; the role of hegemonic forces; and ‘power’ in 
the Foucauldian sense to mention a few. In addition, critical discourse studies can help 
locate the inherently political project of this approach to political ecology, and shares a 
number of questions and goals such as how this project can further a radical democratic 
agenda wherein the re-politicisation of increasingly ‘taken for granted’ processes might 
be realised.  
Much has been written about ‘combining’ critical social theory and green thought; 
although, as always, there are important points of difference. For the purposes of 
situating this theoretical framework, I suggest works in this field can be broadly split 
into two parts: in one, the revealing of critical theory’s green credentials or capacity for 
green critique, whereby a space for a ‘green’ critique tends to arise out of or exist 
alongside a social critique; and, in the other, the potential for a more discrete green 
theory to use the ‘tools’ of critical theory. The distinction is important insofar as revealing 
which theoretical tradition serves as the philosophical basis, but also how this relates to 
epistemic discourses of the environment, such as deep ecology and bioenvironmental 
approaches which stress geophysical boundaries, limits, and horizons, and market-
liberal and social-green approaches where the (political) economy is of central concern 
(see, for example, Clapp and Dauvergne, 2013; Dryzek, 2013). Both critical theory and 
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green theory represent broad and diverse churches and in practice applied uses of each 
have defied stringent labelling and categorisation – a positive thing whose 
problematisation is not the purpose of this section. Nevertheless, it is important to locate 
this theoretical framework in the relevant ontological and epistemological approach. 
Radical democratisation represents a broad and growing body of literature, and 
an extensive review is not possible here. However, I base this study’s interpretation 
primarily on the work of Mouffe and other post-Marxists. Therefore, I define radical 
democratisation broadly as occurring through the engagement and participation of a 
politicised citizenry that contributes to their own and society’s self-constitution, and the 
fulfilment of two base conditions: the continual extension of the ethico-political 
principles of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ (Mouffe, 2005), and the self-grounding of the 
democratic project (Rancière, 2006: 41). Radical democracy thus distinguishes itself from 
other systems through the insistence on a continual state of agonism (Mouffe, 2005), and 
from contemporary-liberal democracy by the removal of constraints that demarcate 
legitimate, formalised spheres of contestation and spaces of politics (Ingram, 2006). 
Norval comments that ‘contemporary radical democrats deconstruct rather than reject 
the liberal tradition’ (2001: 588, see also Lloyd and Little, 2009: 2). This is an important 
basis for this study, where the liberal tradition of democracy is not viewed as inherently 
problematic, but merely incomplete. It is clear that a more radical position than the 
fundamental liberal concept of equality and freedom for all is not possible (Mouffe, 1995); 
the point, therefore, is to engage with those extant systems which, in principle, exist for 
the realisation of this ideal, and through critique to show their shortcomings in this 
realisation.  
Radical democracy therefore seeks to engage with the democratic project on the 
basis of a pluralistic emancipation in which various identities, those extant and those yet 
to be realised, replace the universal revolutionary identity of the working class. For this 
project, it is clear how in the struggle to hegemonize an articulation of sustainability the 
abandoning of a fundamental and universal working class/bourgeois dichotomy is 
essential. This grows in part out of the crisis in Marxism that Laclau and Mouffe 
highlight as the context for their post-Marxism; the erosion of class identity in advanced 
post-industrial societies. But also, as sustainability concerns phenomena spanning the 
local to the global, engagement with localised networks - such as indigenous land rights 
in South America or campaigns for clean air in urban China - the abandoning of a priori 
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identities is essential for any theory seeking to understand, explain, or indeed reveal, the 
common identification that organises local-global networks. 
For radical democracy, then, a central aim concerns re-politicisation and re-
engagement with social groups. The demarcation of official, legitimate, and regulated 
places of ‘politics’ by liberal representative democracy is therefore a key area of critique. 
For sustainability, engaging with the practice of sustainable living concerns, for the 
consumer-subject, particular purchasing habits reinforced by constructed spaces of 
‘green’ consumerism – from the ‘smart city’ or the ‘ethical city’, to more specific point-
of-purchase media and imagery. Speaking on global south climate change adaptation, 
President of Friends of the Earth International, Karen Nansen, at the UNFCCC COP23 
(2017), alluded to the crisis in democracy by arguing that ‘People’s power is the answer 
– it’s time for governments to recognise people’s demands’, whilst also highlighting that 
‘globalised systems control decision making, such as food and energy systems’. The 
problem is further compounded by the fact that ‘this [climate change] crisis is 
inextricably linked to other crises that humanity is facing’, says Nansen, ‘to fight climate 
change and linked crises we need to talk about root causes’. This compounds the issue 
further. A central aim of the political ecological approach taken here is to show the 
complexity of local decisions and move away from simplistic, proximate causes to 
complex, root causes. 
However, recognition of the simultaneity of the democratic deficit with the 
ongoing need for the involvement of citizens in sustainability transitions raises the key 
question of how to address the problems inherent to a narrowly defined, liberal-
representative democracy. Radical democratic principles represent the normative scope 
of this thesis, therefore, but the question of how to engage in a critique of existing 
systems so that this might be realised is essential. Mouffe argues that ‘Such a perspective 
does not imply the rejection of liberal democracy and its replacement by a completely 
new political form of society’, as revolutionary theories entailed, ‘but a radicalization of 
the modern democratic tradition’ (Mouffe, 1995: 1). 
2.1.1. On science 
Poststructuralism, and aspects of critical theory more broadly, have often been met with 
the charge that they are unscientific; the abandoning of the objective positioning of the 
researcher is tantamount to abandoning the scientific ideals of detachment, repetition, 
and universalism. On the other hand, proponents of positivism are accused of adopting 
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subjective positions and through their failure to engage with the contingency of their 
placements produce more limited conclusions than a transparent engagement with 
ontology with produce. The classic rebuttal of Donna Harraway provides a useful 
departure point here; writing in Feminist Studies, ‘situated knowledges’ provides a 
means of understanding (and making clear through transparent discussions) what 
subjectivity is comprised of in a researcher’s particular approach and gaze (Harraway, 
1988). Harraway’s strength of argument lies in the commitment to ‘faithful accounts of 
the world’, whilst arguing that researchers ‘…become answerable for what we learn how 
to see’ (ibid.). 
Harraway’s argument requires that, rather than the pretence of objectivity, the 
personalised subjectivity of the researcher is made clear. This is certainly the approach 
of this research in the social sciences (researcher reflections are offered in Annex I). 
However, in the case of natural sciences, the paradigm of objective, positivist science is 
owed a considerable debt for the (albeit partial) success of bringing environmental crises 
on to the attention of world institutions and political bodies, though this should not 
obscure the importance of social mobilisations in achieving this. Whilst science has 
clearly been important, however, it has generally been social movements and networks 
that have established its importance and enabled the recognition (such as it is) of crisis.  
This points to, as outlined earlier, the distinction between the material and the 
social in discourse theory. As an example, Robbins (2012) highlights the process of 
desertification, which incidentally represents a significant issue in the complex state of 
air pollution in Shenyang (where initial fieldwork was carried out) and other Chinese 
cities. On the one hand, desertification can be thought of as a social construct; from the 
scientific categorisation of land that gives ‘desert’ meaning, to the recognition of the 
expansion of these areas as a ‘crisis’, an inherently social phenomenon (in the absence of 
society there is no anthropic ‘crisis’). On the other hand, referring to desertification as a 
social construct risks downplaying its real risks to people and communities, as well as 
its explanations in which human activities are at least partially complicit. Revealing the 
ultimate causes of such issues (e.g. global, marketised influences on land-use change) 
rather than their proximate causes (e.g. particulate matter transport from desert regions 
to urban regions) often requires recourse to natural sciences to trace local issues through 
chains of causality.   
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 45 of 285 
 
The issue is not unique to environmental and climate events and crises. Sokal9 
puts this somewhat succinctly in his berating of the constructionist turn in the 
humanities and social sciences: ‘Theorizing about the ‘social construction of reality’ 
won’t help us find a cure for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming’ 
Sokal, 1996: 63-4). Sokal’s grounding of his critique in his care for such issues and his 
bemoaning of the Left’s abandonment of science notwithstanding, the picture he creates 
of social constructionism is problematical for the simple reason that he conflates 
specifically social reality with reality in general. Laclau and Mouffe, for example, 
specifically draw a line between a material event (the dropping of a brick, the warming 
of the planet) and the way that society applies meaning to this. The need for such a stance 
is clear from Sokal’s own critique; ‘global warming’ remains a contested political issue. 
Tim Forsyth puts this problem succinctly: ‘[m]any environmental activists and 
scientists argue that climate science is beyond politics, while climate change deniers 
claim that the science is above all politically motivated’ (Forsyth, 2015: 103). In a 
discussion of integrating science and politics, Forsyth outlines his key argument that 
‘scholars should … always consider how politics and ecology mutually shape each other, 
rather than assuming that either of these terms is fixed’ (ibid.). This begins, then, with a 
recognition of the co-development of our understanding of politics and science. Doing 
so, Forsyth argues, means researchers are ‘best placed to address urgent environmental 
problems without pre-fixing either facts or norms’ (ibid.). I interpret this in line with 
broader aims of this research to limit a priori assumptions about which types of 
knowledge are best placed to make sense of a given environmental crisis. A key example 
of this is again air pollution in Shenyang, China, where a number of scientific studies 
have outlined, for example, relationships between air pollution and mortality, the 
changing makeup of air pollution itself, historical trends of increases and decreases of 
certain pollutants, among many other things. On one hand, this provides new avenues 
 
 
9 Sokal’s infamous ‘hoax’ has done the most to demonstrate this view, in which the physicist 
sought to deride the French school generally by submitting a nonsensical article on the 
‘hermeneutics of quantum gravity’ to the journal Social Text, which was not peer reviewed, 
eventually appearing in a special issue Science Wars. It has also served to ensure Sokal’s name is 
tied to the domain he vehemently criticised. His ‘argument’ is considered here as an oft-cited 
flashpoint of the ‘science wars’, rather than to afford his contribution any particular merit to 
critical theory. (See Derrida, 1997 for a discussion.) 
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of critical exploration whilst simultaneously revealing the politics of science. For 
instance, one study showed a causal link between PM2.5 pollutants and increased 
mortality from malignant tumours (Li et al, 2018; see also Yang et al, 2020), most 
significantly in summer months – a pollutant that was historically not recorded officially, 
and reshapes the received wisdom that pollution is significant mainly in the winter (due 
to increases in energy use). At the same time, however, the significance of air pollution 
remains a discursive matter. The ‘experiential element’ shows how everyday 
experiences of air pollution shape local understandings of air pollution and have an 
impact on the types of regulations adopted, and what is viewed as a success. Moreover, 
the revealing of PM2.5 as a significant cause of mortality, a decidedly ‘natural sciences’ 
study, aides a political ecological study: PM2.5 is primarily a product of increased car 
usage (sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide). Understanding the cultural, social, and 
political economic factors for increased car ownership and use, such as an expanding 
middle class where the status of car ownerships symbolises ‘arrival’ in a particular 
socioeconomic status, is evidently important for identifying ultimate drivers of pollution 
(including global markets and consumerism) from proximate causes (emissions from 
tailpipes). There are clearly significant co-benefits for positivistic natural sciences and 
political ecological inquiry if the normative aim is the reduction of environmental harms.  
There remains, however, a dominant fear that allowing for the social construction 
of the environment risks downplaying and removing the legitimacy of important 
scientific knowledge about the environment. Such science has been instrumental in 
revealing the scale and depth of the ecological crises we face. Dunlap and Catton argue 
that the constructionist critique risks ‘global change’ appearing as ‘little threat to the 
future of our species’ (Dunalap and Catton 1994: 23). As Demeritt highlights, such lines 
of argument have brought ‘even that arch iconoclast Bruno Latour’ to question ‘[whether] 
I was wrong to participate in the invention of science studies’ (Demeritt, 2006 and Latour 
quoted in ibid.). Demiritt goes on to the argue that much criticism, particularly that of 
Sokal (1996), arises from a misperception of what constructionism is, assuming its logical 
conclusion amounts to the argument that ‘the laws of physics are mere social 
conventions’ (Sokal, quotes in ibid.). As Laclau and Mouffe highlight, the social 
constructionist critique need not entail the removal of a material, objective world: a brick 
falling occurs outside of our ability to think about it; the planet heats up regardless of 
what metaphors we employ or ‘phony science’ is used. Sokal’s argument infers that the 
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construction of the meaning of these events is somehow synonymous with the 
construction of the events themselves. The warming of the planet as a result of human 
action cannot be denied by a constructionist critique, but the various articulations of 
what this means, not to mention the powerful discourses that refute this claim, clearly 
create a space for a constructionist critique and, more specifically, a discursive approach 
whereby the hegemony of a given articulation becomes the logic for action. 
Within political ecology, an agenda for the critique of scientific categorisation is 
also made. Woolgar, for example, makes the point that ‘nature and reality are the by-
products rather than the predeterminants of scientific activity’ (Woolgar, 1988: 89). In 
this line of thought, social antagonisms arise as ‘struggles over ideas about nature, in 
which one group prevail[s] not because they hold a better or more accurate account of a 
process … but because they access and mobilize social power to create consensus on the 
truth’ (Robbins, 2012: 128). This has clear reflections of Foucault and arguably Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theory of the social. I identify this as a problem in reconciling the clear 
need for scientific evidence about the environment (whether socially constructed or not, 
its impacts on people and communities are real, as are human impacts on ecological 
processes), with a social ontology in which unadulterated access to an objective world is 
impossible. The purpose of this section is not to try to reconcile this on a universal basis, 
but to outline the approach this research project adopts for the sake of critical clarity.  
2.1.2. Sustainability transitions and political ecology 
This thesis is centrally concerned with the resources made available by which people 
self-govern their behaviour and, therefore, may understand their behaviours, actions, 
and selves, in relation to n/Nature under conditions of sustainability crises and in 
imagining their fixes. It is focused, therefore, on a liminal state wherein competing 
visions know of, interpret, and represent a given crisis and its solution(s). These are 
typified as ‘sustainability transitions’ in a broad sense: discourses that are placed to let 
people know what is wrong, and what is necessary to fix, avoid, or transcend it. 
 Critical theory broadly is well versed, perhaps uniquely so, in the 
conceptualisation of such transformations. Gramsci’s central ideas are canonical in this 
sense: the survivability of fundamental aspects of a given system are contained in his 
appropriation of the term ‘passive revolution’ (Gramsci, 2003: 59; 106-114). Gramsci 
contends, referencing Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, that  
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The concept of “passive revolution” must be rigorously derived from the two 
fundamental principles of political science: 1. that no social formation disappears 
as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room 
for further forward movement’; 2. That society does not set itself tasks for whose 
solution the necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc. (ibid.: 106.)    
Gramsci’s argument paints a pessimistic view for sustainability transitions: while 
technical developments may expand in innovative ways, fundamental social forms will 
remain. This is in a context where even the Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services (IPBES) authors argue in Science that:  
Despite the severity of the threats and lack of enough progress in tackling them 
to date, opportunities exist to change future trajectories through transformative 
action. Such action must begin immediately, however, and address the root 
economic, social, and technological causes of nature’s deterioration. (Díaz et al, 
2019.) 
In this assessment, transformations must occur concurrently across economic, social, and 
technological dimensions, while the political economic inertia maintaining a given social 
formation remains unproblematised and the social relations of production do not 
represent obstacles to realising such a transformation.  
 Sustainability transitions enjoys its own literary canon. According to a 
comprehensive review by Markard, Raven, and Truffer, the field has increased in 
diversity of perspectives and quantity of publications, encompassing the four broad 
categories of transition management, strategic niche management, multi-level 
perspective, and technological innovation systems (Markard et al, 2012). The authors 
define sustainability transitions as: 
long-term, multi-dimensional, and fundamental transformation processes 
through which established socio-technical systems shift to more sustainable 
modes of production and consumption. 
The ‘multi-dimensional’ nature of such transitions is of direct relevance here, as the 
thesis develops the argument that (neoliberal) sustainable development is concerned 
with a singular ‘dimension’: that of consumerism in the Marcusian sense. What 
distinguishes these approaches is a different conception of dimension.  
 Markard et al define these dimensions as the ‘technological, material, 
organizational, institutional, political, economic, and socio-cultural’ (ibid.: 956), which 
reflects similar categorisation by Penna and Geels (2012). In Penna’s and Geels’ (ibid.) 
valuable analysis of issue life cycles, the progress of an ‘issue’ develops dialectically 
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between industry and other actors across these dimensions, which are brought into the 
picture at different points in the issue’s development. Industry remains the central node 
around which the issue life cycle develops. This is important for considering the 
inherently social nature of the development of an ‘issue’ of socioenvironmental concern 
(air pollution is provided as the case study). In the final analysis, however, the authors 
do not consider that what is being acted on by industry in its ‘greening’ is this ‘issue’ at 
the end of a complex social dialectic of multiple diverse actors highly abstracted from its 
physical environmental condition. The question, therefore, is to what extent does this 
social artefact reflect the material environmental issue? Industry greening, which must 
necessarily engage with a socially constructed issue that emerges from a complex of 
actors across multiple dimensions, is not necessarily greening in terms of a functional 
sustainability, but one derived from a long process of re-articulatory practices by which 
the ‘issue’ gains ever-new meaning.  
This is demonstrable in the case study of American cars and public perception of 
air pollution that the authors draw on (Ibid.: 1004-1014). This provides valuable insights, 
but ultimately the study is cut off in 1985 ‘because policy makers and the public 
perceived the installation of the three-way catalytic converters as a satisfactory solution’ 
(ibid.: 1005). Crucially, the issue of air pollution was not solved it was perceived as such. In 
fact, the Union of Concerned Scientists warned in 2008 that cars, trucks, and buses 
remain ‘a major source of air pollution in the United States’ which ‘carries significant 
risks for human health and the environment’ (ibid. 2008). Moreover, Stewart et al show 
how ‘respiratory problems are correlated significantly with pollution levels’ in the US 
and the effects are ‘more serious for specific subgroups based upon sex, ethnicity, 
poverty, and age’ (Stewart et al, 2015). The public perception of a solution (the social 
‘being’ of a sustainability issue) is, in this case, detached from the functional existence of 
the issue and the unjust distributions of its burdens in society. Such an interpretation of 
a sustainability transition risks, therefore, assuming a solution has been found even if in 
reality the ‘issue’ has merely been reframed or its impacts moved territorially to 
communities structurally prevented from voicing concerns. The model, therefore, also 
relies on the assumption that actors across the ‘dimensions’ have a just and effective 
influence over the issue lifecycle. This is relevant to observations from Avelino et al who 
point out, learning from a special issue on the politics of sustainability transitions, that 
‘transition research sometimes adopts a shallow relational ontology of ‘the social’ and 
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‘the material’, without explicitly accounting for ‘the political’’ (Avelino et al, 2016: 560). 
This points to an important space in which political ecology and critical geography 
broadly can contribute and, in other ways, learn from research on sustainability 
transitions.  
 If instead of separate ‘dimensions’ in Penna and Geel’s model, politics, business, 
industry, and so on, are seen as interconnected domains then, by contrast, dimension in 
this thesis refers to a particular construction of an issue that remains stable across 
different domains. That is, they share ontological and epistemological assumptions 
about what the ‘issue’ fundamentally is a problem of. Sustainable consumerism, as 
detailed in Chapter Four, represents a dominant dimension due to the resilience of the 
philosophical foundations of the premise that particular consumerisms will resolve 
sustainability crises, and are therefore inherent to a sustainability transition. Such 
contributions within the expanding literature on sustainability transitions (as socio-
technical transitions) outline the importance of continued study particularly of the 
dialectic life cycle of an ‘issue’, the response this leverages from industry together with 
enabling policy landscapes, and, crucially, how public perceptions of ‘solutions’ relate 
to actually resolved sustainability issues.   
Despite the relevance of this to political ecology and political economy, as Newell 
(2020) argues, the ‘perspectives and insights from Global Political Economy (GPE) have 
yet to feature significantly in the study of sustainability transitions’, and (global) political 
ecology builds substantially on the tools of that discipline (Neuman, 2009). Newell may, 
however, be understating even his own work on the issue in applying a political 
economics lens to discuss the relationship between neoliberalism and socio-technical 
transitions drawing on a case study of energy in Kenya: 
The socio-technical landscape provides a point of departure for analysing the 
ways in which neoliberal principles of energy governance have been advanced 
through the institutional power of international finance institutions exercised in 
partnership with state actors. (Newell and Philips, 2016: 40) 
This helps draw lines between sustainability transition research focused on the socio-
technical landscape and those more concerned with the implications of power and 
knowledge. Lawhon and Murphy, for instance, highlight that ‘Socio-technical transition 
studies and political ecology have overlapping interests and approaches in that both 
explore human-environment relations and their consequences, and include descriptive 
and normative components’. Although they present important critiques of the field, they 
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suggest human geography and political ecology are well placed to learn from and 
contribute to the spatial, temporal, and scalar characteristics of sustainable development 
and sustainability transitions.  
2.1.3. The Post-Ecological Era 
Blühdorn and Welsh define post-ecologism as:  
an era in which the historically radical and transformative elements of 
environmental movements and eco-political thought are blunted through 
mainstreaming and have been reconfigured by comprehensive cultural change. 
(Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007: 187.) 
At least for now, post-ecologism as a term remains largely within academic literature 
but alludes to the more general condition of the de-radicalising of eco-politics, and the 
resilience of consumer capitalism in the face of crisis. In this sense, post-ecologism is not 
new. Gorz wrote in 1980 that capitalism merely assimilates the ‘ecological necessities as 
technical constraints’ and adapts to overcome these with new ‘conditions of exploitation’ 
(Gorz, 1980: 3). Not dissimilarly, Žižek’s contributions to ethical consumerism outlined 
the fundamental problems of awareness-branding that highlights a particular ‘wrong’ 
whilst still participating in the complicit system of late global capitalism (see particularly 
Žižek, 2009). Post- ecologism, therefore, can be understood as a more specific articulation 
of the post-political or post-democratic paradigm (cf. Blühdorn in Wilson and 
Swyngedouw eds., 2015).  
In particular, Swyngedouw’s seminal works in urban political ecology have 
perhaps done the most to apply, among others, Zizek’s (2006), Ranciere’s (2001), and 
Mouffe’s (2005) arguments of the post-political and post-democratic to a geography of 
urban space. Swyngedouw sums up the subsequent identification of the necessary 
political moment: 
To the extent that the current post-political condition that combines consensual 
‘Third Way‘ politics with a hegemonic neo-liberal view of social ordering 
constitutes one particular fiction (one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and 
the possibility of a different future) and reveals its perverse underbelly each 
times it becomes geographically concrete in the world, there is an urgent need 
for different stories and fictions that can be mobilised for realisation. 
(Swyngedouw, 2009: 13.) 
Viewed in this way, post-ecologism shares with the post-political a similar take on an 
era ‘both haunted and paradoxical’ in which ‘[e]verything, so it seems, can be aired, 
made visible, discussed, and rendered contentious’ (Wilson and Swyngedouw, eds., 
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2015: 2). As Wilson and Swyngedouw broadly define it, the post-political (and its 
variants) refers to how the ‘political – understood as a space of contestation and agonistic 
engagement – is increasingly colonised by politics’ which is understood as ‘technocratic 
mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate within an unquestioned 
framework of representative democracy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan 
liberalism’ (ibid.: 6). Post-ecologism captures this phenomenon (or these phenomena) 
with respect to the erosion of sustainability as a site of political engagement, and its 
replacement by a formalised institutional politics that imposes the limits of implications 
I argue this depoliticising occurs on at least two levels: first, the limits on what 
unsustainability is allowed to be a crisis of – frequently simplified proximate causes rather 
than globalised systems; and second what this crisis is allowed to entail in terms of change. 
These two levels are closely connected: the initially-imposed conditions of crisis 
determine the permissible ‘fixes’ available.  
As such, post-ecologism aims to talk about the coincidence of success and failure 
in the ecological movement. Rather than focusing on anti-environmentalist 
marginalisation, it seeks to understand an almost opposite phenomenon: how ecological 
concerns became centre stage in mainstream politics, whilst concurrently failing to derail 
any of the key principles underlying the dominant economic imaginary. The underlying 
paradox of this research project, the increased talk but continued inaction, is therefore 
formalised into a coherent conceptual framework.  
Writing in a European context, Nikel and Reid posit this as ‘the comprehensive 
success of the environmental movement and its comprehensive failure’ (Nikel and Reid, 
2006: 133). Blühdorn similarly concentrates on the importance of the EU, for example 
leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen Summit (COP15) (Blühdorn, 2012). Here, he 
maintains that ‘beyond the green rhetoric, the key actors’ primary objective is not really 
to achieve radical change, but to defend and sustain established practices’ (ibid.). This 
further alludes to the paradox articulated in this research project; the simultaneity of 
‘green rhetoric’ and failure to act. However, while Blühdorn is right to highlight the 
objectives of the key actors in this way, as is argued in more detail later, it is problematic 
to draw a line between what is alleged as ‘green’ on one hand (the ‘rhetoric’), and what 
is deemed genuinely sustainable on the other without articulating how this division is 
calculated.  
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As this indicates, most post-ecological research has tended to concentrate on 
European eco-politics (e.g. Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007; Blühdorn, 2009; Zeyer and Roth, 
2013), and occasionally specific instances of formalised interstate eco-politics (e.g. 
Blühdorn 2011; 2012). While important in their own right, I suggest this concentration is 
problematic in two ways: first, its geographic limitation; and second, the potential 
confirmation bias of affirming the existence of depoliticised (de-political) discourses in 
the demarcated spaces of ‘politics’ of those very discourses (i.e. locating depoliticised 
discourses of international sustainability in the institutional frameworks created by 
those discourses). Taken together, these problems risk writing localised, regionalised, 
and global-south forms of political struggle out of the post-ecological paradigm. This 
critique invites two considerations: how to expand the post-ecological paradigm beyond 
the Eurocentric concentration, and how to engage with political struggle from the 
bottom-up. It is important to note those efforts that have been made to engage with the 
latter of these problems, and Zeyer and Roth (2013) set out a convincing framework from 
a public understanding of science perspective in which a discursive psychological 
approach enables them to engage directly with ‘discourse in the making’. Although very 
localised, the model, as they outline, ‘may well be generalizable’, and they conclude that 
post-ecologism ‘is not an active orientation toward materialism and hedonism’ but 
rather ‘a reaction to a lost locus of self-control in a common sense-oriented inner and 
outer world’ (ibid.). This raises the question of loci of control, self-perception, and agency; 
all of which serve to muddy the waters of what has elsewhere in the literature been 
simplified. 
This research project, therefore, utilises the conceptual framework of the post-
ecological era and applies it to more internationalised discourses of sustainability, while 
also digging deeper into the social articulations of sustainability through a localised case 
study. In particular, sustainable consumerism is regarded as an instance of the 
performative behaviours that contribute to the ‘strategies of simulation’ of acting 
sustainably (Blühdorn, 2013). Blühdorn identifies this form of politics in ‘advanced post-
industrial societies’ (ibid.), and the literature generally makes little mention of this mode 
of eco-politics in emerging economies. This research therefore investigates the 
sustainability agendas of China, looking primarily for instances where this form of 
politics has been replicated, reformed, or countered in a key global actor. If we are 
moving (or indeed have already moved) into a post-ecological era, it stands to reason 
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that the geographic distribution of its identified features and discursive resources is 
essential. 
I argue this is essential for at least one key reason: global South countries have 
become increasingly important actors, voices, and observers of ecological crises. In the 
case of the latter, arguably much more so than post-industrial societies whose 
geographic location and greater political and technical resilience reduces, for now, 
exposure to existing crises. A post-ecological era defined in and by the European 
academy risks two things in this line of thinking: first, failing to consider the radical 
forms of eco-politics extant in, for example, South America (for example, Rocheleau and 
Ross, 1995; Rocheleau et al., 2001); and second, reproducing the problem of Western 
knowledge production in which ‘what happens here’ is assumed to reflect ‘what might 
happen there’. The former of these opens up a broader research agenda than is 
considered here in the case of China, but is a necessary consideration, nonetheless. The 
latter calls into question how we produce ecological and sustainability knowledge.  
2.2.  Consumerism, Environmentalism, and Performativity  
Environmental issues have featured in marketing research since at least 1969 (Leonidou 
and Leonidou, 2011), with the number of publications increasing sharply in recent years, 
alongside a ‘greater maturity and rigour’ (ibid.). At the same time, sustainability research 
has broadened topically to encompass diverse areas and sub-disciplines, from supply 
chain management, to information systems, to accounting (McDonagh and Prothero, 
2014). In spite of this quantitative and qualitative expansion, critical considerations 
remain underexplored, namely the problematisation of ‘green marketing’ (and its 
related concepts) and its deconstruction as a politically constituted discourse. Elsewhere, 
much has been written on topics such as consumer fetishism (Goodman, 2004), identities 
(Griskevicius, Tyber and Van den Bergh, 2010), space and moral distance (Chatterjee, 
2003), ecological citizenship (Dobson 2003), among other important themes. However, 
what remains lacking is an evaluation of subjects and subjectivities, and politically-
contingent constructions of ‘sustainability’ in discursive processes.  
Bauman’s widely-cited sociology of consumerism, Consuming Life (2007), 
distinguishes consumerism as the principle propellent and coordinator of modern life. 
Homo eligens (ibid.: 42, 61) emerges, in Bauman’s ‘consumer society’, to reflect the ‘the 
indivisible sovereignty of the  unencumbered  subject;  a  sovereignty  which  tends  in  
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turn  to be interpreted as the individual’s right to free choice’. Here, if only in this sense, 
Bauman draws clear parallels with Marcuse: the one-dimensional [hu]man belongs clearly 
to that species of Homo eligens, ‘choosing [hu]man’. Both concepts live in similar contexts 
and are interpolated in similar ways. However, while Marcuse’s one dimensional [hu]man 
is constrained by a relentless modernity of displacement, alienation, and economisation, 
Homo eligens is set free by it; but the aesthetics of choice and freedom obscure, whilst 
rendering manageable, the costs of ‘progress’.  
For Marcuse, a consciousness of exploitation arose as a consequence of its 
experience – the imagination au pouvoir was available to the individual who could 
imagine a better life. In a more orthodox Marxian sense, collective action could arise as 
a consequence of this ‘revealing’ of the base identity obscured by a totalising modernity. 
Bauman’s Homo eligens is less able to recognise their exploitation, and particularly their 
exploitation of others. Their consent to be governed in this way is continually reaffirmed 
by their seeking of the apparent opportunities, choices, and freedoms that modernity has 
placed on their horizons. Their exploitation of others is not hidden so much as it is 
neutralised as a point around which to organise and protest by the availability of care as 
commodity, from a choice of charity donations to ‘ethical’ goods. The recipient, 
constructed by the charitable endeavour, awaits modernity’s reach as it is extended from 
the ‘haves’ to the ‘have nots’, where sleeper entrepreneurs await activation by capital. 
The formalising of care for market externalities, from exploitative labour 
conditions to environmental destruction, enables hegemonic discourses to sanction 
forms of care and cleanse protest symbology of its capacity to affect change. The aesthetic, 
meanwhile, is captured as a saleable identity, often marketed to those whose collective 
action engineered the meaning of the original articulation, from Doc Martins to Keep 
Cups.   
A deeper reading of consumption borrows from a strong scholarly history in 
critical studies of consumerism, going at least as far back as Marx’s Capital and the 
fetishization of commodities, and the ‘distancing’ between the consumer subject and the 
(social and environmental) conditions of production. Adorno takes this further in the 
culture industry thesis, in which he posits that the ever-encroaching interests of capital 
and an individualised consumer society constitute a ‘total system’ of reproduction. As 
Biro (in Biro, ed., 2013) indicates, the mass acculturalisation of ecological dystopia (and, 
perhaps ironically, to significant profit) is well underway in film and TV. Indeed, films 
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such as James Cameron’s Avatar (2009), which builds on the simple logic of 
‘industrialized resource extraction: bad, communion with non-human nature: good’ 
(ibid.), reached a record-breaking USD2.7 billion in global revenue (Box Office Mojo, 
2017). This brings a certain salience to Walter Benjamin’s statement that mass culture 
‘has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as aesthetic pleasure 
of the highest order’ (Benjamin, 2002 [1969]: 94).  
An understanding of ecological crisis is thus pervasive among civil society. 
However, as Kütting (2009) highlights, the assumption that actors will ‘change their 
behaviour in the face of the appropriate evidence’ is demonstrably flawed. Horkheimer 
and Adorno offer some explanation for this in their cultural theory, wherein the 
‘industry robs the individual of this function’ of imposing meaning on sensory 
experience (Horkeimer and Adorno, 1972: 123). In this sense, as an ‘awareness’ of 
ecological catastrophe increases, its meaning is produced by cultural phenomena. That is 
to say the assumption that sustainable behaviour will follow as a rational consequence 
of evidence and awareness is problematic. This brings into question the role of discourse: 
how is the ‘sustainable consumer’ identity constituted in ways that reproduce an 
economic and cultural orthodoxy? 
In finding sustainability, here defined as a safe operating space for human 
activity within planetary and biospherical boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009), the 
absence of the quantity of consumerism in dominant sustainable development discourses 
is the central problem. Connolly and Prothero (2003) argue that ‘[c]onsumers, even when 
they are environmentally concerned, are still consuming, only they consume perceived 
green products and re-cycle more. The actual level of consumption is not identified as a 
problem.’ They show that in ‘buying an image […] both consumption and 
environmentally responsible consumption are a means of constructing self-identity. 
Both are communication systems incorporating meanings and signs (Connolly and 
Prothero 2003: 286). 
Bauman’s Homo eligens (Bauman 2007: 42, 61), both metaphorically and 
theoretically, presents a teleological explanans for the shift from a society of producers 
to one of consumers, where the latter emerges as an inevitable artefact of capitalism’s 
progress. While power and the political are not absent from this developmentalist 
approach, they are underemployed. Dean’s culture-governance thesis (2007: 61) 
departing from similar territory, is the  
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view that rule in contemporary liberal democracies increasingly operates 
through capacities for self- government and thus needs to act upon, reform and 
utilize individual and collective conduct so that it might be amenable to such rule. 
(Bauman, 2007: 61) 
But, going beyond Bauman, Dean searches instead for the situated deployments of 
power which contextualise the emergence of so-called responsible consumers. For Dean, 
these ‘divide populations and seek to fabricate specific forms of individuality’, 
producing ‘self-evident truths for public policy and governmental practices’ and 
normalisations ‘of particular ways of life embedded in a particular social and political 
order’ (Bauman, 2007: 78). The analytical focus, then, must be to understand ‘how 
identities are formed as ideals for certain social strata engaged in particular social and 
political practices and come to act as educative mechanisms for others’ (ibid.).  
Nevertheless, recent trends in consumer culture and political consumerism 
studies have formed a note of caution about taking the individualisation of consumerism 
as a given (Trentmann, 2007), and insist instead that the ‘political is back’ as the spheres 
of consumerism and citizenship collide in both public life and the academy (ibid.: 147). 
This points to a key question with which this strand of research has yet to fully engage: 
is consumerism more politicised, or is citizenship more commoditised? The ‘colliding 
spheres’ hypothesis is absent an analysis of the collateral damage of this collision: at the 
heart is an assumption that politics, at least partially, can be realised through the acts of 
the consumer, including the still performative act of refusing to consume in specific ways 
(the boycott).  
The work of Micheletti and Stolle (2007) is informative here. The authors note, 
convincingly, that the existing domains of international law and politics, and 
particularly the economic IGOs, have failed to meaningfully grasp the social justice 
problems that occur, proximately, as a result of deregulated, globalised trade. Whilst the 
ethics and morality of such practices can be widely questioned, most frequently they are 
not illegal, and cannot be proven to be intentional. They posit that in this context 
organised consumers, particularly in the West, can impact positively on these trends in 
the global economy, disproportionately in the global South: ‘This ambitious 
responsibility-taking mission demands creative cooperation among a vast array of actors’ 
(Micheletti and Stolle, 2007: 160). Implicit in the work, however, is the assumption that 
largely affluent consumers in the West are both conscious of and sympathetic to the 
conditions of commodity production in the global South. Emancipation becomes reliant 
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upon the whims of affluent consumers: for the citizen-consumer narrative, workers 
themselves cannot bring about their emancipation, but rely on the goodwill of 
consumers in richer countries who must ‘sacrifice’ marginally greater affordability for 
liveable conditions.   
In Micheletti’s and Stolle’s (2007) work, they point out the important struggles 
over time in the anti-sweatshop movement, to its global movement today. Less attention, 
however, is given to why this practice was not ended at any particular juncture, but 
merely moved geographically. The political geography of the citizen-consumer binds 
affluent, white-majority consumers to the story of emancipation in global South 
countries.  Moreover, the study fails to answer the question of how consumers come to 
know the issue at hand. With the myriad interrelated issues that deregulated economic 
globalisation produces and reinforces, which the authors note (Micheletti and Stolle, 
2007: 159), by which process do particular issues gain attention? Do representations of 
these issues as struggles in which the consumer plays an activist role simplify the 
particular problem and remove it from its socio-political context where it interacts with 
other failures? Whereas political ecological literature has focused on the expansion of 
the chains of analysis to locate ultimate and systemic problems, the domain of political 
consumerism reverses this: it focuses on the most proximate causes of the social and/or 
environmental impact. 
In the case of the anti-sweatshop movement, the comprehensive knowledge of 
conditions, of supply chains, of corporate actions and inactions, of the (de)regulatory 
environment, and the established networks through which this information traverses 
globally has produced broad and diverse issue framings and alliances with the 
understanding that cheap clothing has social costs (Bair and Palpacuer, 2012; Benford 
and Snow, 2000), alongside claims that the ‘ethical revolution [is] sweeping through the 
world’s sweatshops’ (The Independent, 2005). For all its successes of awareness raising, 
of corporate social responsibility, and of, at times, regulatory action, it has failed to end 
the existence of sweatshops. Locally, the issues have been resolved as they have moved 
elsewhere. Ultimately, the movement has not moved significantly closer to a future in 
which it is no longer needed, as seen in the 2013 collapse of the Rana Plaza building, 
Bangladesh, housing several garment workshops and resulting the deaths of over 1,100 
people (Karim, 2014)As Radin and Calkins point out, ‘[t]oday’s sweatshops violate our 
notions of justice, yet they continue to flourish’ (Radin and Calkins, 2006: 261). 
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More recently, political consumerism as a category of analysis has been assumed 
to capture ‘the creative ways in which citizens, consumers, and political activists use the 
market as their arena for politics’ (Michelleti and Stolle, 2013: ii). In their more 
generalised and extensive contribution, Michelleti and Stolle briefly consider the charge 
that cumulative advantage and disadvantage play a significant role in determining the 
level and nature of political engagement (Pacheco and Plutzer, 2008). They contend that 
although ‘all forms of political and social participation depend on socioeconomic 
resources, political consumerism might be a case where such resources matter even more’ 
(Michelleti and Stolle, 2013: 61). Their analysis fails to consider the fact that it is only in 
‘political consumerism’ where ownership of these resources explicitly matters. Whereas 
forms of political organisation outside the market, whether religions, trade unions, 
political parties, and so on, can ensure the wide involvement of citizens (or workers, or 
worshipers, or voters) by the communal ownership and deployment of resources, it is 
only in the political consumer where access is a function of individual purchasing power. 
Even the political choice to not consume is contingent, as a political function, on the 
ability to consume – it is this rejection of the ability, the refusal to perform, that constitutes 
the seemingly political act. 
Moreover, the unequal distribution of socioeconomic power, whether locally or 
globally, ensures that entry into the ‘political arena’ of political consumerism is restricted 
to those least likely to be directly impacted by the socioeconomic injustice. As a form of 
politics, it is perhaps unique among social movements that it functions without the 
involvement of those it claims to emancipate. The exclusion of marginalised groups and 
the centring of the consumer enables the individual to cast themselves as the protagonist 
in the story of another’s political struggle. It ensures that, ultimately, workers oppressed 
by deregulated global capitalism can thank it for moving on to someone else and 
somewhere else as, by Michelleti and Stolle’s (2007) admission, these oppressive 
practices move underground or abroad. Instead of being ‘solved’, they incorporate new 
spaces and places into an enlarging system of accumulation; a spatio-temporal fix in 
historical materialist traditions (Harvey, 2003).    
Ultimately, the problem with the consumer-citizen or the political consumer 
narrative is not its existence in political life but its monopoly over it. Few would argue 
that purchasing power, when this results in the ability to choose, does not confer some 
ethical responsibility in the absence of transformational change. This therefore forms a 
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central theme in this thesis where the continual return to the consumer as the agent of 
change in sustainability transitions represents a key characteristic of depoliticized 
sustainability. Because the consumer-subject is so central, the inability of the consumer 
to transcend conditions of capitalism makes it a carefully curated, elite-sanction form of 
‘activism’ – one inherently unlikely to illicit a significant degree of change. Despite the 
conspicuous performance, the fact remains that the most radical act a ‘political consumer’ 
can do is to buy a different brand. 
If the consumer-subject is limited to acting within the performative identities that 
various commodity markets engender, it is necessary to consider alternative forms and 
performances. In Fracking the Neighbourhood, Gullion’s (2015) valuable contribution to the 
study of environmental activism details the importance of the performative in 
embodying and making intuitive the lived struggles of oppressed communities. 
‘Activists’, writes Gullion (2015: 158), ‘express the pain and suffering they experience as 
residents of an environmental sacrifice zone through performative environmentalism’. 
Residents interviewed identify two key struggles: to be seen by others locally, and to 
have their pain seen by the bureaucratic structures and recognised as a ‘problem’, 
because ‘no official body has said there’s a problem here; in fact, the health department 
specifically said there is not a problem here’ (interview with activist quoted in Gullion, 
2015: 155).  
Gullion’s ethnographic study highlights the importance of performativity as a 
tool, a form of praxis, and a process of emancipative storytelling. It focuses on the 
performances of activists as roadside protestors, City Hall picketers, and community 
health guardians. In all senses, environmental performativity has a positive role to play 
in expressing tangibly the pain of activists. ‘Performing pain’ takes place in a ‘multitude 
of forms: Collective sign holding. Blogs and Facebook pages. Newspaper editorials. 
Speaking at regulatory and city council meetings.’ (Ibid.: 160). The performance of pain 
and environmentalism is literal: ‘Artists construct visual and auditory representations 
of their pain. Filmmakers create and share videos. Rational voices. Theatrical voices.’ 
(Ibid.). To each of these there is a consciousness to the performance – it is deliberate and 
targeted. Whilst the ‘performance turn’ in the social sciences is recognised in Gullion’s 
work (by way of Denzin, 2003), less is said of the ways in which roles qua subject 
positions are performed – that is, brought into social being through the act of 
representation. In this sense, the environmental activist performs the role of the activist 
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in the same the role of the consumer is given meaning by acts of consumerism; this does 
not disempower the radical act but locates the individual role within the structure of 
social meaning.  
This latter aspect of performativity is the main consideration of this research 
project.  Whereas Gullion’s important work locates a place-specific rendering of the 
performative activist, it does not engage with the fluidity of this category – ‘activist’ is 
captured as a taken-for-granted category, one signified by the radical acts of dissent and 
protest. A broader analysis of the environmental performativity of the activist needs to 
be on how these signifying practices change over time and across space and according 
to different regimes of truth. In performing pain, are the activists of Barnett Shale more 
authentic activists than those who express their concerns through consumerism, even if 
the latter internalise the same level of pain in relation to the environment?  
For Houtman et al (2011), the answer is clear: 
even though individuals now relentlessly aim to act out their originality, 
uniqueness, and personal authenticity, and almost obsessively insist on 
remaining true to themselves, they paradoxically do so in social environments 
that expect and demand them to do precisely that (Houtman et al, 2011: 22) 
Here, the writers make clear that the insistence on the authentic self in modernity is itself 
an outcome of social control: the ‘individual’ is brought into being by a socio-economic 
structure. Whilst this research project occupies a similar position the rigidity of the 
determining structure is not taken for granted. Houtman et al do not outline how a 
political moment can emerge in which this is challenged. Soper, on the other hand, 
argues that an ‘altered conception of what it is to flourish’ must arise to challenge the 
‘Euro-American mode of consumption that has become the model of the ‘good life’ for 
so many other societies’ (Soper, 2008: 571). Soper’s position more resembles that put 
forward by ecological economists, particular of the Centre for the Understanding of 
Sustainable Prosperity (see in particular Jackson, 2009), whereby the political project is 
to redefine what is meant by ‘prosperity’. There is natural overlap between the ecological 
economic objective of finding a sustainable imaginary beyond the paradigm of ever-
increasing material growth, and this research project’s concern with the reproduction of 
(and possible challenge to) ‘one dimensional sustainability’.  
Without the identification and pursuit of a political moment, the critique of the 
individualization/consumer paradox becomes an infinite cycle: citizens searching for 
the authentic mode of resistance will simply replace one form of commoditised activism 
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for another without fundamentally altering the outcome. In short, it is not sufficient to 
outline the conditions of one-dimensional [hu]man or one-dimensional sustainability; 
the political point must be its transcendence. Sober (2008) highlights what this can 
resemble in the search for the discourse that redefines prosperity outside of the market. 
Whilst this can and does emerge in particular spaces and times, there is a nascent body 
of research that looks at where and how this might emerge to legitimise and illegitimise 
global environmental governance, to which this literature review now turns.  
2.3.  China, Hegemony, and Ecological Civilization 
Political ecological research in and on the PRC is limited, even as the field has enjoyed 
considerable expansion (Yeh: 619-632, in Bryant, ed., 2015). Contributing to this ‘lacuna’ 
is the ‘Chinese state control on scholarship, which affects foreign researchers’ access’ 
(Ibid.: 619)10. A global political ecology approach, especially one adopting discourse 
analysis as the main methodology, remains both possible and important for the 
investigation of some forms of contradictions that emerge from the Ecological 
Civilisation imaginary. For some, China represents a challenge to the market-liberal 
architype from which sustainable development, as a policy agenda, is fashioned (Gare, 
2017, Grumbine and Xu, 2011; Roberts, 2011; Gu, Humphrey and Messner, 2008; Papa 
and Gleason, 2012; among others). For others, China’s legitimacy as an environmental 
actor is tied to its adoption of neoliberal environmental governance reforms (Carter and 
Mol, 2006), even as some point out worsening environmental conditions as a result of 
doing so (Jahiel, 2006). More recently, and most importantly for this research project, the 
importance of Chinese narratives of sustainability has begun to receive attention, whilst 
the case remains that ‘little work’ (at least in the anglophone literature) has actually been 
done on this (Geall and Ely 2018: 2).  
Despite the varied literatures, it is possible to identify common issues. Three 
problems overall are clear. First, much analysis has been tempted to view the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and the state as an internally-consistent identity and 
political blackhole, rather than a highly contradicted terrain with competing power 
 
 
10 See Annex A for a critical reflection of this researcher’s experience here, and its influence in 
the development of the research pathway.  
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interests, visions, and spatialisations (for example, the outward-looking, highly 
financialised Shanghai; the highly securitised Xinjiang; the deeply polluted urban 
centres and the ‘demonstration zones’ of ‘Beautiful China’). This means the party-
political practice of justifying CPC rule (often reduced to the guarantee of a growing 
economy), and the ongoing political struggle to interpret history, represent the present, 
and imagine the future, is often absent in understandings of emergent discourses in 
China. In essence, it is often forgotten that China is also in conflict with itself. This is a 
central part of understanding ecological civilization as a proposition that reconciles 
development and the environment in China’s domestic image while legitimizing CPC 
rule both at home and internationally, as explored in Chapter Five.  
Second, there is a tendency to compartmentalise the economy, politics, and the 
environment, leading, such as in Carter’s and Mol’s (2006) case, to an oversimplified 
representation of ‘environmental issues’ capable of existing and being addressed outside 
of the domains of the economy and domestic or international politics. Lastly, the issue 
of access to research subjects permeates social and political research in China as state 
censorship and other influences can put potential research subjects off engaging in 
research projects (Tran, 2017; see also Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, 2016 for 
a detailed discussion of access to participants). This research project therefore grew out 
of these identified problems; the latter influencing, over time, the research pathway as 
impacts were felt (see Chapter 3 and Annex 1 for more detailed discussions).  
This section proceeds by first reviewing the relevant literature regarding the 
construction of China as an emergent or re-emergent regional and global power and the 
implication of this on global ecopolitics. Here, the theoretical work on hegemony in the 
neo- and post-Marxist canons are revisited and supplemented by considering literature 
of different, or no explicit, theoretical traditions. This is important for locating one of the 
research questions, that of the extent to which China’s global articulations of ecological 
civilization serve to re-politicise sustainability transitions and the imagining of a liveable 
future, in the relevant literature. After this, I consider the limited literature on the 
ecopolitics of ecological civilization. Whilst plenty is written on policies under the broad 
umbrella of this term, it often functions as a proxy for environmental governance rather 
than as a power-laden and politically contingent discourse. This may be because, as 
Goron (2018) has noted, domestic researchers are increasingly obliged to reference their 
work in relation to CPC ideology, where otherwise a more general (or more specific) 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 64 of 285 
 
reference might be used. In a comparative literature search, a Chinese journal with close 
state alignment shows considerably higher references than those only remotely 
connected to an organ of the state (ibid.). The expansion in literature referencing 
ecological civilization, therefore, does not necessarily correlate with a proportionate 
expansion in critical engagements.  Nevertheless, there remains a nascent body of 
literature in which to ground the research the project and indicate where it contributes.  
2.3.1. (Re)Emergence and Environmental Counter-Hegemony  
Holzinger, Knill and Arts (2008) argued that ‘international harmonisation’ and 
‘transnational communication’ were the primary causes of environmental policy 
convergence between industrialised countries. International harmonisation presupposes 
the existence of international institutions whose ‘institutional arrangements constrain 
and shape domestic policy choices’ where actors concede some element of control in 
recognition of common interests (ibid.: 556). This is distinguished from transnational 
communication, whereby organisations (in this case, states and private enterprises) learn 
from and emulate policies deemed to increase social (international) legitimacy by 
converging on policies that are highly valued by the society. The key aspect here is that 
policy convergence takes place based on policies that are socially legitimising, thus 
reproducing internationally legitimate norms, rather than just a logic of achieving the 
greatest efficiency for a set of objectives (ibid.; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Whilst this 
offers something of a framework for assessing the flow of norms between one state and 
another (Braun, 2014), it offers less in the way of determining which norms are more 
likely to be prevalent and why; it marginalises an analysis of power. Instead of this, 
hegemony provides a means of understanding the preservation of power in social 
phenomenon.   
 Gramsci’s (1973 ) formulation of hegemony, as a means of drawing attention to 
the ways governance arrangements reproduce structures of power and political 
practices, has often been drawn on in political ecology’s focus on ‘material, institutional 
and discursive practices of power’ (Newell, 2012: 32). For poststructuralist discourse 
theory, hegemony is derived from a radicalising of Gramsci’s original formulation by 
way of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s seminal work in post-Marxist theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 
2001: 135-137)). Hegemony in this sense rejects the permanent fixation of a fundamental 
class. In this mix, the neo-Gramscian language of Robert Cox helps to conceptualise of 
the more specific instance of sustainable consumerism. The formulation of reformative 
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versus transformative approaches provides a useful framework for conceptualising of 
sustainable consumerism – as a reformative practice that emerges to save the 
contradictory logic of capital accumulation amidst the socio-ecological crises of its 
making. In the process of becoming hegemonized, sustainable consumerism suppresses 
more transformative approaches. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s formulation of hegemony requires that ‘the two conditions 
of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of 
the frontiers which separate them’ (ibid.). In the case of sustainable consumerism and the 
occlusion of alternative imaginaries, there exist various floating signifiers and the 
possibility of their articulation by opposing camps. This discursive arena is the focus of 
analysis here, and the existence of multiple ways of articulating nodal terms like 
sustainability and development, as well as other elements such as nature, value, and 
resource, constitute competing hegemonic articulations. 
Sustainable consumerism is thus conceptualised as a passive revolution in which 
the crisis of unsustainability has emerged as sufficient to challenge, but presently 
insufficient to displace, the dominant economic imaginary. Gramsci’s formulation of 
hegemony can be useful in articulating this, but the need for its radicalising along the 
lines of Laclau and Mouffe lies in the development of new political identities, and the 
paradoxical calls on individuals as subjects of sustainability and consumerism. The 
institution of sustainable consumerism, therefore, is determined, rather than 
determining. Its ability to present a hegemonic bloc is undermined by its incorporation 
into the machinery of neoliberal economics, along the lines argued by Cox (1988) in 
which characteristics of international organisation include representing and furthering 
hegemonic interests, and absorbing challenges and intellectuals.  
It is possible to locate ecological civilization within the critical literature that calls, 
in various ways, for a fundamentally different understanding of the planetary ‘crisis’ 
and the shift to a new society of equality and ecological sustainability.  
Foster (2017) argues from a predominantly orthodox Marxist perspective that 
ecological civilization, specifically that of China, is capable of fulfilling this role. For 
Foster,  
Ecological civilization in the Marxian sense means the struggle to transcend the 
logic of all previous class-based civilizations, and particularly capitalism, namely, 
the interconnections between the domination/alienation of nature and the 
domination/alienation of humanity. (Ibid.: 11.) 
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As such, the transcendence of capitalism represents an inalienable feature of the 
civilization that emerges. For Goron (2018), Foster’s argument represented an 
endorsement of China’s model as an ‘alternative development theory capable of 
revolutionising the global economic order and bring about a global ecological transition’. 
In fact, Foster, whilst describing the necessary utopianism of such a transition, he does 
not presuppose its existence in China, taking note of the fact that development in China 
has been on an increasingly capitalist and globalist footing. Instead, Foster highlights the 
critical question at the heart of this research:  
Could [China] play a role of global leadership in relation to the Anthropocene—
a role that the United States as the hegemonic power has currently abdicated […]? 
Or is China too immersed in the capitalist road, too characterized by extremes of 
inequality, too unable to draw on social forces at its roots, to make this switch? 
(Foster, 2017: 14). 
Foster does not, by his own admission, attempt to answer this question. He does, 
however, advance the notion that China’s transition to ecological civilization carries with 
it ‘hope’ (ibid.: 14) that an emergent bloc will challenge Western capitalism and 
capitalism’s capture of science for the purpose of accumulation.  
Foster’s key limitation is not only, as Goron implies, his endorsement of Chinese 
ecological civilization, but his ontological assumptions. By arguing for the need of an 
ecological civilization, composed of a wholly different and transcendent socio-nature 
relationship to the hegemonic Anthropocene, he looks for this in China on two grounds: 
its ideological engagement with historical-materialism and the fact China calls its new 
vision ‘ecological civilization’. The latter is especially problematic as Foster fails to 
account for the performative quality of announcing the path to ecological civilization. 
‘Ecological civilization’ as a signifier does not confer any objective truth or 
representation; more important than a semiotic similarity is how the discourse is 
structured in relation to the key points Foster explains: nature, capital, commodities, 
markets, and people. 
While Foster places his hope in an ecological civilization brought about from the 
ground-up in China by people suddenly conscious of their oppression under worsening 
environmental and social conditions, Hubbert (2015) more convincingly demonstrates 
the flaws in assuming environmental consciousness will arise in a form that challenges 
existing structures in China. Based on research at the “Green Expo” in Shanghai, 
Hubbert specifically rejects the assumption that informs Foster’s approach: ‘rather than 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 67 of 285 
 
assume that increasing environmental awareness equates to ecological progress’, 
Hubbert interrogates what ‘actually constitutes “environmental awareness”’ (2015: 30). 
In doing so, she finds that environmental awareness reaffirms connections between 
people and the state, practices, and norms.  
Whereas Foster assumes transformational change will be brought about by the 
awareness of class-based oppression, Hubbert reveals the complex, contradictory, and 
conjectural ways in which people respond to the call on them as environmentalists. This 
reaffirms Kütting’s (2014) point that simply increasing awareness has not brought about 
significant change. Neither Foster nor Hubbert, however, offer an analysis of the specific 
ways in which environmental awareness is re-absorbed into the architecture of 
neoliberal, anthropocentric governance. Whilst Foster’s analysis asks key questions, the 
approach does not offer the means of engaging meaningfully with them if the only 
political struggle is identified as the revealing of a deeper-rooted class antagonism. In 
sum, Marxian hopes of a counter-hegemonic bloc emerging from China’s engagement 
with environmentalism take little account of the actual development of the ecological 
civilization paradigm and its tendency to be deployed as a framing device for free-
market capitalism.  
Both accounts of environmental awareness are absent a discussion of the process 
of sense-making for new subjects of environmental discourse. Citizens rarely have an 
unadulterated access to the conditions of their own environmental oppression. Whether 
urban air pollution, climate change, or plastic pollution, the sense of environmental 
degradation passes through the social-scientific machinations of knowledge production, 
and the social filters of knowledge dissemination which are often also a process of 
simplification in order to be ‘understood’. Whilst a scientific discourse is, as discussed, 
best equipped for analyses of the characteristics of its ‘existence’, as it passes into social 
‘being’, an environmental problem is a social fact subject to (mis)representation and 
different storytelling practices that situate it more or less in relation to fixes, causes, 
victims, polluters, and so on. As Newell puts it, the function of the historic bloc of 
sustainable development has been to obscure the ‘fatal connection’ between capitalism 
and ecological disaster (2012: 45), a narrative traceable to at least the 1992 UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED). A discussion of ecological civilization 
needs to account for the story this emerging historic bloc tells: does it similarly obscure 
the ‘fatal connection’, and if so, how? Hildyard (1993) pointed out the chief purpose of 
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the UNCED was to present the global economic order as capable of regulating its own 
impacts: 
In brief, the Summit went according to plan. The net outcome was to minimize 
change to the status quo, an outcome that was inevitable from the outset of the 
UNCED process three years ago. (Hildyard, 1993: 22.) 
While the World Bank gained expanded control over the Global Environmental Facility, 
transnational corporations (TNCs) were constructed as essential in the ‘battle to save the 
planet’ (ibid.) The UNCED presents a key event in the story sustainable development 
tells about the economy, its actors, and the environmental crisis. A similar analysis of 
ecological civilization’s role in confronting, or accommodating, ultimate drivers of 
environmental degradation remains largely under-realised. To corrupt Hildyard’s (1993) 
title, do the foxes remain in charge of the chickens in this new sustainability transition 
of ecological civilization?   
Geall and Ely (2015) provide a valuable overview of the development of 
ecological civilization as a narrative. In detailing both the genesis of the term ‘ecological 
civilization’ (shēngtài wénmíng 生态文明 ) and the wider deployment of civilization 
narratives in China, they locate the term’s emergence, debate, and later codification, and 
the historical context of China’s engagement with the ecological environment since 1972 
(ibid.: 5-6). Noting the importance of a constructivist approach to the study of green 
transitions (Leach et al, 2010), the authors note that way that ‘institutionalisation of 
particular framings of sustainable development … have marginalised, displaced, or 
precluded certain motives and actors from the environmental arena’ (Geall and Ely, 2015: 
1). With a relevance to the goals of political ecological inquiry, the approach marks a rare 
but important step towards a fuller exploration of how ecological civilization makes 
particular actors visible and others invisible, particular processes legitimate and others 
unacceptable.   
Whist the Working Paper offers only an outline, the discussion is significant for 
its conclusion that: 
Perhaps surprisingly for a polity that is often characterised as authoritarian in 
nature, the case indicates that there are in fact tensions and debates about China’s 
future pathways, and that dominant narratives might engender some opening 
up of potential pathways to sustainability. (Ibid.: 14.) 
This is central to identifying the central question of this research – the resolution of these 
domestic tensions in the outward articulation of ecological civilization in global fora. The 
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authors reduce the discourse to a ‘slogan’ (ibid.) that has only recently been ‘codified’, a 
process they argue is about ‘closing down a period of debate and negotiation in order to 
articulate a slogan as an implementable narrative’ (ibid.: 7.) Whilst it is clear that the 
statist articulation of ecological civilization represents a closure in the official process of 
determining what the term means, it is not the case that the process of meaning-making 
is closed completely. This renders the discourse as an objective ontological fact whose 
meaning is now solidified and permanent, with significant implications for its future 
study. This ontological stance mirrors that of Foster’s (2012) to the extent that the 
discourse forms a homogenous bloc of meaning. Within poststructural discourse theory, 
such a stance forecloses on the analyst’s ability to locate a political moment in the 
struggle over this meaning. The fact that the discourse is never ‘closed’, but in a state of 
constant becoming as it is articulated and rearticulated in new contexts and with new 
meaning by association, helps render the narrative researchable as it struggles alongside 
competing stories in global environmental governance.   
The opposing view, however, is present in the discussion of the language of 
ecological civilization. Whereas Geal’s and Ely’s brief paper does not offer an analysis of 
the socio-nature connections articulated by ecological civilization, others argue that only 
a differing ‘human bio-ecological awareness’ grounded in Chinese philosophy of 
harmony, can resolve ‘the ecological crisis’ (Zhou, 2017). Zhou argues moreover that ‘the 
ultimate goal of linguistic harmony is to promote ecological civilization’ while at the 
same time in a ‘harmonious society, it is essential to attain linguistic harmony and 
eradicate the linguistic disharmony’ (Zhou, 2017: 133), a view also argued, albeit more 
broadly, by Pan (2016). At a basic level, both Pan (2016) and Zhou (2017) argue ecological 
civilization can achieve something that neoliberal sustainable development cannot: a 
harmony between language and nature via a discernible Chinese ecolinguistic tradition. 
Both demonstrate the importance of the concept of ‘harmony between man and nature’ 
as a central metaphor of the ecological civilization discourse. 
More problematically, however, Zhou’s argument has, explicitly, the Chinese 
state’s pursuit of ‘harmony’ as uniformity and standardisation, down to the phonetic 
and grammatical harmonization of society. In Zhou’s argument, ecological civilization 
is a part of the Chinese state’s policy of harmonization as a rigid framework of 
compliance with state authority. Whilst a fringe argument, it is important for its 
revealing of the close ties between state policy and research on ecological civilization 
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(see also Goron, 2018). In such a context, it is unsurprising that there exists a lacuna of 
research on the antagonisms and contradictions of the discourse.  
In a comparative study of Chinese ecological discourse and Western counterparts, 
Zhou and Huang (2017) conclude  
that Chinese ecological discourse can be traced back to its Confucian–Daoist 
traditions, and the comparative inquiry shows that Confucian–Daoist 
dimensions of Chinese ecological discourse may imply that the European 
counterpart of the Chinese approach may be encouraged to learn from 
Confucian–Daoist ideas for ecological consciousness. (Zhou and Huang, 2017: 
265.) 
The authors highlight that ecolinguistic harmonisation again provides the route to 
resolving human-nature relationships (ibid: 272-276). The authors argue that the 
‘spiritual resources’ of ‘Confucian-Daoist dimensions of Chinese ecological discourse’ 
can provide Western thought with the ‘intercultural dialogue to jointly foster ecological 
consciousness’ (ibid.: 276). Whilst Zhou and Huang present the discourse as capable of 
embodying a historical narrative outside a direct articulation of it as such, the authors 
capture a key question for political ecological inquiry: does ecological civilization bring 
into being different discursive resources by which to relate to nature, bringing new (or 
old) subjectivities of nature that go beyond the one-dimensional consumer-citizen?   
2.4.  Conclusion  
The literature review shows how political ecology research has frequently drawn on 
critical theory for its mode of analysis. The subjects and narrative canon within political 
ecology in particular draws directly on both the ontological arguments and genealogical 
methodology of Foucault. The adoption governmentality, either as ‘environmentality’ or 
‘eco-governmentality’ has been used to show how subjects are brought into being, 
regulated, and self-governed. Discourse theory and political ecology, therefore, draw on 
similar theoretical principles. They share, too, a tendency to both reveal and begin with 
contradictions in the identification of a research problem.  
The post-ecological era (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007) represents one key concept 
where the critical inquiry of depoliticization (Mouffe, 2005; Žižek, 2006; Ranciere, 2001) 
is applied with particular relevance to the politics of (un)sustainability. The post-political 
condition and the expansion of the sustainable development discourse are closely 
related: the latter provides the technocratic, managerialist grammar of the eco-
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governmentality, while the post-democratic order is ill equipped to challenge the 
erasure of possibilities in the environmental citizen. Nevertheless, on this later point 
there remains limited research. The first conclusion, therefore, is that the subject of 
sustainability transitions – who is constructed and governed – is underexplored in the 
political ecological literature, despite the array of critical theoretical engagements with 
the constructions of subjects under other forms environmental governance. 
 The second conclusion is that political ecological literatures have yet to engage 
with the (re)emergence of China as a hegemonic bloc in the field of global environmental 
governance vis-à-vis the narrative of human-nature and socio-nature relations. Whilst 
the role of China enjoys wide attention throughout environmental politics, less attention 
has been directed to the challenges it represents in its discursive framings of nature, the 
environment, and the liveable future it projects domestically and internationally.  
What research has been done (in 2017) on ecological civilization from Marxian, 
discourse, constructivist, and ecolinguistic perspectives reveals a contradictory terrain 
wherein ‘ecological civilization’ is at once hope for a counter-hegemonic political 
ecological imaginary, as well as an indicator that the existing neoliberal structures of 
global environmental governance remain in place in China. That change is necessary is 
not disputed. The research terrain also reveals questions on which the literature is more 
convergent than some have implied: crucially, the question of whether  China influences 
the direction of global environmental governance and what form this will take remains 
a central line of inquiry, yet one that is rarely directly tackled. Moreover, a discourse 
theoretical approach has, to this researcher’s knowledge, not been conducted on the 
emergence of ecological civilization and its redeployment of the nodal signifiers of 
Western sustainable development.   
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3. Theory and Methodology 
This chapter combines theory and methodology owing to the close intertwining of the 
two in poststructuralist discourse theory. For critical discourse studies, ‘any conception 
of discourse analysis as a methodological approach will always be rooted in a wider 
theory of discourse’ (Atkinson, Held, and Jeffares 2011). It is therefore incumbent on the 
researcher to articulate the links between the theoretical framework and the 
methodological tools used.  This chapter, then, addresses two issues. First, how the 
research problem can be articulated theoretically and understood discursively, entailing 
the social ontology required for understanding the problem, a consideration of what 
kinds of epistemic access exists for developing this understanding, and ultimately what 
broader implications there are for the ‘post-political’ that engenders this depoliticisation. 
And second, once this problem is understood theoretically, I discuss what conceptual 
frameworks exist for tackling it, and outline the theoretical framework this research 
project adopts. 
As such, the chapter sets out the theoretical framework that underlies the 
methodology and informs the analysis. For an interpretive study, however, it is also 
important to note the dialectics of theory and praxis, whereby the theoretical framework 
evolves reflexively with its practical application. As such, both theoretical and 
methodological concerns are addressed throughout the project. Due to this more holistic 
approach, this research project also makes inroads into the application of discourse 
theory to political ecology in the context of China; though, as detailed later, caution is 
necessary in generalising its findings beyond the local context of the research. 
I draw on the theoretical toolkit of discourse theory and the conceptual 
framework of the post-ecological era to further the project of critical political ecology, and 
particularly the depoliticization of sustainability through the mainstreaming of 
sustainability discourses. At the same time, the framework is scaled to the arena of global 
politics, an application requiring its own justification. Throughout, therefore, I focus on 
globalised discourses and outline the sustainability agendas and outcomes and sustainable 
consumer-subject concepts to reveal their complicity in the production of regional, 
national, and local forms of ecological crisis, movements, and articulatory practices. 
I begin by detailing the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe and the Essex 
School of discourse analysis as a more specific set of philosophical assumptions arising 
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from the constructionist tradition. The analytical tools of internal and imminent critique 
form the basis of the discourse-analytic method employed, while the normative ‘project’ 
of radical democratisation provides a means of talking about the re-politicization of 
sustainability. I highlight the ongoing debates between a post-Marxist discourse theory 
and other approaches which share certain similar critical goals, particularly Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2014). This section serves to highlight some of the 
tools that are ‘borrowed’ from these approaches to form a consistent and coherent way 
of ‘doing’ a discourse analysis, such as Fairclough’s concept of the ‘order of discourse’. 
Throughout, the focus is on the relationship between language and ecologically 
destructive processes. This section, therefore, conveys how language and discourse are 
intrinsically part of the field of political ecology.  
Having provided the base theoretical framework, discourse theory, and the area 
of ‘green’ thought to which this is applied, critical political ecology, I move on to 
considering the specific analytical categories deployed in the analysis of discourse, 
namely performativity, ecogovernmentality, and the construction of the sustainable 
consumer-subject as a legitimate agent of change. I posit an articulation of the post-
ecological era that locates the discursive factors of political ecology in the case of 
sustainability and its depoliticization. I build on the work of Blühdorn (2011; Blühdorn 
and Welsh, 2007) and the discussions contained, particularly, in Environmental Politics 
from 2007 onwards. I argue the theorising of this ‘era’ is incomplete without substantial 
application to emerging economies, and insofar as it remains concentrated on ‘advanced 
post-industrial societies’ it remains ill-equipped to contend with some of the most 
important ecological and political actors, especially China. I maintain the reference to 
simulation and performance but focus instead on the antagonisms of sustainability in 
which ecologically unsustainable actions continue as if they comply with the need for 
radical change. Theoretically, I term the framework ‘discursive post-ecology’ in order to 
demonstrate its clear reference to both discursive ecologism and the post-ecological era.   
Following those such as Giddens (1984), ontology as the ‘question of being’ is the 
priority before epistemology, ‘the question of knowing’, for the simple reason that the 
ontological state, the question of what is, of social phenomena determines the possibilities 
of knowing about them. The final section, therefore, covers epistemology and 
methodology. This allows for the question of ontology to ground the discussion of how 
to access social reality. This is placed last in the chapter as it brings together the different 
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strands of theory as well as the empirical results into a coherent mode of explanation 
and draws links between the macro and micro levels of analysis, and provides a clear 
and concise point of reference for addressing the research questions in the remaining 
chapters. Section 3.4 details the specific methods and process of searching for the texts 
that form the three corpora (see Annex II) and of analysing these. This section of the 
chapter ends with a discussion of the ethical issues encountered and the ethical 
framework used, including earlier steps in the research journey which, whilst ultimately 
left out of the final analysis directly, informed the interpretive analysis, and is thus a part 
of the production of knowledge.  
3.1. Discourse Theory 
Discourse theory represents one paradigm with a broader field of discourse analysis that 
also represents similarly critical methods such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), the 
discourse-historical approach (DHA) and discursive psychology. Each of these, at some 
point in their lineage, share some common influences, notably Foucault. More generally, 
they have each been used by broadly ‘critical’ research projects where the revealing of 
hidden power relations, political contingency, or historicity have been a normative drive. 
In this project, I outline the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, building primarily 
on their seminal Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
(2014), as well as Laclau’s later publications on discourse theory (1990; 1996), those of 
the ‘Essex School’ more generally (Howarth et al., 2000; Howarth, 2013), and Mouffe’s 
later works on radical democracy and its normative potential (2008; see particularly 
section 3.3.5. of this chapter). 
I begin by setting out the broader social ontology that underpins the discourse 
theory, where I distinguish it from other discourse approaches and formally define the 
research project’s ontological assumptions, and similarly what this means for 
epistemology. In the same section, I outline the theory of signification; the post-
structuralist adoption of Saussure’s (2011 [1959]) networks of meaning. Leading on from 
this, I then outline what ‘space’ exists in such an approach for the ‘natural sciences’, 
weighing the arguments from those such as Latour with the ongoing (and arguably 
increasing) ‘anti-environmentalism’ problem. Section 3.3.3. then discusses how the 
metatheoretical concepts of power and hegemony are understood in post-Marxist terms, 
and link this back to discussions from political ecology. Finally, I outline the normative 
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and critical frameworks by grounding this in a discussion of radical democracy and 
previous discussions of the consumer subject, highlighting the work of, among others, 
Glasson (2016) for whom the ecological subject ‘offers Greens hopes of a fulcrum from 
which to transcend’ both mainstreaming and anti-environmentalism.  
The social ontology set out here follows the controversial ‘ontological turn’ (for 
the controversies of this turn, see for example Critchley, 2004; Rorty, 1980). As Howarth 
(2013) highlights ‘many social scientists claim to have discovered a paradigm or model 
of social behaviour…which can enable a practice of ‘normal science’ to be properly 
grounded and conducted’ (2013: 88). However, the attainment of a value-free science of 
society, in which objective facts can be known in clear, presentable, and consistent ways 
is itself problematic. The problem remains that it is ‘far from demonstrated that those 
who reject questions of ontology do not themselves presuppose certain ontological 
assumptions’ (ibid.: 90). This charge is arguably fundamental to post-structuralism. As 
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) highlight, when reduced to a simple spectrum of post-
positivism to positivism, critical discourse approaches tend to gather towards the 
constructionist end. The extent to which the ontological approach is ‘purely’ 
constructionist provides one dynamic that helps to distinguish between critical-realist 
approaches such as CDA (see particularly Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2004) and an inherently 
post-positivist discourse theory. This simplification, however, risks presenting each 
approach as having more or less agreed upon a stance within this area of philosophy, 
obscuring the disagreement and variety within each approach, discourse theory 
included.  
 Ontological assumptions within Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory follow 
their theorising of ‘the social’. The approach does not distinguish between discursive 
and non-discursive elements, nor does it rely on the materialist dialectic in which 
meaning is a production of both material and discursive realities. Instead, discourse 
encompasses all social phenomena, expanding the definition of ‘discourse’ beyond text, 
speech, or visual media to all aspects of social interaction. At the same time as expanding 
this definition, the social is inherently discursive; discourses are constitutive of social 
reality, rather than being constituted by social reality. This basic distinction distances 
discourse theory from other forms of discourse analysis such as CDA, as well as other 
critical theorists from whom Laclau and Mouffe adapt and radicalise particular concepts, 
principally Althusser and Gramsci. It also raises the potential problem of, if all social 
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phenomena are discursive and all meaning is discursively produced, then any and all 
social phenomena might form the object of study. Perhaps more problematically, it 
further stresses the researcher’s balance between producer and observer of discourse.  
This thesis therefore situates itself towards the constructionist end of the 
ontological ‘scale’. However, a distinction is made between social reality and material 
reality. Following most post-Marxist theory, this research project leaves economic 
reductionism and even the materialist dialectic behind, in place of a post-structuralist 
account whereby meaning is fluid, power-laden, and always produced discursively. 
Outside of these networks of meaning, through which reality is produced, understood, 
and acted on, physical material conditions occur and react with each other, but there 
exists no unadulterated access to them. Laclau and Mouffe assert that  
Every object is constituted as an object of discourse [and this] has nothing to do 
with whether there is a world external to thought…An earthquake or the falling 
of a brick is an event that certainly exists…independently of my will. But whether 
their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or 
‘expressions of the wrath of God;, depends upon the structuring of a discursive 
field. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014 [1985]: 108.) 
The production of meaning therefore takes place in the social; it is accessible only via 
discourse. As discussed in the next section, this has clear ramifications for a paradigm in 
which the role of science as the privileged provider of knowledge is central. 
 In the rejection of economic determinism, Laclau and Mouffe revisit neo-Marxists, 
especially Gramsci, for whom the economic model of base and superstructure was at 
least partly problematic. To simplify a broad literature, in more ‘traditional’ Marxist 
orientations the base structure – that is, the means of production – played the ultimate 
role of determining the superstructure – the meaning-producing institutions, whether of 
the state, the church, and others. In this conceptualisation the relationship between the 
materialist-economic base and the superstructure was one-way: the former was 
determinative of the latter. In Gramsci’s (1973) critique, this created the problem of, if 
this is the case, how can an organic revolution take place if the superstructure is 
produced only by an economic-materialist base whose motivation is the continuation of 
the production of surplus value in the interests of profit? Gramsci problematises the one-
sidedness of this relationship, opening up agency for the working classes to recognise 
their oppression and thus organise and work to undermine it. 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 77 of 285 
 
However, in Gramsci’s framework, the base and superstructure still exist 
objectively, and the base structure is determinative in the final instance. For 
environmentalism this is problematic: if the base and superstructure are objectively 
existing social facts, this privileges the ‘working classes’ as the fundamental 
revolutionary identity. Environmentalism (as with other social movements), on the other 
hand, seeks to build a new identity behind which organise counter-hegemonic 
formations. In place of the objective existence of fundamental class alliances, Laclau and 
Mouffe assert discursive processes and the primacy of politics shapes the extant groups 
in society (see particularly Laclau, 1990). As a result, the importance of networks replaces 
the base-determined groupings of people and identities. In place of the working class as 
the fixed revolutionary identity, new identities can form that engage with emergent 
discourses that challenge hegemonic discourses. The creation of a pluralistic radical-
democratic politics reflected the identified ‘crisis’ underpinning Laclau and Mouffe’s 
work: the erosion of class politics in the West and the authoritarian implementations of 
Marxism in the East. The abandoning of the essentialist manifestations of Marxism 
creates space, instead, for counter-hegemonic identities and networks to emerge without 
an a priori classism. 
This makes hegemony central to discourse theory. In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, 
‘truth’ in relation to the social is an ongoing struggle between discourses. Discourses 
evolve dialectically with their challengers in a constantly fluid dynamic in which the 
fixation of meaning around a particular aspect of the social is both impossible and the 
operating logic of a discourse and its subjects. In other words, a discourse seeks to 
establish what is ‘known’ in a common-sense way about a particular topic. The 
Foucauldian concept of genealogy (see, for example, Foucault, 1984) is a clear departure 
point here, whereby ‘truth’ emerges as a historical artefact; a discourse and the subject 
positions it creates are thus a reflection of power that exists as a function of the extent to 
which their radical contingency is obscured or forgotten. Mouffe calls ‘hegemonic 
practices’ the temporary stabilisation of a system of meaning, and adds that ‘what is at 
a given moment accepted as the “natural order”, jointly with the common sense that 
accompanies it, is the result of sedimented hegemonic practices’ (Mouffe, 2008: 4). The 
radicalising of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony thus provides the essential antagonism 
in discourse theory. Unlike Foucault’s concept of an overarching discourse of an epoch, 
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Laclau and Mouffe locate the political struggle at the frontiers of discursive terrains – 
the mediations of the meaning of social phenomena. 
The role of networks in the process of rearticulating tends to focus analysis at the 
local scales of (re)articulation, but as Grant, Keenoy, and Oswick (1998) point out, 
counter-hegemonic practices may also emerge as the result of ‘an overt or covert struggle 
for discursive dominance’ by strategically placed interest groups (1998: 8). Following on 
from this, this research is primarily interested in such strategically-positioned actors, 
particularly states, IGOs, and private companies, to produce signs – the joining of a 
signifier with the signified – and thus to produce what makes sense in relation to a nodal 
point. This requires setting out Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of signification. 
Borrowing fundamentally from Saussure’s (2011 [1959]) theory of structural 
linguistics, Laclau and Mouffe posit the same building blocks of language-meaning, la 
parole in Saussure’s vocabulary, whereby meaning is always and only relational. There 
exists no objective meaning of a word, and the meaning of a word is therefore a function 
of its relationship to other words. Jorgenson and Philips use the metaphor of a fishing 
net to demonstrate how signs acquire meaning in the Saussurian sense: 
…the structure of language can be thought of as a fishing-net in which each sign 
has its place as one of the knots in the net. When the net is stretched out, the knot 
is fixed in position by its distance from the other knots in the net, just as the sign 
is defined by its distance from the other signs. (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 11.) 
Saussure’s original formulation of the system of signification fixated these meaning-
constituting relationships of signs. Post-structuralism in general challenges this fixation. 
As Laclau points out, ‘[t]he post-structuralist trend has been to experiment in the logic 
of subversion of discursive identities which follows from the logical impossibility of 
constituting a closed system’ (Laclau, 2007: 543-544). Thus, meaning is malleable due to 
the impossibility of closed system of meaning. This further articulates the place for 
hegemony, as discourses struggle to hegemonize a particular articulation, but also has 
implications for the formation of identities. 
The concept of ‘sustainability’ is the nodal point around which differing 
discursive formations compete to hegemonize meaning. Each of these create different 
subject positions for subjects to occupy; that is, they formulate different modes of 
engaging with what it means to be sustainable. Sustainable consumerism, particularly 
when understood as part of the more general sustainable development discourse, 
represents one such hegemonic formulation in which the consumer-subject as a set of 
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expectations and possibilities for action is given meaning. As indicated above, this 
meaning cannot be closed and fixated in time, but alludes to the idea of it; discourses 
attempt to establish meaning as if a permanent fixation were possible. ‘Power’ in the 
Foucauldian sense thus derives from the extent to which this is achieved – how the 
inherently political (what is termed the ‘radically contingent’) is taken as apolitical, as a 
common sensical way being so that its existence goes unquestioned, what is referred to 
by Foucault as the sedimented discourse. The appearance of fixation is reinforced in the 
continued (re)production of the discourse – by the carrying out and performance of the 
subject positions, for example. In the sustainability example, the simulation and 
performance of a sustainable consumer-subject reinforces the discourse of sustainable 
development.  
Discourse theory takes the post-structuralist critique of Saussure to a conclusion 
in which the excess of meaning is contained in the ‘field of discursivity’; the contained 
discourse is always challenged by articulative formations arising from within this 
surplus of meaning. Because a discourse can never be a closed system, as in Saussure’s 
(2011 [1959]) formulation, a discourse never achieves a permanent fixation of meaning, 
but instead evolves dialectically with other discourses that emerge to challenge it. This 
formulation bears a clear resemblance to Gramsci’s concept of the war of position that 
ultimately alludes to the resilience of a discourse’s fundamental apparatus, even as it is 
challenged.  
However, a key problem with this approach is the unstructured nature of the 
field of discursivity. Discourse theory, in Laclau and Mouffe’s original formulation, 
offers no means of organising or ranking which signs might challenge or be incorporated 
by a given discourse. Jorgensen and Philips demonstrate this with the example of 
modern medicine. As a contained discourse with a nodal point of the (human) ‘body’, 
western medicine represents a system of meaning that imbues the word ‘body’ with its 
meaning as an object for scientific inquiry and all the regulatory apparatus that comes 
with that. The nodal point ‘body’ can thus be challenged by other forms of ‘medicine’; 
alternative forms of therapy, homeopathy, and so on. Equally, religious discourses 
imbue ‘body’ with a different meaning still, and chains of equivalence are, in the Holy 
Trinity sense for example, drawn between ‘body’ and ‘spirit’. These challenge the 
scientific and ethical principles underlying modern medicine in clear ways (Jorgensen 
and Philips, 2002). Jorgensen and Philips point out that the discourse of ‘football’, for 
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example, is unlikely to challenge modern medicine discourse around ‘body’, yet 
discourse theory offers no means of establishing this; Laclau and Mouffe offer no way of 
ordering extant discourses in the ‘field of discursivity’. In place of this, Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach defines an ‘order of discourse’ (Fairclough, 
2013). Fairclough defines this as ‘a social structuring of semiotic difference, a particular 
social ordering of relationships between different ways of making meaning’ (ibid.: 89). 
This challenges Laclau’s and Mouffe’s distinction between a discourse (that is a partially 
fixed system of meaning) and the surplus of meaning which they refer to as the field of 
discursivity. It can be rendered, as in Figure 3, as a complete system of structuration, 
wherein the order of discourse contains discursive figurations most likely to challenge a 
dominant, or sedimented, discourse.  
 
In detailing their theory of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe define their key 
theoretical concepts as follows: 
we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such 
that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The 
structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. 
The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, 
Least structured 
Most structured 
Field of discursivity refers to the total 
excess of meaning not captured by 
higher levels of structured meaning 
around the nodal term. I.e. what is 
possible. 
 
Order of discourse represents a semi-
structured arena of contestation 
around the same nodal term. This 
represents potential counter-
hegemonies. I.e. what is likely to 
challenge. 
 
Discourse represents the most 
structured, hegemonized system of 
meaning around a nodal term. I.e. what 
is. 
Figure 3: Illustration to show relationship between discourse theoretical concepts according to structuration. Y 
axis indicates most to least structured. 
Field of 
discursivity
Order of 
discourse
Discourse
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we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not 
discursively articulated (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 105; italics original). 
This study adopts these definitions of the key terms, but of particular importance is that 
of articulation. This is essential as the concept through which the performance and 
simulation of sustainability through the consumer act is understood theoretically. 
Through performance of ‘green consumer’, the arbitrary connections between the 
consumer, the consumed, and notions of sustainability are created and affirmed. The 
concept of nodal point represents the privileged sign that centres the network of meaning 
and thus organises meaning (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 112). ‘Sustainability’ can 
therefore be understood as a nodal point in the discourse of sustainable development – 
actions are understood by the relationship to this signifier, and different articulations of 
‘sustainability’ seek to invest it with different meaning. 
The obfuscation of the sites of discursive contestation, the political frontier of a 
system of meaning, is achieved, in Laclau and Mouffe’s language, in the ‘myth’: the 
imagined totality that organises a social space (such as ‘the nation’). Laclau defines myth 
as 
…a space of representation which bears no relation of continuity with the 
dominant ‘structural objectivity’. Myth is thus a principle of reading of a given 
situation, whose terms are external to what is representable in the objective 
spatiality constituted by the given structure. (Laclau, 1990: 61.) 
The discursive formation of the myth, as a distorted representation of reality, is 
(re)produced continually. Anderson draws attention to this in his Imagined Communities, 
in which the ‘nation’ is produced through phenomena that are imagined to be shared. A 
national anthem, a minute’s silence, a flag, and a broad array of over signs, thus 
represent powerful ways of drawing connections between people that have never met 
and likely never will meet. More pertinently, an effect of the myth is to obscure the points 
of difference and divergent interests of different groups who are imagined as united 
under the myth. In the case of the ‘nation’, it serves to outline a broad unity between 
potentially conflicting social groups, such as classes in the Marxist sense. The myth can 
therefore obscure the radical contingencies and the political frontiers to the extent that 
particular interests (for example, capital accumulation) can be made to seem like the 
general interest, with clear implications for diverse social movements; not the least the 
sustainable consumer-subject whose participation in the contradictory goal of 
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sustainable exponential growth and the subsequent furthering of particular interests can 
be made to seem like serving a higher and more general interest (i.e. sustainability). 
Having outlined the social ontological considerations and the theory of 
signification that provides meaning in place of an objective meaning derived from 
objective sensory perception, particularly with regards ecological sustainability it 
therefore becomes important to outline how a space for natural sciences can be preserved. 
The discussion therefore turns to how the natural, and particularly earth, sciences can 
be brought into a critique of ideology whilst reflecting on the extent to which such 
paradigms and their institutions are also products of social and inherently political 
processes. Following this, the discussion of critique continues by expanding on forms of 
critique and the normative project of radical democratisation. 
3.1.1. A space for science 
The scientific consensus is, and has been for decades, clear on the pressing climate and 
environmental impacts of modern industrialism, if not in the minutiae, then at least in 
the general sense. If political action were a simple function of locating and presenting 
the right evidence, followed by the unanimous changes in society as the result of rational 
thinkers and thinking, there would indeed be less need for a constructionist critique. In 
the ten years since the publication of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007)  and the IPCC 
findings (IPCC, 2007), the world has witnessed, in close succession, the adoption of a 
wide-ranging climate accord and the notification of withdrawal of the planet’s 
historically largest producer of emissions (the US) from that accord. At the same time as 
objective, positivistic studies that showed the greater economic sense lay in investments 
in solar and wind power, there were renewed commitments to coal, fossil fuel gas, oil 
exploration, and nuclear power. Scientific evidence, as Gabriella Kütting (2009) has 
outlined, has not led to the type and scale of change its conclusions have implied are 
essential. 
The importance of constructionist critique, therefore, comes not necessarily from 
challenging scientific evidence but from investigating the wider discourses that 
contribute to suppressing it. For example, in revealing the mental acrobatics at play in 
criticising the ‘phony science’ of the scientific consensus at one point (as in US Senator 
Inhofe’s speeches in 2003 and 2018), then committing to making ‘decisions not on a 
political agenda, but on sound science’ (Inhofe, 2003.) within the same speech. More 
pertinently, following Sokal’s (1996) argument to its conclusion of rejecting any form of 
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social critique of the conditions of knowledge production encounters the opposite 
problem of limiting the space for a social critique. In the sustainability debates, this is 
most clear in claims made about population. In neo-Malthusian terms, calls have 
emerged for limits of population growth on the grounds of the inherent unsustainability 
of exponential growth of populations, as well as quantitative growth in terms of 
resources per capita. The renowned ecologist and author of The Tragedy of the Commons, 
Garret Hardin, quoted in Commoner, represents the disturbing conclusions of such lines 
of thought when he asks ‘[h]ow can we help a foreign country to escape 
overpopulation?’, to which his own answer is ‘[c]learly, the worst thing we can do is 
send food… Atomic bombs would be kinder’ (Hardin, quoted in Commoner, 1988: 156). 
Hardin expanded on this in an interview in 1979 with Mother Earth New: on 
overpopulation Hardin comments that ‘Of course, this doesn't present a serious problem 
in a country like the United States’ (Hardin, Mother Earth News, 2017). Hardin best 
reflects the tendency for overpopulation to always be the fault of someone else when the 
discourse is deployed. Bioenvironmentalist approaches that have occasionally offered 
such views have thus been accused of ignoring the social ramifications of such 
conclusions, as well as representing the problem in terms of populational growth 
aggregated at a planetary level rather than focusing instead on the distribution of 
resource use and market demands.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the point here is that Hardin builds on ‘science’, 
with the identity of biologist or ecologist, with the effect that the disturbing conclusions 
reached appear as logical outcomes of a scientific enquiry. For discourse theory this 
presents the challenge of how to critique such a discourse. The tendency for the 
overpopulation discourse to ‘Other’ is clear from a discourse-internal critique. That this 
is complicit in violent racist discourse requires recourse to an external critique, yet it is 
clearly insufficient to end the analysis at the identification of the Other, or the revealing 
of internal inconsistencies, and not to consider the violence and racism of its assertions.  
The key outcome of this for theory is that it becomes clear that ‘science’ cannot 
represent a single, universal arbitrator of environmental conflicts. Depending on what is 
calculated and where it is measured, differing accounts of responsibility can be 
articulated by appeals to ‘fairness’ arising from scientific evidence. This is not to 
problematise the scientific method per se, but to problematise the wider architecture of 
the social production of scientific knowledge which incorporates the institutions for 
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funding, the decisions of what is studied and what this occludes from being studied, and 
ultimately how this is communicated to society generally and adopted (or, of course, not 
adopted) by politicians and system of governance.  
 For this research, the scientific consensus represents a source of external critique 
for discourses of sustainability. I argue this is important for two key reasons: first, the 
broad scientific consensus is widely available and accessible in a number of languages, 
such as through the IPCC (2014; 2007), and more localised uses of scientific evidence 
(particularly in the case of China) are generally available to stakeholders in the native 
language, as well as in English. Second, the types of evidence drawn upon are less 
contentious than those highlighted by most political ecological approaches, primarily 
concerning land use change, landscapes, and so on, in which the ‘writing out’ of 
Indigenous and local peoples has been shown to be a significant consequence of 
numerous conservationist approaches, as well as in popular aesthetic representations of 
a ‘wilderness’ that existed prior to colonisation. As  one notable environmental historian 
captured the problem, ‘the definition of the environment as a natural field to be 
dominated for productive use, and the definition of the British as a distinctive colonial 
ruling class over alien peoples, went hand in hand’ (Gilmartin, 1995: 211).  
 Overall, then, I return to Forsyth and Harraway by arguing that the ideals of 
scientific objectivity should serve as a guiding principle for more accurate reflections of 
the social world, while a purely unadulterated access to it remains impossible if only for 
the simple fact that the scientific enterprise occurs and works within a social world. This 
has the outcome that the scientific method can represent a less ideological means of 
understanding provided, in the cases of land use science, ecology, and other Earth 
sciences, the assumptions made are transparent and incorporated into the subjectivity of 
the researcher, and thus the conclusions.  
On a practical level, Mouffe identifies ‘employing the symbolic resources of that 
very tradition’ as a form of imminent critique (e.g. Mouffe 1995: 1), however, I instead 
articulate such a mode of critique as discourse-internal, following more in the lines of 
Wodak’s discourse-immanent critique (e.g. Wodak, 2008; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 32-35). 
Wodak defines the discourse-immanent concept as a practice of ’discovering 
inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or 
discourse-internal structures’ (2008: 88). I use discourse-internal to distinguish between 
this approach and that of immanent critique that re-engages with society beyond the 
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singular discourse (that is, identifying continuity within the field of discursivity, or order 
of discourse, rather than within the discourse). Such a mode of critique is of benefit to 
revealing a discourse’s consistency – the extent to which its own practices match or 
deviate from its own aims. In the case of sustainability, this creates the basic mode of 
critique for the neoliberal sustainable development discourse. Here, the ‘aims’, that is, 
what is being sustained, are articulated through policy at global, national, and local levels 
but also aesthetics and ideals of ‘wilderness’, ‘nature’, and so on. The latter of these is of 
particular importance for the discourse of sustainable consumerism. The ‘aims’ of the 
consumer act are to contribute to this image of sustainability – the chain of equivalence 
between the consumer act and the sustainable act. The revelation of the practice as 
inherently unsustainable therefore represents the basic form of critique: the action has 
failed by its own criteria.  
However, a discourse-internal critique is limited. To illustrate this, the neoliberal 
sustainable development discourse can be critiqued from the perspective of whether the 
outcomes match the agenda, but ultimately distinguishing whether an act is or is not 
sustainable requires recourse to an external discourse. Maintaining, for instance, that the 
hybrid car industry is inherently unsustainable requires reorganising the network of 
meaning around sustainability, involving appeals to moments outside of the discourse-
internal structure – the field of discursivity (or, more specifically, Fairclough’s order of 
discourse). More succinctly, imagining an incoherent, racist discourse, a purely internal 
critique would highlight only the incoherence; a grounded critique of racism requires 
recourse to other discourses. It is therefore essential to also outline both the role and the 
specific nature of an external critique in this study. 
Scientific consensus is both problematic and ultimately essential. For this reason, 
appeals to more bioenvironmental discourses (following Clapp’s and Dauvergne’s (2012) 
distinction of environmental discourses) is used as an external critique for globalised 
discourses of sustainability. I argue this is necessary and justified for three related 
reasons: first, the globalised discourse of sustainable development (broadly interpreted) 
has appealed directly to the natural sciences and scientific consensus. The discourse is 
promoted as being the natural response to the given evidence; it is depoliticised in this 
way, but this also makes the scientific consensus a part of the discourse – it is a part of 
the network of meaning that creates the discourse. More specific examples exist in 
sustainable consumerism, where, to use the same examples highlighted earlier in this 
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chapter, hybrid vehicle manufacturers justify their ‘green’ credentials by reference to 
scientific vocabulary, scientific testing, and the presentation of their (brand-
distinguishing) technologies as a natural outcome of this. Second, the scientific 
consensuses on a variety of topics from climate change to biodiversity loss is available 
through IGOs (particularly the UNEP, IFCC, WHO, and World Meteorological 
Organisation) in a variety of languages and access formats, greatly increasing the 
number of people with access to such information. Nevertheless, education on such 
matters remains problematic, not least in many global-South countries, and so caution is 
necessary in appeals to largely Western epistemic communities on local and Indigenous 
issues. Third, the scientific consensus has been paramount in achieving the first element 
of the paradox I outline; that ecological sustainability is at the centre of global efforts and 
politics. Whilst this success is offset by the failure of significant action, this should not 
mean the rejection of the epistemic paradigm that has provided the understanding 
necessary to highlight instances of unsustainability.  
As such, the two modes of critique represent a broad but coherent framework for 
a consistent analysis of discourse. Grounded in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, 
social ontology, and normative framework of radical democracy, it also borrows from 
elsewhere in the broader discourse studies to fill conceptual gaps. Having outlined the 
some of the commonality and mutual problems of political ecology and discourse theory, 
then, it is necessary to fill that space with a more consolidated conceptual framework 
that draws together the disparate threads.  
3.2. Ecogovernmentality and the Consumer Subject 
Robbins, surmising the ‘environmental subjects and identity thesis’, highlights the basic 
premise that animates this chapter directly and the research project generally: 
people’s beliefs and attitudes do not lead to new environmental actions, 
behaviours, or rules systems; instead, new environmental actions, behaviours, or 
rules systems lead to new kinds of people (Robbins, 2012: 23). 
This assumption underlies the critical-discursive, or post-structuralist, approach; the 
kinds of narratives that are built around nature, sustainability, crises or consumption, as 
well as the aesthetic ideals, economic rationalities, and everyday experiences of what it 
means to be, and act, sustainably are fundamental to understanding the modes by which 
we relate, exploit, protect, identify, or otherwise experience a ‘natural world’. In this way, 
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the ecological subject is a product of the hegemonic discourse which organises consent 
and gives meaning to social reality. Sustainable development broadly, and sustainable 
consumerism more specifically, represent discourses through which radically 
contingent constructions of nature are taken for granted.  
Ecogovernmentality, an application of Foucault’s concepts of governmentality 
and biopower, is a fundamental conceptual framework for understanding the creation 
of environmental subjects. As Foucault first articulated the concept of biopower in a 
series of lectures between 1977 and 1978, it refers to the ‘set of mechanisms through 
which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power’ (Foucault, 2007: 1). For political ecology, the 
implications of this line of thought have been discussed by scholars such as Robbins 
(2007) who draw on Althusser’s (1973) theory of interpellation and the subject. Robbins, 
nevertheless, also challenges hierarchical social theories and instead points out how 
everyday ecological relations (such as lawns) construct subjects through an interplay 
between the Althusserian hailing and the ecological necessities required to realise the 
subject position. More directly, Wainwright and Mercer (2009), who draw on biopower 
and how hegemony implicates ecological relations, advocates for incorporating Gramsci 
into the political ecological project. And, as Mann (2009), highlights, a Gramscian 
historical materialism is an unavoidable consideration in political ecological research for 
historicising Foucauldian concepts (see also Robertson, 2015). This provides a greater 
space for discourse theory and a post-structuralist political ecology (which I expand on 
in more detail in section 3.4).  
 Revisiting Foucault’s concept, then, the sustainable-consumer subject can be 
viewed as a product of discourse, with the addition of ‘a certain kind of nature as an 
external referent’ (Robertson, 2015; see also Agrawal, 2005). In the discourse-theoretical 
approach I detail later, however, it is problematic to reflect on a ‘nature’ external to the 
social. This reflects the tendency for political ecology to represent ‘softer’ forms of 
constructionism; for ‘most practitioners in political ecology dwell somewhere in between’ 
constructivism and realism (Robbins, 2012: 125). Discourse theory, by contrast, 
represents a more ardently social constructionist agenda. Though this is not, as some 
have claimed, to the exclusion of material realities. (The implications of this and finding 
a space for the sciences in a discourse theory of ecological relations is tackled in section 
3.3.2.) For this reason, the ‘political’ project of political ecology is more radicalised and 
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questions of the post-political are intrinsic to understanding how sustainability has 
become an issue of preserving a dominant economic system. What is being sustained is 
therefore an overarching concern, and in terms of political ecology the ways in which 
humans relate with and within ‘nature’ are a part of this puzzle.    
Consumer subjects arise out of the politics of ecogovernmentality and biopower 
as it determines the modes of relating to sustainability, and thus nature generally. In the 
act of ‘greening’ the consumer, the sustainable development discourse calls on a variety 
of actors, institutions, and discursive resources to articulate a given action as being not 
merely ecologically neutral, but a positive contribution to the sustainability effort. As 
explored in detail in Chapter Four, the concentration by IGOs and national governments 
on ‘innovation’, and the role of the consumer in driving innovation, places the consumer 
at the centre of sustainability efforts. In such discourses, it becomes an inherent duty of 
the ‘environmental citizen’ to partake in consumerism. This constructs consumerism as 
a privileged mode of environmental action: consumption must become sustainable in 
order for society to be sustainable. The sustainable identity is therefore articulated 
through engagement in the private sphere. Whilst these specific features are outlined in 
respect of the sustainable consumerism discourse, as Swanson has argued (2008), in 
more general terms depoliticization through economic ‘common sense’ also contains at 
least two broader considerations: the naturalizing and essentializing of a particular 
mode of behaviour, and the limitations of political agency or control. I argue these 
broader features are also essential elements of the sustainable consumer discourse. 
However, I argue naturalisation discourses still afford an amount of political agency and 
control, but specifically that which is curated and regulated by the discourse, which is 
captured here as part of the overall performance of instigating change through the 
simulation of political engagement, while partaking in a limited field of consumer choice 
legitimised by the hegemonic discourse.     
Section 3.3. furthers this discussion through the lens of the post-ecological era 
wherein the movement from the radical implications of ecologism to the status-quo 
maintenance of technical-managerialism and economic rationalisation are central to 
understanding the depoliticization of sustainability. In order to ground this particular 
approach to political ecology it is necessary to turn the discussion to discourse theory, 
before finally reconciling these two broad areas in the more specific conceptual 
framework of discursive post-ecologism. 
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3.3. Discursive Post-Ecologism 
Having outlined the theoretical framework of Laclau and Mouffe, and indicated how 
this can be operationalised and applied to political ecological research, the discussion 
now turns to what I refer to as discursive post-ecologism which aims to draw attention to 
the inherently discursive features of the depoliticization of sustainability that has shaped 
eco-politics since the 1980s. This section grounds the post-ecological in a broader 
discursive approach in which the discursive resources that the contemporary 
sustainability imaginary draws upon are continually open to struggle. This provides a 
normative agenda for the re-politicisation of sustainability, and in doing so changes the 
focus from contemporary Eurocentric ecopolitics (Blühdorn’s politics of unsustainability) 
to the sites of ecopolitical struggle elsewhere in the world in which counter-articulations 
of ‘sustainability’ represent the political frontier.  
While the distinction of an ‘era’ defined by a prevalent discourse risks reflecting 
Foucault’s conception in his archaeological body of work of an ‘epoch’ as determined by 
the domination of a given knowledge regime (Foucault, 1972: 117), it departs from this 
position insofar as the displacement of this discourse is an ongoing process of struggle 
and contestation between a number of extant discourses. Indeed, the central research 
questions of this project focus on the struggle over investing ‘sustainability’ with 
meaning by competing discourses. Blühdorn and Welsh identify this struggle between 
discourses early in their work as an important area of the new research agenda when 
they ask ‘[w]hy are both discourses [of unsustainability and sustainability] being 
sustained at the same time, and who benefits?’ (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007).  Post-
ecologism more generally, however, has been interpreted variously as a contained 
discourse, the outcome of a separate, specific discourse, and the dialectic synthesis of 
contending discourses. In part, this might be attributed to the fluidity of the term 
‘discourse’ itself and its application across different theoretical paradigms with a loose 
commonality via Foucault. It is therefore a lost cause to aim for an application of the 
term consistent with all users; but for internal consistency it is essential to define post-
ecologism and its relationship to ‘discourse(s)’ in this research project. This subchapter 
therefore grounds a discursive consideration of post-ecologism in discourse theory.   
Reflecting these considerations, this project concentrates on the antagonisms 
manifest in the post-ecological era. The social production of what is termed the post-
ecological era mobilises a set of discursive resources that, according to discourse theory, 
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necessarily invite challenge as a function of their existence. China, in particular, has 
emerged as a key actor in global environmental politics, especially in a post-Copenhagen 
and post-Trump atmosphere of reduced EU and US leadership. Historically, China has 
mobilised similar discursive resources and played a studious role in (particularly climate) 
relations with the EU, going so far as referring to the EU as ‘our teachers’ in the area of 
carbon trading at the COP21 in Paris (Carbon Pulse, 2015). More recently, however, 
China has played a considerably more autonomous role; increased domestic resources, 
both discursive and material, have been mobilised in support of ‘ecological civilisation’ 
and to increase China’s contributions to global fora in attempt to rebalance 
environmental agreements in terms of blame, responsibility, and provision. 
As such, this research project broadens the agenda of post-ecological research. A 
more nuanced understanding of its globality and of its application to emerging 
economies is vital: as China’s role is increasingly fundamental to any ‘solution(s)’ to 
climate change and other ecological crises, a paradigm that is poorly equipped 
conceptually to tackle what is and is not unique about its form of eco-politics and 
therefore relies on its application to post-industrial societies risks being obsolete. What 
follows, therefore, is an outline of how this important concept is adapted for use in an 
interpretive study that focuses on more globalised discourses and their interaction with 
emerging sustainability discourses that shape the realities of an increasing number of 
people.  
Post-ecologism, in this research project, is therefore understood as a conceptual 
framework that provides a grounded way of talking about the depoliticization of 
sustainability. In order to better operationalise this within the terms permitted by 
discourse theory, I depart marginally from Blühdorn’s (2007) concept of the politics of 
unsustainability. The politics of unsustainability is determined by Blühdorn and Welsh to 
be the ‘particular mode of eco-politics’ that contributes to defining the ‘era of post-
ecologism’ (Blühdorn and Welsh, 2007). In their constitution of the problem at the heart 
of late-modern society and its sustainability, the post-ecological era and the politics of 
unsustainability go hand-in-hand. The politics of unsustainability therefore delineates the 
form of politics that enables the continuation of unsustainable practices, especially 
hegemonic practices heavily sedimented in everyday social and economic life.  
This is a key area of investigation for this research project, and more generally in 
the political ecology project. However, Blühdorn’s concept implies the paradigm of 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 91 of 285 
 
sustainability no longer captures the unfolding mainstreaming and depoliticising of the 
term itself. Blühdorn argues that ‘[f]or their politics of unsustainability, so the theory of 
post-ecologist politics suggests, advanced post-industrial societies are relying, in 
particular, on strategies of simulation’ (Blühdorn, 2012, emphasis original). ‘Simulation’ 
here denotes a number of performative and discursive actions that ‘entail the production 
and maintenance of societal self-descriptions in which modern societies portray 
themselves as having fully recognised the seriousness and urgency of the sustainability 
crisis’ and contribute broadly to a sense of taking up the necessary actions to combat it 
(ibid.). This articulation implies an attempt to get behind the mainstream discourse of 
sustainability and reveal the ‘reality’ of its unsustainability. While representing an 
urgently necessary critique of the prevailing discourse of sustainability, this view fails 
to understand sustainability as a political frontier whereby differing discourses struggle 
to invest the signifier with meaning. What is signified, therefore, by sustainability 
remains the object of political inquiry. In discourse theoretical terms, the floating 
signifier of ‘sustainability’ does not contain an objective meaning. The political project is 
thus not to elaborate a politics of unsustainability, but to better understand the ostensible 
appropriation and mainstreaming of more radical eco-politics into a discourse of 
sustainability in which hegemonic modes of production, exploitation, and degradation 
are maintained. 
Therefore, I posit two weaknesses in the concept of the politics of unsustainability 
as the groundwork for articulating a new concept. First, the issue of agency is 
underdeveloped. Blühdorn’s concept implies a co-option of the sustainability agenda in 
terms that allow the continuation of unsustainable practices alongside an awareness of 
the crisis in which those practices are complicit: it is unclear in Blühdorn’s concept who 
is involved in this and how ‘aware’ those actors are that they are reproducing an 
unsustainable discourse. Moreover, it is unclear what agency this permits to dissenting 
actors – are these to exist outside of the eco-politics of unsustainability, and if so, is a 
separate mode of eco-politics required for this? Second, it is unclear where Blühdorn 
situates his critique of what is deemed ‘unsustainable’. While there are frequent appeals 
to ecological sustainability, these are non-specific and fail to account for how 
sustainability itself is political: whose sustainability, what is sustained, and how these 
questions are also dependent on power-laden representations of nature (see, for example, 
Leff, 2015). While the IPCC’s findings are mentioned numerous times (and this research 
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project utilises these too), the wider problem of contradictory sustainability agendas and 
claims is ignored. In other words, the concept relies on an external critique that is not 
well defined in order to judge what is or is not sustainable. While the problem of 
ideological assumptions in discourses that contribute to the politics of unsustainability is 
detailed, this critical position is not maintained and considered in the production of 
knowledge about what is unsustainable.  
In place of this, I propose a distinction between sustainability agendas and 
sustainability outcomes as a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon 
of post-ecologism to overcome the highlighted weaknesses above, that also considers a 
post-structuralist orientation. Discourse theory does not try to get behind a discourse to 
reveal what’s ‘really’ happening. This helps solve the agency problem as sustainability 
discourses reveal their agency in clear ways: who produces, disseminates, and interprets 
the discourse is normally a recorded factor in the kinds of materials analysed here. 
Because I contain this within the paradigm of sustainability, a key difference is that the 
continuation of unsustainable practices occurs as if those practices were sustainable. 
Acting sustainably is therefore possible even in the absence of ecological sustainability. 
On the second problem, the differentiated agendas and outcomes concept provides a 
clearer frame of reference for investigating the discourses of sustainability according to 
an internal critique in which a discourse’s own stated aims and ideals are used as the 
basis (Wodak, 2008).  
Sustainability agendas therefore represent discourses where ‘sustainability’ is held 
as an ideal, and a series of behaviours, regulations, norms, values, and other politically-
contingent discursive resources are mobilised to achieve those ends. Agendas are thus 
about process. In the production of the (Western) post-ecological era, the outcome-oriented 
sustainability discourses of the 1970s and 1980s, marked most prominently by the 
publication of the Brundtland Report (1987), are displaced by the rationalisation of 
ecological crises in economic terms and techno-managerial fixes in which a privileged 
and taken-for-granted system represents the confines of political deliberation.  
Market-liberal sustainability approaches focus on the continuity of the given 
system; the status quo answers the question of what is sustained. In this sense, the 
sustainability agenda of market-liberal sustainability merely articulates the ability to 
continue an already established system; it imagines a future of the least possible change 
required for its continued reproduction. This constructs consumerism as part of the 
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solution to ecological crisis, rather than part of the cause. The obstacle to sustainability 
is thus problematised as a failure to innovate, to which the solution is technological 
advancement and ecological modernisation; a discourse in which the consumer subject 
participates in the process of innovation. 
Sustainability outcomes represent the external discourses of ecological 
sustainability – grounded in biophysical sciences such as the planetary boundaries 
framework, for example, they provide a grounded, normative critique of sustainability 
agendas. Outcomes are about the results of a given sustainability transition framework; 
they might also be judged by experiences of local groups, for example the visible 
reductions of air pollution observed in the case study of Shenyang (Chapter 6). The 
outcomes concept is used to provide a transparent means of critique, and organises the 
critical tools of analysis outlined earlier in the chapter (internal and imminent critique), 
as well as appeals to the external discourses of consensus-based science in the form of 
the IPCC and other bodies. In this project, I employ both localised experiences of 
outcomes in the case study of Shenyang, as well as well as appeals to the external 
discourses as outlined earlier in the chapter. 
 With regards the post-ecological era, the key point is that sustainability outcomes, 
that is, tangible, measurable successes of an agenda, are not required in the production of 
a sustainability discourse. Because an agenda can represent an organised way of ‘doing’ 
and ‘acting’, that is, the performance of sustainability, in a discourse-internal logic, 
outcomes are taken as arising from the act of doing. This incorporates the post-
structuralist concentration on language and communication, and more specifically the 
importance of speech-acts in social creation and the bringing into being of the object. In 
the context of this research project, then, the act of sustainable consumption performs 
sustainability; the discursive repertoires of the consumerist act construct the notion of 
sustainability. 
Building on Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014 [1985]) discourse theory, I posit that a 
reconciling of the green-consumer paradox and overdetermination is attained only 
through a construction of fantasy; a sustainability agenda in which the pursuit of 
sustainability outcomes is both implausible and, in any case, secondary to the 
sustainability of an economic and social status quo. The hegemonized discourse of 
consuming sustainably thus depoliticises sustainability as a concept and practice. This is 
facilitated by green marketing discourse which provides a temporary stabilisation of a 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 94 of 285 
 
system of meaning that invests a particular action with the notion of sustainability; 
providing a subject position whereby acting sustainably is possible even in the absence 
of ecological sustainability. This allows for the pursuit of sustainability agendas without 
sustainability outcomes. 
‘Sustainable consumption’, as mentioned in the various IGO literatures above, 
assumes an essentialist position on behalf of the subject: an a priori identity for whom 
consuming forms an inherent part of living in modernity. The focus thus becomes on 
rationalising and enabling this behaviour in the face of a multitude of crises in which 
precisely this behaviour is complicit. The naturalisation of such a concept removes it 
from deliberation with the consequence that consumerism occupies a privileged position 
so that crisis mitigation is organised around, and in service of, this hierarchy. Put simply, 
‘sustainable consumption’ emerges and serves to reproduce and legitimise the dominant 
economic order at precisely the point of its greatest failure. ‘Sustainable consumption’ 
therefore becomes an issue of hegemony because the conditions of its existence occlude 
alternatives from being. The legitimacy of the discourse, ‘truth’ in the Foucauldian sense, 
is attained not through an inevitable and exclusive response to scientific fact, but the 
radically contingent outcome of prevailing power relations. The market-focused 
response to ecological crisis is not an inherent element of the crisis, but it has been 
articulated as such. To frame this in discourse theory, then, the consumer-focused 
response is radically contingent; it is possible but not necessary. The focal point of this 
mode of eco-politics is thus how it becomes established in common sense.  
Aesthetics and cultural productions can therefore reinforce the post-ecological 
paradox; disaster movies, dystopian futures, among others, reinforce the notion of 
environmental catastrophe as contributing to an end of civilisation. The narrative is 
simultaneously part of and critical of late-modern consumer capitalism. It alludes to the 
dangers of ecological catastrophe whilst participating in and relying on its essential 
causes as a means of capital accumulation. But beyond a political-economic critique, it is 
essential to understand these behaviours discursively. 
In this sense, the post-ecological era doesn’t represent a discourse in itself. 
Instead, the mainstream discourse of sustainable development makes sense of certain 
actions as being sustainable, and other actions as being unsustainable. The importance of 
subject positions is therefore fundamental to understanding the post-ecological era; 
following a social constructionist logic, the identity of a subject is a function of the 
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discourses available to them. In this way, the concept of the politics of unsustainability is 
replaced by a concept that re-engages with the discursive modes of social production, 
and therefore locates the political frontier in the ongoing struggle to invest sustainability 
(and, by implication, unsustainability) with meaning.  
This provides a framework for understanding a broader array of struggles that 
attempt to (re)assert their autonomy or meaning on localised forms of ecology. Key 
literature in this area has approached the politics of ecology through engagement with 
gender (Carney, 2004), indigenous eco-movements (Murray Li, 2004; Bebbington, 2004; 
among many others), and race (Kosek, 2004), among others. The point here is that there 
exist multiple strands of eco-political thought and practice concerned with the political, 
especially in the global south and particularly where formal institutions have failed one 
way or another in the promise of representation. As such, the discursive, democratic, 
and counter-hegemonic struggles are key sites of the re-politicisation of sustainability; 
and this forms a key normative drive of this research.  
Because of this, the framework of the post-ecological era is taken, as with any other 
system of meaning, to be transient and always in a state of challenge. More specifically, 
this research attempts to open up this question of what challenges it to the global 
discourses of sustainability and the emerging influence of China. In China, a new 
balance of agendas and outcomes is articulated, and, more pertinently, different 
discourses invest sustainability with different meanings. The post-ecological era is taken 
as a framework that has emerged within a particular context (the ‘west’) that serves as a 
much-needed critique of the process and of depoliticization and mainstreaming of 
sustainability; but the key question remains how does China reflect, rearticulate, and 
challenge this?  
3.4. Methods: Discourse Theoretical Analysis in Practice 
As is typical of research from a normative, critical theory perspective, theory and 
methodology are inseparable in practice.  Discourse analytical tools are always 
embedded in a theory of discourse (Atkinson, Held, and Jeffares 2011). It is therefore 
incumbent on the researcher to articulate the links between the theoretical framework 
and the methodological tools used. Overall, the choice in methodology reflects the need 
to overcome linguistic barriers and the need for the data gathering process to reflect the 
theoretical framework epistemologically. 
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While discourse analysis Qua data gathering tool is relatively void of 
philosophical assumptions - or at least open to a number of approaches – discourse 
theory represents a set of philosophical assumptions and a broadly complete, if 
fragmented in Laclau and Mouffe’s initial works, theory of the social. This distances it 
from methodologically similar approaches, such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
discursive psychology, or the discourse-historical approach (DHA) where discourse 
analysis, to different extents, is but one tool necessary for understanding the social. This 
grouping of critical discourses studies is in turn distinct from the more positivistic tools 
of corpus linguistics, conversational analysis, and so on. Discourse theory approached 
this is as part of the wider poststructuralist challenge to positivist modes of 
understanding, and, wider still, the communicative turn in social sciences. More 
specifically, it represented an answer to the ‘crisis of the Left’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014) 
rooted in the reductionism of Marxist economic determinism. 
Discourse theory interprets more orthodox Marxism as a grand theory that 
predetermines the oppressed identity, continually implicates a materialist economic 
base, and reduces the function of ideology to that of false consciousness. In place of this, 
discourse theory insists social categories are unfixed, and the political frontier is located 
where a dominant organisation of consent comes up against alternative articulations. In 
doing so, post-structuralist discourse theory challenged a conventional wisdom that 
privileged a particular way of ‘knowing’ about the social world, specifically the 
monopoly that positivism and essentialism held on the right to interpret the world and 
produce knowledge. 
Discourse theory (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014; Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, 
2000) represented the most obvious means by which to pursue constructionist research 
where rhetoric and narrative played a key role not just in describing a natural state 
relating to ‘the environment’, but in constituting it and defining actors, relationships, 
and so forth. However, in practice, elements from the CDA approach and corpus 
linguistics were utilised to help articulate discourse analysis as a set of methodological 
procedures. 
Discourse theory does not contain a consistently applied and generally agreed 
upon set of methodological procedures. The foundational text, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, set forth a series of conceptual tools and grammars that facilitated the analysis 
of discourse and policy, but did not articulate a specific process by which the analysis 
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could or should be conducted. Subsequent work in the ‘Essex School’ (e.g. Howarth, 
Norval, Stavrakakis, 2000; Laclau, 1994) of discourse analysis furthered these concepts 
through various theoretical and applied arguments and projects, presenting different 
ways in which empirical phenomena can be captured and understood. It is this body of 
work, therefore, that I draw on primarily for the interpretation and analysis of discourse. 
Discourses on sustainability make numerous claims about the role of economic 
growth, innovation, technology, consumerism, the state, citizenship, and so on, in ways 
that are possible, but not necessary. The use of abductive logic avoids the apriorism of 
fixed categories as is seen with more grand-theory approaches and deductive studies. 
Abductive logic, instead, begins with a ‘surprising empirical fact’ (Watts and Stenner, 
2012: 43) and this study employs works on a similar premise by incorporating discourse 
theory’s preference for initially investigatory study. This initial investigatory phase 
explored various literatures, statements, and speeches across states and IGOs, as well as 
situated knowledges in China, conversations with experts (experts of particular 
disciplines, or experts by experience of environmental burdens such as air pollution). As 
such, data is collected in an initial phase before the determination of modes of 
representing it or choices about where to concentrate a detailed analysis. 
Shenyang was chosen for this part of the exploratory research. Shenyang 
represents a particularly acute instance of the conflation of economic and environmental 
interests. As a large centre of heavy industry in China’s northeast (Dōngběi), Shenyang 
has played a historical role in the development of Chinese industry. Petrochemicals, 
metallurgy (particularly steel), electronics and machinery are the pillar industries of the 
province, while Shenyang also plays a significant role in the defence industry. At the 
same time, the local climate necessitates substantial energy expense on heating during 
the winter, heavily derived from coal-powered plants. These broad factors combine to 
produce air and water pollution which, at the start of this research project, were the 
‘worst ever’ seen in the country (BBC, 2015). At the time, state media blamed the local 
government (Global Times, 2015), whilst this study found that local government officials 
were limited by state government policy on the closure of polluting factories. Moreover, 
the air quality crisis occurred after local and state governments, as well as state and 
international medias, claimed a ‘turning point’ from ‘gray to green’ (e.g Larson, 2011). 
As part of this initial exploration I compiled a corpus of English-language 
documents sourced primarily online from a variety of formal sources: Chinese 
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governmental agencies, EU agencies, various UN agencies, the OECD, IMF, World Bank, 
AIIB, among others. The aim here was to reflect a wide range of formal institutional 
discourses around sustainability. Next, a similar technique was used that focused on 
INGOs and NGOs. Texts where then selected for a close analysis. These were gathered 
through a mixed approach, combining stratified searches online and convenience 
sampling in person and online. The strata varied according to chapter. Chapter Four’s 
contribution to the language of performative sustainability was developed from a 
sample of green advertising. This sample was chosen on the basis of the most commonly 
purchased electric and hybrid vehicles representing a sector, transport, that accounts for 
the largest GHG emissions in the UK. ‘Sampling’ for discourse theoretical analysis does 
not aim to find a comprehensive, representative sample of all possibilities of articulation 
(which is theoretically endless), but to represent those of hegemonic blocs where 
particular meanings are solidified through articulatory practices and enjoy a ‘taken for 
granted’, or sedimented, status.  Chapters Five and Six searched records of various 
Chinese institutions relating to sustainability or development, such as the Ministry for 
Ecology. This included formal announcements made through or included in state-
owned media. In the corpora record in Annex II, this is recorded as the named official 
making the comments, followed by the platform on which they appear.  
Annex II (Figures 10 – 14) provides a breakdown of the texts selected for close 
analysis to inform the study, including content, date, author or origin, type of text, and 
source. It should be noted that, in addition to these corpora, in-person experiences 
inevitably informed the interpretative analysis. This included formal and informal 
discussions in China and engagements with numerous events during the two-week 
period of the UNFCCC COP23, including official events by China, the EU, IPCC, UNEP, 
and other states including the UK, Germany, France, and several ‘host countries’ of the 
BRI. Moreover, a substantial body of literature contributed to the development of 
concepts and themes in this thesis, which were further refined through presenting to 
conferences and workshops between 2016 and 2019. These have not been reproduced 
here but are reflected in the Literature Review and bibliography.  
These corpora comprise 105 texts in total, broken down between Chapter 4 (41), 
Chapter 5 (20), and Chapter 6 (44). Chapter 4’s second stage analysis contains more 
imagery given the focus on advertising and consumer-facing materials. Texts are 
grouped according to the chapter to which they relate most directly. This broadly reflects 
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the sequence by which they were first engaged with over the course of the research. 
Chapter 4 is further grouped into two subsections relating to IGO texts (Figure 10) and 
advertising texts (Figure 11). Chapter 5 is a single corpus (Figure 12). Chapter 6 is further 
grouped into two subsections relating to ecological civilization (EC) in Chinese external 
relations generally (Figure 13) and EC in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) specifically 
(Figure 14). Where possible, URLs that have ceased functioning or redirect since being 
analysed have been replaced by archived versions which reflect the content and format 
of online content at the time of the analysis. Following discourse theory, ‘text’ is given a 
wide definition to include multimedia formats and imagery, though in practice the 
majority of articulations were in text form in the narrow sense of the word given the 
concentration on speeches and state or IGO publications. 
The inclusion criteria for close analysis of texts varied by chapter. For Chapter 
Four, concentrating on the social construction of environmental consciousness in 
sustainable consumerism, texts for close analysis from advertising had to be public-
facing and offering a product or service reflecting allegedly ‘green’ qualities, values, or 
processes. In Chapter Five, it was necessary that the text be articulated or endorsed by 
the Chinese state, be articulated domestically (i.e. pertain to China’s internal governing), 
and mention ‘ecological civilization’, or commonly associated terms, such as ‘living in 
harmony with nature’. For Chapter Six, close readings of texts were conducted on those 
which specifically articulated ecological civilization in an international context outwith 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A second round focused on broader ‘greening’ 
language associated with the BRI, including articulations of ecological civilization. The 
choice to focus on the BRI reflected its unparalleled scope in terms of capital, the spaces 
it occupied within and outwith China, the emphasis placed on it by the Chinese state, 
and the engagement with it by IGOs and INGOs. Once texts were selected for close 
analysis, rather than focusing on the corpus-linguistic factors such as word frequency 
and collocation, the analysis followed a qualitative, interpretivist approach. Four related 
aspects are used for the qualitative analysis: content, context, actors, and specific 
procedures. While their use helps to make the critique a more transparent process, these 
are necessarily broad in order help alleviate a priori assumptions about what specifically 
is being looked for. This replaces the deductive tendency of hypothesis testing (the 
positivistic hypothetico-deductive model) in favour of an abductive approach. The steps 
for analysing a given text were therefore to question: 
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• What is the content of the text? How is meaning portrayed and solidified around 
key terms such as sustainability, consumer, or ecological civilization? 
• What is the context of the text’s emergence and its articulatory practices? Is it 
presented as a solution to a given issue? How is that issue constructed as a 
problem? What latent assumptions does the text lean on (e.g. reduced carbon 
emissions = ‘green’)? What knowledge is required and what knowledge(s) are 
obscured or omitted? 
• What actors does the text articulate? What mode does agency take (e.g. a 
protestor? An investor? A consumer? A voter?)   
• What specific practices does the text articulate, call on, or disregard? How does 
the text challenge or continue the hegemonic project of a particular meaning of a 
process or outcome? Does the text allude to a ‘micro-discourse’ of expert 
language, such as carbon trading or climate justice, within a broader discourse 
such as climate change? 
These four lines of questioning relate, in order, to content, context, actors, and specific 
procedures. 
Content, following the poststructuralist tradition, does not refer to an objective 
and universal description of a passage of text, image, or other sensible phenomena, but 
a range of possible articulations. The key focus here, therefore, is the investment of 
meaning in the floating signifiers between discourses, such as ‘sustainability’ as a master 
signifier, but also ‘nature’, ‘wild’, ‘development’ and so forth; terms without a fixed 
definition that appear fixed in context. The overall critical theory agenda of revealing 
such taken-for-granted terms and their contingency, in the Foucauldian sense, is central 
here. Following Wodak’s (2008) Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), and drawing 
more on the Frankfurt School lineage in critical theory, an important consideration here 
is also of a ‘discourse-immanent critique’ which ‘aims at discovering inconsistencies, 
self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal 
structures’ (Wodak, 2008: 88). 
Context, to relate again to the DHA, can be understood as ‘Socio-diagnostic critique’, 
and ‘is concerned with demystifying the – manifest or latent –persuasive or 
‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices’ (ibid., italics original). However, 
whereas the DHA, following its CDA heritage, draws ‘on social theories as well as other 
theoretical models from various disciplines to interpret the discursive events’, discourse 
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theory contains its analysis entirely within the discursive; Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
the social as constituted by rather than constitutive of language allows for this. 
Nevertheless, the importance of locating the text within the social is paramount to the 
discourse analysis, however the ‘social’ is conceived.  
Actors refers to the importance of identifying agency in the discourse; with whom 
does power to do things lie and who is precluded from acting. This is an essential aspect 
for analysis where interpolation and subject positions, following discourse theory’s 
radicalising of Althusser, are explored. In this sense, the analysis incorporates not just 
who is called upon but in what ways. Such a focus is particularly revealing, for example, 
in the sustainable consumer discourses where citizens are called upon to act through 
consumption in order to drive innovation to help solve the climate change problem. This 
raises a key question that is investigated in the close analysis stage: what forms of 
inclusion do sustainable discourses construct, and how are dominant social relations 
implicated in such an articulation? 
Specific practices refer to the analysis of strategic actions within the text and is a 
way of identifying intertextual crossover. For example, carbon trading is alluded to 
frequently in EU-China dialogues of climate change, as well as in each region’s internal 
documents. Specific practices can thus contain a type of ‘micro discourse’ whereby 
specific terms and phrases make sense in relation to the practice itself and what it enables 
or restricts. Within the ‘global green new deal’ discourse, for example, investment is 
understood as a particular (‘green’) type, enabling the creation of jobs and investment 
returns, but restricting which industries receive that investment. Within the context of 
the document, then, ‘investment’ has particular connotations and restrictions which 
aren’t necessarily present in another. 
To put this in practice using a limited sample of the discursive resources, Figure 
4 demonstrates this with an illustration of specific texts. Here, the nodal point, the 
consumer, is understood in relation to various moments. This represents a snapshot of 
one articulation of the consumer role in sustainability transformations, taken from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Green Growth 
agenda: 
Consumers account for more than 60% of final consumption in the OECD area, 
and can have a major impact on green growth by purchasing products that have 
desirable environmental properties such as recyclability and energy efficiency, 
and by modifying their behaviour to support environmental goals.  (OECD, 2018.) 
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Consumers are key to driving sustainable production and play a central role in 
sustainable development. (OECD, 2008.) 
‘Consumer’ as an identity, or subject position in discourse theory, is equated with 
various elements: driving innovation in production; achieving development; growth; 
freedom; individual choice. This is typical of economic intergovernmental organisations, 
post-industrial states, and indeed similar to what can be seen in companies: consumers 
are the agents of change. These elements become moments within the articulation of the 
consumer. Similar articulations, calling on similar moments to give meaning to 
consumerism, represent iterations of this. 
  
In contrast, Figure 5 shows the same nodal term, consumer, in a counter-
discourse – a different way of articulating what is meant by consumerism, or what it 
ought to mean in a context of sustainability transition. It provides a very different subject 
position for individuals to occupy. From Friends of the Earth’s (UK) position on 
consumption (FoE, 2018): 
We often buy things not because we need them, but because it makes us feel good 
and expresses who we are. We do need to consume stuff to survive and enjoy life, 
but excessive consumption is damaging the environment and harming people. 
We need to reduce overconsumption by doing more with what we have (eg by 
Figure 4: Chains of equivalence between the nodal point ‘consumer’ and its signifiers in OECD 
articulations. 
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sharing, making better products, developing a circular economy), changing how 
we market and advertise, increasing empathy towards others to encourage more 
careful consumption, and supporting ways of expressing who we are that don’t 
involve excessive consumption (eg through sports).  
Here, the chains of equivalence drawn between consumerism as the nodal term and 
innovation, choice, development, growth, and so on, are replaced by more negative 
equivalences: excess, environmental damage, and social harm.  The basic distinction 
between these two articulations of consumerism is that the latter seeks to limit the harm 
of consumerism, while the former understands consumerism as inherent to the fix. In 
the business-as-usual-friendly OECD articulation (fig. 2), consumers are powerful 
agents of change whose outcome-affecting power must be harnessed to achieve anything 
sustainable. In the environmental NGO example (fig. 4), consumers are a body to be 
limited, consumerism as a practice is problematised, and alternatives modes of 
identification are encouraged, in this case, ‘through sports’.  
 
 
When nodal points are articulated and re-articulated in this way, discourse theory refers 
to them as floating signifiers. This captures the political process: one group of people 
articulate a term in one way, opening up one set of regulatory criteria for subjects to 
Figure 5: Counter-articulation of the ‘consumer’ in Friends of the Earth articulation.  
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occupy, and another group take the same term and open a different set of criteria. Political 
struggle, essentially, comes down to the power of one set of socially available, regulatory 
criteria to be taken as ‘common sense’ (or ‘sedimented discourse’ in PDT) whereby it is 
simply accepted as the way things are.  
In the poststructuralist tradition, the privileged role of consumerism in 
mainstream sustainability transitions can be viewed as a product of this necessary 
feature of language. Sedimented discourse is necessary for the communal understanding 
of meaning among a given social group – it accounts for the relative permanency and 
resilience in the relationship between signifier and signified. While resilient structures 
can appear fixed, poststructuralist accounts insist this sense of permanency is illusionary 
and resilient structures can and do change over time and space. This insistence that 
relationships between the signifier and signified change marks the key distinction 
between the structural linguistics of Saussure et al and poststructural linguistics.  
Whilst these figures are intended only to illustrate the approach, the small 
samples are still revealing. For example, existing institutions are called upon in the 
OECD text. In the FoE text, existing institutions are problematised to a degree, but action 
is still individualised: the reader is called upon to assert their individuality in more 
sustainable ways. What’s missing from both texts is the role of collective action. Both 
texts can be critiqued for incorporating a neoliberal drive whereby the individual is 
alienated, and social factors such as empathy become a condition of consumption, rather 
than of collective political action or solidarity in a more organised sense. The individual 
as the determined agent of change remains a more fundamental point of convergence 
between the two otherwise oppositional texts.  
While it is important to not draw too wide a conclusion from limited texts (FoE 
articulate elsewhere the importance of collective action), the point here is the near 
limitless potential of consumerism demonstrated by two seemingly competing 
discourses. In FoE’s text, consumption, whilst problematised, is still constructed as being 
capable of incorporating both care and empathy, and the need ‘of expressing who we 
are’ maintains the external locus of identity that drives consumerism as a performative 
act, or, following Marx, ([1844] 1972: 81) as a transformative act.  
In practice, these criteria of analysis produced an array of factors relating to 
‘sustainable consumption’ as a discourse, which became the focal point of the discourse 
analysis as a more specific manifestation of the hegemonic sustainability discourse. This 
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was adopted into the theoretical framework, and thus informed subsequent analysis of 
the ‘sustainable consumer-subject’ and to highlight the role of sustainability agendas 
versus sustainability outcomes in producing what I term one-dimensional sustainability. 
Specifically, these consisted of active-positive language, complexity reduction, economic 
rationalisation, representation and participation, problem construction, and open 
signification. 
However, it should be reiterated that discourse theory represents a series of 
overarching concepts that inform the research project throughout. Critical analysis is not 
merely a specific device employed at a particular point, but an encompassing philosophy 
brought to bear continuously on not just ‘data’ per se, but in all aspects of carrying out 
research. 
3.4.1. Research ethics 
In addition to corpus discourse analysis, initially11 the data collection aimed to conduct 
interviews and use Q-methodology in China with local stakeholders – this would have 
provided an insight into to the ways in which extant networks interpreted and made 
sense of sustainability from an abductive logic approach. This ‘departs from and 
represents a critique of hypothetico-deductive logic which typifies knowledge 
production in much mainstream research’ (Capdevila and Lazard, 2008), opening up 
space for the study of marginalised perspectives. A comprehensive online programme 
was developed for this purpose, using a series of professionally translated statements 
gathered from focus groups of Chinese postgraduate students from Liaoning University, 
coded to their English translation. I considered ethics from several perspectives: 
participation, data security, researcher reflexivity, and lastly cross-cultural and 
postcolonial research. Ethics approval was awarded by De Montfort University for 
carrying out the research in China over a 3-year period. In addition to this, I held 
conversations with academics at Liaoning University on issues of ethics and data 
security in a Chinese context (June 2016 and June 2017). Overall, the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) Framework for Research Ethics (2015, updated January 2016) 
 
 
11 This is included briefly as a reflection on the eventual path the research took – whilst unused 
directly, it remained an important part of my approach to research in China due to the lessons 
learnt. Owing to the nature of interpretive research, the final analysis would have been different 
without these earlier exploratory paths.  
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provided the ethical framework for identity protection, data security, and researcher 
integrity.  
The fieldwork coincided with a state crackdown on academic dissent and general 
difficulty in gaining access to NGOs, academics, and public officials. As Tran puts it, 
universities ‘will be closely scrutinised, professors will be evaluated and the Party will 
punish those lacking ideological firmness…despite the undeniable international 
character of Chinese universities, higher education and research must tow the party line’ 
(Tran, 2017; see also Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, 2016 for a detailed 
discussion of access to participants). In this context, I took ethical and security 
precautions that may have been unnecessary in a different research environment.  
In terms of participation, a key concern was the political nature of the subject and 
the opening up of issues of dissent, particularly in a context where suppression of dissent 
is a widely used tool of state. Because of this, guarantees of anonymity and 
confidentiality were paramount to those I spoke with. In regard to the Q-methodology 
and interviews, I concluded that the hesitancy displayed to discuss potentially political 
issues, both in interviews and in informal situations, reduced the likelihood of gathering 
useful data and increased participants’ unease in the setting. Whilst this was originally 
moved entirely online to help with this, that approach also failed to produce sufficient 
data. As such, it became impossible to gain a significant number of interviews and it was 
agreed collectively with the supervisory team to focus on discourse analysis and 
building a corpus of documents as the main means of data collection and analysis. 
Ethical considerations remained both in relation to the collection and analysis of 
documents and other discursive phenomena. 
Issues of studies conducted by researchers based in the West on populations 
based in developing countries or other historically marginalised communities has 
gained traction in post-colonial research as an issue of ethics (see, for example, Jack and 
Westwood, 2006; Tikly and Bond, 2013; Robinson-Pant and Singal, 2013). Fundamentally, 
this tackles the discursive representations of post-colonial and developing countries in 
the West, as well as highlighting the role of power. Together, this brings to light the issue 
of ‘voice’ in the research. How are historically marginalised communities portrayed and 
emancipated? How can research in and on developing countries avoid replicating the 
‘colonial project in the way it appropriates the Other?’ (Jack and Westwood, 2006).  
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While China has eluded some attempts to classify or categorise its state of 
development, official accounts have insisted on the ‘developing country’ status, and 
indeed scholars at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in their comprehensive Chinese 
Modernisation Report, 2005 argue China could reach ‘developed’ status around 2080, and 
‘moderately developed’ around 2050, concluding the Chinese economy was around 100 
years behind that of the G7 states in 2001 (China.org.cn, 2005). In 2011, the same research 
consortium classified China as ‘an elementary developed country’ (CAS, 2011), and in 
2009 ranked it 7th in an index of cultural influence, behind the US, Germany, UK, France, 
Italy, and Spain (CAS, 2009).   
For the research pathway taken, it remained important to avoid projecting 
epistemic claims which reflected an historically Westernised, techno-managerial and 
empiricist approach to knowing about, in particular, nature. As such, the research 
project does not dismiss local and Indigenous knowledges on grounds of science – there 
is no objective ‘truth’ deployed to legitimise or illegitimise those discourses. In this sense, 
knowledge was not imposed to discredit representations of nature. This also speaks to 
the ethics underlying the data gathering: by engaging with local academics and 
researchers I aimed to gather what Holliday (2013) refers to as a ‘decentred attitude to 
research ethics’. Throughout the thesis, there is a concern with avoiding the ‘Othering’ 
and homogenising of broad and varied cultures, societies, and communities, which 
formed an essential part of the research journey whilst in China, if not ultimately in a 
determinable aspect of the data.  
3.5.  Conclusion 
Poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT) can show how discursive structures construct 
subject positions and power relations. Furthering Foucauldian theory, PDT develops the 
insights of how ‘truth’ emerges and represents a function of power. It is possible, and 
important, to distinguish the material ‘existence’ of a phenomenon from its social ‘being’ 
– PDT, as deployed here, focuses on the latter. For instance, the exploding volcano ‘exists’ 
but does not contain meaning. Instead, meaning is projected onto it as the moment is 
incorporated within a discourse of signs. Whether it is understood as an act of gods, or 
outcome of converging and diverging tectonic plates, depends on the available 
discursive resources with which to invest the phenomenon with meaning. This a 
function of power – the structuration of a discourse, what it includes and occludes.  
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A hegemonic discourse therefore wields the ability to supply meaning. In the 
case of the volcano, it might incorporate the eruption into a discourse of governance: the 
displeasure of gods serving as a regime for regulating behaviours, creating governable 
subjects and concentrating the right to knowledge production in an elite priesthood or 
similar. Absorbed into the meaning-making structure of scientific volcanology, it 
provides valuable insights into the reliability of models to predict hazards, but also 
occludes alternative knowledges and places ‘objective’ knowledge out of reach of the 
untrained. Discourse theory does not provide a clear means of making a judgement on 
which of these is ‘best’. Instead, PDT points to the importance of radical democracy, of 
building alliances, and of exercising the political, formed of antagonisms, in public 
spaces. 
Why does this matter for this study? Sustainable development represents a 
hegemonic discourse. Instead of an erupting volcano, it supplies meaning for other 
phenomena: climate disruption, the extinction of species, collapse of ecosystems, plastic 
pollution, and so on. To take the latter as an example, scientific discourses have 
invaluably increased our knowledge of the extent of microscopic plastic pollution that is 
otherwise invisible to sensory experience. The existence of this plastic is a material reality. 
Sustainable development invests it with meaning. It is not the only discourse to do this, 
but it is the dominant narrative in policymaking. It is possible to articulate the ubiquitous 
presence of plastic throughout the world in grand discourses of the circular economy, or 
by the far more limited interventions into consumer behaviour through plastic bag 
charges. Even social phenomena, such as the airing of BBC’s Blue Planet II, as covered 
earlier, become absorbed by the prevailing discourse of sustainable consumption.  
The role of discourses in producing power and constructing subject positions is 
therefore central to an inquiry into the sustainable consumer subject, how it is 
constructed and governed, and what subject positions are constructed by opposing 
discourses. For this reason, the thesis turns to an exploration of these subject positions 
in the discourse of Western sustainable development transitions.   
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4. One-Dimensional Sustainability   
 
 
In general, people are treated as consumers rather than citizens 
UK Ministry of Defence, 2018 
 
By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and 
awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature 
Sustainable Development Goal 12, Target 12.8. UN, 2015 
 
 
 
This chapter details the construction of the ‘sustainable consumer’ in neoliberal 
sustainable development. As identified in the literature review, investigations of the 
‘subject’ of sustainability transitions – who is brought into being as the agent of change, 
who is made governable – is underdeveloped in global political ecology. From this 
analysis, the sustainable consumer subject, the space created by discursive resources of 
sustainable development, is made comparable to the subjects that arise from Chinese 
discourses. For this reason, this chapter focuses on Western articulations of sustainable 
development and constructions of the environmental subject and the discursive 
conditions that mediate their access to nature. As highlighted by the quotes above, the 
key contradiction that drives this analysis is the construction of both the consumer and 
the sustainable citizen.  
The UK Ministry of Defence in its Global Strategic Trends report (6th edition, 
October 2018) states that ‘In general, people are treated as consumers rather than 
citizens’, it goes on to observe that  
there is a seller’s market for loyalty and identity, which is led by non-state actors, 
including megacities and corporations. Most people have multilayered identities 
that not only reflect allegiances to non-state actors, but also a particular nation or 
region. (UK Ministry of Defence, 2018: 26). 
The construction of people as consumers, and related issues of identity, have, at this 
small scale, been securitised in official defence literature before it is even acknowledged 
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in reports of environmental, development, or climate change departments and agencies 
as a category distinct from the needs of consumption.  
This construction of consumers, in particular the sustainable consumer, is the 
main focus of this chapter. I argue that the ways in which environmental and climatic 
factors are problematised, and their solutions, agency, limits and opportunities 
articulated, are functions of a hegemonic consumerist discourse that privileges a 
performative sustainability which suppresses both environmental impacts and 
subaltern ways of knowing nature and crisis. Talk of ‘sustainability’ is primarily a 
performative practice where the continuation of consumerism with minimal reformation 
is the one of the ‘sustained’ activities. Sustainability in the ecological sense, here 
understood as a ‘safe operating space’ within planetary boundaries, is reduced to an 
aesthetic; a product-distinguishing quality whose sign-value as sustainable identity is 
divorced from its utility value as functionally sustainable. As Connolly and Prothero (2003) 
note, ‘Consumers, even when they are environmentally concerned, are still consuming, 
only they consume perceived green products and recycle more. The actual level of 
consumption is not identified as a problem’ (2003: 288). 
Goal 12 of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, above, shows how this 
subject position is dependent on the handing down of the right information, while 
‘lifestyles in harmony with nature’ are a function of sustainable consumption and 
production (Goal 12). Not only are consumers constructed as an agent of change and as 
form of citizen but are they one of only two subjects created by the discourse: the second 
is the opposition contained in the articulation of the sustainable consumer, the 
unsustainable consumer.  
The chapter presents an interpretive analysis of globalised sustainable 
development narratives to develop an understanding of how (green) consumers are 
constructed. As such, it serves to ground the broader argument regarding the 
convergence and divergence between China’s ecological civilization and Westernised 
sustainability discourse. The overall concept of ‘one-dimensional sustainability’ is 
developed with reference to institutionalised and elite discourses, and illustrative 
articulations of the sustainable consumer in marketing. Doing so enables subsequent 
analysis to proceed from a discussion of globalised sustainability discourses: the 
question becomes to what extent counter-discourses assert a multidimensional 
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sustainability, one that includes and articulates elements in transformational ways, and 
what forms this takes.   
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (2002 [1991]) explores the tendency for a modern 
technocratic society to dominate the human experience, so that people live within and 
according to a single capitalist dimension. The link to the Marcusian canon largely 
begins and ends here, however. Unlike Marcuse’s project, post-structuralist discourse 
theory (PDT) is not concerned with unravelling a system of oppression so that 
humanity’s ‘real’ desires (or class, or other base identity) can be realised beneath it: there 
is no getting ‘behind’ discourse. Nevertheless, the concept of the one-dimensional 
experience is salient to the ways in which consumers are constructed as such in relation 
to sustainability. It serves to frame, for the purposes of this analysis, the singular, techno-
managerial dimension in which agency is sanctioned and applied by elite and 
institutionalised sustainability discourses.  
The one dimension through which sustainability-as-crisis is articulated 
depoliticises sustainability by the occlusion and co-option of alternatives. Equally 
importantly, it renders what re-politicising sustainability might look like: the 
understanding and pursuit of ‘sustainability’ in different dimensions beyond the 
consumer or commercial; beyond the governmentality of neoliberal economising. A 
counterhegemonic project, therefore, can be determined by the ways in which it forms 
new imaginaries by articulating different ways of living with and within nature – the 
imagination au pouvoir in Marcuse’s vernacular12.  ‘One-dimensional sustainability’ is 
thus an overarching vocabulary for interpreting the more jargonistic concepts of green 
performativity and aesthetics developed in this chapter.  
One dimensional sustainability does not represent a structurally determined 
inevitability. It is, in a post-structuralist sense, in a state of continual flux – responding 
dynamically to the challenges presented to it by the emergence of counterhegemonic 
discourses, in turn reflecting the categories of differentiation between competing 
discourses. Discourses that articulate broader and deeper connections between humans 
and nature, indeed that move beyond the anthropocentric ‘human excemptionalism’ of 
 
 
12 Though an orthodox interpretation of the Marcusian ‘imagination of power’ would place 
perhaps too much emphasis on the ability of the individual consciousness (the formerly-One-
Dimensional [Hu]Man) to overthrow a systemic oppression. 
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late modernity (Dunlap and Catton, 1994) represent challenges to the Westernised 
hegemony, with both degrowth (and, to a lesser extent, post-growth) socioeconomics 
and Chinese ecological civilization articulating some elements in this way. The sustainable 
consumer aesthetic calls on the elements beyond this singular dimension. More 
appropriately, then, one-dimensional sustainability is a constantly evolving war of 
position in the Gramscian sense: it adapts to challenge. Other dimensions in which to 
realise citizen, community, and other forms of organised political agency exist insofar as 
they form discourses by which their actuality is articulated. As Howarth points out, 
drawing on Gramsci, ‘the political aspects of a practice involve attempts to challenge 
and replace existing social structures, as well as attempts to neutralize such challenges 
in a transformist way’ (Howarth, 2010: 328). 
In PDT, the social arrangement is never finished, and as such one-dimensional 
sustainability, or any discourse, exists in a constant state of becoming; a detailed 
rendering of its discursive structuration is a snapshot of a system in flux. Arguably, very 
recent, and currently unfolding, events have done much to re-politicise what 
‘sustainability’ means. Protests under the banner of Extinction Rebellion and the Youth 
Climate Strikes have, purposefully or not, built a wide alliance under broad signifiers of 
emergency. Though it cannot form a significant part of this study, the emergence of a 
broad alliance that rejects not just inaction on climate and ecological ‘emergencies’, but 
single-track sustainability agendas that occlude social justice or privilege economic 
‘sense’, represents a strong emergent counter-hegemony, often in the same spaces where 
they interact and compete with the deeply sedimented discourses they challenge, such 
as London. A Gramscian war-of-position over floating signifiers, as would be expected, 
is evidenced, for example, by the declaration of a ‘climate emergency’ (representing the 
first of three demands of the group) by the United Kingdom. A later aim for a net-zero 
carbon economy by 2050 is reminiscent of Extinction Rebellion’s second demand, albeit 
the latter demands a 2025 deadline.  
With the continuation of business-as-usual in all significant respects, it remains 
unclear what actions and outcomes a climate emergency declaration and net-zero target 
have set in motion. Regardless, the declaration has, already in its short life, been used to 
disarm protestors of their legitimacy, as in the case of a Greenpeace UK protest in June 
2019. Here, following the peaceful disruption (and violent reaction), the UK Foreign 
Secretary at the time, Jeremy Hunt, resumed his speech at the briefly interrupted event: 
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The irony of course is that this is the government that has just led the world by 
committing to a zero-carbon economy by 2050 [extended applause]. (The 
Guardian, 2019.)      
The co-option of counterhegemonic demands as a pacification exercise, wherein the 
phrase coined loses its signification of radical, transformative change is especially 
significant in the context of ‘finding sustainability’ in a deeply consumerist culture. The 
tendency for language to be co-opted and rendered under a different meaning-giving 
structure of antagonisms, differentiation, equivalencies and agencies is a central point of 
analysis in PDT, and the central object of study in this chapter: articulation by consumer 
discourses of a ‘sustainability’ in which the consumer is constructed as the agent of 
change. 
The chapter proceeds by first offering a post-structural discourse analysis of 
institutionalised sustainability discourse. It identifies and details a series of discursive 
characteristics of the sustainable consumer discourse, following, broadly, the self-
interpretive approach detailed in the Logics method of PDT (Glynos and Howarth 2007; 
Howarth, Glynos and Griggs 2016) and detailed in Chapter 3. Following the steps of 
critique (ibid.; see also Chapter 3 of the thesis), this section applies and retroductively 
develops the theory.  
The IGO literatures analysed represent two discernible discourses of 
consumption in sustainability transitions between which the role and agency of the 
consumer, and citizens as consumers, varies. In terms of PDT the equivalences and 
differentiations that serve to invest the ‘consumer’ with meaning, both as a governed 
subject and an agentic category, differ so as an antagonism is discernible between rival 
constructions of the consumer. A third discourse that challenges key equivalences in 
these discourses is then shown as an emergent counter-hegemony with increasing, 
though still fringe, institutionalisation.  
From this, the second section identifies two related but distinguishable 
discourses of the consumer: as ‘manageable’ and as ‘innovator’. A third discourse that 
goes beyond the consumer, in both post-growth and degrowth iterations, is briefly 
explored as a re-emergent discourse whose counterhegemonic challenge forms part of 
its self-identity. 
In the ‘manageable consumer’, ‘natural resources’ are ‘limited’ and ‘wise use’ is 
necessary. Production and consumption must become ‘responsible’ and ‘basic needs’ are 
discernible from ‘perceived’ ones. These patterns are governable by the application of 
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appropriate policies by state governments. Sustainability is something done to 
consumers. 
The ‘innovative consumer’, on the other hand, is a fundamental, privileged agent 
of change. The availability of choice in the system is the given condition for the consumer 
to ‘drive innovation’. In this articulation, consumers act rationally according to the 
information they have.  
For ‘manageable consumer’, sustainability is something done to consumers; in the 
latter, something produced by them. Producer and consumer are thus performed by the 
same overdetermined subject: individuals are called upon to produce the aesthetic they 
consume, that of the responsible, green consumer.  
A final, counterhegemonic discourse of ‘limits to growth’, popularised by the 
Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report in 1973 but largely subsumed by the sustainable 
development discourse of the late 1980s onwards (Dryzek 2013: 147-160) has 
(re)emerged as a counter-articulatory practice to the growth-dependent economic 
paradigm (Daly, 1996; Jackson, 2009; Victor, 2008; Jackson 2013; Dietz and O’Neil, 2013). 
Cross-party groups on post-growth economics have, for example, formed in the EU and 
UK parliaments. While representing an antagonism over the signifier ‘growth’, among 
others, its articulation of the consumer is radicalised. 
4.1.  Logics of sustainable consumerism   
The discourse analysis here and in subsequent chapters follows the poststructuralist 
tradition in the style of Laclau and Mouffe (2014 [1985]) and what has become the Essex 
School of discourse theory (Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000; Laclau 2005; 
Howarth 2010; Jacobs 2018, among others). Jacobs (2018), arranges the grammar of 
poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT) thus:  
“signification” is a product of the “articulation” of certain “elements” as 
“moments” that are “dispersed” in a specific pattern. When such “dispersions” 
become “regular” through continuous “iteration,” the “discourses” they 
constitute become “hegemonic” “structurations.” This implies that there are no 
“extra-discursive” structures beyond “hegemony. (Jacobs, 2018: 3-4.) 
Through performance of the ‘green consumer’ the arbitrary connections between the 
consumer, the consumed, and notions of sustainability are created and affirmed. To 
Jacobs’ (ibid.) arrangement it is necessary to add the concept of nodal point which 
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represents the privileged sign that centres the network of meaning and thus organises 
meaning (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 112). 
From a PDT analysis of governmental and intergovernmental literatures, as well 
as predominantly online marketing messaging of hybrid and electric vehicle 
manufacturers, I identify seven logics that sustainable consumer discourses build on. 
Each of these are identified by features of text and image use, contributing to an overall 
aesthetic. It is important to note, however, that they remain interrelated, and 
individually are insufficient as critique or explanation. Equally importantly, the archival 
material analysed, in particular marketing messaging, frequently displayed 
characteristics of seemingly oppositional logics, even within the same text. For example, 
both Toyota and Nissan on specific consumer product pages reduce environmental 
complexity to specific, narrow indicators by which a general ‘sustainability’ is 
articulated. Elsewhere, however, they each have rich stories of broader sustainability in 
which the consumer is welcomed to partake, albeit rarely with clear indicators. 
As such, the discourse represents a richly textured sustainability agenda, 
wherein both simplifying the message for consumers, whilst also telling a wider story 
about ‘build[ing] a more sustainable future’ (Nissan 2019a) or creating a ‘better Earth’ 
(Toyota 2019d) are necessary. What follows is the application of this theoretical approach 
to the critical analysis of sustainable consumer discourse, while considering the 
extensive secondary literature that helps reveal a rendering of the discourse’s object’s 
functional sustainability.  
4.1.1. Active-positive language 
As opposed to limiting damage in certain categories of ecological impact (for example, 
driving an electric vehicle reduces emissions), active-positive language constructs the 
consumer performance as an active contribution to environmental protection. 
Purchasing the product ‘produces’ an active environmental benefit. The act of 
consumption must be a given in this scenario: the ‘good’ comes from not consuming a 
similar product without the ‘green’ credentials. For example, buying an electric vehicle 
is, in absolute terms, still contributing to carbon emissions, congestion, roadwork 
infrastructure, particulate matter pollution, and material drain. It is only ‘green’ in 
relative terms, where buying an electric vehicle replaces buying a conventional vehicle. 
This takes the latter act as a given in order to achieve a relative environmental good – it 
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perpetuates an inherently unsustainable practice by constructing relative gains as 
absolute gains.  
For instance, Toyota’s Sustainable Mobility13 agenda opens with the paragraph: 
As one of the world’s leading car manufacturers, we take our responsibility to 
help protect the environment seriously. We are creating vehicles which have as 
little impact as possible on the natural world around us. It is important to us to 
find cleaner, sustainable ways of making vehicles and disposing of them when 
they reach the end of their useful life. (Toyota 2019e.) 
In helping to ‘protect the environment’, the discourse enables the consumer to signify 
Toyota with active protection, rather than merely reduced impacts. The second sentence 
helps confirm this. Vehicles with ‘as little impact as possible’ still have an impact which, 
as argued below, can be substantially higher than that of conventional vehicles, even at 
the point of use.  
On the same page, Toyota’s agenda claims ‘We have spent decades researching 
how we can make vehicles that are kinder to the environment’ (Ibid.). The identity of the 
‘sustainable’ vehicle (‘vehicles which have as little impact as possible on the natural 
world around us’; ‘kinder’ vehicles) is constituted by the existence of the ‘unsustainable’ 
vehicle – the reference point for finding ‘cleaner’ and ‘kinder’ ways of manufacture and 
disposal. The sustainability sign-value of hybrid and electric vehicles is much more 
questionable in the absence of conventional vehicles. This example is particularly salient 
given the evidence that electric vehicles have a higher material footprint than 
conventional vehicles, with the manufacturing phase dominating the life-cycle material 
footprint (Sen et al 2019). Similarly, Yu et al. (2018) found that a comparison between 
conventional vehicle and electric vehicle power systems in China showed resource 
depletion and environmental impacts of electric vehicles were significantly higher. Two 
types of electric vehicle power systems showed total environmental loads of 376% and 
119% higher than that of conventional vehicles (Yu et al., 2018.)  
Most importantly for the consumer, the end-use of an electric vehicle is where 
the majority of the environmental potential is located. As numerous studies have found 
 
 
13 The Sustainable Mobility landing page reflects the most comprehensive sustainable agenda 
quickly accessible on Toyota UK’s website. On a desktop-optimised site, the pages are reached 
quickly in the online customer journey via the dropdown from the banner menu, the landing 
page is two clicks away under ‘Environment'.  
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(Onat, Kucukvar and Tatari 2015; Casals et al 2016; Yu et al 2018; among others), this 
actual benefit varies significantly depending on the power-generation used to charge the 
electric vehicle. For example, Onat et al (2015) found that electric vehicles were the least 
carbon-intensive vehicle option in just 24 of 50 states in the US. In the majority of states, 
electric vehicles performed worse on the key indicator in which they are supposed to be 
leading the way.  
This is pertinent to much of the advertising of electric and hybrid vehicles. One 
widely shared advert (e.g. Wired 2010; New York Times 2010a) 
follows a solitary polar bear on a trek south from a warming Arctic, through 
forests, along highways and into the city, finally reaching a driveway in the 
suburbs. There, as a man prepares to open the door to his Nissan Leaf and set off 
on his morning commute, the massive bear rears up on its hind legs and — wait 
for it — gives him a big cuddly hug. (New York Times 2010a) 
The Nissan Leaf is one of the most common electric vehicles in the US. Airing first in the 
coveted advertising space of a National Football League game, the advert constructs a 
direct cause-and-effect between buying the electric vehicle and protecting the Arctic 
from global warming. A separate New York Times article described a sound heard at the 
end of the advert as ‘reminiscent of the so-called aural branding that Intel does in its 
commercials’, about which vice president for Nissan marketing at Nissan North America 
said ‘[w]e’re calling it the sound of innovation’, to brand its ‘innovation for all’ theme 
(New York Times 2010b). 
The advert, and similar calls-to-action, construct consumer action as central to a 
story of innovation that actively protects the ‘environment’, proxied by a polar bear or, 
in other cases, forests. Such discourses rely on the occlusion of environmental impacts 
that do not fit with the aesthetic. By suppressing both elite knowledge about 
environmental impacts, and the lived experience of those closer to, or involved in, 
mining and other distanced effects and processes, the discourse solidifies an aesthetic in 
which the sign-value of sustainability can contribute to a performativity of the green 
consumer wherein a particular purchase signifies a particular protection, and thus a 
particular identity. Consuming a functionally unsustainable vehicle is reconfigured as 
not merely a benign act, but an actively benevolent one.  
As Jackson (2009) highlights, unit-level efficiency savings in vehicles cannot 
offset industry-wide exponential growth – i.e. without sufficient negative contributions 
(such as taking carbon dioxide (CO2) out of the atmosphere), the unsustainability of an 
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industry that grows at an exponential rate is inevitable. Similarly, the review of SDG 12 
(‘Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns’) by the UN High-Level 
Political Forum 2018 found that  
domestic material consumption (DMC) per unit of GDP changed globally from 
1.2 to 1.1 kg per dollar of GDP from 2010 to 2015, indicating that fewer materials 
are required to produce a unit of output. However, DMC per capita and in 
absolute terms from 2000 to 2017 is steadily growing globally, with consequences 
in terms of both resource depletion and associated environmental impacts. (UN 
2018.) 
The material input into the global economy continues to grow, even as unit-level 
efficiencies are made. The same review outlines that  
despite evident progress on the development of policies, knowledge resources 
and technical tools, the application and implementation of these to foster 
concrete and tangible changes in practices and impacts remains limited.  
The manufactured benevolence of individual acts of consumerism, whose functional 
environmental load is worse in many respects, and in some locations worse in all 
respects, that the ‘non-green’ alternative, is a dominant practice among green marketing. 
In any case, the concentration on metrics such as CO2 and nitrogen oxide (NOx) 
emissions, whilst important, indicate another feature of sustainable consumerism 
discourse: complexity reduction.  
4.1.2. Complexity reduction  
Building partially on the key argument of Scott (1998), wherein ‘seeing like a state’ means 
simplifying complex problems in order to make them governable, ‘seeing like a marketer’ 
simplifies a complex problem in order to make it marketable. Correspondingly, ‘seeing 
like a consumer’ means identifying and operating on the basis of sign-values conveyed 
by the acts of obtaining and possession. Reducing ‘environment’, ‘nature’, ‘planet’, or 
other signifiers, to one category of ecological impact (e.g. climate change/CO2 emissions) 
gives the impression of a more general sustainability. For example, limiting CO2 
emissions is a specific action that limits contribution to atmospheric radiative forcing 
(the greenhouse effect) thus reducing a specific negative. But this is discursively 
constructed as ‘environmentally friendly’ (contributing a general positive). This often 
occurs alongside expert-knowledge of a specific type that reinforces the legitimacy. 
Following the same example, claims of ‘environmental kindness’ (e.g. Toyota, 2017a) by 
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hybrid and electric vehicle manufacturers ignores the complex ecological impacts of 
electric and hybrid vehicles as outlined previously. 
Toyota’s Sustainable Mobility agenda claims that: 
We have spent decades researching how we can make vehicles that are kinder to 
the environment, producing technologies such as hybrid that have already 
proved their value in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and helping us move 
towards a low carbon society. We are still on that journey and we want to reduce 
our vehicle CO2 emissions by 90% by 2050, compared to the level we were at in 
2010. (Ibid.) 
The text evokes a common signifier of care for the environment: kindness. But this is 
reduced to greenhouse gas emissions both within the paragraph and throughout the 
agenda, where the ‘ultimate eco car’ is determined purely by its fuel mix, rather than 
any consideration of its distributed material footprint or carbon footprint of production. 
Government policy has similarly relied on reductionist constructions of 
environmental action. In a context of increasing protest and demonstration, the UK’s 
declaration of a climate emergency and adoption of a target for net-zero greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050 is an important example. In this narrative, achieving ‘net-zero’ is 
predicated on electrifying transport, largely as-is. The Committee on Climate Change 
report purposefully privileges ‘greening’ a status quo to the occlusion of radical 
intervention. In response, the UK light transport fleet should be made entirely electric 
by 2050, with the phaseout of new conventional vehicles by 2035. However, ‘the further 
deployment of renewable energy and EVs will result in a dramatic increase in the 
demand for those materials’ such as rare earth elements (Sen et al, 2019; see also US 
Department of Energy, 2015: 7).. 
A letter from the Natural History Museum, signed by eight scientists of an 
interdisciplinary programme on world resources, sets out the functional sustainability 
issues with this approach: 
To replace all UK-based vehicles today with electric vehicles (not including the 
LGV and HGV fleets), assuming they use the most resource-frugal next-
generation NMC 811 batteries, would take 207,900 tonnes cobalt, 264,600 tonnes 
of lithium carbonate (LCE), at least 7,200 tonnes of neodymium and dysprosium, 
in addition to 2,362,500 tonnes copper. This represents, just under two times the 
total annual world cobalt production, nearly the entire world production of 
neodymium, three quarters the world’s lithium production and at least half of 
the world’s copper production during 2018. Even ensuring the annual supply of 
electric vehicles only, from 2035 as pledged, will require the UK to annually 
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import the equivalent of the entire annual cobalt needs of European industry. 
(Herrington, cited in Natural History Museum, 2019.)  
Rather than being solved, environmental and social impacts (Ali, 2014) are simply 
moved around geographically. The letter, taken together with previously outlined 
evidence of distributed environmental impacts of electric vehicles, shows how the 
complexity reduction logic produces a range of unintended environmental 
consequences. The letter shows the exclusion of some forms of knowledge about nature 
from the sustainability transition: in reducing the question of sustainability to one of 
carbon dioxide emissions, the discourse draws a specific, narrow equivalence to one 
indicator of ‘being green’, and leaves the various questions of resource availability, 
ecological impacts from mining, and so on, outwith the structuration. By contrast, the 
letter’s authors draw on a more holistic range of impacts that ‘sustainability’ signifies.  
The greenhouse gas emission reduction strategy is thus a far more narrowed and 
limited agenda than it is portrayed as. The 2050 strategy represents a relatively strong 
rhetorical commitment to progress in one dimension: to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions while sequestering or trading the equivalent of remaining emissions. Yet, in 
announcing the new strategy, the UK May government points out that  
The UK has already reduced emissions by 42% while growing the economy by 
72% and has put clean growth at the heart of our modern Industrial Strategy. 
This could see the number of “green collar jobs” grow to 2 million and the value 
of exports from the low carbon economy grow to £170 billion a year by 2030. (UK 
Government, 2019) 
Challenging the limits to growth discourse (Meadows et al 1973; Daly 1996; Victor 2008; 
Jackson 2009; among others) the simplification logic signifies ‘emissions’ as the only 
externality of growth – once greenhouse gas emissions are sufficiently decoupled from 
GDP growth, ‘clean growth’ can drive the creation of two million ‘green collar jobs’ via 
a ‘modern Industrial Strategy’. This reduces environmental limits to growth to a function 
of GHG emissions, suppressing both the material footprint of economic output and the 
role of exporting manufacturing in reducing the apparent emissions of consumption. 
The latter is made possible due to the territorial measurement of GHG emissions, 
legitimised by the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contribution model of 
assigning emissions to point of release, rather than point of demand.  
In advertising, car manufacturers similarly employ a narrow measure of a 
particular environmental impact as a proxy for a general ‘green’ or ‘eco-friendliness’. In 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 121 of 285 
 
the case of Toyota’s ‘truly visionary car’, the Mirai (Toyota 2019a), consumers are given 
the opening paragraph: 
The Mirai is at the forefront of a new age of hydrogen fuel cell cars that allows 
you to enjoy long distance zero-emissions driving. As well as only producing 
water from its tailpipe – which means no impact on our planet when you're 
driving – the Mirai brings the unique Toyota Hybrid driving experience to a new 
level. 
The consumer’s purchase of the new car is constructed as entirely benign – a balance is 
presented between ‘your driving’ and ‘our planet’, wherein the consumer is empowered 
as a responsible member of the shared commons, our planet.  
On a separate landing page of the same vehicle, accessed immediately under the 
car’s name in the website menu, the Mirai is described under the title ‘the ultimate eco 
car’: 
Mirai truly is a visionary car. By harnessing the power of hydrogen, it represents 
the next generation of electrically powered vehicles. With an energy conversion 
rate two-to-three times greater than conventional engines, Mirai’s hydrogen fuel 
stack means you can go further on less fuel while completely eliminating 
emissions from your car. (Toyota 2019b) 
Determining the ‘ultimate eco car’, then, is the elimination of greenhouse gas emissions 
from the consumer-use. Emissions released during the process of resource extraction, 
transport, manufacture, assemblage and, eventually, disassembly, are entirely excluded 
from the discourse. 
This is accompanied by a series of images of the Mirai as a translucent silhouette 
among ‘natural’ landscapes of dense foliage, as shown in Image 1. The vehicle is 
constructed as something entirely passive to the natural world – its passage will go 
unnoticed by ‘nature’. The consumer can reconcile a desire to be ‘green’, to not damage 
‘nature’, with the desire to purchase the commodity.  
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Image 1: Toyota Mirai image accompaniment to online specification (Toyota 2019c). 
  
The Mirai presents something of a novelty as the only industrially produced hydrogen 
fuel cell car. Hydrogen-powered electric vehicles have been shown to have less impact 
than conventional electric vehicles in GHG emissions and air pollution, which depend 
on the energy production in the local area. However, requiring batteries and other 
advanced electronics, together with conventional materials, means there remains a 
material footprint comparable to other vehicle types, with comparable supply chain 
emissions to electric vehicles.  
Similarly, the Nissan Leaf, one of the most widely used electric cars, offers the 
headline to consumers ‘zero emissions whilst driving’, captioned with ‘sustainable 
driving’ (Nissan 2019a). Further down the same page, a page-spread image features the 
wording (accompanying a clickthrough to ‘savings & benefits’): 
SPEND LESS, GO FURTHER 
LOWER RUNNING COSTS AND MAINTENANCE 
Spend less and gain more. A sustainable future starts here, in the Nissan LEAF. 
(ibid., emphasis original) 
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With the phrase ‘zero emissions while driving’ repeated throughout the advertising for 
Nissan’s electric fleet, a still implicit but less secretive acknowledgement is made of the 
remaining impacts of electric vehicles beyond the consumer’s immediate use. Yet, 
‘sustainable driving’ remains accessible to the consumer with the purchase of the vehicle: 
sustainability remains a function of greenhouse gas emissions at the point of use.  
By the continual reduction of ‘sustainability’ to narrow measurements of impacts 
which, whilst important, are insufficient indicators of environmental load, the consumer 
is able to understand their contribution to sustainability. It presents a simplified measure 
by which consumers can make choices on a simple scale from conventional vehicles with 
the highest GHG emissions (least sustainable), to hybrid vehicles with reduced 
emissions (more sustainable), and finally to zero-emissions with electric vehicles (most 
sustainable). The simple projection of consumer impact on the environment renders the 
innate complexity of multiple environmental impacts intelligible to consumers. In doing 
so, the discourse suppresses information of broader, displaced impacts relating to the 
material footprint and the sourcing of energy for charging electric vehicles.     
The logic of complexity reduction is pervasive among sustainable development 
discourses. This is significant because it individualises the sustainable identity: 
individuals can ‘act’ sustainably on an individual basis while contributing to an overall 
unsustainable system, whose fixes would require a more organised action. Impacts are 
moved away from the consumer purchase and consumer use; negative functional 
impacts are airbrushed to render a performative environmental sustainability 14 . 
Sustainable individual identities can thus be performed even within an unsustainable 
society. The sustainability aesthetic is consumed as sign-value, while the utility-value of 
a product operating within planetary limits remains rarely and/or poorly 
communicated to the consumer.    
 
 
14 ‘Environmental’ is inserted into ‘performative sustainability’ to avoid comparisons to the use 
of ‘performative sustainability’ in the context of analyses on the performance (and thus social 
sustainability by reproduction) of racial discourses (e.g. Alexander, 2004; 2012), with a 
grounding in the works of Frantz Fanon (especially Fanon, 2008). Whilst this shares certain 
theoretical groundings, where ‘performative sustainability’ appears in this thesis, it is in 
reference to this environmental sustainability.    
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4.1.3. Economic rationalisation  
The sustainable development discourse extends economic logics as a means of 
understanding the environment. In doing so, the discourse makes equivalences between 
nature and moments of (neoliberal) economic governance. The report of the Brundtland 
Commission, Our Common Future, in 1987 helped catalyse the discursive hegemonizing 
of ‘green growth’, ‘green economy’, and particularly ‘sustainable development’ over 
discourses of limits, distribution, and equity. The pursuit of development as enabler of 
sustainability – indeed, its necessary condition – rendered a new ecopolitics of economic 
rationalisation.  
The report outlined that ‘poverty reduces people’s capacity to use the 
environment in a sustainable manner; it intensifies pressure on the environment’, while 
the pressures on the environment resulting from (predominantly Western) development 
are occluded: only a lack of development is negatively impactful. Reconciling the 
paradox between this approach and the recognition of the ‘ultimate limits’ of the 
biosphere is the need to ensure ‘equitable access to resources and reorienting 
technological efforts to relieve the pressure’. Equity is thus problematised, but its 
solution is greater growth and a reliance on technology; a larger pie, rather than a 
redistribution of its slices.  
In 1987, the report’s recommendations were made a few years after world 
demand outstripped the planet’s carrying capacity (Figure 6), according to 
Wackernagel’s et al (2002) famous analysis (see also Ch. 3 of this thesis). Going by this 
global aggregate, the argument that continued development, with its concomitant 
requirements of greater material throughput, could solve the problem of resource 
overuse was problematic even before it was fully articulated.  
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The hegemonizing of the sustainable development agenda from the 1980s was 
not a function of its appropriateness as an agenda to confront the undeniable problems 
of poverty and unsustainability. Instead, it emerged to establish a new political alliance 
whose hegemony was a function of ‘truth’ in the Foucauldian sense: a radically 
contingent articulation of dominant power relations that produced a common sense. 
Increasingly pervasive inequality is understood as a major obstacle to achieving 
the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda (UN, 2015b). The UNDP, in its 
‘new focus’ on ‘inequality’ claims that: 
Inequality is a paradox of our times; in recent decades innovation has exploded, 
poverty has gone down in every region of the world and emerging markets are 
booming. 
Yet inequalities persist and grow, intersecting and reinforcing each other and 
perpetuating intergenerational poverty and exclusion. 
Inequality has jeopardized economic growth and created a serious barrier to 
eradicating poverty, the bedrock of the 2030 Agenda. (UNDP 2019.) 
Figure 6: Time trend of humanity's ecological demand. Source: Wackernagel et al., 2002 
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Inequality is articulated as not merely a factor distinct from economic development, but 
one whose increase and persistence are a ‘paradox of our times’. That greater 
development of an exploitative political economy might explain this increase is entirely 
absent. The economic orthodoxy of development cannot abide by the fact that 
quantitative expansion has occurred without inequality being addressed in the process – 
indeed, that it has been worsened at the same time.   
As with the Bruntland Report, ‘eradicating poverty’ is the ‘bedrock’ of 
sustainable development. The material and energy requirements of sustained 
exponential growth are absent from the articulation of sustainability. The capacity for 
development is not problematised. Moreover, poverty is articulated as a distinct element 
from inequality. Rather than related concepts that, while non-reducible to one or the 
other, remain bound up in one another, inequality is a ‘serious barrier’ to poverty 
alleviation. The articulation suppresses means of defining poverty in relation to 
inequality. Whilst inequality and inequalities concern important factors beyond poverty, 
that inequality exists at least to the same extent as does poverty, is suppressed. This 
approach, that poverty is also a relative experience, would identify the opposite of 
relative poverty: the greater accumulation of wealth in a decreasing proportion of civil 
society (Alvaredo et al. 2018).      
Whilst understood as a ‘paradox’, signifying the incredulity of the failure of 
inequality to follow the requirements of the economic growth discourse rather than vice 
versa, the UNDP text insists inequality remains both intelligible and manageable: 
But inequality is not natural or inevitable. 
It stems from policies, laws, cultural norms, corruption, and other issues that can 
be addressed. (ibid.) 
This final part of the text’s articulation of inequality reconfirms the fantasmatic logic that 
inequality can be reduced to its symptoms and its most proximate condition. Inequality 
is thus rendered governable by reformist, managerialist interventions. Inequality as a 
systemic phenomenon whose solution requires transformative change along multiple 
dimensions is suppressed. The text fails to detail how, given the apparent knowledge of 
inequality and its drivers, even its unnaturalness, conditions that increased inequality 
might be transcended and conditions facilitating its decrease established – or why this 
seemingly manageably problem has not hitherto been managed.   
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Nevertheless, referring back to the OECD articulation of the consumer (fig. 1), 
‘growth’ is still taken as an inalienable characteristic of the economy in the ‘green growth’ 
discourse. This forms a relation of domination wherein the consumer-subject is called 
on an as a facilitator of ‘green growth’: the consumer is unable to see their participation 
in the economy in terms outside of the growth paradigm, despite the slow emergence of 
post-growth economics, including in political fora, such as the EU (at the Post-Growth 
2018 Conference) and the emphasis placed elsewhere on ‘overconsumption’. 
Consequentially, the subordination and occlusion of the quantity of consumption 
in articulations of green consumers as economic rationalists poses a significant problem 
for finding functional sustainability (Conolly and Prothero 2003). This helps identify an 
important political moment that permeates sustainable development narratives at 
multiple scales. The review of Sustainable Development Goal 12 at the UN High Level 
Political Forum recommends that: 
There needs to be a shift away from economic models that value growth for 
growth’s sake, toward a new mind-set that respects planetary boundaries, 
recognizes the economy as a subset of nature, and supports the concept of living 
in harmony with nature. 
At the same time, SDG 12 is a significant tool for even highly developed economies to 
justify the pursuit of growth in itself as a fundamental objective of governing. 
For instance, the Scottish Government backs its consumer-focused messaging 
highlighted earlier in its transport strategy (Transport Scotland, 2018) and predicts that, 
by 2037, its own policies will lead to: 25% increase in car trips; 44% increase in goods 
trips; 37% increase in congestion (measured as time wasted per mile); 7% decrease in 
urban bus usage (5% for inter-urban) (measured as bus passenger miles); 11 second 
increase in the average travel time per mile; 42% increase in rail usage (rail passenger 
miles) (rail currently only accounts for 2% of journeys made, however). No forecasts are 
provided for cycling or walking, but cycling currently accounts for 1% of journeys made, 
while walking accounts for 22%.  
The same report highlights the importance of transport vis-à-vis growth: 
Transport demand is an indicator of economic growth. Whilst the provision of 
transport infrastructure does not generate, by itself, economic growth; a lack of 
transport infrastructure can hamper economic growth and impose economic 
welfare costs through travel delays. (Ibid. p.7.) 
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This correlates with the Scottish Government’s ‘central purpose’ which ‘has been to 
create a more successful country, with opportunities for all of Scotland to flourish, 
through increasing sustainable economic growth’ (Scottish Government, 2015).   
This systemic inertia reflects the sedimented discourse – the establishment of a 
common sense whose reproduction is habitual. The pervasive idea that economic 
growth is ‘hugely important’ and is capable of reflecting or indicating sustainability, 
inclusivity, or other forms of progress, creates little space for the use of alternative 
indicators that might better reflect these policy objectives. More problematically, the 
continual framing of environmental objectives in economic terms, and specifically 
growth economic terms, necessitates privileging existing constellations of power 
relations and existing modes of production and consumerism. Economic growth and the 
protection of consumer choice are repeated throughout the policy landscape alongside 
environmental objectives. As such, Scottish climate and environmental policy represents 
a significant area where the line between public and private messaging is increasingly 
blurred.  
The economic rationalisation and subsequent mainstreaming of ecological claims 
is fundamental to understanding the post-political eco-politics of sustainability 
(Blühdorn, 2007; 2011; 2013). To a significant extent this represents the cornerstone of the 
market-liberal discourse on sustainability, with car manufacturers more commonly 
resorting to the economic rather than explicit environmental logic (De Burgh-Woodman 
& King 2013).  
Similar equivalences, then, are made in advertising. The Toyota UK website 
specifies the following ‘fact about hybrids’ (number five of five total): ‘Easy on your 
wallet and the environment’, with the caption: 
Not only will you love being behind the wheel of a Hybrid, you’ll really 
appreciate just how much they save. Our best-selling Hybrid cars feel right at 
home in the city – switching off their engines as often as they can to save you fuel 
and money. And with low fuel-consumption comes low emissions; our Hybrid 
cars boast some of the lowest CO2 emissions in their classes and very low levels 
of harmful nitrogen oxides (NOx). (Toyota, 2017b.) 
This does not, however, simply represent a new trend whereby financial and 
environmental considerations are reconciled together post-2007. An American advert 
from 2002a leads with the headline ‘more green for less green’; the entire advert is hued 
green (Toyota, 2002a).  
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Another advert from the same year claims, ‘the real winner is the planet’ and 
offers a click-through titled ‘get the feeling’ (Toyota 2002b). The economic rationalisation 
logic of sustainable consumer discourse therefore opens up space for involvement of the 
subject through the act of purchasing. Responding to the ‘hailing’ of so-called green 
advertising, the consumer subject is interpolated by the discourse of sustainable 
consumerism.  
The Toyota (2017b) text’s sentence on ‘feeling at home in the city’ further 
distances the commodity from its use-value as a low-impact mode of transport. Taken 
together with the projected (and actively encouraged) growth in private car ownership, 
the construction of hybrid and electric vehicles as a sustainable transport solution in an 
urban context requires occluding all other forms of public transport from the horizon of 
possibility. Against these options, the material and greenhouse gas footprints of the life-
chain are substantially higher in electric and hybrid vehicles. It challenges the emerging 
trends for urban centres to be thought of as places and spaces of radical change and 
requires the continuation of the city as an architecture designed for drivers. This is 
furthered by the need for charging points to be incorporated into urban spaces. Electric 
vehicles are thus not merely permitted but encouraged and supported by public funds 
to continue their colonising of the urban under the ‘win-win’ logic of economic 
rationalisation.  
4.1.4. Representation and Participation   
The creation of the sustainable or green consumer subject position creates a space for 
participation in the sustainability discourse through identification. The sustainability 
aesthetic of a given product means that all that remains is for the consumer to make the 
purchase. Simple calls such as ‘get the feeling’ combined with assurances that the hard 
work and thought has already been completed create minimal barriers to ‘acting 
sustainably’. This puts the focus on ways of consuming rather than amounts.  
In UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1, Transforming our world: the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Assembly outlines the ways in which the 
planet will be protected: 
We are determined to protect the planet from degradation, including through 
sustainable consumption and production, sustainably managing its natural 
resources and taking urgent action on climate change, so that it can support the 
needs of the present and future generations. 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 130 of 285 
 
Here, sustainable consumption is a tool with which to protect. Consumption is the only 
activity specified in which most people are able to participate – the vacuous terms of 
‘managing’ and ‘taking urgent action’ are absent any forms of inclusion for citizens, or 
any other formulation of people. 
The 2030 Agenda identifies three categories of people: the ‘we’, the ‘present’ 
generation(s) and the ‘future generations’. The agency of the ‘we’ is vast: able to ‘protect 
the planet from degradation’ and manage ‘its natural resources’ while ‘taking urgent 
action’. This agency ensures the needs of the other two categories can be met. As a 
precursor to this, their needs are known. The ‘needs of future generations’, a key defining 
criteria of sustainability, seem reduced to needs placed on natural resources by processes 
of consumption.  
The social construction of future generations as a category represents a uniquely 
extreme case of inclusion without any agency over their representation: the ability for 
unborn future generations to have a say in their representation is evidently non-existent. 
Future generations are rendered governable by the sustainable development discourse 
as their needs are assumed to be known and assumed to be the same as those of current 
generations; the variable is not what those needs are but how they might continue to be 
serviced. Despite the inability to know the needs to future generations, not least in the 
context of worsening ecological and climatic conditions whose resultant impacts on 
human flourishing remain subject to speculation, sustainable development presents 
these as both knowable and supportable in the present.  
The lack of current agency in future generations was well recognised and 
articulated in the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s report: 
We act as we do because we can get away with it: future generations do not vote; 
they have no political or financial power; they cannot challenge our decisions. 
(WCED 1987: 16)  
Despite this early recognition of the deficit in participation, then-existing power relations, 
distributions of access and processes of oppression that prevented  participation in the 
present (see, for example, the testimony of Bruyere in ibid.: 54),  have continued, while 
the sustainable development discourse has championed the economic managerialist and 
reformist approaches of ecological modernisation and green growth. The discourse has 
excluded transformational changes in systemic processes of exploitation. By doing so, 
the needs of future generations are assumed to be met according to the same conditions 
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that have imperilled them. Thus, the same conditions that have increased inequality 
within generations (UNDP 2019) are still assumed to decrease inequality between them.  
 In addition to their ‘needs’, future generations are similarly known to the market 
as consumers, as the UNDP review of sustainable development interpolates15 future 
generations:  
billions of under-served consumers can be brought into the global market place, 
and business- and employment creation could accelerate—particularly in rural 
areas where such energy supplies are most likely to be lacking. (UNDP 2012: 20.) 
Future generations are consumers of the future, whose needs of sustainable energy 
supplies are understood in relation to their service to the market. It is in insufficient, in 
the UNDP articulation, to require energy to prevent, for example, the highly gendered 
impacts of indoor air pollution from dirty fuel use for cooking, a leading cause of non-
communicable disease in the Global South (WHO 2014). In the ‘triple win’ of 
environmental, economic, and social wins (UNDP 2012: 5), the ‘wins’ resemble more 
criteria to be met: only when a given activity contributes to all three areas does it have 
most value.  
 Future generations, and the future generation of consumers, in terms of agency, 
are not afforded an infinite horizon of possibility to forge radically different relations 
with and/or within nature, where different needs might be constructed through 
different social and cultural determinations of what is important. One-dimensional 
sustainability thus expands laterally through a self-recognised period of change, while 
the basic premise of natural resource extraction in the service of consumption remains a 
constant in how the discourse makes environmental subjects of populations. The needs 
of future generations are understood through the power-laden needs of the present. 
Some variation in the representation of future generations exists, for instance, in 
alternative social epistemologies, such as the ‘visioneering’ approach of Whitaker (2014) 
and others: ‘confronting oneself with a range of future potentialities reconstituted from 
an interwoven cloth of ideas, experiences and senses’ (Whitaker, 2014: 67). Such 
 
 
15 Though it should be noted Althusser did not explicitly include the unborn subject in his 
theory of interpolation. Though the subject is clearly unable to respond to the hailing, this has 
not prevented the political regime’s ability to call upon, and call into being, the subject as a 
consumer of the future. 
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discourses help reveal the contingency of hegemonized articulations of future 
generations in which their needs are known; indeed, pre-ordained as a production of the 
present distribution of power. 
For the ‘present generations’, their participation and representation in discourses 
of sustainability is similarly one dimensional. The generalising of peoples as a ‘present 
generation(s)’ renders the globally complex differences of responsibility, affectivity, 
agency, risk, exposure, and so on, universally governable under the political regime of 
sustainable development: the singular category universalises what ‘needs’ are.  
Participation in this environmentality is regularly articulated solely in relation to 
consumers. The concentration by IGOs and national governments on ‘innovation’, and 
the role of the consumer in driving innovation, places the consumer at the centre of 
sustainability efforts. In such discourses, it becomes an inherent duty of the 
‘environmental citizen’ to partake in consumerism. This constructs consumerism as a 
privileged mode of environmental action: consumption must become sustainable in 
order for society to be sustainable. In marketing, the sustainable identity is therefore 
articulated through engagement with the product sign-value – the status it occupies 
within the broader system of meaning that produces its being as not just an apparently 
sustainable commodity, but a commodity of the aesthetic of sustainability. For 
Baudrillard, it is this social relationship that is consumed.  
For example, in BMW’s hybrid and electric recycling process, whereby the 
purchase is the only action required to be part of this brand-distinguishing story of 
sustainability, the consumer’s self-understanding as a pioneer driving the ‘innovation’ 
necessary for sustainability is furthered:  
Sustainability and taking care of the environment is firmly embedded in BMW 
Group’s culture and corporate strategy. We view it not just in our vehicles, but 
as a basic requirement for the individual mobility of tomorrow. It is therefore an 
integral part of every thought and action we take. (BMW 2019a.) 
BMW is dedicated to leading a new generation of mobility and exploring what 
the future holds for the ultimate driving machine. 
A BMW i3 is more than just the green option; it’s an investment in the future. 
(BMW 2019b.) 
Links between acts of consumption now are discursively tied to promises of a future that 
the consumer has helped to bring about. Their investment is in this transition to a ‘new 
generation’, the ‘ultimate driving machine’, rather than ‘just the green option’.  
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As such, consumers become a privileged agent of change. In marketing, this is 
often by articulating consumers as ‘rebels’, or as conscientious consumers or activists – 
articulations of difference to an established norm. This differs in institutionalised 
discourses which articulate consumerism, and related elements like innovation and 
choice, as a process based on the rational consumer – sustainable choices are made on 
the basis of economic rationality and according to the need to be green. In such 
discourses, ‘greening’ requires consumer involvement in order to transition to a 
sustainable system. The contradiction between privileging ‘choice’ and the need for a 
universal transition to a ‘green’ economic state forms a key discourse-internal critique of 
the sustainable consumerism discourse. 
 Throughout the marketing of green commodities is the tacit assumption that 
consumerism is capable of absorbing care for the environment. Sustainable 
consumerism articulates a discourse of opportunities – even when ‘planetary boundaries’ 
are articulated as part of the discursive formation. For instance, the UNDP Triple Wins 
for Sustainable Development insists, in 2012, that ‘[c]urrent patterns of consumption and 
production risk breaching planetary boundaries’, despite the evidence by the architects 
of the planetary boundaries framework that this had already occurred decades 
previously; at least three critical boundaries are already in overshoot (Steffen et al. 2015; 
Rockström et al. 2009). The appeal to consumers as partakers in the process of finding 
sustainability by innovation requires that environmental problems be solvable by 
increased economic demand.    
4.1.5. Problem construction  
The presentation of the ‘problem’ in sustainable development discourse works 
backwards from the necessary agency of consumers. As Edkins (2008) outlines:  
Searches for solutions assume they know what the ‘problem’ is and focus on the 
need to solve it, not to engage with the results or implications of what is 
happening or has happened. They ignore the way in which it is often difficult 
even to describe fully or coherently what has in fact happened, let alone subsume 
it under a label (Edkins 2008: 29). 
The ability to subsume the problematisation of unsustainability ‘under a label’ has a 
literal relevance to how consumerism and specific commodities and commoditisations 
are constructed as both able and necessary to manage the problem. Discursively, this 
works alongside complexity reduction to offer the consumer a simplified message that 
communicates both the problem and the fix.  
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 Electric vehicles, for instance, demonstrate the ability for private electric car use 
to eliminate greenhouse gas emissions at the immediate point of use (while charging will 
often worsen the emissions burden depending on energy infrastructure) compared to 
conventional or hybrid cars. This is communicated as the fix to the emissions problem 
in both marketing and public discourse. As a result, the problem of climate change is 
reduced to a specific geography of impacts: the emissions produced by the consumer at 
their point and place of use, suppressing the importance of emissions produced along 
the supply chain and disposal chain, and potentially at the power station which 
ultimately charges the vehicle (Onat, Kucukvar and Tatari, 2015; Yu et al., 2018). The 
embedded emissions of the car’s construction, deconstruction, and the distributed 
emissions of its charging, are at best secondary to the problems of the immediate 
emissions of use.  
  The consumer’s role as ‘fixer’ is reliant on the construction of the problem in this 
particular way. Both global institutional discourses of the sustainable consumer, and the 
hailing of the consumers in marketing, construct the problem as primarily one of 
innovation wherein the consumer plays a central role. In this construction, the problem 
is a hurdle to be vaulted by the rational application of capital and opening of new 
markets in which to cater to the environmentally concerned consumer.  
James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State makes the broad point that ‘[c]ertain forms of 
knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision’ (Scott, 1998: 11). The sense of 
erosion in the process of management is a prescient theme of the argument. Erasure of 
local knowledges, alternative epistemes and modalities by which nature might be 
understood, related to, expressed, and, perhaps, accounted for forms a metaphor 
through which Scott explores the tendency for centralised, authoritarian regimes to 
reduce and render governable something which, in its aggregate, is ungovernable.  
The invention of scientific forestry, freehold tenure, planned cities, collective 
farms, ujamaa villages, and industrial agriculture, for all their ingenuity, 
represented fairly simple interventions into enormously natural and social 
systems. After being abstracted from systems whose interactions defied a total 
accounting, a few elements were then made the basis of an imposed order. (Ibid.: 
352.) 
Scott uses the state-imposed organising of land use, and with it the de facto management 
of a complex web of social and natural elements variously implicated in the question of 
land use, to inform his insights into technocratic, ‘high-modernist’ interventions of the 
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20th century. I argue, however, that whilst an essential contribution, the role of non-state 
actors and networked forms of consent-based governance are under-realised (though 
not ignored) in expanding the broader insight.  
 Seeing like a consumer involves an essentially similar process in the context of one-
dimensional sustainability: the information provided to consumers renders an external 
nature governable via the deployment of particular elements that stand as proxies for a 
more general, total system. Ecolabels, often the stamp of approval differentiating 
‘sustainable’ from ‘unsustainable’ consumerism, symbolise the ability of consumerism 
to absorb care for the environment. The process by which a complex system is 
streamlined into manageable bits assumes that the information necessary for its 
governing (according to given policy objectives) has survived that process. The 
abstracted information is to serve as a proxy for the wider system. 
 If consumers are to function as the ‘drivers of innovation’ through the choices 
they make, the information provided to them must be sufficient for the task. An 
economistic rational consumer can still only act according to the information they are 
presented with. To help with this, ecolabeling has emerged to indicate this information 
– to, in theory, guide the consumer. Covering circular economy principles, such as 
Cradle to Cradle, to the Cruelty Free label guaranteeing no harm to animals, as well as 
statutory designations, ecolabels condense often a wide array of indicators into a 
particular symbol whose presence serves as both information and value-added for the 
product. Criticisms of the approach, however, have ranged from perverse impacts (Dosi 
and Moretto, 2001; Bougherara, Grolleau and Thiébaut, 2005; Grolleau, Ibanez and 
Mzoughi, 2015) to direct accusations of greenwash. One NGO alliance, for instance, 
awards the ‘Prix Pinocchio’ [Pinocchio prize] to the firm displaying the most flagrant 
misuse of ecolabeling – the ‘Prix Pinocchio du Climat’ for 2015 was awarded to a list 
dominated by energy companies (Prix Pinocchio, 2019).  
 The Carbon Trust outlines the supposed role ecolabeling plays in enabling 
sustainable consumerism: 
At its simplest, if you give people better information then they are in a position 
to make better choices. And one of the most effective ways to give people 
meaningful information on a product is through a labelling scheme. 
This is why industry groups and governments continue to push forward with 
ecolabelling schemes around the world, helping to drive sustainable choices and 
grow markets for greener products. (Carbon Trust 2014.) 
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Information, then, is key to unleashing the power of commodities markets to absorb care 
for the environment. Specifically, consumers must have the information necessary to 
‘drive sustainable choice’ and ‘grow markets for greener products’. The Foucauldian 
regime of truth comprises the sustainable versus unsustainable dichotomy, 
disaggregated to the level of the individualised consumer who is confronted by 
categories of differentiation, one understood in relation to the other, and signified by 
producer-controlled, frequently opaque signifiers of ecolabels and generalised green 
claims16. 
 The information made available to the consumer constructs the categories of 
differentiation by which understandings of sustainability arise. The ‘problem’ lies in the 
unsustainable category, while the solution lies in the diametrically opposed category of 
the ‘sustainable’, articulated by green aesthetics while reaffirming the existence and 
legitimacy of the category as a domain of activism, innovation, and awareness.   
4.1.6. Open signification  
Poststructuralist discourse theory (PDT), in radicalising Saussurian linguistics, 
effectively collapses the signifier-signified binary in their ontology. In a constructionist 
ontology, the signified has no social meaning without signification by a system of 
meaning; an object must be socially placed to have being. As outlined previously, this 
rejection of an objective social being does not totally collapse the physical, material 
existence of an object, or the properties of a volcanic eruption, and so on. How these 
phenomena are brought into being is the primary concern of PDT. The ‘signified’ might 
be better understood as a site of overlapping signifiers. Some of these determinations 
will enjoy a sedimented status wherein their signification is established as a wide 
common sense. One implication of the primacy of signifiers in determining an object’s 
identity, especially where the signifier is widely but vacuously employed, is that a given 
signifier can denote a potentially endless number of phenomena. 
For Laclau in particular (2007 [1996]), the ability to invest a suitably broad 
signifier with different meanings plays an important role in the forging of political 
 
 
16 For instance, TerraChoice (now part of Underwriters Laboratories) produced a series of 
reports into ecolabeling and green claims by 4,744 products, arguing that, in 2010, 95% of 
products exhibited one or more signs of ‘greenwash’. (Underwriters Laboratories 2010)   
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alliances. Doing so allies broad movements under eminent terms, such as ‘freedom’, 
‘justice’, ‘equality’ rather than appeals to universal truths or grand narratives. Recently, 
climate change protests have, if tacitly, relied on this tendency to unite a broad a set of 
interests under shared banners. In the consumer’s search for identity, however, it has 
different implications. In the same way ‘healthy’ might denote a near-endless series of 
products, processes, activities, means of production, and so on, ‘green’ has achieved a 
similar level of ubiquity in public vogue.  
As Director of the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy says in his Foreword 
to ‘Triple Wins for the Sustainable Development’ (UNDP 2012): 
Sustainable development is synonymous in the minds of many with the colour 
green —and for good reason. 
‘Green’ is, as such, more than a narrowly linguistic signifier. The cultivated aesthetic of 
‘green’ has emerged as a multimedia discourse wherein vastly differing practices and 
approaches are afforded a degree of commonality.  
 The UNDP’s ‘good reason’ for the synonymity between sustainable development 
and the colour green is not fully articulated. Instead, the ‘triple wins’ of economic, social, 
and environmental development are detailed, while ‘green’ appears as the category that 
unites them, as does sustainable development. The interchangeability of ‘green’ with 
‘sustainable’ and other broad signifiers is problematic as the term is employed without 
any degree of shared standards or criteria. Within transport discourse, walking and 
cycling are frequently presented as ‘green options’, while so too are hybrid and electric 
vehicle purchases. The broad social and cultural category of ‘green’ presents an 
equivalence between otherwise very different environmental impacts. 
In contemporary hybrid and electric vehicles advertising, clues of sustainability 
are often entirely symbolic. Even though hybrids are recognised as symbolising ‘greener’ 
driving, brands like Toyota Prius leave much of their advertising free of direct 
sustainability claims (De Burgh-Woodman and King 2013). Instead, the focus is on 
technology, innovation, and distinction-making. Consumers are thus free to invest the 
marketing and potential purchase with their subjective meaning of sustainability. The 
marketing does not supply a meaning of sustainability but leaves it open to 
interpretation. In Suassurian language, the ‘signified’ is missing, while the ‘signifiers’ 
are subtly present, encouraging customers to draw their own conclusions of what is 
signified and how ‘green’ a purchase it is. Laclau (2007: 36-40) argues a signifier cannot 
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be thought of as ‘empty’ merely because it can be invested with different meaning in 
different contexts: such a structuration would still be signifying. Instead, ‘open 
signification’ refers to the strategy of enabling consumers to close the signifier-signified 
loop. Rather than foreclosing a subject’s possibilities, the power of open signification is 
in achieving the opposite at an aesthetic level: the consumer subject can invest the 
performative act of the purchase with whatever latent ‘green’ credentials they feel the 
act congeals in material form – responsibility, ethics, sustainability, environmental 
friendliness, and so on.  
With regards the hybrid and electric vehicle industry, this is particularly 
significant given the evidence of significant environmental impacts (life-cycle and 
supply chain analysis) – companies cannot claim substantial environmental positives 
beyond the narrow measures highlighted earlier, but allude to it through the use of other 
signifiers of sustainability – capitalising on the latent public perception of sustainability 
apparently inherent in the category of vehicle.  
4.2. A global political ecology of the sustainable consumer subject 
Political ecology frequently both begins and ends with a contradiction (Robbins 2012: 
95-97). In this study, a contradiction can be reached via the two paradoxes detailed 
previously that drive both the identification of the research problem and, broadly, the 
approach taken in its analysis. The first paradox is the disparity between sustainability 
agendas and sustainability outcomes, while the second is the latent and often explicit 
assumption that sustainability can be attained alongside, indeed depending on, 
exponential economic growth in quantitative terms. What is here termed the 
construction of fantasies is a means of talking about the two irreconcilable pursuits of 
exponential growth and the establishment of an ecologically sustainable society as if a 
reconciliation were possible. In the context of the ‘sustainable aviation’ discourse, 
Howarth and Griggs (2007) argued the discourse ‘was structured around the fantasy that 
these two elements do not contradict or cancel each other out, but can be equally desired 
and achieved’. The discourse of ‘sustainable consumption’ and green marketing, I argue, 
is similar.  
Ultimately, the political ecology detailed here ends with a contradiction which in 
PDT terms forms a fantasmatic logic: the (un)sustainable consumer, whose role is 
brought into being and made governable by increasingly indistinguishable 
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intergovernmental organisation literatures and commodity marketing. The closing 
contradiction also represents the site of antagonisms – the sustainable consumer, already 
pulled in opposing ways, is also deconstructed by re-emergent discourses wherein the 
consumer is more directly problematised, and thus absent from their articulation of a 
sustainable transformation.  
Rather than contributing to a critique of the consumer per se, this analysis 
considers the subject position constructed by hegemonic discourse, and the ways in 
which it is and might be contested. It is not, therefore, a behavioural analysis but one of 
the deployments of power in constructing particular types of agency while oppressing 
and excluding others. Secondary to this problem is that of the overdetermined subject 
whereby more than one identity, and frequently competing identities, exist. How are 
individuals (or groups) to act out and fulfil both sustainability and consumer identities? 
While this is open to a number of approaches (such as environmental psychology, 
ecological citizenship, ecological or environmental economics, among others), this 
analysis focuses on the power-political and discursive dimension of this question: how 
do certain possibilities emerge over others and foster a ‘common sense’?  
What follows, therefore, is an interpretive analysis conceived of as a situated 
ability of the researcher17. This considers the discursive construction of the sustainable 
consumer explored hitherto with reference to discourse-external processes with which 
this construction interacts. 
As shown above, consumers drawn to narrowed green messaging still contribute 
to often hidden environmental impacts – some of which, as is the case in electric vehicles, 
to greater environmental impacts of different types. In this regard, the ‘green consumer’ 
emerges as a fantasmatic narrative. For Howarth et al. ‘fantasmatic policy narratives … 
structure the way different social subjects are attached to certain signifiers, and the 
different types of ‘enjoyment’ subjects procure in identifying with discourses and 
believing the things they do’ (Howarth, Glynos, and Griggs, 2016: 100). For the consumer 
subject position, the act of consumption is distanced from environmental impacts and 
harm, while the act is immediate. In articulations of electric vehicles in marketing, 
 
 
17 The situated ability of the researcher is explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. My critical self-
reflection that provides a more transparent account as situated researcher is offered in Annex A  
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environmental benefits accrue locally, such as fewer air pollutants, as a result of the 
consumer’s decision, while impacts are incurred elsewhere and, when articulated, are 
manageable within the consumer-producer unit. 
When impacts do arise from the consumer’s action these can be ‘offset’. Carbon 
emissions, for instance, can be produced so long as the right to do so is purchased on the 
carbon market and embodied in the price of the product, or if a commensurate amount 
of the emissions produced are sequestered elsewhere  by either ‘natural’ means, such as 
tree planting, or carbon capture and storage (CCS) solutions. In either case, the consumer 
act is legitimised by sustainability agendas. The actual emissions released remain able to 
contribute to other impacts, such as ocean acidification, while the activity undertaken to 
sequester carbon performs a neutralising duty, rather than a net-benefit to the emissions 
problem.  
In such a scenario, the purchase of the product, assuming the carbon offsetting 
costs are internalised in the final price of the product, is necessary to mobilise the finance 
in the right place at the right time to enable the offsetting activities. The sequestering of 
carbon is not utilised until something is consumed. The necessity of carbon sequestration 
alongside drastic cuts in emissions to maintain a 1.5-degree Celsius pathway (IPCC, 2018; 
UK Committee on Climate Change, 2020: 98) is poorly realised by consumer offsetting. 
As such, the discourse avoids questions of quantity in favour of articulations of 
innovation as a fix to the problem confronting the conscientious consumer. Through 
distancing, offsetting, and simplifying complex problems into narrow solutions, the 
discourse opens up a space in which the consumer is able to perform both sustainability 
and consumerism.    
4.2.1. The manageable consumer 
In 1994, the Oslo Symposium, chaired by Norwegian Minister of Environment Thorbjørn 
Berntsen for the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, offered a definition of 
sustainable consumption and production: 
the use of goods and services that respond to basic needs and bring a better 
quality of life, while minimising the use of natural resources, toxic materials and 
emissions of waste and pollutants over the life cycle, so as not to jeopardise the 
needs of future generations (Berntsen quoted in Oslo Symposium, 1994) 
The Roundtable took as its guiding insight Mahatma Gandhi, ‘[t]he Earth has enough 
for everyone’s need but not for everyone’s greed’ (Gandhi quoted in ibid.). At least as far 
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back as the report from the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, (Wold 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987), global governance institutions 
have hinted at determining, and even problematising, the social construction of 
‘perceived needs’ in sustainability discourse: 
Living standards that go beyond the basic minimum are sustainable only if 
consumption standards everywhere have regard for long-term sustainability. Yet 
many of us live beyond the world's ecological means, for instance in our patterns 
of energy use. Perceived needs are socially and culturally determined, and 
sustainable development requires the promotion of values that encourage 
consumption standards that are within the bounds of the ecological possible and 
to which all can reasonably aspire. (WCED 1987: 42) 
Here, the Brundtland Commission report identifies two categories of need: the ‘basic 
minimum’ and the ‘perceived needs’.  
In this discourse, a distinction is apparent between consumerism and 
consumption. While consumption refers to all manner of acquiring resources, including 
biological functions from breathing to eating, ‘consumerism’ can distinguish a ‘defining 
trait of the modern social identity’ (Brooks and Bryant, 2014: 80-81) as constituted by and 
through the consumption of goods, and the pursuit of aspirations defined as distinction-
making. This semantic point is important because while ‘necessities’ are, and have 
historically been, subject to marketing discourses that create value through the 
construction of difference, the consumption of fresh water, for example, is an ecological 
and developmental issue of fundamentally different characteristics owing to its base 
biological necessity and potential scarcity.  
While it is tempting to make this distinction on grounds of ‘need vs. want’, this 
doesn’t fully grasp the role of consumerism and associated economic discourses in the 
contemporary imaginary as a means of ‘getting on’ in the world, such as economic 
growth, job creation, and so on. More pertinently, it ignores the role of consumerism in 
the reproduction of identity through performance. Put simply, ‘unnecessary goods’ is 
something of a misnomer given the fundamental utility of consumerism in 
contemporary mainstream economic, social, and cultural practice.  
The critique of ‘perceived needs’ (or wants as distinct from needs) is not new. 
Siegfried Kracauer, writing in 1929 at, according to Bauman (2007), the turning point 
from producer to consumer society, notes: 
The rush to the numerous beauty salons springs partly from existential concerns, 
and the use of cosmetic products is not always a luxury. For fear of being taken 
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out of use as obsolete, ladies and gentlemen dye their hair, while forty-year-olds 
take up sports to keep slim. ‘How can I become beautiful?’ runs the title of a 
booklet recently launched on to the market; the newspaper advertisements for it 
say that it shows ways ‘to stay young and beautiful both now and for ever’. (Ibid.: 
7.) 
Kracauer identifies, before Habermas et al could offer their cultural thesis, the beginning 
of a long trend that, for Bauman, culminated in the emergence of the Homo eligens and 
their accommodating arrangements of social space and practice. However, for Bauman, 
as for Kracauer, this did not denote the emergence of a desire-driven hedonism at the 
level of the sovereign individual; or, at least, to the extent that it did denote this, it was 
a product of social demands rather than a collapse of puritanical morality at the level of 
the individual. Distinguishing consumerism from consumption on the basis of needs 
versus wants is thus problematic. Beyond base biological needs, like water and energy, 
all needs can be considered ‘perceived’, in the sense of arising from a given social 
configuration.  
 In its most widely articulated form, the iteration contained in Sustainable 
Development Goal 12 (‘sustainable consumption and production’), the consumer will 
‘live in harmony with nature’ at quite a specific point in time according to the 
achievement of Target 12.8: 
By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and 
awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature 
(UN 2015: 25.). 
The Target constructs the possibility that the right information can be gathered at the 
right time, in the right place, in the right format, and in a form sufficiently intelligible to 
all, for ‘lifestyles in harmony with nature’ to be realised. In short, the Target assumes the 
existence of, if not perfect, then at least sufficient information. Consumers, when 
provided this information, can be relied on to rationalise their behaviour provided their 
awareness of ‘sustainable development’ is sufficiently elevated. The who, what, and how 
of these provisions are not articulated.  
Target 12.6 of Goal 12 specifies the need to  
[e]ncourage companies, especially large and transnational companies, to adopt 
sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their 
reporting cycle. (UN, 2016.) 
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As a result, SDG Goal 12 assumes that behavioural change occurs with the deployment 
of information and awareness – indeed, that this occurrence is an event that takes place 
by 2030, rather than a social arrangement of continual development and redeployment 
of information. Most importantly, the marshalling and dissemination of information and 
the bringing into being of awareness take place within established institutions, within 
the existing configuration and distribution of power. In effect, Goal 12 calls upon 
institutions to volunteer the tools for their own dismantling.  
 As outlined in the previous section, this provisioning of information is deeply 
flawed in the pursuit of functional sustainability. What is instead deployed under the 
banner of ‘Basic needs’ becomes a continually shifting domain of human-nature 
exploitation. Beyond powerful but simplistic reductions to ‘need’ and ‘greed’, needs and 
the perceptions of them are indistinguishable at the point of access for individuals who 
are simultaneously consumers of society and consumed by it. ‘Basic needs’, as a category 
for understanding a minimum level of consumption, the minimum that must be 
sustained, cannot escape the social configurations that determine what basic needs are. 
The discourse of the ‘innovative consumer’, therefore, represents less a counter-
hegemonic articulation of the managed, limited consumer than an already hegemonic 
discourse of consumerism expanding to accommodate this challenge. 
4.2.2. The innovative consumer  
In the innovative consumer, the consumer-subject is afforded the degree of sovereignty 
that enables them to affect the sustainability transition themselves. Indeed, it is the 
capacity to choose freely, in the context of a sufficiently competitive market, that drives 
the innovation necessary for overcoming the obstacles between unsustainability and 
sustainability. The OECD (2008), states that ‘[c]onsumers are key to driving sustainable 
production and play a central role in sustainable development’. Similarly, the UN’s ‘Goal 
12’ of the Sustainable Development Goals is to ‘ensure sustainable consumption and 
production patterns’ (United Nations, 2015). The OECD’s overall aim of ‘green growth’ 
is defined as ‘fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural 
assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-
being relies’ (OECD, 2011: 9). Such attempts to operationalise sustainable consumption, 
as in the case of the OECD’s Green Growth agenda, focus on the opportunities for capital, 
such as the ‘creation of new markets by stimulating demand for green technologies’ 
(ibid.). Here, ‘weak sustainability’, wherein natural, labour, and human-made capital are 
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mutually interchangeable (Neumayer, 2013: 22-25), is normalised in place of a deeper 
interpretation of sustainability, whereby human-made or labour capital cannot 
adequately substitute for ‘core’ natural capital without runaway environmental impacts. 
With weak sustainability, in order to substitute one type of ‘capital’ for another, the 
natural capital must be valued and reproduced efficiently. The concentration on such an 
approach necessarily captures ‘value’ as a market-determined feature and its sustainable 
increase is therefore a function of innovation. 
The place of innovation, therefore, is always central: ‘Innovation will play a key 
role …[because] the ability of reproducible capital to substitute for (depleted) natural 
capital is limited in the absence of innovation’ (OECD, 2011: 10). Similarly, the UN 
stresses that it is ‘in businesses’ interest to find new solutions that enable sustainable 
consumption’ (UN n.d.). A key aspect of this, relative to ecological considerations, is the 
concentration on quantitative growth rather than qualitative ‘progress’. This relates to 
the old problem of interpreting the Enlightenment’s significance: science as innovation 
for the overcoming of obstacles (such as environmental obstacles to growth), or as 
enabling the transformation of economic and social practices. Adorno’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment helps to illustrate this, wherein the historical tendency for science and 
technology to further embed unequal social relations and means of production obscures 
the potential of science for transforming them. In the ecological sense, a quest for greater 
understanding of nature is displaced by ever-greater domination over nature.  
By compounding notions of ‘sustainability’ with practices of consumerism, the 
discourse fails to create a new imaginary or ideal. ‘Sustainable consumption’ merely 
articulates the ability to continue an already established system - it imagines a future of 
the least possible change required for its continued reproduction. Sustainable 
consumption partakes in the historical process of commodification, individualisation, 
and alienation. Its framing by the sustainable development paradigm, an inherently 
industrialist and modernist discourse, places the consumer at the centre of the drive for 
sustainability (e.g. OECD, 2008). This constructs consumerism as part of the solution to 
ecological crisis, rather than part of the cause. The obstacle to sustainability is thus 
problematised as a failure to innovate, to which the solution is technological 
advancement and ecological modernisation; a discourse in which the consumer subject 
participates in the process of innovation. 
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The discourse at once empowers consumers as drivers of innovation and passivizes 
them as a rational body which will respond predictably to the right market signals, 
especially with respect to the economistic logic of environmental action. In the former, 
consumers transcend their role as manageable body in order to make demands of greater 
sustainability; in the latter, the market enlarges to encompass these demands, 
reconstituting the managed consumer through elite-sanctioned forms of environmental 
care whose aesthetic contributes a value-added benefit to ‘green’ commodities as the 
requirement to ‘buy green’ becomes socially normalised.  
The discourse of the innovative consumer most clearly relays the ideas of the 
consumer as the ultimate sovereign, wielding power through the freedom of choice. In 
this capacity, consumer subjects are the privileged agents of change on whom a 
sustainable transition rest. Bureaucratic architectures are necessary to the extent that this 
consumer-driven change requires sufficient information.  
4.2.3. Beyond the consumer 
That growth has failed to reduce inequality (indeed, as highlighted previously, that 
inequality has increased despite growth), adds demand to already overexploited 
resources and sinks, and has failed to decouple itself from growth in energy and material 
throughput has enabled the limits discourse to enjoy something of a rebound. The UN’s 
2019 progress evaluation of Goal 12, for example, found that   
[w]orldwide material consumption has expanded rapidly, as has material 
footprint per capita, seriously jeopardizing the achievement of Sustainable 
Development Goal 12 and the Goals more broadly. (UN, 2019a) 
There appears an abject failure within the SDGs, according to the terms of the sustainable 
development discourse itself, to realise both economic growth and the sustainable 
management of ‘natural resources’, as per Target 12.2 and Indicators 12.2.1 and 12.2.2 of 
Goal 12. 
 Ten cross-party Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) organised the Post-
Growth 2018 Conference in August 2018. The website, under Why post-growth? notes that: 
Although we have greatly benefited from economic growth, the continuous 
pursuit of growth and ranking GDP as the primary measure of development are 
criticised even by top-rank economists. Climate scientists have suggested that 
even the Paris Agreement will not suffice to tackle climate change – we need to 
start thinking about a post-growth future. (Post-Growth 2018 Conference, 2018.) 
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The post-growth discourse thus situates itself in opposition to even widely championed 
symbols of progress in environmental governance (the Paris Agreement) as being 
insufficient. In this discourse, growth is the primary logic of differentiation; growth is 
equated with excess, with failing to meet social needs, and with the overexploitation of 
nature. Against this articulation of growth, the post-growth and degrowth discourses 
open space for new indicators.  
 The academic case for post- and de-growth economics has been extensively made. 
This takes the recent work in ecological economics on post-growth economies, degrowth, 
and steady-state economics (Daly, 1996; Jackson, 2013; Victor 2008; Dietz and O’Neil, 
2013; D'Alisa, Demaria and Kallis, 2015; Wanner, 2015) as the groundwork for a 
normative approach that problematises the assumptions made by growth-dependent, 
market-liberal responses to ecological crises. In these latter responses, focusing on 
markets and consumption, ecological problems are not merely subordinated to the 
concerns of the economy, but also constructed as an enabler of them in marketing 
discourse through the maintenance and creation of value. 
 The campaign, led by, among others, the Centre for the Understanding of 
Sustainable Prosperity, to rescue the elements typically associated with the growth 
paradigm has a clear consciousness of the importance of language. Rescuing and 
redeploying the terms of prosperity forms a creative process of rearticulating ‘the good 
life’ (cf. Jackson 2013). Within the post-growth movement, however, different discourses 
open up. Degrowth, a network of academics and campaigners present at the EU 
conference, argued that bringing post-growth discussion ‘to EU politics apparently also 
meant going along with rules of the game’ (Treu, Mastini, Saey-Volckrick 2018). 
Commenting on Jackson’s speech, the authors note it ‘lacked the idea of degrowth to 
decolonize our imagineries [sic]’, arguing instead that degrowth is ‘about questioning 
the very way we think about our society and economy’ (ibid.).18 
 Nevertheless, there remains a jointly articulated need to move beyond a growth-
dependent system and reopen to imaginations what a sustainable society and economy 
 
 
18 The distinctions between post-growth and degrowth discourses should not be 
underestimated. A full account of their differences is not possible here, however. To the extent 
that discourses beyond growth have had success in affecting public debate and institutional 
governance, it is as a generalised ‘post-growth’ economics, and the intention of this section is to 
analyse what is articulated as possible in networks of global governance.   
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can and should resemble. The importance of this close grouping of discourses is that the 
role of the ‘consumer’ is not clearly discernible. The metaphors of freedom and agencies 
of choice as drivers of innovation and producers of identity are replaced by functions 
beyond the market. Though a decisive rejection of capitalism is not a common iteration. 
The narrative is, broadly, shifted from a focus on individuals finding sustainability to a 
social undertaking in which roles are reimagined. The sense that post-growth and 
degrowth perspectives are viewed with suspicion, that they, to enter particular spaces 
of politics, have had to adopt new ‘rules of the game’ is testament to the inertia in the 
system.    
4.3. Conclusion  
In sum, building on Laclau and Mouffe’s (2014 [1985]) discourse theory, I posit, overall, 
that a reconciling of the green-consumer paradox and overdetermination is attained only 
through a construction of fantasy. The hegemonized discourse of consuming sustainably 
depoliticises sustainability as a concept and practice. This is facilitated by green 
marketing discourse which provides a temporary stabilisation of a system of meaning 
that invests a particular action with the notion of sustainability; providing a subject 
position whereby acting sustainably is possible even in the absence of ecological 
sustainability. This allows for the pursuit of sustainability agendas without sustainability 
outcomes.  
Whilst discourse theory does not concern itself with identifying a fundamental 
‘truth’ behind discourse, this is not to say that partaking in a discursive articulation does 
not have social and material repercussions beyond the immediate articulation. That is, 
buying a hybrid vehicle on sustainability grounds is partaking in green consumer 
discourse, but there remain non-apparent implications of this: the environmental and 
social conditions of production, sourcing, waste, and so on, in which the consumer 
equally partakes. Indeed, green advertisements frequently rely on the non-articulation 
of distributed impacts, and the articulation of a narrow, relative gain as a far broader 
‘greening’. Going beyond the discourse’s internal structure (the single articulation or 
structuration) is necessary to ascertain its broader implications. 
‘Sustainable consumption’, as mentioned in the various IGO literatures above, 
assumes an essentialist position on behalf of the subject: an a priori identity for whom 
consuming forms an inherent part of living in modernity. The focus thus becomes on 
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rationalising and enabling this behaviour in the face of a multitude of crises in which 
precisely this behaviour is complicit. The naturalisation of such a concept removes it 
from deliberation with the consequence that consumerism occupies a privileged position 
so that crisis mitigation is organised around, and in service of, this hierarchy. Put simply, 
‘sustainable consumption’ emerges and serves to reproduce and legitimise the dominant 
economic order at precisely the point of its greatest failure.  
The ‘sustainable consumption’ discourse is hegemonic to the extent that the 
conditions of its existence occlude alternative dimensions of sustainability from being. 
Consumerism needs to absorb and claim to reflect these dimensions. The legitimacy of 
the discourse, ‘truth’ in the Foucauldian sense, is attained not through an inevitable and 
exclusive response to scientific fact19, but the radically contingent outcome of prevailing 
power relations. The market-focused response to ecological crisis is not an inherent 
element of the crisis, but it has been articulated as such. To frame this in discourse theory, 
then, the consumer-focused response is radically contingent; it is possible but not 
necessary.  
It is not the case that alternative means of realising agency and affecting change 
are often explicitly excluded from hegemonic discourses of neoliberal sustainable 
development. But specific forms are privileged. In this transition, consumers, as such, 
find themselves widely and comfortably accommodated by the existing social 
arrangements and distributions of power. Other subjectivities must be fought for. 
Looking beyond the discourse-internal structure, the sustainable consumer subject is 
situated within its broader context: the relations of subordination, oppression, and 
domination that characterise the neoliberal economising of an externalised nature. Four 
interrelated features of this ecopolitics, in which the sustainable consumer functions as 
both enabler and beneficiary, are identifiable and serve to summarise the political 
ecology of sustainable consumerism.  
 
 
19 It is important to note that the ‘scientific facts’ themselves (around ecological crises) are not 
problematised here – this body of scientific evidence is taken as a given and understood 
through the planetary boundaries framework (itself a discourse nonetheless, signalling 
inclusions and exclusions) that in this case serves to organise our understanding of ‘crisis’ 
through tipping points, boundaries, horizons, imbalances, and so on that indicate an 
overstepping of biospherical limits. See, for example, Steffen et al., 2015. 
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 First, the production of a ‘safe space’ of consumerism, wherein the over-
interpolated subject’s ethical anxieties of exploitation are reconciled in a space of fantasy, 
and the act of consumerism enabled as a benign or even benevolent act.  
Second, building especially on the discourse’s simplification of complex, 
interrelated ecological and climatic impacts, ‘seeing like a consumer’ (cf. Scott’s Seeing 
Like a State, 1998) denotes the need to simplify complex problems in order to render a 
product ‘green’, and thus ‘consumable’ as a sign. A broader implication of ‘seeing like a 
consumer’ is the construction of a governable agent of change to whom the problem is 
communicated and thus constructed.  
Third, sustainable consumerism contributes to the removal of ‘sustainability’ 
from the realm of the political. Following similar arguments in post-political literatures, 
this section highlights the role commoditisation and consumerism play in locking 
modern society ‘into a technocratic politics of unsustainability’ (Blühdorn in Wilson and 
Swyngedouw, 2015: 146-166, emphasis original). 
Finally, a so-called ‘green’ consumerism represents a key interface between 
humans and nature – it forms an intermediary through which signifiers of nature are 
adopted by the marketing of products. Anthropocentrism is further reinforced when 
human-nature relations are reduced to a dichotomous exploiter-exploited relationship. 
Consumers are called upon to ‘solve’ or otherwise actively contribute to fixing some 
environmental blight.   
Overall, this chapter has argued that the sustainability aesthetic produces 
commodities; it is these signs that are consumed. This is distinct from the fantasmatic 
ideal of a commodity that is ‘sustainable’. The sustainability of an object is socially 
constructed, and thus rendered intelligible by politically contingent discourse. 
Contrasted with this, and used here as a form of critique, is an object’s impact, understood 
as the object’s contribution to planetary system overshoot: a state more resembling 
existence (for instance, a volcanic eruption), rather than of being (for instance, the volcanic 
eruption being an  ‘act of G/god’ or a ‘natural disaster’). Townshend, in analysing Laclau 
and Mouffe’s implicit acknowledgement of this differentiation, concludes: 
[…] we   have   to   distinguish  between discourses that attempt scientifically to 
explain an ‘external’ reality, which require systematically organised data from, 
and often hypothetical reasoning about, that reality, and those such as 
aesthetic/imaginative or certain political discourses that  have  a  clear  symbolic  
dimension  and  do  not  require,  or  aspire  to,  agreed methods to demonstrate 
proof. (Townshend, 2004: 274.)  
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In application, for instance, when I buy an electric car, I might buy its service to me as 
sign-value – of being ‘green’ – but I also contribute to a plethora of measurable impacts. 
The former, capable of taking infinite form, is socially constructed, and capable of 
forming a site of political contestation when it is challenged. The latter is not. Whether 
the act – the plethora of impacts – is completable indefinitely, other things remaining 
equal, is deducible in ways being or performing ‘green’ is not.  
As such, central to this chapter’s critique of the sustainability aesthetic and the 
social construction of the sustainable consumer is the epistemological distinction 
between a sustainability of existence and a sustainability of being. I term these, 
respectively, ‘functional sustainability’ and ‘aesthetic sustainability’. In clearer keeping 
with poststructural discourse theory, it is impossible to objectively access a pure 
‘functional sustainability’, and as such an ‘aesthetic sustainability’ is always articulated 
when environmental sustainability is called upon. 
Leading from this, the repeatability of an act must be understood both spatially 
and temporally: how many times, at the same time, the act is repeatable around the 
world; and how far into the future the act(s) are repeatable. For brevity, I term these, 
respectively, horizontal and vertical impacts.  
This has important implications for the social construction of a sustainable act of 
consumption. For instance, one person might be able to fly every minute of their life – 
so long as the number of people doing so remains very low, the act is unlikely to send 
the planet into overshoot. But this activity is unlikely to be considered a sustainable or 
‘green’ action. What is problematic is the articulation of any given singular act as 
sustainable or unsustainable, whether the use of a plastic straw or a private cross-
Atlantic flight. Functional sustainability in terms of planetary overshoot is a function of 
the scalability of an activity according to a holistic set of impacts. For instance, a single 
electric car cannot send the planet into overshoot, but to convert the existing fleet of cars 
in the world to electric would quickly exhaust the planet’s supply of a range of rare Earth 
metals (see in particular 4.1.1. of this chapter). In this way, while an individual action 
cannot be rendered unsustainable or sustainable, its impacts are, nonetheless, calculable. 
As such, at the level of the individual action and the individual commodity, there exists 
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no extra-discursive sustainability, but there exist extra-discursive material impacts; these 
are drawn from the significant literatures on life-cycle analysis20.  
The sustainable consumer discourse transcends these issues with the 
deployment of a range of fantasmatic logics that contribute to the social construction of 
an aesthetic sustainability incapable of realising a functional sustainability. The eco-
governmentality of one-dimensional sustainability serves to disarm rather than to 
promote the efforts of citizens-as-consumers to turn environmental awareness into 
effective environmental action even according to the discourse’s aims of sustainable 
development. The consumerist prism through which ‘nature’ or global environmental 
change is channelled splits the total into manageable fragments, neither one coordinated 
with the other, and each presenting to the consumer a broad, green aesthetic.  
  
 
 
20 I do not, however, present myself as an expert in the conduct of life-cycle assessment. I rely 
instead on the extensive secondary literature, such as in transport and other relevant areas. 
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5. Ecological Civilisation: Towards Multidimensional 
Sustainability? 
 
 
"the pursuit of harmony between humans and nature is about having both 
gold mountains and green mountains" 
PRC President Xi Jinping, 2015 
 
 
 
Ecological civilization, as a key area of study, was not decided on prior to engagement 
with discursive resources in China and with Chinese texts on sustainability. It became 
apparent, over time, that this represented a particular ordering of meaning within the 
field of discursivity that tied subjects to nature in radical ways.  In this quote, quoted in 
Communist Party of China (CPC)-owned China Daily (2015b) on Ecological Civilisation, 
President Xi Jinping was answering a question raised by students regarding growth and 
the environment at Kazakhstan’s Nazarbayev University. The metaphor permeates 
statist discourse both domestically and in international fora, including at local levels to 
construct environmental protection and wealth accumulation as synergetic. As 
mentioned previously, political ecologies often begin with paradoxes or contradictions. 
The principle, though by no means only, contradiction highlighted here is that 
‘harmony’21, when it refers to humans and nature, means, rather than deconstructing 
boundaries, re-establishing them. The harmonising of the human-nature relationship, as 
Zhuang (2015) highlights, is reduced to a consumer-consumed relationship rationalised 
in economic terms. Gold mountains are the primary means of recognising the value of 
green ones. In this way, harmonisation is primarily the process of justifying existing 
modes of capital accumulation: ‘green mountains’ are essential as their base necessity is 
incorporated into the means of production by the process of being ‘seen’ in economic 
 
 
21 Harmony, in Chinese statist discourse, has a long genesis with multiple applications whose 
full investigation is not possible here, encompassing human-nature relations, social relations, 
security (and particularly securitised social policy), and others.  
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decision making and, most importantly, by markets. This resembles similar processes 
such as natural capital valuation and accounting, where nature will be protected on the 
basis that, and only so long as its ecological function in the economy is irreplaceable, and 
the policy intervention is merely to make this contribution visible to market forces. In 
short, the analogy lacks the means of recognising green as gold, or vice versa.  
 Nevertheless, the metaphor does not imply a conversion: green mountains are 
not, in a direct sense, turned into gold ones, as a simple extractive analogy might suggest. 
In this sense the metaphor is not automatically aligned with a neoclassical economic 
imaginary of an extractive, linear economy reliant on ‘natural resources’; that which is 
presented as in need of reformation in Western sustainable development, but not 
transformation. Historically, ecological modernisation, as detailed by Mol and Summers 
(2007), wherein these reformations take explicit form as means of recognising the ‘win-
win’ of environmental action, has taken hold in the PRC from its beginnings in Europe. 
This chapter builds on the logics and articulations of sustainable consumerism 
identified in the Western sustainable development imaginary detailed in the previous 
chapter. The extent to which characteristics of the domestic Chinese discourse of 
Ecological Civilisation converges on and diverges from a predominantly Westernised 
discourse of sustainable development is a necessary angle of analysis to inform the 
discussion on how an emergent discourse represents a potential re-imagining of socio-
nature relations in what is increasingly a global imaginary. 
As a statist discourse, Ecological Civilisation, and its genesis in other forms of 
‘harmonising’ discourses, forms both a state-building and state-reinforcing discourse of 
governance, and a narrative with which the Chinese state presents its social-
environmental visioneering to the world; what is later presented as ‘green power’ – the 
ability to shape global imaginaries as existing socio-economic, political, and cultural 
systems contend with the need to adopt sustainable pathways. This chapter, therefore, 
presents a political ecology of the society-nature relations articulated by the statist 
discourse of Ecological Civilisation.   
 The chapter begins by outlining areas of convergence and divergence in policy 
between a historical leader in environmental and climate governance, the European 
Union (EU), and China. In the field of global environmental governance, the study of the 
relationship between the EU and China has emerged as a significant area of development, 
albeit one with substantial challenges. The provision of a wide variety of official 
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communiqués offers potential for looking at how the current environmental governance 
leader acts as a normative power towards a fast-emerging historic bloc which may 
overtake in important areas (for example, South-South cooperation and southern 
capacity building) in the coming years. This section outlines where this relationship 
finds common ground and assesses whether policy convergence represents a 
continuation of market-liberal orthodoxy in environmental policy making, or whether 
divergence in significant areas gives rise to a counter-hegemonic bloc.  
The chapter goes on to more substantively detail the discursive resources that 
constitute the subject position for individuals to occupy or resist. In this sense, Ecological 
Civilisation is analysed as an ecogovernmentality that constructs a particular regulatory 
narrative. As outlined in previous chapters, the ecogovernmentality that emerges from 
the collision between late modernity and the biophysical limits of its material progress 
can be described, broadly, as a one-dimensional sustainability. Here, environmental 
relations are navigated by consumers and mediated through markets. Biospherical limits 
are re-cast as opportunities for capital, driven by consumer choice which produces the 
required innovation. Sustainability is depoliticised as a terrain of radical transformation 
and recast as one where consumers are the privileged agents of change, to the occlusion 
of other forms of agency and transformational change. As such, one-dimensional 
sustainability describes the regulatory narrative that, by processes of occlusion and 
commodification, assigns roles, constructs legitimate agency, and rationalises 
environmental action as a form of managerialist intervention for economic care. 
 A key question of this research is where a counterhegemonic multidimensional 
sustainability might arise from, how it might re-articulate elements of the discursive 
terrain, and what channels might it seek to assert itself at a global level. This section, 
therefore, offers a closer analysis of some of the discursive resources of Ecological 
Civilisation22 , focusing in particular on the ways in which it transcends, or fails to 
transcend, a neoliberal orthodoxy conceived of as two interrelated paradoxes: the 
sustainable consumer-subject, and the growth of performative rhetoric at the same time 
 
 
22 In focusing on central statist discourse, the analysis is limited to official English translations, 
though the original Chinese is consulted when claims are made about apparent differences 
between original and official translation, which in practice denote different articulations to 
domestic and international audiences.  
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as the growth of ecological and climatic impacts. This is predicated on the assumption 
that a counterhegemonic sustainability agenda that offers transformative change has 
transcended the irreconcilable pursuits of sustainability and endless exponential 
economic growth. This way, the analysis shifts from a mapping of contemporary 
dystopia(s) to a more outward search for articulations resembling a utopic alternative in 
the tradition of critical political ecology and critical geography (cf. Bromley, 2007: 57).  
 Whilst post-growth and, in particular, degrowth discourses have emerged in 
recent years to challenge latent assumptions of the necessity of material growth, and 
their relationship with patriarchal, colonial, and other forms of violence and oppression, 
less focus has been given to those alternatives expressed as such by (re)emergent global 
powers, including in spaces they seek to problematise, such as the United Nations. 
China’s role as a leader in global South consolidation and as a powerful voice against 
the territorial determination of greenhouse gas emissions and other forms of pollution 
helps distinguish it as a subject of study in this regard. Coupled with its developing self-
identity as an environmental leader, the discursive and spatialised articulations of 
Ecological Civilisation within China provide an important, albeit limited, understanding 
of the different ways in which agency, legitimacy, and subjectivity are constructed.  
5.1. Policy Convergence  
This section details those areas which, from an analysis of secondary literature and 
official documents, reveals substantial areas of convergence in climate change mitigation 
policy, and environmental governance more broadly.  
5.1.1. Market-based instruments 
The EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) represents the most significant 
development of ecological modernisation as a norm (Braun, 2014: 114-115), and has 
provided a means for EU industry to pursue minimally invasive means of cutting 
emissions, while not just protecting existing economic structures, but providing new 
opportunities for them (Bailey, Gouldson and Newell, 2011). The project was 
characterised by the European Commission’s Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, in 
a speech he gave in 2007 as ‘nothing less than the EU taking global leadership in 
catalysing a new industrial revolution’ (Piebalgs, 2007, emphasis original to EU 
Commission transcript).   
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MBIs represent a significant area of convergence between the EU and China in 
both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Domestically, the Chinese leadership set out 
its strategy for placing a greater emphasis on MBIs at the Third Plenum of the 18th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Zhang, 2015). A key area of such 
expansion is in emissions trading systems (ETS). Both the EU and China pursue greater 
expansion in ETS, with China deciding to implement a national system in 2017, set to be 
operational in 2020 (see IEA, 2020 for a detailed analysis), and plans for an integrated 
EU-China ETS in the coming years voiced by UK special representative on climate 
change, David King in an interview with BusinessGreen (BusinessGreen, 2016). At the 
COP21 climate negotiations in Paris, China’s special representative on climate change, 
Xie Zhenhua, indicated strengthening relations with the EU (China.org.cn, 2015a) over 
emissions trading, whom he described as ‘our teachers’ (Xie quoted in Garside, Carbon-
Pulse, 2015). ETS as a policy area represents not just a significant area of convergence, 
but also of Chinese learning from EU actions (Zhang, Karplus, Cassica and Zhang, 2014), 
particularly via the three-year collaboration project launched by the EU Commission to 
assist with the ‘design and implementation of emission trading in China’ (European 
Commission, 2016).  
Alongside emissions trading, the report by Moarif and Rostagi (2012), Market-Based 
Climate Mitigation Policies in Emerging Economies, highlights the role of subsidies to both 
business and consumers, and taxes as market instruments for encouraging particular 
behaviour. Financial incentives vary from encouraging private preferential financing, to 
feed-in tariffs for renewable electricity generation. De Cock (2011) makes a convincing 
case that the EU-China relationship fostered a particular approach to reconciling 
economics and environmental protection, facilitating the ‘diffusion of the ‘business case’ 
for a low-carbon economy’ by helping to ‘overcome the traditional understanding in 
China of the environment and the economy as competing concerns’. At the Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the plenum 
stated that China ‘must deepen economic system reform by centering (sic) on the 
decisive role of the market in allocating resources’ (China.org.cn, 2014). It should also be 
noted, however, that while market-liberal developments are clear, the state maintains an 
interventionist approach in some areas, such as restricting private lending to companies 
with poor environmental records (ibid.: 13); an important area of divergence discussed 
in more detail in section 4.2. 
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By concentrating broadly on reformist approaches to market functions, China’s 
approach corresponds closely with ecological modernisation in important ways as 
discussed in section 3.2. However, since 2005, academics instrumental in the emergence 
and mainstreaming of ecological modernisation in Europe have charted its trajectory in 
China as an organisational concept for combating climate change (cf. Zhang, Mol and 
Sonnenfeld, 2007). In doing so, the authors note the differentiation in China’s adoption 
of the theory, concluding that, despite the use of the term ecological modernisation, 
actual understandings diverge in some significant ways from the mainstream approach 
in Europe; reflecting a unique Chinese version of modernisation. While the underlying 
logic of allowing for industrial flexibility while tackling emissions is mirrored in Chinese 
progress towards a single emissions trading system, the rhetoric surrounding ecological 
modernisation is different.   
5.1.2. Economic development and ‘weak sustainability’ 
‘Weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability remains an important debate within development and 
environmental politics (see, for example, Neumayer, 2013 among others). ‘Weak’ 
sustainability posits that different kinds of capital (man-made, natural, and human) are 
mutually substitutable; what matters, therefore, is the total stock of capital. In principle, 
though rarely advocated, is Solow’s (1974: 11) observation ‘that the world can, in effect, 
get along without natural resources’ assuming the stock of natural capital has been 
efficiently substituted for by stocks of man-made or human capital.  
Conversely, strong sustainability argues that certain critical natural capital must 
remain as such and cannot be substituted for any other type of capital.  Weak 
sustainability builds on the neoclassical economics view of distinct, though related, 
realms of activity. Strong sustainability departs from this and reveals how the economy 
is constituted by social relations, and how economic systems lack a direct access to 
natural ‘resources’ – processes of natural capital exploitation take place by and through 
society. 
Rather than taking the pursuit of economic growth as an objective subordinated to 
sustainability, both the EU and China build economic growth into climate change 
mitigation and environmental governance mechanisms. This is shown by the opening 
point of the 2015 EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change: 
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The seriousness of the challenge calls upon the two sides to work constructively 
together for the common good, in the context of sustainable economic and social 
development. (European Commission, 2015.)  
With climate change mitigation ‘work’ taking place ‘in the context of sustainable 
economic…development’, climate change is thus subordinated to the wider, 
contextualising frame of economic development. The two sides also agree to ‘cooperate 
on developing a cost-effective low-carbon economy while maintaining robust economic 
growth’ (ibid.). This places economic instruments as the means through which climate 
change might be tackled, and the means of defining what is achievable, and what 
measures are not. 
While this also plays an important role in global, multilateral responses to climate 
change, it takes explicit institutional form in EU-China bilateral relations. Convergence 
in this area is key in establishing market-liberal hegemony spatially across the north-
south divide, and temporally as China increasingly emerges as a key player in global 
negotiations. This perpetuates the ideological assumptions made by market-liberal 
approaches: that economic and environmental considerations inhabit distinct realms, 
rather than the strong sustainability model insistence that the economy can only be a 
subset of the environment. Economic concerns are thus dis-embedded from 
environmental and social relations in orthodox interpretations. The given framework for 
action thus reproduces and strengthens the economic imperatives of market-liberalism, 
particularly the maintenance of ‘robust economic growth’ as a measure of wider social 
progress that also delineates the appropriate course of action. 
This is linked to the market-liberal assumption that growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) is automatically correlated with notions of progress and represents a 
legitimate metric of overall economic performance and development. Both China and 
the EU commit to GDP growth along these assumptions. China’s proposals for the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan23 remark that ‘China has seen great progress in the past five 
years’ with ‘per capita GDP increasing to $7,800’ (XinhuaNet, 2015). China’s growth 
forecast for 2016 remains high at 6.5-7% (XinhuaNet, 2016). Climate change policies are 
 
 
23 The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan was confirmed on the 16th March 2016 – at the time of writing, 
no full document was available. The source used here is a state-created outline of proposals in 
the form of an infographic, available at XinhuaNet, 2015.   
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viewed very much in the market-liberal tradition of contributing positively to GDP, 
providing new areas for investment (and investment returns), and providing a job-
creation strategy. UNEP’s update for the Pittsburgh Summit outlined that: 
Chinese experts estimate that for every US$ 100 billion of green investment, GDP 
would grow by US$ 143 billion, tax revenues by US$ 1 billion, and household 
consumption by US$ 60 billion. In addition, it is estimated that 600,000 new jobs 
would be created. (UNEP, 2011.) 
In particular, China’s ‘Green Stimulus’ package topped the G20 in absolute terms at 
US$ 218 billion under the ‘Global Green New Deal’ framework encouraged by UNEP, 
and the 11th Five-Year Plan, with an additional $US 2.5 billion estimated for solar power 
subsidies (ibid.; see also HSBC Global Research, 2011). Such approaches to ‘greening’ 
economic structures reveal the anthropocentric philosophy that underlies ‘weak’ 
approaches to sustainability, and represents an important area of convergence that, 
perhaps due to the extent to which it is taken for granted, is often occluded from the 
literature as a basic area of agreement in global environmental governance, and from 
policymaking as an area of contestation. 
5.1.3. Anthropocentrism 
EU and Chinese climate change mitigation policies, and environmental governance 
generally, are based on further human-centred management of nature, constructing the 
environment as an area subject to an ever-expanding human agency. 
Anthropocentrism24 places humans as the privileged interpreters of value in nature, 
such that the valuation of natural ‘capital’ is determined by its service to the human 
species, an important example being the valuation of ecosystem services (ESS) (cf. 
Costanza et al., 1998; Costanza et al., 2014). This contrasts with the eco-centric philosophy 
found in, for example, deep ecology perspectives that assume an intrinsic value in nature. 
 
 
24 It should be noted that there exist other challenges to anthropocentrism somewhat beyond the 
scope of this research project, but significant to the ongoing process of critical emancipation. 
Ecofeminism responds to the ‘anthropocentric’ philosophy by pointing out that historical 
environmental exploitation (or at least decision making relating to this) has been 
overwhelmingly male-centric, rather than representatively human-centric. Second, some 
ecofeminists argue that the patriarchal system fails to value the unique relationship between 
women and nature through shared experiences of exploitation. See particularly Ruth-Johnson, 
2013, for a pertinent discussion on ecofeminism’s contemporary contribution to political 
critique. 
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The latter of these philosophies can also be found in various religious systems, such as 
Buddhism and Daoism (Confucianism is discussed a little later), but also in localised 
knowledge-systems. Eco-centric or bio-centric approaches challenge the assumption that 
natural value is ‘knowable’ uniquely to humans; arguing instead that the natural world 
is intrinsically valuable in ways that cannot be exploited and substituted for.  Market-
liberal and social-green theories typically, though not always, imply an anthropocentric 
view, often incorporating a more ‘prudential’ element to account for valuing nature. 
Salles (2011) demonstrates that the ‘concepts and methods [used] to value 
ecosystems and biodiversity have progressively emerged with roots in the core of 
economic theory of value’. As an example, while market functions might determine the 
economic value of timber, there is no function for accounting for the symbolic meaning 
or cultural value of the particular woodland from which the timber is sourced. Offsetting 
loss of that woodland by planting elsewhere the number and species of trees destroyed 
cannot offset the subjective value attributed by local communities, nor account for the 
intrinsic value. In recent years, Ecosystem Marketplace, a non-profit organisation25, has 
charted the growth of biodiversity offset markets, aiming to increase their transparency 
and as such their functionality (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2016; see also Madsen, Carroll, 
and Moore Brands (Ecosystem Marketplace) 2010). The approach aims to better 
operationalise systems such as biodiversity offsetting and habitat banking by 
standardising value attribution, including in inherently subjective ‘services’ such as 
‘cultural values’ (ibid.: 4, see also Daily et al., 2000). However, as Kirchhoff (2012) argues, 
‘many cultural values attaching to the natural/cultivated environment cannot be 
addressed in this way’. 
 In this area, China has taken steps to reflect such valuation by internalising 
subjective losses into environmental auditing, but ultimately puts such responsibilities 
at the behest of market instruments. As an example, Brandt et al. (2015) showed that tree 
logging accelerated in Tibetan sacred forests and old-growth forests, in spite of an official 
logging ban, which ‘suggests that the implementation of official policies may displace 
local forms of protection’. In terms of climate change, this is pertinent as ‘[f]orests 
 
 
25 Ecosystem Marketplace aims to facilitate the growth of MBIs in environmental management, 
and is supported by organisations including UNDP, the Global Environment Facility, and the 
Grantham Foundation, among many others.  
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provide indispensable ecosystem services, including carbon sequestration, climate 
regulation and recreation, and are essential for biodiversity conservation’ (ibid., see also 
Kinzig et al., 2011). 
Similarly, some ecologists have argued that as biodiversity represents a 
considerable area of doubt (Stork, 1997) in terms of known species, known interactions 
between these, and how different species and systems might provide services to 
humanity in areas such as carbon sequestration, it is impossible to accurately value. It 
has been estimated that the number of known species represents as little as 10% of the 
total number of species in the world (UNEP, 2001: 61; Oldham, 2002: 13-15). Moreover, 
of the 1.7 million species believed to be accounted for, ‘we know virtually nothing’; and 
there are ‘enormous gaps in western scientific knowledge of global biodiversity and the 
ecological processes that shape our world’ (ibid.; see also Stork, 1997: 45). In an 
introduction to a special biodiversity issue of the American Journal of Botany, Raven et al. 
(2011) point out that ‘Earth's biodiversity...is declining at an alarming rate, even faster 
than the last mass extinction 65 million years ago’ and that humans ‘impact biodiversity 
via rapidly expanding human population growth, consumption of resources, and spread 
of disease’. In this light, market-liberal approaches cannot account for biodiversity if our 
knowledge of such systems is so lacking to begin with. As such, the convergence 
between the EU and China on anthropocentrism, while representing a widely held 
philosophical ethic, also provides challenges to current and future climate change 
policies to account for the intrinsic and/or unknown value of nature.  
Within this area, Confucianism manifests as a potential divergence insofar as it is 
held as an ideal-type in official communications. Confucianism offers an alternative 
epistemology26 which ‘values’ nature without market forces, and the rhetorical adoption 
of Confucian ideas represents an important departure from the rhetorical devices of 
most Western policy documents. As such, ‘living in harmony with nature’ has become a 
common phrase among governmental communiqués regarding environmental crisis 
management. In the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central 
 
 
26 This is not to confuse such a broad philosophy as representing a homogenous set of 
assumptions; Confucianism, neo-Confucianism and (to a lesser extent) the ‘New Confucianism’ 
represent a long history of philosophical tradition, but in this capacity the basic tenets of 
Confucianism from around the first century BCE until the ninth century are employed.   
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Committee of the Communist Party of China, the plenum committed to the ‘harmonious 
development between Man and Nature’ (China.org.cn, 2014). Within the same 
communiqué, however, it is stated that China ‘should adhere to the major strategic 
judgment that development is still the key to solving all problems in China [and] take 
economic construction as our central task’ (ibid., emphasis added). This necessarily 
submits environmental crisis management to economic concerns, and represents a 
notable departure from the holistic, integrated knowledge-systems of traditional 
Confucian philosophy.  
Moreover, as Zhuang (2015) illustrates with the analysis of Confucian rhetoric in 
the Chinese eco-city movement, the human-nature relationship implied by 
Confucianism is effectively reduced to a consumer-commodity relationship. As such, 
Confucian philosophy appears to play a significant part in Chinese rhetoric but remains 
essentially indistinct from an anthropocentric philosophy to the extent that increasing 
human agency in the environment at the behest of market forces is stipulated alongside, 
and even in service of, this ideal.  
Nevertheless, more research is needed on this potential area of divergence that 
analyses how such discursive practices are interpreted among civil society, and whether 
or how the rhetorical use of Confucianism is implicated in maintaining exploitative 
processes by merely re-framing such processes.  
5.2. Policy Divergence 
China and the EU have also diverged in significant ways. This section looks in more 
detail at a selection of these areas, the criteria for selecting which lies in their capacity to 
challenge assumptions made by market-liberal approaches. This is in order to gauge the 
extent to which China might be viewed as a substantive counter-hegemonic bloc in 
global climate change governance.  
5.2.1. Differentiated responsibility  
The issue of differentiated responsibility is deserving of a detailed analysis in its own 
right from a critical perspective, which lies somewhat beyond the scope of this research; 
as such, a brief overview of the temporal and geographic elements is included in order 
to contextualise the main discussion of divergence. In global climate change negotiations, 
responsibility plays an important role both in challenging cooperation between, broadly 
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speaking, the economically developed countries (generally Annex 1 Parties to the 
UNFCCC) and developing countries (non-Annex 1 Parties); but also in fostering 
collaboration within these two broad categories, if only in the enlightened self-interest 
sense of a shared interest in promoting a particular framework for judging responsibility. 
The debate focuses on how to gauge responsibility for GHG emissions, particularly 
carbon dioxide (CO2), and comes down to two competing views: historical/accumulated 
emissions, and current/predicted emissions. Cumulative measuring takes account of the 
production of GHGs during the historical course of industrial development since the 19th 
century, given the longevity of the CO2 greenhouse effect of between 200 and 2,000 years 
(Archer et al., 2009). Using current and predicted GHG emission levels largely ignores 
this accumulated build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere. These contrasting ways of 
measuring contributions to climate change have a substantive impact on global climate 
change politics.  
For the period 1850-2002, the EU-25 member states contributed 26.5% of global 
CO2 emissions, with China producing 7.6% over the same period (Torney, 2015: 82). 
Overall, currently industrialised countries contributed over three-quarters of cumulative 
CO2 in 2002, with developing countries contributing the remainder (Baumert, Herzog 
and Pershing, 2005, cited in Torney, 2015: 82). For contemporary considerations, this is 
significant because the accepted wisdom of measuring CO2 emissions places China as 
the largest contributor in absolute terms since 2006, and even having overtaken the EU 
in per capita emissions in 2014 (Friedlingstein et al., 2014). Allowing for historical 
accumulation, however, pushes this figure forward to 2050, and overtaking EU 
emissions in 2021 in absolute terms (Botzen, Gowdy, and van den Bergh, 2008; Torney, 
2015: 82). Given this, as Torney (2015: 82-83) argues, ‘it is clearly in the interests of 
countries that have contributed significantly to past emissions to design a regime that 
concentrates on current and future emissions trends’. The ways in which climate change 
regimes account for GHG emissions geographically and assign responsibility typically 
in aggregate terms at the national level, encounters the same challenges and invites a 
similar critique.  
This issue invites a critique of the orthodox assumption that GHG emissions, and 
environmental impacts in general, should be accounted for in the geographic area they 
are produced, rather than at the point of demand and consumption. This is a particularly 
salient point given the huge trade deficit between the EU and China, as shown by Figure 
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7 In addition to the trade deficit, EU outward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
are over 500% higher than inward flows of FDI from China: €127.7bn versus €25.5bn 
respectively in 2013 (EU Commission, 2015). In this sense, accounting for environmental 
damages and GHG emissions at the point of production is largely blind to a significant 
portion (though by no means all) of the causes of such processes: the outsourcing of 
manufacturing from industrialised to developing countries, whether by purposeful 
intent in line with the pollution haven hypothesis, or a by-product of other competition 
mechanisms which happen to concentrate environmental impacts in developing areas. 
This ties in with a feature of capitalism well described by David Harvey: ‘capitalism does 
not solve its problems; it moves them around geographically’ (Harvey, 2010). This 
presents a clear divergence and challenge for EU-China negotiations; Qin Gang, Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson for China puts it succinctly: ‘On the one hand, you increase 
production 
in China; on the other hand you criticize China on the emission reduction issue’ (Qin 
Gang quoted in Scientific American, 2009). 
Combined with the challenges of accumulated versus current GHG emissions, 
there is a clear gap between EU and China stances. Torney (2015: 83) questions whether 
such an argument is fair based on whether ‘responsibility assumes intent’; that is, given 
the lack of knowledge of GHG emissions or their impact prior to the late 20th century, is 
it fair to assign responsibility for emissions that predate this understanding? However, 
this approach ignores what might be better understood with a more genealogical 
analysis. In this sense, the current capabilities and privileges of industrialised countries, 
in terms of financial provision, large low-energy-intensity services industries, 
technology, and infrastructure resilience, are largely products of an early industrialising 
process and the benefits that came along with this. As such, those who have historically 
contributed most detrimentally to the climate change crisis are also those who have 
 
EU-China trade in goods, 2012-2014, measured in € billions  
Year EU Imports EU Exports Balance 
2012 292.1 144.2 -147.9 
2013 280.1 148.2 -131.9 
2014 302.0 164.8 -137.3 
 
Figure 7: Table to show EU imports and exports with China, 2012-2014. Source: 
adapted from EU Commission, 2015 
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gained the most from the process and are those most capable of providing the financial 
and technical support for tackling it today. Moreover, Kreft et al. (2015) have shown that 
‘Of the ten most affected [by climate change] countries (1995–2014), nine were 
developing countries in the low income or lower-middle income country group, while 
only one (Thailand) was classified as an upper-middle income country’; a view also 
shown by the regional analyses from Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014). This places all of the top-ten most at risk countries in 
the non-Annex 1 grouping of the UNFCCC. While contributing most emissions, and 
reaping the most rewards, developed countries are at the same time most isolated from 
the negative impacts of such actions27, while conversely being best equipped to tackle 
them. 
Divergence in this key area adds weight to the possibility of China acting as a 
counter-hegemonic bloc towards the dominant means of accounting for emissions and 
assigning responsibility. China has assumed a leading role in fostering south-south 
cooperation, institutionalised at the UN level in 2010 with China’s South-South and 
Global Cooperation framework (see UNDP China, 2015), as well as a dominant place in 
southern multilateral negotiations on climate change, as shown by the South-South 
Cooperation on Climate Change Forum, which met for the second time at COP21 in Paris 
(China.org.cn, 2015b). Given this, the emergence of a key climate change and trade 
partner that directly challenges the assumptions in this area made by developed 
countries and regions might have a significant impact on future multilateral negotiations.  
5.2.2. Role of markets and hierarchical governance 
While this analysis has so far highlighted the significant and increasing role of MBIs in 
climate mitigation policy in China, there remains important inconsistency between the 
EU’s and China’s approach. In general, this is attributable to the ongoing desire to blend 
economic systems, producing a mixture of command-and-control resource governance, 
and market governance. This emerging market-focused consensus is captured well by 
 
 
27 This is not to say, however, that developed countries will not be significantly impacted by 
climate change – the 5th IPCC Assessment clarifies that each geographic region, given the innate 
complexity of the climate, but also of political and socio-economic relations, will experience 
dramatic upheavals; but the immediate impacts are disproportionately located in developing 
regions, such as much of Africa, Bangladesh, Vietnam, etc.    
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the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China:  
We must deepen economic system reform by centering on the decisive role of the 
market in allocating resources [and to achieve this by] greatly reducing the 
government's role in the direct allocation of resources, and promote resources 
allocation according to market rules, market prices and market competition, so 
as to maximize the benefits and optimize the efficiency (China.org.cn, 2014). 
However, the Chinese leadership also confirmed that:  
What is most important is to uphold the leadership of the Party, adhere to the 
Party's basic line, reject both the old and rigid closed-door policy and any attempt 
to abandon socialism and take an erroneous path, firmly take the socialist road 
and ensure that our reform is in the right direction. (Ibid.) 
In addition, the same document stated that ‘The underlying issue [for reform] is how to 
strike a balance between the role of the government and that of the market, and let the 
market play the decisive role in allocating resources’ (ibid.). This blended approach 
shows the unique socioeconomic direction underpinned by the philosophy of ‘socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’ first outlined by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s (see Chang, 
1996 for a detailed discussion), and more recently affirmed in the most recent 5-Year 
Plan: 
In line with the chief objectives of improving and developing socialism with 
Chinese characteristics and modernizing the country’s governance system and 
capacity for governance, we need to improve the systems by which the market 
plays the decisive role in resource allocation and the government plays a more 
effective role. (Central Committee of the CPC, 2015: 14). 
Since 2005, academics instrumental in the emergence and mainstreaming of ecological 
modernisation in Europe have charted its trajectory in China as an organisational 
concept for combating climate change (cf. Zhang, Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2007). In doing 
so, the authors note the differentiation in China’s adoption of the theory, concluding that, 
despite the use of the term ecological modernisation, actual understandings diverge in 
some significant ways from the mainstream approach in Europe; again, reflecting a 
unique Chinese version of modernisation. Highlights of proposals for the Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan also show that, while a greater role is given to markets in some contexts 
and ‘modernisation’ is referred to in relation to the economy and industry, alongside 
such commitments is the provision for ‘responsibilities of the central government and 
other authorities to be strengthened’ (XinhuaNet, 04-11-2015).  
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The focus on environmental authoritarianism has taken into consideration the lack 
of involvement of civil society and the non-participatory policy-making process (Kostka 
and Mol, 2013; Zhu et al., 2015; among others). Typically, such studies have focused on 
the poor record of ‘local implementation and civil society participation’ of overly 
ambitious central policies (Kostka and Mol, 2013). Such studies show a clear divergence 
between EU and Chinese governance characteristics. However, Lo (2015) demonstrates 
convincingly that ‘although China's national low-carbon policy appears highly 
authoritarian, the situation on the ground is much more ambiguous, displaying a 
mixture of authoritarian and liberal features in climate change policy’ (ibid.: 158). In this 
sense, divergence on governance type is a less clear-cut picture. Central policymaking in 
China displays a continuation of the principles outlined by former-President and market 
reformist Deng Xiaoping, using a combination of market and command-and-control 
tools.  
There is evidence, however, of a clear deviation from this ideal-type in local 
implementation with what has been ‘described as de facto neoliberal environmentalism 
given the lack of control’ in some local contexts (ibid.). Nevertheless, secondary literature 
reveals a clear divergence from the more fundamental role of markets in the late Western, 
neoliberal tradition, at the very least in the ideal-type communicated rhetorically from 
central government in China, which continues to place an emphasis on command-and-
control instruments to work in parallel with market instruments. This is significant for a 
potential hegemon in climate change policy; retention of state intervention as a 
‘legitimate’ economic function offers different instruments for providing sustainability 
rather than purely indirect consumer- and market-led interventions.  
5.3. Ecological Civilisation as Statist Discourse 
China has unambiguously signalled a departure from a discourse in which an 
unendingly expansive consumerism can absorb sufficient environmental care to halt and 
reverse ecological and climatic emergencies. A section of Xi’s address 28  at the 19th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China (henceforth CPC)(2017) entitled 
 
 
28 A full extract of this section of the speech is available in Appendix B 
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‘Speeding up Reform of the System for Developing an Ecological Civilization, and 
Building a Beautiful China’ begins with the observation that: 
Man and nature form a community of life; we, as human beings, must respect 
nature, follow its ways, and protect it. Only by observing the laws of nature can 
mankind avoid costly blunders in its exploitation. Any harm we inflict on nature 
will eventually return to haunt us. This is a reality we have to face. (Xi, 2017) 
Xi goes on to note that, within a context of ‘promoting green development’, ‘we…will 
cut consumption of energy and materials … We encourage simple, moderate, green, and 
low-carbon ways of life, and oppose extravagance and excessive consumption’ (Ibid.). A 
discourse of limits, recognised as both externalised environmental limits and 
internalised self-limits in ‘ways of life’, is in stark contrast to Westernised discourses of 
greening consumerism as a means of transition.  
 However, within the same section of speech, Xi notes that: 
In addition to creating more material and cultural wealth to meet people's ever-
increasing needs for a better life, we need also to provide more quality ecological 
goods to meet people's ever-growing demands for a beautiful environment. (Ibid.) 
There is, therefore, an internal contradiction in the discourse, indeed within the same 
text, that material consumption will at once be created and discouraged by the same ‘we’, 
and towards the same end of ‘building a beautiful China’.  
The competing requirements to create ‘more material … wealth’ and to ‘cut 
consumption of energy and materials’29 is similar to the overdetermination confronting 
the sustainable consumer-subject, in which the subject is hailed by the competing 
messages of problematic overconsumption and consumption as driving green 
innovation.  
It is this apparent paradox that this analysis begins with as the basis of locating 
a site of contestation. Whilst some scholars have argued that under Xi Jinping, and 
especially since its codification in Party and state architecture, Ecological Civilisation has 
 
 
29 Given the translation, it is worth noting that in the Chinese version of the speech (see 
Xinhuanet, 2017) the same rendering of ‘material’ is also used in both instances. Material wealth 
is 物质财 whereas in the context of cutting consumption, 物耗 is used for ‘material 
consumption’. In each, the character 物 (similar to objects or things) indicates the same ‘material’ 
(that is, physical objects) is being discussed in each. In short, the contradiction is also apparent 
in its original Chinese. 
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emerged from a tumultuous genesis into a coherent framework for implementation. 
Instead, this analysis aims to show the inconsistencies in the discourse-internal structure, 
as well the highly contingent statist discourses with which it interacts domestically. This 
is done by analysing those documents at primarily the central governmental level, and 
particularly by Xi Jinping, that help to codify Ecological Civilisation as a central strand 
of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in the era of ‘national rejuvenation’. Whilst 
accepting that these represent primarily political, frequently propagandistic documents, 
the point of analysis is not to distinguish between propaganda and ‘reality’. For 
discourse theory, the analytical value is not a determination of an objective material 
reality either purposefully promoted or obscured, but an investigation of what forms of 
articulation have political legitimacy; in short, what stories are being told of how humans 
relate to nature in statist discourses, and how different is this to neoliberal sustainable 
development and sustainable consumerism? 
The analysis proceeds according to three broad analytical categories that 
correlate to those explored in the previous chapter: development; consumerism and 
agency; and rationalisation. The three categories interrelate and build on an analysis of 
the same texts.  
5.3.1. Development  
Xi Jinping, in his report to the 19th CPC National Congress, commented that ‘[w]hat we 
now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the 
people's ever-growing needs for a better life’ (ibid.). The amendment 30  to the CPC 
constitution that followed the 19th National Congress confirmed that this ‘principle 
contradiction facing Chinese society’ would be adopted and serve ‘as an important basis 
on which we formulate major policies and long-term strategies for the Party and the 
country’ (Xinhua, 2017b). The amendment goes on to outline the contributing strands to 
the Party’s official ‘Thought’: 
The Congress unanimously agrees that, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, in addition to Marxism-Leninism, Mao 
Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and 
 
 
30 The full amendment resolution is included for reference in Appendix B. 
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the Scientific Outlook on Development, shall constitute the guides to action of 
the Party in the Party Constitution. (Ibid.) 
Development in official CPC ‘Thought’ is highly codified as a seemingly unstructured 
system of references to previous developmental paradigms. Potential contradictions 
between, for instance, Marxism-Leninism and Deng Xiaoping Theory (the philosophy 
requiring and legitimising China’s market-oriented reforms) are not addressed as 
potentially conflicting frameworks for action, but more in the tradition of Chinese 
dialectics wherein the many philosophies constitute several but united ‘guides’ that 
produce ‘action’. In this sense, contradictions between the competing discourses 
(including differing roles for the state and markets, and differing concepts of the people, 
from rural peasants to the proletariat and, increasingly, as urbanised consumers) does 
not produce a polarisation or political stalemate, but a combined ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ that legitimises a particular approach at a particular time in Chinese 
development. 
The ‘new era’ that ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ materialises in is one characterised by, as 
noted above, the contradiction between ‘unbalanced and unequal development’ and the 
‘ever-growing needs for a better life’. The Theory of the Three Represents, which served 
to mainstream three tenets in the CPC’s constitution in the 16th National Congress 
(productive forces, advancing culture, and majority consensus) similarly enshrined in 
the constitution the need to build ‘a well-off society in an all-round way and [speed] up 
the socialist modernization drive’ (Communist Party of China, 2002). The modernisation 
of Chinese socialism follows the thought of Deng Xiaoping and the need to open up 
China’s labour to international markets, contributing to significant economic growth and, 
consequently, severe environmental pollution. As Lewis and Litai argue, the Theory of 
Three Represents shows China ‘has cast its lot with the beneficiaries [of economic growth] 
in the apparent belief that only development and expanding opportunities can ensure 
stability and mitigate the problems’ (Lewis and Litai, 2003: 927). As then-President of the 
PRC, Jiang Zemin, reported, ‘[a]ll sectors of the economy can very well display their 
respective advantages in market competition and stimulate one another for common 
development’ (Jiang, quoted in CCTV, 2002). The co-existence, indeed, the self-styled co-
dependence, of socialism and market-driven reforms in China provide a unique context 
for the emergence of sustainability transition discourse.  
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 The ‘contradiction’ of unequal development and the expanding needs of Chinese 
citizens was similarly recognised in the 17th CPC National Congress, in which the 
Scientific Theory of Development emerged as a core tenet. In the 2012 revision of the 
Constitution of the CPC, for instance, the General Program notes that: 
At the present stage, the principal contradiction in Chinese society is one between 
the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and the low level of 
production. (CPC Central Committee, 2012.) 
The same Report by then-President Hu Jintao said that:  
Taking economic development as the central task is vital to national renewal, and 
development still holds the key to addressing all the problems we have in China. 
Only by promoting sustained and sound economic development can we lay a 
solid material foundation for enhancing the country's prosperity and strength, 
improving the people's wellbeing and ensuring social harmony and stability. We 
must unwaveringly adhere to the strategic thinking that only development 
counts. (Hu, 2012: section IV.) 
Since 2012, therefore, the CPC has not wavered it its insistence on the nature of the 
principle contradiction in China, nor the central policy that ‘only development counts’ 
to reconcile this contradiction. Moreover, as the same Report details, economic growth 
is taken as the main indicator of development, and a crux of the Scientific Theory of 
Development: 
In contemporary China, pursuing development in a scientific way best embodies 
the thinking that only development counts. Taking the pursuit of development 
in a scientific way as the underlying guideline and accelerating the change of the 
growth model as a major task is a strategic choice we have made for promoting 
China's overall development. (Ibid.) 
‘China’s overall development’ is thus reduced to a function of the growth imperative. 
Here, development, defined as the process by which China enhances its ‘prosperity and 
strength 31 ’ is held by the CPC as central to achieving China’s problems. As with 
Westernised articulations of sustainable development, environmental protection is both 
a requirement for and a function of development. 
 
 
31 Military modernisation is similarly seen as largely a function of economic growth: from the 
16th National Congress, ‘[China will] push forward the modernization of national defense and 
the army on the basis of economic growth’ (CCTV, 2002).   
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 Despite the tendency for the phrase ‘sustainable development’ to be abandoned 
in place of ‘ecological civilisation’ and, to a lesser extent ‘scientific development’ (Goron, 
2018, see particularly p.46), the 13th 5-Year Plan, 2016-2020, out of keeping with other 
high-level strategies of the PRS since 2012, does not mention ‘ecological civilization’32. 
Instead, ‘sustainable development’ is employed five times (see Appendix C, Figure 8 for 
word concordance analysis). 
 Here, sustainability, as in the case of Westernised articulations, is a lucid concept 
that at times shifts between noun and adjective; respectively, as a destination or as an 
aspirational process. As noun, it refers to a tangible thing there can, indeed should, be 
more of: ‘bolstering sustainable development’, and ‘[m]aintain a medium-high rate of 
growth [w]hile working to achieve more balanced, inclusive, and sustainable 
development’. Elsewhere it indicates a process; existing development becoming more 
sustainable, for instance ‘more efficient, more equitable, and more sustainable 
development.’ Here, it is likened to the adjectives efficient and equitable – development 
must become these things, and it must become sustainable. As adjective, ‘sustainable’ 
implies a moderating, regulating approach, as in its final usage where ‘an appropriate 
intensity of development’ is permitted by adopting the moniker of sustainability. As 
both noun and adjective, sustainable development legitimises rather than questions 
extractive, growth-dependent developmental pathways: it defines the transition and 
transformation of capitals between Xi’s ‘green mountains’ and ‘gold mountains’.     
Despite these overtones of faith in the growth model of development, there are 
clear instances where this model is problematised, from the same 5-Year Plan: 
…we must be soberly aware that China’s development model is inefficient; 
uneven, uncoordinated, and unsustainable development continues to be a 
prominent problem; the change of pace in economic growth, structural 
adjustments, and the transformation of the drivers of growth present interwoven 
problems… (Communist Party of China, 2015a: 11) 
This begins to imply a problem with growth, or at least its scalability. However, the 
critique does not go so far as to recognise that a ‘change of pace’ is an inherent function 
 
 
32 Analysis performed on official English translation by author using Word Sketch, March 2017. 
Includes variations and alternative anglicisations (‘civilisation’). Analysis also performed on 
official Chinese version, using ‘生态文明’ as the query. Zero results shown for any query. 
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of exponential growth33. China’s economy in GDP terms, in constant 2010 USD, grew 
from 827.7 billion in 1990 to 2.23 trillion in 2000, and to 6.08 trillion in 2010 (World Bank, 
n.d.). The era of unprecedented growth helped establish the ‘opening up’ policy of Deng 
Xiaoping Thought as fundamental Party ideology and reinforce the Party’s promise, tied 
to its legitimacy, of modernising China. In 2018, the Chinese economy was 13.6 billion 
USD in GDP terms. At an annual growth rate of 6%, achieved in 2018, the economy will 
double in under 12 years34. The CPC-owned China Daily takes this further in a rare direct 
problematisation of the growth model by a Party mouthpiece: 
After more than three decades of economic success, environmental degradation 
and other adverse effects of the scale-based mode of growth have become an 
obstacle for economic and social development. 
As the Chinese government has shifted from its long-held GDP-obsessed 
development to a comprehensive social and economic development evaluation 
system that balances GDP growth with its impact on the environment, the 
pursuit of an ecological civilization has naturally become the choice of the nation. 
(China Daily, 2015.)  
As with sustainable development in Western and global discourses, there remain 
articulations where growth is problematised. ‘GDP-obsessed development’ mimics 
other discourses of degrowth and post-growth wherein GDP is a commonly 
problematised indicator of harm, and a key intervention is to destabilise its widely-
established equivalence with progress, wellbeing, opportunity, job provision, wage 
growth, and others. Such critique is rare in the mainstream of economic orthodoxy, 
however, and this is particularly true in China.  
Even here, a rare case of direct criticism of the central government’s strategy, the 
growth model itself is not problematised. The criticism levelled at the historic strategy 
of the central government is legitimised because the fix has also been found there: the 
‘comprehensive social and economic development evaluation system’ that successfully 
‘balances GDP growth with its impact on the environment’. Neither GDP, nor the model 
 
 
33 China’s original target of 10% annual GDP growth would more than double the size of the 
economy in 10 years compared to the original value, as indeed happened between 1990 and 
2000, almost tripling in the next decade. A sudden growth in scale was inevitable with a 10% 
ambition.  
34 Using growth/decay formula: x(t) = x0 × (1 + r) t   where x0 is the initial value, r is the growth 
rate, and x(t) is the value after the time interval t. This assumes other conditions remain equal. 
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of growth it measures, are beyond salvation as long as harmony is found between the 
positives they are assumed to entail and the negatives they clearly inflict. This harmony 
is at once a new solution to a new problem, and a continuation of a long-established 
process of harmony in Chinese discourse.   
5.3.2. Consumers and agency 
Western discourses of sustainability transitions generally, as argued in the previous 
chapter, articulate three distinguishable, though sometimes overlapping, iterations of 
the consumer-subject: ‘manageable consumer’, ‘innovative consumer’, and, less 
commonly, ‘over-consumer’ (though the latter is often generalised as overconsumption 
to indicate a move beyond individualising responsibility). Innovative consumer 
represents a hegemonic discourse in mainstream, market-liberal sustainability 
transitions: the sustainable consumer-subject is not merely a managed (and manageable) 
element, but a driving force of transition. The economic rationalising furthers the 
neoliberal imaginary of markets as the optimal delivery mechanisms for needs which 
are, as discussed previously, broadly indistinguishable from wants. The key intervention, 
if there is any, is that consumers require greater information to ensure their choices have 
the necessary impact of driving ‘green’ innovation.  
 The pursuit of innovation in China as both economic strategy (wherein moving 
from manufacturer of foreign-owned technology to driver of high technology is a key 
domestic agenda) and as part of social and environmental strategy is central. This section 
highlights, however, that Chinese consumers are rarely so afforded this transformative 
agency. Instead, the potential for Chinese consumers is the aggregate of their spending 
as an emerging series of increasingly specialised markets to solve China’s industrial 
oversupply. As then-President Hu Jintao stated in 2012: 
We should firmly maintain the strategic focus of boosting domestic demand, 
speed up the establishment of a long-term mechanism for increasing consumer 
demand, unleash the potential of individual consumption, increase investment 
at a proper pace, and expand the domestic market. (Hu, 2012: section IV.) 
The requirement for a fast-expanding domestic market has remained a key policy under 
President Xi Jinping. (See Appendix C, Figure 9 for the results of a concordance analysis 
of the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan.) At the same time as increases in the quantity of 
consumerism, the Plan highlights also the need for an increase in the quality, value, and 
scope of consumer goods; an increase in consumer rights and protections; a greater 
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degree of specialisation; and an increase in the integration of online and offline 
consumption. 
 Consumerism, therefore, is intended to increase across a range of quantities, 
qualities, spaces, and practices. It is intended, in short, to drive material economic 
growth and bring per capita spending and accumulation of material goods in line with 
those in the West. An increase in consumerism is explicitly a goal in itself. The 
implications for this central policy for a sustainability transition are significant: a 
transition capable of transforming the socio-economy so that planetary (and more local) 
environmental limits are not breached would need to be capable of not only reducing 
the existing ecological footprint, but a vastly enlarged one. As the previous section 
indicated, development is assumed to be key to solving this, and any other, problem: 
…we will work to improve the environment in which the potential of 
consumption is unleashed, better satisfy and create consumer demand through 
improved and innovative supply, and constantly strengthen the fundamental 
role that consumption plays in fueling [sic] economic growth. We will channel 
great energy into expanding spending by increasing consumer buying power, 
improving consumer expectations, and tapping rural potential for consumption. 
(CPC, 2015a: 32) 
If development is key to solving all of China’s problems, then, as the fuel for economic 
growth, consumerism is inherently key, too. Nevertheless, it is the supply that is 
innovated which then creates consumer demand. Chapter Four the of the CPC the 
Development Philosophy similarly insists innovation ‘should permeate the work of the 
Party and the country’ but leaves out any room for an inherently ‘innovative consumer’ 
as Western articulations of innovations construct (CPC, 2015a: 20).  
In a document entitled ‘Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council on Further Promoting the Development of Ecological Civilization’ (often 
referred to as ‘Central Document Number 12’), the CPC provides a nine-section strategy 
for the implementation of Ecological Civilisation. Here, the CPC refers directly to the 
role of consumers in the realisation of this goal: 
We will actively guide consumers to buy energy-efficient, environmentally-
friendly and low-carbon products, such as energy-efficient and new energy 
vehicles, energy-efficient home appliances and water-saving devices, reduce the 
use of disposable goods, and restrict excessive packaging. (Communist Party of 
China, 2015b: 19.) 
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The passage indicates a contrasting role for consumers than is typical of Western 
sustainability narratives. Here, the only reference to consumers in the strategy is as a 
passivized body regulated by the state. Whilst the purchasing power of the individual 
is recognised as a core constituent of a sustainability transition, their role as choosers 
(the ‘innovative consumer’ of Western sustainable development) is absent. In this 
articulation, the sustainable consumer subject is constructed as a manageable consumer 
whose material consumption is a given, and whose consumption has the capacity to 
reflect, but not alone produce, the desired transition. 
 But this passivizing is not universal. For instance, as Chinese Vice-President 
Wang Qishan has articulated:  
By embracing economic globalization, China has achieved faster development 
and contributed to the progress of the world. Market economy is driven by the 
demands of willing consumers. China has a big market of 1.4 billion people and 
the largest middle-income population in the world. The deepening of reform and 
opening-up will unleash still greater potential of the Chinese market. (Wang, 
speech quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2019.) 
The ‘demands of willing consumers’ relocates this agency – consumers are afforded a 
degree of willpower. At face value, the market economy of Wang’s imaginary is 
responsive only to willing consumers. The oppositional identify of the ‘unwilling’ is not 
articulated: whether a category of ‘unwilling consumer’ arises, or whether a ‘consumer’ 
is assumed to be inherently willing is indeterminable from Wang’s speech. Located 
alongside the other elements of consumerist discourse, however, consumerism is 
afforded the same place as Western developmental narratives: to achieve broad social 
goals, consumerism is essential. As outlined previously in this respect, a consumer ‘want’ 
from an economic ‘need’ is a crude and reductionist distinction. Similarly, the will, or 
not, to be a consumer is removed from Chinese statist rhetoric. The ‘willing consumer’ 
begins, instead, to look more like the articulation of the innovative consumer: will is 
exercised as choice within the marketplace, and the right will (that of protecting the 
environment, for instance) is the driver of the market economy. However, the 13th Five-
Year Plan outlines a strategy in which, again, the consumer subject is passive to the 
regulation of the state: 
We will pursue innovation-driven development, ensure that business startups 
and innovation flourish, and see that total factor productivity is markedly 
improved. Science and technology will become more deeply embedded in the 
economy, the ingredients needed for innovation will be allocated to greater effect, 
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major breakthroughs will be made in core technologies in key sectors, and 
China’s capacity for innovation will see an all-around improvement. Fulfillment 
[sic] of these goals will help China become a talent-rich country of innovation. 
(CPC, 2015: 15-16.) 
As such, the tendency remains in the RPC for statist discourse to articulate a category 
more resembling the manageable consumer. But, in some specific cases, the emergence 
of a potentially self-willed discerning consumer is evident. With such an analysis, the 
need arises for a focus on what constitutes the drivers of consumer choice, and what 
power-laden constellations of interest are apparent in these. 
In the statist resources of the Ecological Civilisation discourse, the Communist 
Party and state maintain a monopoly in the development of a civilised development path. 
The centralising and legitimising of the state as the legitimate actor in this transition 
further strengthens the Communist Party’s legitimacy as guarantor of the people’s 
fundamental wellbeing, as emphasised in the 13th Five-year Plan: 
The Party’s leadership is the greatest strength of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, and provides the fundamental political guarantee for sustained, 
healthy economic and social development. (CPC 2015: 15.) 
The people are the basic force behind development, and realizing, safeguarding, 
and developing the fundamental interests of the largest possible majority of 
people is the fundamental purpose of development. We must remain dedicated 
to a people-centered notion of development, make improving wellbeing and 
promoting people’s well-rounded development the starting point and ultimate 
goal of development, develop people’s democracy, safeguard social equity and 
justice, protect people’s rights to equal participation and equal development, and 
give full rein to their enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity. (CPC 2015: 13-14.) 
Outside of the lens of consumer subject positions, this highlights a strongly pluralistic 
interpretation of development, significantly beyond reductionist econometrics, albeit 
with the continued, indeed increased, centrality of the Party. Nevertheless, it contradicts 
other articulations of development, such as Wang’s (2019) speech in which development 
has been accelerated by economic globalisation and opening up to global markets, and 
will be furthered in the future by greater opening up – in this articulation, ‘people’ is 
reduced to 1.4 billion consumers within which the large middle-income market place is 
the most important.   
 Taken together with the dominant forms of subjectivizing citizens in China’s 
sustainability transition discourse, both the principle propellant and endpoint for 
development remains increased per capita consumption. This is true domestically, 
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where increasing markets help absorb domestic oversupply, as well as internationally, 
where particularly middle-income earners in China are a key emerging market. As with 
sustainability, the discursive construction of agency and legitimacy remains the key lens 
through which a departure from Westernised narratives of development is determined. 
In this sense, development of ‘the people’ is realised primarily in the singular dimension 
of consumerism: it is both the means and the indicator of achieving greater development. 
Ecological Civilisation differs to the extent that this emergent consumer body 
must be regulated by the state: the Foucauldian governmentality arises as existing and 
additional state architecture is legitimised by the emergency represented by global/local 
environmental change. The protection and legitimisation of the status quo resembles 
that of Westernised sustainability narratives, in which particular constellations of 
meaning emerge, via state and consumer messages, to satisfy environmental awareness 
while maintaining the pursuit of a neoliberal imaginary founded on the ideal of 
perpetual growth. Merely the architecture being sustained has changed, and the 
particular discursive resources of the two agendas has created different 
governmentalities: in the PRC, the state and Party retain the monopoly on legitimate 
agency – it is they who know best, and they who wield the authority and power to bring 
about a ‘civilised’ transition. In the West, the sovereign ‘innovative consumer’ knows 
best. Regardless of which panopticon the consumer-subject enters, the functional 
sustainability of consumerism remains a detached, and thus-far unattained, assumption 
inherent in, and constructed by, a performative sustainability agenda in which the 
growth paradox is reconciled by the fantasmatic logic of greater economic growth which 
creates the conditions for less environmental impact. This base assumption is consistent 
across the two discourses.  
5.4. Conclusion: Towards Multidimensional Sustainability? 
Ecological Civilisation is not merely rationalised as good economic sense, as in 
reductionist logics driving the emergence of Chinese variants of ecological 
modernisation (e.g. Mol and Summers, 2007). Whilst economic rationalising, 
particularly in reference to development and the material growth of the economy, are 
central to the discourse, the term also draws chains of equivalence to a romanticised 
history of Chinese-environmental relations, as well as to a people-centred philosophy of 
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development. The term is employed not simply to imagine a future, but to historicise the 
present and rescue Chinese history from its long association with environmental damage. 
 Hansen et al (2018) argue that Ecological Civilisation draws on biased and 
reductionist ‘interpretations of philosophical and religious traditions in China’s ancient 
past in order to make claims to a fundamental difference between humankind and 
nature, and between Western and Chinese thought’ (ibid.: 197). This is apparent also in 
the statist discourse’s rationale for environmental protection: 
We need to uphold the fundamental state policy of conserving resources and 
protecting the environment as we pursue sustainable development, and keep to 
a civilized development path that ensures increased levels of production, better 
living standards and sound ecosystems (CPC, 2015: 20). 
The impression arises that nature is so distanced from economic activity that the latter 
will march inexorably forward, unaltered in substance, and nature can keep up or fall 
behind; nice to have but inessential.  
More pertinent, however, is the ‘need to uphold the fundamental state policy of 
conserving resources and protecting the environment’ (ibid.), which reinforces Hansen’s 
et al argument (2018). Whereas neoliberal sustainable development transitions, 
particularly in the ways the subject position of the sustainable consumer mediates 
human-nature relations, place the solution continually on the horizon, Ecological 
Civilisation finds the solution by looking, partly, back – it is not a continual ‘new’. Whilst, 
in its existing statist discourse, this amounts to little more than a propagandistic 
historicising and retrospective legitimizing of China’s development pathway, it 
represents a crucial logic whose meaning could be radical in the modern context where 
sustainability is typically a function of progress. This latter possibility is realised in 
limited but important ways at the state level. 
However, in terms of issue-framing, there is a clear departure from a Westernised 
and globalised framing. At the same time as China, domestically and globally, confronts 
the multifaceted problems of global environmental change, the state’s ‘rejuvenation’ 
under Xi Jinping appears to carry with it potential for upscaling the framing of issues; 
indeed, framing problems according to Marxian structures. In 2018, during the 
celebrations marking two-hundred years since Marx’s birth, Xi notes that  
Writing Marxism onto the flag of the Chinese Communist Party was totally 
correct … Unceasingly promoting the sinification and modernisation of Marxism 
is totally correct. (Xi, quoted in South China Morning Post, 2018.) 
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Marxism has enjoyed a return to the centre of Chinese state rhetoric, even as it enters a 
new genesis by its continued ‘Sinification’ under Xi Jinping Thought. Xi further says that 
China ‘must continuously improve the ability to use Marxism to analyse and solve 
practical problems’ (ibid.). Taken amidst the claims of the ‘scientific truth of Marxism’ 
and the requirement for Marx’s works, rather than simply a ‘Sinification’ of these woks, 
to be central in party members’ ‘way of life’ and ‘spiritual pursuit’ (ibid.), there is an 
apparent emergence in China of a counterhegemonic articulation of the problems China, 
and the world, confronts. 
Ultimately this chapter argues, however, that harmonisation represents two 
processes: the suppression of alternative means of valuing nature, including local 
subjectivities, and the emergence of an authoritarian eco-governmentality whose, albeit 
particular, construction of consumer-subjects is enabled by discourses emanating in 
Western sustainability narratives. Not only, therefore, does Ecological Civilisation fail to 
offer a radical, multidimensional imaginary alternative to Western sustainable 
development, but the latter’s discursive resources are implicated in the totalising, statist 
discourse of the former. A mixture of neoliberal economic orthodoxy and selective 
historicising of modern regulatory practices, namely ‘harmonising’ and ‘civilisation’, 
produce an ecogovernmentality discursively rooted in a uniquely Chinese mode of 
progress (referred to in the statist discourses as ‘Sinification’). The resulting articulation 
of Ecological Civilisation makes similar chains of equivalence between, for instance, 
progress, development, growth, and innovation, with a more ‘managed-consumer’ 
articulation of consumerism.  
Despite the similarities, the discourse presents its sustainability transition as 
something unique to China – grounded in, and emerging from, a selective and highly 
curated rendering of progress in Chinese history and philosophy, even as these terms 
are reinvested with different meaning-making equivalences that largely reinforce rather 
than challenge Western sustainable development discourse. This is except, arguably, in 
the constructed agency of the consumer, whose sovereign act as ‘chooser’ and arbiter of 
the market place (and thus driver of the innovation necessary for technological ‘fixes’) is 
displaced by the ‘manageable consumer’ whose presence is noticeable in Western 
articulations, but subordinate to that of the ‘innovative consumer’.  
Ultimately, this Chapter has shown that Ecological Civilisation does not emerge 
as a radical re-imaginary of human-nature relations. Nevertheless, whilst its political 
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project remains the consolidation of state power under the Communist Party, the agenda 
does rearticulate the consumer subject position. Whereas in Westernised sustainability 
transitions, both in state and non-state advertising discourses, consumers are called on 
as sovereign choosers whose actions drive the innovation essential to sustainability, 
Chinese Ecological Civilisation tends to pacify consumers as a manageable bloc. Similar 
rhetoric (re)constructs the power of consumerism, but not of individualised consumer 
subjects – the role of ‘chooser’ is monopolised by the state which ‘actively guides’ 
supposedly sustainable options while ‘restricting’ those which are less so. The state in 
this sense contributes to the regulation of consumers via the ecogovernmentality of 
Ecological Civilisation.  
Whilst more explicit in Chinese articulations, the practice resembles that of the 
promotion of particular varieties of consumerism in the West: both forms of state 
involvement promote consumerism as a fix to the sustainability crisis. Both, as such, 
promote the fantasmatic ideal that increased per capita consumption will provide the 
framework for reduced environmental impacts. In each case, the contradiction is 
resolved by the apparent ability of material consumption to transcend its present 
conditions, to withdraw the economy from the environment by circularising its material 
footprint, despite the lack of evidence in both cases that decoupling has occurred at a 
sufficient pace or scale 35 , and the continued failure to contend with the growth 
imperative that overrides these moderate relative gains. Discursively, the framework of 
signifiers differs – civilisation, modernisation, harmonisation, among others, have 
particular equivalences with broader statist discourse. Nevertheless, a consistency 
between Western and Chinese sustainability transition is evident in the way in which 
the status quo is afforded considerable legitimacy, even as the socio-economic order it 
engenders remains ecologically unsustainable.  
 
 
35 The CPC’s 2016-2020 5-Year Plan includes the relative decoupling for water, energy, and 
carbon (per unit of economic output), providing a column for the 2015 baseline and the 2020 
goal – but these sections of the table are not populated by data. However, Wang and Jiang 
(2019) showed that China maintained only weak decoupling for CO2 between 2005 and 2014. 
Between 2002-2005, strong negative decoupling prevailed – where CO2 emissions growth 
outpaced economic growth. These figures, however, only contend with one metric of 
environmental impact, ignoring the broader ecological footprint. See Jackson (2019) for further 
discussion of the global economy and its relative versus absolute decoupling. 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 182 of 285 
 
With the PRC, what is being sustained differs to what is being sustained by 
neoliberal sustainable development. In the PRC, consumerism contains the potential for 
driving sustainability because it is governed appropriately, with the legitimate actor for 
doing so being the state, and the particular formations of Chinese statist discourse. 
Ecological Civilisation, therefore, emerges to maintain the legitimacy of the Party and 
state system, with whom the ‘people’ are ‘harmonised’. By maintaining the monopoly 
on ‘civilised development’, ‘environmental protection’, ‘conservation of resources’, and 
other indicators of ‘nature’, living in harmony with nature necessitates harmonisation 
with the state. In both ecological civilisation and neoliberal sustainable development, the 
political agenda remains the foreclosure of radical alternatives to a system at the point 
of its failure. Discursively, both employ terms with a general equivalence to ‘nature’ and 
the ‘environment’ as a means of disarming alternatives; ‘sustainable consumerism’ 
emerges in both discourses according to this pattern and reflects the performativity of 
sustainability agendas that obscure the ecological unsustainability of the practices.    
Overall, therefore, the discourse reproduces a knowledge-power structure that 
legitimises the State’s authority and authoritarianism. The consumer-subject is present – 
indeed, as with neoliberal sustainable development, it is the central subject position – 
but their sovereignty is removed as ‘chooser’ and ‘driver of innovation’. The latter is 
reserved to the State and the logics of harmonisation. We do not arrive, therefore, at a 
discourse where sustainability is recognised across different dimensions than the market 
and the consumer. What is different, however, is the embeddedness of ‘nature’ within 
(revised) historical narratives of China. Living in harmony with nature is presented as 
arising from the ‘character’ of Chinese culture and people. As such, the discourse draws 
equivalences between a liveable future and a mythical past: it is possible for people to 
act sustainably not just by consuming but also by revisiting Chinese history, even as that 
history is disseminated, in revised form, as a tool of state. This context of the ecological 
civilization discourse is unique, predictably, to China. As identified in the literature 
review, it is here that too many analyses have stopped, and searched for this particular 
deployment. Instead, this thesis turns to a deep analysis of the particularities of the 
internationally deployed ecological civilization discourse.  
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6. Ecological Civilisation as ‘Green Power’ 
 
 
We will move forward with building a Beautiful China and make new 
contributions toward ensuring global eco-security. 
13th Five-Year Plan, Communist Party of China (2015) 
 
We hope that China becomes a new leading power to increase ambition and 
save our Earth. 
Jean-Paul Paddack, Executive Director for Network Development, WWF (in Xinhua, 
2019) 
 
 
 
As seen in Chapter 4, the securitisation of the environment is not especially new (see, for 
instance, Trombetta, 2009; 2014). However, the role of China in bringing about a state of 
‘global eco-security’ has seen relatively little attention in Western literature, and the 
same is true of the unique spatialisations and institutionalisations of China’s 
securitisation of environmental issues. This is the more surprising for the focus 
throughout China’s recent international engagement on the need for a new global ‘vision’ 
of international relations in which the human-nature antagonism has been reconciled at 
the same time as (growth-based) development has been achieved. In its 13th Five-Year 
Plan, the Communist Party of China (CPC) outlines the process by which this vision 
might be realised: 
We will move faster to build a resource-conserving, environmentally friendly 
society and bring about a new model of modernization whereby humankind 
develops in harmony with nature. We will move forward with building a 
Beautiful China and make new contributions toward ensuring global eco-
security. (CPC, 2015: 20-21.) 
The benefits of a ‘new leading power’ for ‘sav[ing] our Earth’ have even been encouraged 
and welcomed by leading international conservation organisations (Xinhua, 2019): the 
assumption makes clear that saving the Earth is dependent on the emergence of a new, 
inherently different type of global power. Yet elsewhere, this view is challenged by IGO 
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and NGO analyses that depoliticise the (re)emergence of Chinese power and depoliticise 
it by accommodating it within existing norms.  
This chapter argues that the pursuit of ‘global eco-security’ is not reducible to the 
institutional apparatus that engenders global governance of the commons, provides fora 
for communal and individual state goal-setting, and a transparent framework for 
accounting for this. Global eco-security is firstly an imaginary; secondly an informal and 
contestable regime of governance in which actors are made visible or invisible, 
legitimacy is set, and power reflected; and lastly the formalised architecture and 
spatialisations of this mode of governance. This chapter details how Ecological 
Civilisation permeates China’s engagement with these, with particular emphasis on the 
ways in which this discourse imagines possible, but not inevitable, futures; how it 
forecloses radical and alternative political ecologies; and ultimately how it deploys a 
depoliticised performative sustainability to reinforce a market-liberal hegemony. With 
respect to the overall research project, it answers three questions: Does the potentially 
radical imaginary of ecological civilization survive in discursive resources outside the 
Party and statist context of domestic China? To the extent that ecological civilization 
articulated alternative forms of environmental citizenship and community (i.e. beyond 
the consumer), how does this apply externally? Finally, is there a noticeable difference 
in the articulation of agency between domestic ecological civilization and external 
ecological civilisation?  
It is tempting to take state articulations of China’s Ecological Civilisation as 
evidence that, at present, it is merely a process of imagining: the ‘we will…’ from the 
previous-quoted Five-Year Plan. Construction has yet to occur; when it does, it will 
happen as a collective whole: the ‘humankind’ and the ‘friendly society’. This chapter 
contends, however, that the discourse is at once imagining, constructing, and reflecting 
social reality and relations of power. Much of what is imagined in the ‘we will’ exists as 
contingent power in the present, where it is made sense of, and the past, whose 
environmentally destructive and politically violent history it helps legitimise. This 
contingency is redecorated rather than rebuilt: ‘Beautiful China’ emerges as a state-
driven brand whose promise is conditioned by, and conditional on, existing power 
relations.  
In analysing global (environmental) sustainability transitions, this chapter’s key 
contribution is in articulating this process of visioneering, of claiming the institutional 
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legitimacy of global leadership and the legitimacy to lead, as an expression of ‘green 
power’. Whereas Nye’s (2005) terminology of soft power (and hard power) claims a 
broad applicability across the field of global power politics, green power is of purposefully 
limited scope, and serves here to demarcate the contested territory of competing green 
imaginations. The comparison is more than semantic, however: it is argued that the more 
traditional concerns of the hard and soft power categories are increasingly implicated in 
an actor’s ability to deploy a vision of a liveable future. Whilst the securitisation of 
‘environmental issues’, such as climate refugees (Trombetta, 2014; Baldwin, Methmann 
and Rothe, 2014), has helped establish sustainability as a category of concern for hard 
state power, less has been said of the value to hard, especially economic, power of a 
coherent, if not functional, sustainability imaginary (with energy sovereignty potentially 
an exception at a domestic level). Whilst the analytical category of soft power has 
burgeoned under consideration of, for example, the diplomatic success and complexity 
of the Paris Agreement, it too has failed to assess what benefit flows from the ability to 
deploy a narrative in which development of the ‘good life’, with its consumable markers 
of arrival, is reconciled with the social and environmental crises of sustaining that life or, 
more specifically, those markers. As argued in previous chapters, the successful 
deployment of a sustainability discourse is not conditional on any functional 
sustainability, but merely an aesthetic sustainability.  
Throughout, therefore, this chapter builds on Derrida’s assertion of power, 
which he summarises: ‘the dominant power is the one that manages to impose and, thus, 
to legitimate, indeed to legalize … on a national or world stage, the terminology and 
thus the interpretation that best suits it in a given situation’ (Derrida quoted in Borradori, 
2003). The chapter concludes by articulating China’s green power as a performative 
sustainability. ‘Beautiful China’, ultimately, is aesthetic; the metaphors of ecological 
civilization permeate China’s conduct on the world stage, in its legitimation of new, 
larger, more globalised, more disconnected markets; in its promotion of global eco-
security; and in its promises of development to the ‘friendly society’ of ‘humankind’. 
Despite the seemingly clear journey the articulation of Beautiful China puts the 
country on, the role of China in ‘ensuring global eco-security’ is unclear. Speaking at the 
19th CPC National Congress, Xi noted China’s role in bringing about this change: 
Taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, 
China has become an important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the 
global endeavor for ecological civilization. (Xi Jinping, 2017.)  
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The use of four metaphors here insists China will at once lead (a ‘driving seat’; a 
‘torchbearer’) and merely partake (the ‘participant’; ‘contributor’). Depending on the 
prevailing metaphor with which the audience makes sense of China’s approach to 
‘international cooperation’, it will either be leading the pursuit of ecological civilization 
or simply there as it happens. In either case, the ‘endeavor for ecological civilization’ is 
articulated as that of the world, not just of China. Here, Xi does not own and present 
China’s vision of ecological civilization but projects it onto the world stage. In this 
worldview, neoliberal sustainable development is not absent, as argued previously, but 
redrawn in a way that mutes Western-centric notions of development – the liveable 
future for humankind is founded on principles that emerge from China, and this 
includes the complex, dialectic development of China’s market economy. As such, an 
analysis relying on simplistic Western-versus-Chinese competition fails to reflect either 
the philosophical convergence or global-political divergences in these hegemonic blocs.  
Yet in articulating these visions, China’s discourse seeks to externalise their 
development. The effect is that China emerges to fill a vacuum of leadership: it is pulled 
in by the pressure of departing leaderships of the US and EU, rather than pushed by 
expansionist logics domestically. Ecological civilization, in China’s outward articulation, 
exists already and is merely waiting for its potential to be realised. Whilst much has been 
written on the domestic drivers, such as oversupply, in ‘really’ pushing this agenda (or 
a detailed analysis see Cai, 2017), this chapter is principally concerned with the 
projection of ecological civilization ahead of China’s expansion of influence into spaces 
previously led by actors such as the EU and the US. In this sense it mirrors the promotion 
of sustainable development rhetoric whilst seeking to replace it as the de facto language 
of sustainability transition. Yet it is a distinct articulation to the extent that its 
international audiences are less exposed to the contingent meanings of civilization and 
harmonisation which further embed state authority in domestic articulations of 
ecological civilisation. This insertion of ecological civilization into international 
economic expansion policy and global fora provides the discursive resources analysed 
in this chapter, which is subsequently divided into examples of each. The first explores 
the Belt and Road Initiative, the major economic and diplomatic policy of Xi’s leadership. 
The second discusses less expansive but equally significant moments of leadership, with 
a focus on the lead up to China’s chairing and hosting of the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity (Fifteenth Conference of the Parties), set to take place in 2020.  
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6.1. Belt and Road Initiative 
China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI)36 forms the keystone of President Xi Jinping’s 
development strategy.  Announced in 2013, the BRI directly covers 71 countries, two-
thirds of the world population, and a third of the world’s GDP. Around 900 billion USD 
is expected to be spent, with an estimated US$575 billion ‘executed, in implementation, 
or planned’ outside of China (World Bank, 2018). More than this, however, the BRI 
represents an expression of how China articulates its philosophy of international 
relations, as Vice President Wang Qishan highlights at the Second Paris Peace Forum: 
We adhere to the independent foreign policy of peace, and respect the right of all 
peoples to choose their own development paths. […] Through concrete actions, 
such as promoting Belt and Road cooperation … China is sharing with the world 
the vast opportunities of its development (Wang, 2019). 
In Wang’s speech, the reassertion of respecting the choices of other countries to choose 
their ‘own development path’ echoes similar articulations in which China’s role is 
passivized. At the same time, as this section shows, the ‘concrete action’ of the BRI 
promotes a particular mode of market-based development as a ‘sharing’ of China’s 
opportunities which gains legitimacy in global governance as it does so.   
The initiative, however, has received a mixed reception internationally. On one 
hand, there is a need for infrastructure development and investment on a regional level 
and increasingly global level, plus the desire for China to cooperate on international 
security issues, such as the questions over North Korea, global terrorism, and climate 
change. These combine to produce a recognition of the necessity of China on the world 
stage, including over climate change and species loss. On the other hand, China’s 
increasing global role in investment and development are viewed with suspicion, both 
in the West and central Asia (Shattuck, 2019; Kyzy, 2019). On a regional level, for 
example, this has produced a discourse in India that gains power as investments increase 
 
 
36 The Belt and Road Initiative is frequently called the New Silk Road, and the One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) initiative, both outside and inside China. The latter is still common in the original 
Chinese, though Anglicisations tend to employ Belt and Road. I use Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) here for the most consistency with the translated sources quoted. China officially renamed 
the initiative outside of China for the purpose of clarifying the initiative is not only one road but 
many channels. Additionally, the belt refers to the land portion (the Silk Road Economic Belt) 
while the road refers to the sea channels to East Africa and the Mediterranean (the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road). 
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under the China-ASEAN (since 2003) and Maritime Silk Road strategies (Yunsong, 2015). 
Globally, political opposition has manifested as outright bans, such as on Chinese 
investment in the US energy sector in 2015 (on Chinese ownership of wind turbine farms) 
due to the US security review process on inward investments. Contributing to the 
complex picture emerging on the global stage, the US ban in Chinese investments in the 
renewable energy sector coincided with the allowance of a large investment in the UK’s 
nuclear energy sector (The Guardian, 2016); the latter being met with some political and 
popular opposition.  
China’s BRI initiative was initially developed against a background of significant 
global suspicion of the political motivations that lie behind economic policies. Regional 
and global actors fear particularly an increase of what is seen as an adversary’s influence. 
On a global basis, this has been led by US calls against increasing Chinese influence in 
what is viewed as the American sphere of influence, as one US congressperson mentions: 
We're concerned about the [Latin American] countries dealing with China. It's 
extremely important that we don't let a potential enemy of the US become a 
dominant force here. (US Congressperson Dan Burton, 2007.) 
Such rhetoric constructs US and Chinese interests as automatically oppositional. 
In the past ten years, antagonistic rhetoric has continued to dominate US mainstream 
politics, yet changes are clear in intergovernmental literature and in engagement with 
many of the seventy countries involved in the BRI. In the case of both, endorsements of 
the Initiative, including specifically its approach to environmental issues, have increased 
since the first BRI forum in 2017. This sections details how the BRI has gained legitimacy 
as a sustainability transition narrative among such actors, as well as environmental 
INGOs, and how this process is primarily one of investing the BRI’s and ecological 
civilizations floating signifiers with meanings established initially in the neoliberal 
sustainable development discourse. 
The emphasis on the BRI to support diplomatic engagement is clear in 
articulations of China’s role in its establishment: 
We have jointly pursued the Belt and Road Initiative […]  
China champions the development of a community with a shared future for 
mankind, and has encouraged the evolution of the global governance system. 
With this we have seen a further rise in China's international influence, ability to 
inspire, and power to shape; and China has made great new contributions to 
global peace and development. (Xi, 2017.) 
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Here, similar language to that highlighted previously helps externalise the BRI as a 
‘jointly pursued’ project. More clearly, it constructs a dichotomy between a community 
of a ‘shared future for mankind’ and those excluded from such a community. What this 
resembles in terms of the networks facilitating this community are touched upon by Xi: 
China will actively promote international cooperation through the Belt and Road 
Initiative. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, 
and people-to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for 
international cooperation to create new drivers of shared development. (Xi, 2017.) 
This helps explain the seemingly conflicted role of China outlined in the introduction to 
this chapter, where China’s role is both active and passive. Xi’s stance indicates an 
awareness of the dangers of being seen to aggressively lead, and an acceptance of the 
discontent towards the overt impositions of particular developmental logics under 
neoliberal globalisation. 
Despite the attempted placation of potentially contradictory developmental 
pathways, however, such as moves towards inclusive governance, there remains a 
Western perception of a lack of regulatory oversight. As Jörg Wuttke (EU Chamber of 
Commerce in China) remarked in 2017, the BRI has ‘been hijacked by Chinese companies, 
which have used it as an excuse to evade capital controls, smuggling money out of the 
country’. Such open confrontation points to an existential challenge of building trust in 
new regulatory frameworks and puts the blame squarely on (almost entirely state-
owned) companies. Wuttke’s language is reminiscent of the ongoing calls from the EU 
and US Chambers of Commerce for an increased role for open market competition and 
an end to subsidies of SOEs as ‘market distortions’. This type of rhetoric constructs 
Western and Chinese interests as oppositional. The BRI is seen to confer advantage on 
Chinese SOEs at the same time as ‘Chinese companies’ are constructed as a distinct entity 
that has ‘taken over’ a supposedly separate initiative.  
The ongoing trade debates, in which the EU and US Chambers of Commerce 
have played a central role, revolve around the ‘market distortions’ of SOE subsidies 
creating a business environment in which foreign (and even domestic-private) 
enterprises cannot compete. Such arguments construct China as failing to evolve its 
political economy sufficiently along a preordained path of market liberalisation, 
beginning with ‘opening up’ in the 1970s, systemic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and 
in which assent to the World Trade Organisation marked a significant step. Chinese 
modernisation, particularly the embeddedness of the ‘Ecological Civilisation’ model of 
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development, represents a potentially different trajectory for development, and a 
different imaginary for globalisation. However, the question remains about the extent to 
which this represents a different mode of society-nature relations.  
The ‘community’ fostered by this engagement is fundamentally an epistemic one 
– one that reproduces and recreates knowledge about the appropriate governance of the 
political economy, and, through the BRI, the spaces this imposes on. This is key to 
understanding the role of both ecological civilization and the BRI as respectively the 
ecogovernmentality and spatialization of that governmentality through the construction 
of ‘corridor countries’, whose relationship to China is framed by both financial debt and 
as part of the ‘community’ of China’s international relations philosophy. 
6.2. Ecological civilisation embedded in the BRI 
The analysis of statist articulations of ecological civilization here primarily draws on the 
Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s ‘Belt and Road Ecological and 
Environmental Cooperation Plan’ (Chinese Government, 2017), together with remarks 
by Xi Jinping and other members of the CPC. This is contrasted with perceptions of the 
BRI’s environmental agenda in IGO and other literatures.  
The Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s (MEE) document sets out 
how China will ‘strengthen cooperation on eco-environmental protection and enable 
eco-environmental protection to serve, support and guarantee the Belt and Road 
construction towards environment-friendly routes’ (ibid.). This ambition introduces the 
Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan (ibid.) in which an 
‘environment-friendly Belt and Road’ is a ‘fundamental requirement’. The use of active-
positive language, as detailed in Chapter 4, represents a particular logic of performative 
sustainability: the representation of managing impacts as an active good for the 
environment. Moreover, the protection of the environment (‘eco-environmental 
protection37’) is mobilised to ‘serve, support and guarantee’ the interests of economic 
 
 
37 Chinese discourse frequently, though not consistently, refers to the “eco-environment” when 
indicating the ecological environment, as distinct from other uses of the term which often 
appear in the same document, for instance the “innovation environment” or “financial 
environment”.  
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development, defined as ‘environment-friendly routes’ of new construction. In such a 
rendering the environment is afforded no value in itself. This is especially important in 
relation to the insistence that different developmental pathways, different cultures, and 
different civilizations are recognised and accommodated in the BRI. The potential for 
different communities to associate with nature according to place-specific and historical 
political ecologies is occluded from the envelopment of nature as merely a market which 
supports performatively green construction.  
The ecological civilization discourse fails to make the same equivalences to 
‘green mountains’ as explored in domestic articulations. This is tied directly to ecological 
civilization later in the plan: 
Guided by the philosophies of ecological civilization and green development, the 
Belt and Road Initiative will be advanced in an environment-friendly way to 
improve green competitiveness, covering policy coordination, facilities 
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. 
(Chinese Government, 2017: Section II.)  
Ecological civilization in internationalised articulations begins to take a clearer form 
from Section II. The active-positive language of being ‘environment-friendly’ is seen as 
a ‘way’ – a  coherent programme rather than an outcome or descriptor – while free trade 
and the means of facilitating this are constructed as enablers of ‘green competitiveness’, 
which forms the ultimate vision for the BRI’s green credentials. The BRI facilitates the 
extension of ecological civilization through the increase of material goods that flow from 
China; produced, transmitted, and consumed within the empty signifier of 
environmental friendliness.  
This is furthered in Section V, which concentrates on the need to ‘Promote 
Sustainable Production and Consumption and Boost Green Trade’. Here, the Plan says 
that China will: 
conduct researches on environmental protection’s role in optimizing trade and 
investment and explore the feasibility of including environmental considerations 
into free trade agreements with major countries along the Belt and Road. (Ibid. 
Section V.) 
This confirms the articulation of environmental protection as something in service of 
capital and trade, the wider frame of ‘green trade’ is quickly being reduced to free trade 
with other signifiers. Moreover, the extension of this mode of relating to protecting 
nature, what is argued here as representing a political ecology that brings the 
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environment into tangible and social being, is considered as part of free trade 
agreements along the Belt and Road, bringing more countries inside this 
ecogovernmentality in which consumer goods signify the protection of nature, and 
consumer subjects behave as its guardians.  
Taken together with Section II’s aims to ‘improve green competitiveness’, the 
manageable consumer of domestic articulations of ecological civilization begins to be 
replaced by an implied sovereign consumer. The Plan covers how this will occur under 
the same section: 
We will carry out eco-label exchange and cooperation projects and share 
experience in eco-label certification system. Countries along the Belt and Road 
will be recommended to include more eco-labelled products into government 
procurement. (Ibid.)  
The eco-labelling of products both delineates a category of consumer product that 
competes with non-green products and reduces environmental impacts to simplified, 
measurable units. As discussed previously, this tends to obscure environmental harm 
by focusing on a particular indicator and generalising this under a frame of ‘eco-
friendliness’, even as other indicators of harm may be worsened. The BRI, therefore, 
seeks to further legitimise rather to challenge the market-liberal mainstays of 
sustainability transitions but maintaining the sovereignty of the consumer and placing 
them centrally as the agents of change and the ultimate subject of green competitiveness 
– deciding which products prevail. In highlighting the ‘concept of ecological civilization’ 
in the BRI, the Plan notes that:  
The practical experience of green development will be summarized and 
environment-friendly technologies and products advocated to meet green 
development needs. 
Here, the pursuit of green development needs is again reduced to the performative 
sustainability of technologies and products, which are assumed to accommodate 
whatever ‘needs’ this may entail across the cultures impacted along the BRI. 
Throughout the Plan, ecological civilization, environmental-friendliness, and 
eco-environment protection serve as new frames for the same processes. By merely 
serving as decoration, they fail to offer a radical approach to ‘green development’ 
capable of recognising the multiple and varied ways in which people might relate to 
nature. Instead, what space is created for people is as new consumer-subjects of the 
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extending ecogovernmentality which, through the BRI, takes explicit and spatialised 
form. 
6.2.1. Neoliberal consensus in external analyses of BRI greening  
The World Bank has engaged extensively in analysis of the BRI from October 2018 
through 2019 with a total of nineteen research papers (of most relevance, see Bird et al, 
2019; Maliszewska et al, 2019; Lall et al, 2019; and Losos et al, 2019) and an overall 
summary (World Bank, 2019). Despite this abundance of scrutiny, nothing has 
concentrated on the green promises of the discourse. ‘Infrastructure megaprojects’, as 
the World Bank defines projects costing US$1 billion or more, are assumed to ‘improve 
the environment’ inherently due to the renewal of aging infrastructure, while 
‘consumers’ are assumed to benefit ‘through higher quality services’ (World Bank, 2019: 
101). Moreover, the World Bank’s analysis starkly assumes that ‘broad income growth 
can reduce the environmental impacts of production and consumption through 
Environmental Kuznets Curve effects’ (ibid. 112).   
At the same time, however, the World Bank also point out that, accounting only 
for fossil-fuel burning (therefore excluding the emissions from land use change or 
process emissions, such as deforestation or cement manufacturing), ‘CO2 emissions go 
up worldwide by around 0.3 percent’ as a result of the BRI’s implementation (ibid. 116). 
The distribution of these emissions can have significant impacts on participating 
countries’ greenhouse gas inventories, for instance the Lao transport sector emissions 
increase 5%. Though unrecognised in the World Bank’s analysis, under the Paris 
Agreement these emissions are accounted for territorially regardless of the point of 
demand or where any profit might accumulate. As such, participating countries receive 
a greater GHG burden by hosting the infrastructure and transport required for Chinese 
economic expansion, while ‘China, on the other end  of the spectrum, sees modest output 
declines in a number of sectors including air transport, chemicals, rubber, and plastics, 
and pulp and paper’ (ibid.). Significant sectors of China’s economy, including persistent 
high emitters such as air transport, will see their emissions decline as a result of their 
increase elsewhere, yet this inequity is unrealised by the World Bank’s analysis.  
In a separate analysis covering ‘economic, poverty and environmental impacts’ 
(World Bank, 2019), the analysis concludes that ‘findings indicate that the Belt and Road 
Initiative would be largely beneficial’, despite also concluding that ‘the initiative would 
lead to a modest increase in global carbon dioxide emissions’ (ibid.: ) and that ‘there are 
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no explicit policies that are targeting emissions’ (ibid.: 11). This is mirrored too in an 
OECD report, which in its only significant mention of climate change suggests: 
investments in sustainable and quality infrastructure in the region are needed to 
allow Asia to maintain its growth momentum, adequately address climate 
change and bring down high levels of persistent poverty. (OECD, 2018: 6.) 
Whilst it is important to not problematise, in itself, the need for infrastructure in 
impoverished areas, the assumption remains that climate action is inherent in the 
process of debt-based infrastructure finance and construction.  
 Contained in this analysis is the assumption that material growth is a necessary 
precursor to better environmental outcomes. The reliance on environmental Kuznet 
curves (EKZ) makes this clear, where economies are assumed to move along an inverted 
U curve with the curve’s peak representing the most damage to the environment, 
propelled by GDP growth. However, while the ‘curve may hold for obvious, local 
environmental problems such as urban air quality, it is far less robust and probably non-
existent for global, less obvious problems such as climate change and species extinction’ 
(Victor, 2008: 165). Stern similarly attests that ‘there is little evidence for a common 
inverted U-shaped pathway that countries follow as their income rises’ (Stern, 2004: 
1435). Even at a country level, Ozturk and Al-Mulali found that Cambodia, a host 
country of Belt and Road initiatives apparently standing to ‘benefit enormously from 
this highly ambitious Chinese initiative’ (Heng and Po, 2017: 1), shows no evidence of 
the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis as GDP increases (Ozturk and Al-Mulali, 
2015).  
Despite the poor evidence base for these assumptions, it is at the level of 
discourse, specifically the meaning creation between nature and the socio-economy that 
these assumptions perpetuate, that is of most importance. The World Bank’s deployment 
of EKC as a macroeconomic tool that justifies increasing levels of consumption and 
growth as a market solution to the problems of overconsumption applies also to the 
individual consumer. With the assumption that marginal gains in consumerism decline 
overtime whilst the marginal gains of intact nature increase, the World Bank posits that 
this 
could motivate changes in individual behaviors and could lead to support for 
public environmental regulation that would increase environmental quality even 
if at the expense of consumption. (Losos et al, 2019: 13-14.) 
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The EKC, and GDP growth as a feature of protection, occur here according to the 
appropriate behaviour of consumers, whose environmental consciousness is a function 
of their greater wealth: poorer individuals simply lack the means to care for the 
environment. To resolve this, the market equips consumers with an understanding of 
nature as a construct of leisure-time. Nature enters the category of protection because 
the case now exists for the consumer’s enjoyment of it as commodity, rather than the 
society’s reliance on it as the provider of life and livelihoods. In the context of the BRI, 
this consumer individualisation has additional implications: the sustainable consumer-
subject becomes responsible for greening China’s economic expansion as they are 
brought under its influence. Newly constituted subjects of ecological civilization drive 
the ‘greening’ they are promised as an inherent feature of the BRI. In effect, a new social 
contract exists between the sustainable consumer-subject, who behaves appropriately 
within elite-sanctioned, market-provided forms of ‘being green’, and the 
ecogovernmentality of China’s ecological civilisation, deployed within a framework of 
debt between the host country and China (as warned about by IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde (Lagarde, 2018)).  
More broadly, the capture of nature as a construct of leisure-time and of 
commodification serves to foreclose alternative political ecologies in which human-
nature relations exist outside the market. Under assumptions about the inherent 
requirement of growth to deliver desirable environmental outcomes, local 
environmental protections are reliant on the provision of capital, further establishing the 
power of capital providers. Within the BRI infrastructure corridors, this has special 
importance for semi-autonomous regions with particular, historical political ecologies, 
such as Tibetan communities, whose indigenous territorial identities are already 
‘increasingly circumscribed by state and global nature conservation schemes’ (Coggins 
and Hutchinson, 2011) while global commodity markets have already become 
embedded (Yeh, 2000).  
The external analyses of the BRI’s environmental credentials, therefore, seem 
rested on the assumption that greater GDP, delivered by higher levels of consumerism, 
will deliver greater environmental benefits. Sustainability, in this view, is achieved as 
new consumers are brought into being by the expansionist economic policy of a regional 
hegemon. To achieve this necessary growth, host countries are required to provide 
favourable conditions for private and foreign investment. The World Bank’s analysis 
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makes clear that the responsibilities for receiving this fall on host countries, who, like 
new sustainable consumer-subjects, are required to act appropriately: 
To increase private participation in the BRI, countries need to adopt 
complementary reforms to improve the business and investment climate facing 
potential investors (World Bank, 2019: 81).  
Here, the requirement is explicit and driven by the assumption that private participation 
in infrastructure, via provision, is beneficial. Host countries’ regulatory and legal 
frameworks ‘need’ to change to accommodate the needs of capital within the BRI; 
whether or not this is desirable is unquestioned. As with environmental issues, 
managing economic risk is the responsibility of host countries who achieve this by 
providing low-risk conditions for capital.  
Under growth dependent and EKC assumptions, therefore, environmental 
outcomes as a function of growth in turn rely on the acquiescence of the indebted host 
countries to conditions preferable to capital. Despite this, support for the potential of the 
BRI to help the world achieve Agenda 30 and the associated Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) is widespread. For instance, the then-President of the UN General 
Assembly, Miroslav Lajčák, remarked in 2018 that the BRI ‘represents a commitment to 
the SDGs, to climate action and to multilateralism’ (Lajčák quoted in China Daily USA, 
2018). Nor is the potential for ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ (Shattuck, 2019) seen as a concern: 
In just its first year, it lent $1.73 billion to support sustainable infrastructure and 
other projects. It will no doubt help to close the $5 to 7 trillion gap we face in 
financing the SDGs (Lajčák quoted in China Daily USA, 2018) 
Lajčák’s comments indicate an acceptance that China’s BRI is aligned to the goals of 
Agenda 30 and sustainable development. This is further reflected in the framing of the 
BRI as a common endeavour, reflecting the Chinese articulations of the BRI as an 
externalised entity whose progress is merely furthered and greened by China’s 
involvement: 
This is not only China's development strategy, rather, it is globally rooted in 
cooperation, trade and geography (ibid.). 
Lajčák’s articulation of the BRI as part of Agenda 30, and as an initiative in common with 
established international norms in trade and cooperation serves to depoliticise China’s 
policy. Given the importance of the BRI as a vessel of ecological civilization, it becomes 
clear that the emergent discourse does little to challenge existing norms of practice and 
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values in the international community. The reliance on, and contribution towards, 
material growth mediated by an increasingly free market as a condition of 
environmental protection and an indicator of development helps legitimise both the BRI 
and ecological civilization by articulating that it is, in effect, unchallenging to the existing 
neoliberal hegemony.  
In addition to IGO literatures, the acceptance of the BRI, in principle, and the 
metaphors by which it represents its connection to environmental and climatic action is 
present even with international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). A key 
analysis of the environmental impact of the BRI by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
(WWF) (2018) focuses on how China’s BRI can exist within the current structures, laws, 
and norms of global environmental governance, while welcoming the ‘Guidance on 
Building the Green Belt and Road’ analysed in this chapter (ibid.: 9). Across nine 
recommendations (ibid.: 10-13), the report suggests the use of a series of established tools, 
including natural capital approaches, strategic environmental assessments, 
‘opportunities for investments in ecological infrastructure’, and protected sites and 
national parks. Overall, to ‘mitigate the potential negative impacts’, the report suggests 
all BRI projects should: 
follow the highest environmental and social standards and safeguards (such as 
the ones applied by international finance institutionssuch as the World 
Bank/International Finance Corporation); 
be consistent and comply with relevant international law and standards; 
apply a fair and level playing field in procurement procedures. (Ibid.: 12).  
Overall, the report’s nine recommendations seek to manage the risk of the BRI by 
holding it to existing standards and norms and suggesting a series of established 
practices. Despite a context of unprecedented worldwide deterioration of nature (IPBES, 
201938) and a widely-referenced ‘sixth mass extinction’ (Wagler, 2011  see also Ceballos, 
Ehrlich, and Dirzo, 2017), the report encourages the BRI’s adoption of existing tools and 
norms as a satisfactory mitigation of the risks posed.  
 
 
38 The Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
(IPBES) attempts to also account for highly relational human-nature interaction, local 
knowledges, and Indigenous knowledges and is considered here as an optimal if inherently 
incomplete global assessment.  
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 198 of 285 
 
The report also recommends that the BRI ‘be formulated, planned and 
implemented within the framework’ of ecological civilization and the SDGs, both of 
which ‘address pressing sustainable development challenges in China and the rest of the 
world’ (ibid.: 10). Similarly, this constructs existing governance practice as sufficient for 
mitigating environmental risks and helps process the BRI as business-as-usual in the 
global economy. Any radical futures imaginable through the discursive resources of 
ecological civilization are foreclosed by its encompassing within the existing set of 
practices. The report forgoes any opportunity of encouraging the discourse of ecological 
civilization to challenge existing correlations of power, narrative, and representation of 
nature.  
This is the more surprising when considering the remarks made elsewhere by 
the WWF on the topic of ecological civilization. Jean-Paul Paddack, Executive Director 
for Network Development, WWF, has said “we hope that China becomes a new leading 
power to increase ambition and save our Earth” (Paddack quoted in Xinhua, 2019), with 
the clear implication that the existing power structuration is insufficient, and new 
alignment is necessary to ‘save our Earth’. The message is fundamentally different: in 
one treatment of ecological civilization and the BRI, WWF manages the risks associated 
with the rise of China, whilst welcoming its approach, within the demonstrably failing 
standards of the present. In the other, indicated by Paddack’s comments, the rise of 
China is seen as instrumental in disrupting the existing system in order to bring about a 
state of power politics in which ecological civilization forms a new sustainability 
transition.  
Nevertheless, Paddack also reiterates the depoliticised, consumer-focused 
changes that ought to be taken. The state-owned news agency, Xinhua, reports from the 
interview with Paddack that 
Exploding human consumption is the driving force behind the unprecedented 
planetary change that humans are witnessing, through the increased demand for 
energy, land and water. (ibid.) 
Which is followed by Paddack quoted as: 
"There are many actions we can take, from sustainable consumption to 
sustainable production and reducing energy use to avoiding the use of 
disposable plastic". (Paddack quoted in ibid.).   
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Marginal gains in efficiency, avoidance of particular substances, and the categories of 
sustainable consumption and production once again are presented as solutions, at least 
partially, to the ‘explosion’ of consumption and the functional overuse of planetary 
resources. Ultimately, a problem of consumption is constructed as solvable by it. Despite 
the fact that, were China to lead a new sustainability transition encompassing these 
actions, it would not actually be replacing the already dominant approach, the seeming 
difference in approach within a particular organisation is still reconciled through a lens 
of one-dimensional sustainability. Consumerism remains the interface between new 
subjects of sustainability, whether transitions or futures, and nature.  
The tension between China’s pursuit of a new model of development, and the 
perceived need to gain legitimacy by presenting this as part of achieving existing models 
is clear even within China’s own articulation. President Xi, speaking at the opening of 
the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, insists that: 
We should pursue the new vision of green development and a way of life and 
work that is green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable. Efforts should be made 
to strengthen cooperation in ecological and environmental protection and build 
a sound ecosystem so as to realize the goals set by the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.  
Even within Xi’s speech, indeed a single paragraph, the articulation represents a paradox 
– that China will at once pursue something new whilst holding it to the standards of 
what exists already. As seen in WWF’s response to this, it is capable of eliciting different 
reactions even within a single organisation: on one hand a welcoming and encouraging 
of China’s expanding influence in terms of hard power as a means to change a flawed 
system of environmental governance (Xinhua, 2019), and on the other an insistence that 
China must obey the laws and norms of that flawed system (WWF, 2017). This 
contradiction allows the floating signifiers of development and sustainability to be 
invested with different meanings: at once a legitimising discourse for its framing within 
Agenda 30, and a counter-hegemonic articulation of a new pathway beyond it. To 
analyse this in greater detail, it is necessary to consider how the discourse interacts with 
established global fora in environmental governance.  
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6.3. Ecological Civilisation in Global Fora 
A key tenet of The Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the 
Basic Policy, the area of thought outlined by President Xi Jinping at the 19th CPC National 
Congress as the guide for China until the mid-century, is that  
major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics aims to foster a new type 
of international relations and build a community with a shared future for 
mankind. (Xi in China Daily, 2017) 
Wherein ‘harmony between human and nature’ helps ensure ‘global ecological security’ 
and ecological civilization provides an essential logic for ‘speeding up reform of the 
system’ domestically. Nevertheless, the capacity for ecological civilization and living in 
harmony with nature to represent discursively different pathways in global fora is 
limited. 
Early mentions of ecological civilization have tended to occur alongside market-
based mechanisms and approaches in economic and environmental governance. For 
instance, a UNEP Governing Council in 2012 took ‘note with appreciation’ of those 
countries promoting ‘the green economy in the context of sustainable development’ 
including ideas ‘of ecological civilization, natural capital accounting, payment for 
ecosystem services, low-carbon economy and resource efficiency’ (UNEP, 2012). As at 
other times, the representation of ecological civilization as simply another tool in the 
greening of an otherwise unchanged developmental pathway serves to depoliticise the 
agenda by accommodating it within established, market-based instruments.  
However, at a time that China has become the second largest financial 
contributor to the UN (United Nations Secretariat, 2018) and increased its presence in 
UN spaces (Farand, 2019), China has successfully bid to host the 15th Conference of the 
Parties for the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. These talks are critical to 
determining the post-2020 framework for protecting and restoring biodiversity after the 
failure of the previous framework, the Aichi Targets, to address the challenges facing 
ecosystems. The BRI greening plan briefly mentions that China would seek to help BRI 
countries to meet commitments under multinational agreements, including the CBD 
(Chinese Government 2017: Section VII). Since being announced as the host for the 2020 
talks, however, ecological civilization has emerged as the key frame for both China’s 
involvement and the CBD’s eventual framework in three key ways: its announcement as 
the ‘theme’ of the ‘landmark’ 2020 event (CBD, 2019), its centrality to the initial aspects 
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of the scope and content of the post-2020 framework, and its subsequent strong presence 
in the Zero Draft. Together, the CBD-specific discursive resources of ecological 
civilization indicate a growing confidence not just of China’s engagement on the 
international stage, but of its homegrown narratives for envisioning a sustainable future. 
The Zero Draft of the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework produced by the 
Open-ended Working Group within the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
makes clear the extent of transformation necessary: 
urgent policy action globally, regionally and nationally is required to transform 
economic, social and financial models so that the trends that have exacerbated 
biodiversity loss will stabilize in the next 10 years (by 2030) and allow for the 
recovery of natural ecosystems in the following 20 years, with net improvements 
by 2050 to achieve the Convention’s vision of “living in harmony with nature by 
2050”. (CBD, 2020.) 
Here, the ‘urgent policy action’ is compared with the sustainable future envisioned by 
China’s narrative, projected onto the ‘Convention’s vision’. ‘Living in harmony with 
nature’, whilst not exclusive to China’s discourse, represents a continually deployed 
proxy for ecological civilization in both domestic and international articulations. More 
importantly, in articulating the problem and, in broad terms, what the fix will resemble 
(that of a stabilisation of trends followed by recovery), the Zero Draft leans on an 
anthropocentric epistemology in which a series of indicators is sufficient to judge arrival 
at state of ‘living in harmony with nature’. Such indicators are necessarily abstracted 
from the subjectivities and local and Indigenous knowledges that form diverse and 
place-based connections to, with, and within ‘nature’. The means of identifying the 
problem and the solution foreclose the understanding of either in languages other than 
the techno-scientific which remains fully accessible to only a few.  
This contrasts with the announced theme of the 2020 talks, ‘Ecological 
Civilization: Building a Shared Future for All Life on Earth’. Here, China’s Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment suggests that  
the theme of the 2020 UN Biodiversity Conference gives voice to the aspirations 
of people around the world to build a global society in which economic, social, 
cultural and environmental concerns are addressed in a truly holistic way, by 
recognizing that nature is the fundamental infrastructure supporting life on earth, 
and that the UN CBD Vision of Living in Harmony with Nature by 2050 can be 
achieved through a renewed relationship between humans and nature. 
Beyond the Spectacle? A Comparative Critique of the ‘Green Consumer’ in Global and 
Chinese Sustainability Transitions 
 
Scott Leatham  Page 202 of 285 
 
Predating the Zero Draft, it remains unclear how the ‘renewed relationship between 
humans and nature’ is understood. In between the two documents, the radical potential 
of achieving a ‘renewed relationship’ is supplanted by the hegemonic epistemology of 
highly abstract empiricism. On the other hand, in constructing the possibility of a 
renewed relationship the theme announcement forecloses the existence of multiple 
knowable relationships: it is a singular relationship that is problematised, and a singular 
one that is suggested. As such, the question of finding a new relationship is answered in 
the presentation of ‘living in harmony with nature’, which in its presentation reduces 
human and nature to consumer and commodity by its articulation as a market-based 
relationship. The ‘renewed relationship’ is different to the extent that it is understood by 
the ever-increasing quantity of performatively ‘green’ goods provided by China’s 
economic expansion. Inherently, it is a relationship to nature that China, as an 
increasingly central actor in global environmental governance, sets the legitimate 
parameters of. In the stage of gaining legitimacy on the world stage, the language is 
shaped by the dominant technocratic, anthropogenic logic of human-nature relations. 
This tension is clearer in the ways in which language is purposefully amended in being 
presented in such spaces. 
China’s articulation of ecological civilization has been sometimes specifically 
adapted for international audiences. In at least one key address by then-President Hu 
Jintao on Ecological Civilisation, for the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the original Chinese 
(shēngtài wénmíng 生态文明  ) that directly translates as ‘ecological [shēngtài 生态  ] 
civilisation [wénmíng文明 ]’39 was translated in the official English version as ‘ecological 
progress’ (Hansen, Li, Svarverud, 2018: 195). As such, ecological civilization specifically 
does not appear anywhere in the English text but is throughout the Chinese version. 
Hansen et al point out this is possibly an attempt to make the paradigm resonate more 
with a Western and global audience (ibid.). Though they make little of the point, the 
implications of this are substantial, while the speech by then-President Hu is not unique.  
 
 
39 This word, wénmíng ( 文明 ), is hard to associate with any Chinese words for progress (most 
commonly Jìnzhǎn 进展 or Yǎnbiàn 演变 ) or development (Fāzhǎn 发展 ), as typically used in 
reference to sustainable development.  
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The differentiated articulation has in fact been made as recently as 2019. During 
a speech at the Second Paris Peace Forum, in the original Chinese Vice-President Wang 
Qishan remarks that China will ‘ 大力推进生态文明的建设 [dàlì tuījìn shēngtài wénmíng 
de jiànshè]’ (vigorously promote the construction of ecological civilization) (Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 2019a). In the official English translation appearing, for instance, on 
the English-language website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and anglophone 
embassies (Chinese UK Embassy, 2019; Chinese New Zealand Embassy, 2019), Wang is 
quoted as saying ‘we are vigorously promoting ecological progress’ (Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2019b, emphasis added). While a single change in 2012 might be 
attributed to an error, or otherwise a one-off, the same change repeated suggests a more 
coordinated effort to adapt the language so as to be appropriate to particular audiences.  
In addition to the change of ‘civilization’ [ 文明  ] to ‘progress’, the word 
‘construction’ (de jiànshè的建设 ) is also removed from the official English translation. In 
the English version, nothing new is needed in order to achieve the goal of living in 
harmony with nature; in the Chinese articulation a new paradigm is constructed: 
something new is required to achieve the goal. The distinction further reveals the key 
tension in China’s international pursuit of establishing ecological civilization: Chinese 
speakers are informed of the ‘vigour’ with which ecological civilization will be 
constructed, whereas English speakers are informed of how China pursues the empty 
signifier ‘progress’. The former helps further the image of China as a challenge to the 
existing system of governance where the latter helps establish China as a rule-taker 
within international governance. 
Therefore, on occasions spanning the crucial development years of the China’s 
ecological civilization and BRI, non-Chinese speakers have not so much a window into 
Chinese domestic policy as a mirror that deliberately reflects Western metaphors. In this 
possibility, Westernised narratives tend to dominate the politics of appropriateness: to 
legitimately occupy this space, Chinese domestic discourse is obscured so as to not 
challenge the economic orthodoxy. In this particular example, ecology, or, indeed, 
human understanding of it, must progress – innovate, improve, and move from a state in 
which it is incapable of sustaining the economy to one in which it is. To do so, ‘ecology’ 
is conceptually externalised from other human domains; it is not an inherent and 
indivisible aspect of the lived experience, but a manageable collection of ecosystem 
services.  
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In the context of sustainability, this ecology must fit the space required by the 
economy, not vice versa. The idea that ecology, so constituted, can progress or be 
improved is a necessary and inherent assumption of the growth paradigm, in which ever 
greater services, from carbon sinks to water, are demanded of a diminishing resource, 
from species and habitat distribution, connectivity, and diversity, to clean water and air. 
In this discourse continual progress is necessary to reconcile these fundamental 
contradictions in the growth paradigm, where absolute decoupling of materials, carbon 
emissions, and waste from production has failed to occur, despite modest gains in 
relative decoupling (Jackson and Victor, 2019; Jackson, 2017). Civilisation, however, 
implies a reciprocal and reflective relationship without an implied motion; whilst still 
externalised, ecology can stand still, or be recovered, or be otherwise reconstituted in 
human-nature relationships without an insistence on its ‘progression’ as part of a 
modernist discourse. 
6.4. ‘Green Power’ and Performative Sustainability  
Having assessed the discourse of ecological civilization in key areas of China’s 
engagement in international spaces, three features are apparent that I consider essential 
to understanding China’s green power: 
1. The extent to which an emergent discourse can destabilise what is legitimate and 
reconstruct, dialectically, a new form of legitimacy and appropriateness in the 
structures of global environmental governance.   
2. The extent to which a discourse can construct and project a desirable and liveable 
future whereby a hegemonic ecogovernmentality determines, and governs, 
subject positions and human-nature relations, including the ontological and 
epistemic claims made of n/Nature and on behalf of marginalised and oppressed 
peoples. 
3. The extent to which performative utterances construct a sufficient sense of 
sustainability so as to constitute a holistic framework of transition and enable 
subjects to imagine a liveable future through the aesthetics of arrival in that 
future, such as the purchase of an electric car.  
This is not to render a normative framework for action that actors might ‘use’, nor one 
assumed to be already in ‘use’ per se, but to present an analysis of the extant discourse.  
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An analysis of ‘green power’ in this sense is beneficial as it helps identify three 
possible, interacting struggles internationally where sustainability might be re-
politicised, and thus help see it as a political project:  
1. Legitimacy: the struggle to exert, and subsequently appeal to, legitimacy in 
global environmental governance. 
2. Anthropocentrism and subjects: The struggle over claims of knowing and 
representing n/Nature, and of identity in relation to it. 
3. Performativity: The struggle over how functional sustainability, (living within an 
indefinitely reproducible operating space) can be signified and lived materially 
without being reduced to performative sustainability.  
I below highlight the state of this struggle as apparent from the discursive resources 
highlighted previously.  
Both push and pull factors impact on China’s engagement in global fora and on 
the international stage. Domestically, economic oversupply pushes the agenda for 
expanding and deepening regional markets, whilst industries such as photovoltaic cells 
are particularly impacted, encouraging a ‘green’ focus. Internationally, the perceived 
need for global leadership, especially in terms of global South-South cooperation and 
organisation and in the absence of US leadership create a vacuum in global governance 
leadership. At the same time, the push and pull factors interact with a latent mistrust in 
particularly Western international spheres, though also in India with regards the China-
centrism of the BRI in the South Asia region, resulting in a refusal to join (Times of India, 
2018). Compounding this is the strong desire of the CPC for China to adopt greater 
responsibility in select areas of international governance, even to articulate a ‘Chinese 
World Order’ (Waldron, 2018). Amidst this, climate breakdown, biodiversity loss, 
desertification, and air and water pollution threaten fundamentally the ability for 
China’s economy to grow and to bring increasing numbers out of poverty and to 
construct a ‘moderately-prosperous’ country by mid-century. These factors interact with 
the CPC’s legitimacy domestically, tied strongly to the ability to deliver moderate 
prosperity, as well as China’s perceived legitimacy in international spheres. As Waldron 
points out, China lacks the economic and political resilience to fundamentally transform 
the global economic system by hard power (ibid.).  
In this context, it is unsurprising that paradoxes develop in China’s discourse. In 
effect, it wants the world to be different but is cautious to be seen as trying to change it 
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internationally, while needing to represent Chinese power as able to do just that 
domestically in nationalist discourses. This is clear in the representation of sustainable 
development pathways. Articulations of an alternative ‘Chinese way’ in international 
community building is common (‘[China] will demonstrate the country's readiness to 
take on responsibility for building a community of shared future for mankind’ (Xinhua, 
2017)), alongside the need to respect the developmental pathways of different nation 
states. A heterodox development pathway (including a counterhegemonic political 
ecology, sustainability transition, and future imaginary) beyond the Chinese state is 
idealised but ultimately unrealised as the discourse interacts dialectically with 
established market logics, whose re-articulation helps legitimise China’s economic 
expansion.  
As seen in the BRI’s green plan and the insertion of ecological civilization, 
consumers form a subject position of China’s ecogovernmentality as it is articulated 
internationally. Crucially, without the signification of its (highly contingent) domestic 
context, principally harmonisation and the CPC’s ‘leadership’, the ‘managed consumer’ 
subject of domestic ecological civilization is afforded greater sovereignty: the subject 
position more resembles the agent of change that the ‘innovative consumer’ subject 
enjoys in Western sustainability logics. Ecological civilization in this sense is really two 
discourses: the domestic ‘sinofication’ (as it has emerged as a more codified framework 
for action under Xi Jinping) and the external language of sustainable development in 
which potentially radical articulations are instead made sense of by hegemonic 
Westernised articulations – innovation, green consumerism, and green-growth 
economies. The latter are present domestically, but there the chains of equivalence to the 
floating signifiers form different meanings. The same signs are invested with alternative 
meanings by the different audiences with which they are intended to resonate, and by 
the different spaces in which they operate.   
6.5. Conclusion 
China demonstrates a commitment to furthering globalisation, equated with the 
expansion and liberalisation of trade, to the market in absorbing sufficient care for the 
environment, and to the ontological claims of technocratic, anthropocentric 
interventions to manage the environment as a series of risks. In doing so, China achieves 
legitimacy with key IGOs, including the OECD, the World Bank, and the UN. Ecological 
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civilization, understood by these three broad equivalences, is contained within the 
discourse of neoliberal sustainable development. China’s projected development 
pathway is less a challenge to the model of Western sustainable development than an 
adoption of it, including the tendency for pollutions to accumulate in areas with weaker 
or weakened institutions and regulation, as shown along the BRI, in effect helping to 
solve the ‘sustainability’ issue by the transference of risk of newly indebted ‘host’ 
countries. This continuation of the pollution haven hypothesis marks a significant 
convergence with Westernised development pathways; both reinforce the growth 
dependency inherent in the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis which, as seen, 
helps legitimise the BRI and its green credentials in the eyes of the World Bank.  
The CBD ‘Vision of Living in Harmony with Nature by 2050’ (CBD, 2019) helps 
show this. The human-nature relationship, that of harmonious co-existence, is 
something ‘achieved’ at a particular point. Throughout the Zero Draft, abstracted and 
empirical indicators serve as the means for judging this achievement: the ‘renewed 
relationship’ (ibid.) is achieved at the point these indicators reach a particular level, 
where biological diversity can be said to be recovering. The point of arrival for this new 
human-nature relationship remains subject to the empiricism of technocratic governance, 
Meanwhile, the problems of the existing relationship are absent.  
Throughout China’s articulations of ecological civilization, and in particular the 
BRI, ‘living in harmony with nature’ has provided both the means and imagined future 
of a sustainability transition. But, as shown, it is reduced to the performative language 
of environmental ‘friendliness’, expressed through the adoption and promotion of 
ecolabeling and green consumer goods. It is not possible, however, to say that the 
performativity is inherent to the reliance on consumers given the reduced role of 
consumer choice in Chinese discourse. Instead, environmentalism and sustainability are 
performed, chiefly, by the state and the market within condoning international system 
where environmental benefits are assumed to flow as a result of GDP increases 
according to the myth of the environmental Kuznets curve. 
Overall, I have shown that in each case China’s discourse, in its current 
structuration, represents the one-dimensional sustainability that similarly defines 
Western sustainable development, more so than domestic articulations: there is little 
suggestive of a re-politicised struggle over these meanings, and in this sense ecological 
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civilization fails to emerge as a counter-hegemonic bloc to neoliberal, one-dimensional 
sustainability. 
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7. Conclusions: Beyond One-Dimensional 
Sustainability? 
The thesis began with the issue of depoliticised sustainability narratives as their reach 
into the ordering of socio-economic and socio-nature relations increases, propelled by 
urgency but confronted by contradictions and paradoxical claims on citizen subjects. It 
followed Mouffe’s (2005) concept of the political as the ‘dimension of antagonism’ 
wherein the political is expressed in oppositional identities as hegemonic blocs (2005: 9). 
For this reason, the tendency for ecological civilization to be thought of, both in state 
declarations and in key literature, as oppositional and in place of neoliberal sustainable 
development set the basic question of this research: did ecological civilization and 
neoliberal sustainable development meet in a dimension of antagonism? Did China’s 
growing role in global environmental governance amplify a dissenting counter-
hegemonic narrative to neoliberal governmentality and, perhaps, open up space for the 
emancipation of subaltern political ecologies and ways of ‘being’ in relation to nature?   
I have used ‘one-dimensional sustainability’ to describe the neoliberal 
hegemonic order that gives rise to an ecogovernmentality in which the consumer is the 
ultimate arbiter, the sovereign chooser and driver of innovation whose rationality will 
determine the transition to sustainability, if only they are confronted with a range of 
‘green’ commodities and select information about them. Viewed in this way, the direct 
answer is no: whilst it is clear that domestic articulations of ecological civilization are 
engaged in an antagonism with a neoliberal sustainable development, as China’s role 
has increased globally, it has articulated a second discourse of ecological civilization that 
reaffirms this hegemonic order. The concept of ‘green power’ is used to describe a 
situation in which a basic convergence on the Anthropocentric and market-centric 
ontology of nature, that of a series of packaged indicators exchangeable across space and 
time, is taken for granted whilst antagonistic relations are consumed by whose 
metaphors for extraction are central. Ultimately, this is far from a return to the political.  
This research has offered an interpretive, poststructuralist analysis of the 
ecological civilization discourse as it is deployed in state-centred articulations of a 
sustainability transition and the (social) construction of a liveable future. To do so, it has 
focused on the bringing into being of particular agencies, knowledges, and stories. 
Through a critical political ecological lens, the broad question has been to what extent 
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has ecological civilization told a different story to neoliberal sustainable development? 
In considering this, it is necessary to revisit what a political ecological analysis of subjects 
involves.  
Political ecology often begins, and ends, on contradictions (Robbins, 2012). At its 
beginning, the prevailing contradiction with this research grappled was the paradox of 
inaction. On one hand, knowledges and lived experiences of environmental degradation 
have increased in diversity and intensity, and this has been met, through political 
struggle, with the emergence of environmental issues at the heart of global governance. 
On the other hand, things have worsened in every metric of defining a liveable planet, 
and in local and Indigenous accounts of Nature. 
The analysis primarily followed the tradition within political ecology that 
considers the social construction of a subject. Robbins (2007) for instance considers the 
specific instance of lawns in the United States: the prevalent narrative of a manicured, 
highly managed, high-input lawn and the subject this creates in relation to it. As he puts 
it,  
Such a lawn only developed as a product of the economic growth conditions in 
suburban real estate development, tied to proselytizing that connected the lawn 
with a certain kind of desirable urban citizen and economic subject. (Robbins, 
2007: 129.) 
For political ecology, it is not sufficient to end an analysis at the proximate cause of a 
particular socio-ecological phenomenon. One contradiction Robbins notes is that, with 
regards the harmful impacts of the use of chemical products in the maintenance of lawns, 
‘increased consciousness of risks has coincided with increased input application’ (ibid.). 
The contradiction encourages an analysis beyond a proximate answer to the question, 
why do we manage lawns in the ways we do? Whereas a proximate answer might even 
reveal important relationships between lawns and, for stance, societal expectations, 
house values, fertiliser adverts, and so on, ultimately the lawn subject is ‘mediated by an 
aesthetic designed far away in space and time’ which connects these. This research 
project has not aimed, however, to investigate the contradictions, anxieties, and 
performances of the subject per se, but that of the space open to them to occupy or to 
resist: the subject position. More directly, it has analysed what this faraway aesthetic 
consists of.  
As an interpretive discourse analysis, the interpretation of the discursive 
resources has focused on what actors, what struggles, what events, and what storytellers 
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are constructed in this narrative. The analysis offers three interrelated contributions to 
this body of literature: 
1. State-centric articulations of ecological civilization are at least two discourses, not 
one contiguous discourse as it is treated in the literature of Chinese ‘greening’. 
The first is a domestic deployment of cultured metaphors that revisit Chinese 
modernisation to recast its environmental legacy and to embed state authority 
and legitimacy through the agenda of harmonisation. The second is the 
international deployment of ecological civilization as a means of galvanising 
China’s commitment to free trade, providing a green narrative for its 
construction of economic pathways to accommodate its production oversupply 
crisis and bind corridor states to China through debt-based infrastructure 
projects. This discourse strongly converges on market-based solutions in 
sustainability transitions, gaining legitimacy in IGO and INGO literatures. In 
both cases, ecological civilization provides, in effect, a green social contract 
wherein the provision of specifically Chinese goods, technology, and philosophy 
will ‘green’ the subject as consumer. I also demonstrate how the literal re-
articulation of ‘ecological civilisation’ as ‘ecological progress’ is more widespread 
and significantly more recent than previously outlined (Hansen et al, 2018), 
further complicating the emergence of ecological civilization as a terrain of 
competing articulations between domestic and international spaces. 
2. The consumer-subject remains the privileged agent of change in China’s 
contributions to global narratives of environmental governance, which is tied 
directly to the ‘performance’ of sustainability. ‘Fixes’ to environmental and 
climatic crises are as a result of the commodification of nature. But the sustainable 
consumer-subject has a different agency: in domestic ecological civilization 
articulations of the consumer, they are a managed, and manageable, subject 
called on by the state as much as markets – the ‘manageable consumer’. In 
international articulations, the consumer-subject is afforded a greater degree of 
sovereignty more compliant with the ‘innovative consumer’ of neoliberal 
sustainable development: it is the consumer as sovereign chooser who will drive 
the innovation necessary to overcome obstacles in the path to sustainability.  
3. China re-establishes the primacy of the Anthropocentric and economistic 
epistemology of one-dimensional sustainability in its articulation of ecological 
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civilization. This is both in its international economic expansion policy and its 
increasing leadership in global environmental governance regimes. Rather than 
the holistic human-nature harmony argued by some (Pan 2016, Zhou, 2017), or 
the counter-capitalist imaginary hoped for by others (Foster 2017), the human-
nature relationship is re-articulated as a consumer-commodity relationship, 
especially in international contexts. This serves to marginalise local, Indigenous, 
and other subaltern ways of ‘knowing’ n/Nature, even as the discourse claims 
to represent them. Knowing of n/Nature in a context of crisis continues to 
involve the reduction of it to manageable, governable, and crucially marketable 
‘bits’: ecological civilization mimics the way neoliberal sustainable development 
sees like a market.  
 
Here, I discuss the project’s key arguments and contributions while reflecting on the 
original questions posed. The key concepts developed, namely one-dimensional 
sustainability, the sustainable consumer-subject, and green power, are brought to bear 
on these and the broader contradiction between sustainability agendas and 
sustainability outcomes, and whether China’s emergent narrative disrupts or 
reproduces this. I begin with a discussion of one-dimensional sustainability and the 
extent to which China’s ecological civilization, as an ecogovernmentality, determines 
subjects in dimensions beyond the consumer. I move on to consider the discourses of 
ecological civilization, highlighting the implications of its multiple articulations which 
occur simultaneously across different spaces. Following this, I discuss the implications 
of ecological civilization’s maintenance of one-dimensional sustainability for the re-
politicisation of sustainability transitions. Green power, as the mode of politics through 
this limited politicisation is best understood, is then considered in relation to the 
performativity of sustainability. I finish by offering reflections for the state and future of 
global environmental governance, and the deployment of utopian narratives of 
transitions and liveable futures.  
7.1. Performative Sustainability  
Chapter Four detailed features of what I term ‘one-dimensional sustainability’. This 
borrows, rather than follows, from Marcuse’s one-dimensional [hu]man (2002 [1964]), in 
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which Marcuse details the subject of late modernity reduced to a participant of the 
capitalist system, wherein a technocratic rationality produces the irrationality of 
pursuing ever greater quantities of material goods, waste, and damages, far beyond the 
needs basis or use value of those goods; categories which themselves become 
commodities. Writ large, one-dimensional sustainability is the form of neoliberal 
sustainable development as a narrative of transition, and as a story about the liveable 
future. It is one where the consumer-subject re-emerges as ‘sustainable’, ‘green’, ‘eco-
friendly’, and so on, in order to re-legitimise the neoliberal hegemonic order at precisely 
the point it fails. 
To make these connections, Chapter Four considered hybrid and electric vehicle 
advertising as well as the literatures of IGOs; the two functioning together to produce 
the consumer subject and reflecting Marcuse’s concentration on the role of advertising 
to constitute the commodity as the signifier of the good life. In revisiting the Essex School 
of discourse analysis, the theoretical development in this chapter outlined the ‘space for 
science’ as discourse with an imperfect but optimal, for the sake of the research, view of 
functional, planetary sustainability. The planetary boundaries framework (Steffen et al, 
2015; Rockström et al, 2009) served the purpose of defining the characteristics of a safe 
operating space: sustainability as existing phenomenon. More in keeping with discourse 
theory, however, the chapter detailed the performativity of sustainability that is always 
the social being of sustainability, that is, how one acts in the role of the sustainable 
consumer (in this instance) and the chains of equivalence that produce this 
understanding of the role. In analysing this performative sustainability, and its role in 
producing one-dimensional sustainability, I detailed six characteristics of the neoliberal 
sustainable development discourse in relation to the consumer-subject position from an 
interpretive analysis: 
1. Active-positive language  
As opposed to limiting damage in certain categories of ecological impact, active-
positive language constructs the consumer performance as an active contribution 
to environmental protection. Purchasing the product ‘produces’ an active 
environmental benefit. 
2. Complexity reduction 
‘Seeing like a marketer’ simplifies a complex problem in order to make it 
marketable, governable, and exchangeable. Correspondingly, ‘seeing like a 
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consumer’ means identifying and operating on the basis of sign-values conveyed 
by the acts of obtaining and possession. Reducing ‘environment’, ‘nature’, 
‘planet’, or other signifiers, to one category of ecological impact (e.g. climate 
change/CO2 emissions) gives the impression of a more general sustainability. 
Epistemologically, nature is packaged and processed in manageable bits that 
occlude holistic and subjective ways of knowing, protecting, and valuing nature. 
As well as messaging to consumers from both states and advertising (and the 
increasingly blurred lines between them), this language constructs biodiversity 
offsetting as a legitimate management approach to environmental destruction.  
3. Economic rationalisation 
The consumer’s constructed agency relies on the base assumptions of ‘green 
economy’ approaches wherein environmental degradation is understood as an 
externality capable of being reintegrated to the market. The problem is not with 
market logics per se, but with their reach. To the consumer, both state and 
advertising discourses construct ‘green consumption’ as financially beneficial; 
often as the leading rationale for the purchase. The sustainability transition in 
these cases does not so much create sustainable consumer-subjects as responsible 
spenders, with implications for the resilience of environmental citizenship when 
the least damaging path is not also the cheapest. The consumer-subject is firstly 
economically rational, not environmentally rational.  
4. Representation and participation 
The creation of the sustainable or green consumer subject position creates a space 
for participation in the sustainability discourse through identification. The 
sustainability aesthetic of a given product means that all that remains is for the 
consumer to make the purchase. As such, consumers become a privileged agent 
of change. In marketing, this is often by articulating consumers as ‘rebels’, or as 
conscientious consumers or activists – articulations of difference to an 
established norm. The category of ‘consumer’ operates across both space and 
time, tying together the producer in Bangladesh with the consumer in the US, the 
financier in London with the forester in Brazil. Across time, ‘future generations’ 
are future consumers: their needs reduced to the plentiful supply of commodities 
whose use-value are known in the present. One-dimensional sustainability 
makes a totalising claim over nature and what matters within it, preserving what 
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matters now to this Westernised discourse in different capital forms (natural, 
financial, human) that package nature for different types of markets (ecosystem 
markets, carbon markets, biodiversity offset markets, and traditional markets). 
In doing so it envelops future subjects within its governmentality and forecloses 
on the range of future potentialities by deciding in the present what will be 
valued in the future, and thus what will exist in the future.  
5. Problem construction 
Both global institutional discourses of the sustainable consumer, and the hailing 
of the consumers in marketing, construct the problem as primarily one of 
innovation wherein the consumer plays a central role. In this construction, the 
problem is a hurdle to be vaulted by the rational application of capital and 
opening of new markets in which to cater to the environmentally concerned 
consumer. The consumer’s role as ‘fixer’ is reliant on the construction of the 
problem in this particular way. The information made available to the consumer 
constructs the categories of differentiation by which understandings of 
sustainability arise. The ‘problem’ lies in the unsustainable category, while the 
solution lies in the diametrically opposed category of the ‘sustainable’, 
articulated by green aesthetics while reaffirming the existence and legitimacy of 
the category as a domain of activism, innovation, and awareness.   
6. Open signification 
For Laclau and Mouffe, the ability to invest a suitably broad signifier with 
different meanings plays an important role in the forging of political alliances. 
Recently, climate change protests have, if tacitly, relied on this tendency to unite 
a broad a set of interests under shared banners. In the consumer’s search for 
identity, however, it has different implications. In the same way ‘healthy’ might 
denote a near-endless series of products, processes, activities, means of 
production, and so on, ‘green’ has achieved a similar level of ubiquity in public 
vogue. ‘Green’ is, as such, more than a narrowly linguistic signifier. The 
cultivated aesthetic of ‘green’ has emerged as a multimedia discourse wherein 
vastly differing practices and approaches are afforded a degree of commonality. 
As has been shown, marketers often rely on the latent perception of 
environmental goodness in category of ‘green good’ (such as a hybrid car) to 
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obscure environmental harm and because direct claims of being green. Green 
aesthetics are used in place of challengeable green statements. 
 
This performative sustainability characterises one-dimensional sustainability. In 
detailing this, the research project provides a framework for considering what a ‘multi-
dimensional’ sustainability might resemble: the expansion of the horizon of possibilities 
and potentialities in sustainable transitions. For the subject, this is realisation of human-
nature relations beyond the consumer-consumed duality, and beyond socio-nature 
relations as the organised mode of extraction and use of a commodified and marketised 
system of Anthropocentric services.   
It is important to note this research project has not sought to problematise 
‘performativity’ per se; the performance of a role is an inherent part of social being. 
Instead, it has shown that the conditions of the performance – the discursive resources 
available to people to identify with – are complicit in the production of environmental 
citizens, and as such are as politically contingent and deeply implicated in the 
(re)production of power relations. As has been shown elsewhere, the performance of 
environmental activism can also be revealing, political, radical, and emancipative. 
Indeed, a sustainability transition or green future of multidimensional sustainability 
would allow for a plurality of performances of the environmental and political subject 
to accommodate the diversity of knowledge and cultural systems.   
7.2.  Ecological Civilization Discourses: in Harmony or Inharmonious? 
With this groundwork, Chapter Five could then detail the interpretive analysis of 
domestic ecological civilization, such as was accessible to the researcher, and the extent 
to which offered different forms of socio-nature relations, and different subject positions 
for citizens to occupy that did not require their reduction to consumers. From the 
analysis, it was clear the consumer remains integral in ecological civilization 
sustainability transitions and in how this discourse imagines a liveable future. But its 
articulation of the consumer differed principally in where the sovereign act of choosing, 
the place of innovation, occurred. In ecological civilization, this rests mainly with the 
state: sustainable consumer-subjects are passive in comparison to the active, innovation-
driving consumer of sustainable development.  
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Thus, in determining the consumer, two subject positions are clear from the 
analysis. The ‘innovative consumer’ of neoliberal sustainable development drives the 
search for solutions to planetary crises through the sovereign act of choosing. This 
position is overdetermined by the discursive resources that construct the economic 
rationality of the consumer: green makes sense when it is the more affordable option. 
This represents a contradiction in the discourse whereby ‘innovative consumers’ will 
adjudicate the competition of environmentally friendly products to determine the more 
sustainable product, at the same time as their rationality as environmental subjects is 
replaced by an economic rationality of greatest individual financial benefit. Beyond this 
contradiction, which permeates transport advertising, ‘innovative consumer’ is 
constructed as the final agent of the sustainability transition and, as a result, a part of the 
collection of architects responsible for constructing a liveable future. In this fantasmatic 
logic, the consumer-subject is not fallible, all they need is the right information which 
can be provided by means of ecolabels and the proper incorporation of environmental 
information into decision making processes for externalities to be reflected in prices. 
Information, therefore, is the key obstacle to sustainability in this formulation: its 
provision empowers ‘innovative consumer’ to maintain an exponentially growing 
economy through the power of choice and markets.  
Chapter Five showed how Chinese ecological civilization, on the other hand, 
calls on the ‘manageable consumer’. This subject position lacks the sovereignty of 
‘innovative consumer’ as the role of innovation as an inherent outcome of choice in the 
myth of the market logic is absent in domestic articulations. Instead, the consumer-
subject is managed by a wider technocratic structure which retains the power to innovate. 
Nevertheless, it is the commodification of nature and its exchange value that is still 
required for this sustainability transition – environmental subjects are still consumers, 
they just lack the sovereign agency of the choosing, ‘innovative consumer’.  
Both subject positions are explicable from an analysis of their political context. In 
neoliberal sustainable development, the pursuit of freedom remains discursively tied to 
the provision of choice to the individualised consumer.  In China, the consumer as 
environmental subject partakes in the State-sanctioned regime of environmental goods 
while it maintains for itself the role of innovator and chooser. In place of the ‘freedom’ 
of consumer choice, Chinese ecological civilization offers the ‘harmonization’ of the 
people, the state, and nature in the context of ‘moderate prosperity’. Both consumer 
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subjects, then, reflect and reproduce the hegemonic discourses of citizenship offered by 
the respective governmentalities.  
Chapter Six, by contrast, introduced a third discourse: the global ecological 
civilization. Whereas existing literature on ecological civilization in both Western (Goron, 
2018; Hansen et al, 2018; Foster, 2012) and Chinese (Pan, 2016; Zhou 2017) canons has 
treated statist ecological civilization as a more or less coherent discourse across space, 
and others have pointed to unique local deployments, this research has shown the 
articulation of ecological civilization in global fora and China’s flagship diplomatic and 
economic strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), differs to that of domestic state 
articulations. The chains of equivalence that produce meaning in signifiers, particularly 
the consumer and the nodal point of sustainable development, are different in global 
articulations. The analysis of ecological civilization in the BRI reinforced the logic that 
consumerism will serve as the means by which we achieve and recognise a sustainability 
transition.  
Despite this divergence in appeal to different forms of legitimacy, in both cases 
nature is brought into being by consumers and consumerism: this remains the common 
mode of exchange between society and nature. In both cases, the performance of the 
consumer, the act of buying, remains the essential act: whether this is a performative act 
of compliance, or one of supposed freedom and innovation. Subjects of sustainability 
transitions are created as sustainable or green consumers, whether this exchange is 
facilitated through the logic of technocratic management or through the logic of the 
sovereign, innovative consumer. This point of difference has repercussions for agency 
and for the location of the consumer-subject within an arena of politics (Michelleti and 
Stolle, 2007, 2013). However, in each, that agency is a reconstitution of existing power 
relations, while in neither are these power structures challenged. In the case of neoliberal 
sustainable development, the innovative consumer extends their power of choosing into 
newly constituted environmental markets, asserting themselves as sovereign agents and 
the final arbiters of sustainability rights and wrongs in the market economy. In the case 
of ecological civilisation, consumer subjects are managed by the technocratic state, which 
offers a comprehensive, liveable future as part of the social contract.  
Market solutions to environmental problems are inherently an epistemic claim 
and process: for the purpose of market exchange, nature is reduced to tangible, 
governable, and exchangeable bits of knowledge, such as carbon, or the numerous 
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indicators of biodiversity. The complexity of nature is rendered as a simplified series of 
manageable parts, knowable objectively and to the exclusion of subjective, Indigenous, 
local, or other forms of knowing, valuing, protecting, or understanding. In essence, both 
neoliberal sustainable development and ecological civilization narratives articulate the 
logics of one-dimensional sustainability in which the performativity of ‘being’ green is 
the pursued aim. ‘Sustainable’ or ‘green’ consumerism remains at the heart of human-
nature interchange. As such, both discourses perpetuate anthropocentric, and 
specifically capital-centric, worldviews in which consumerism is inherent to ‘fixes’ of 
sustainability crises, which serves to foreclose deep ecology and other radical renderings 
of socio-nature relations.  
Nevertheless, the fundamental convergence on the commoditisation of nature 
and its use by consumers sees the continued reduction of nature to economic units of 
exchange, wherein the greater the threat, the greater the extension of market-liberal 
epistemology into nature, expressed in carbon markets, biodiversity offsets, natural 
capital, and other systems  exerting a hegemonic claim over knowing nature. Politically, 
the contradiction provides advantage: ecological civilization allows China to speak to 
two different audiences who invest the term with different meanings. It allows the 
deployment of an overarching frame capable of earning legitimacy in the globalised 
governance of the World Bank, OECD, WTO, and others, as well reinforcing the 
legitimacy of CPC rule domestically. For the latter, it allows the state to indicate the 
global acceptance of Chinese terminology, products, and leadership to citizens which 
forms a part of the legitimising story of the CPC. Post-structuralist discourse theory 
helps to understand how this is possible. As seen between Chapters Five and Six, the 
discourse structure that imbues the metaphor with meaning is composed of different 
chains of equivalence between domestic and international articulations.  
One-dimensional sustainability is ultimately firmly embedded in the fabric of 
global ecological civilization discourse. The key divergence between the global and 
domestic articulations of ecological civilization lies in the equivalence it draws with 
neoliberal sustainable development: within China, this frequently takes on an 
oppositional relationship, whereas globally, ecological civilization is reduced to the 
Sinification of sustainable development and the two are taken as mutually reinforcing 
strategies under the same paradigm.  
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This research has shown that ecological civilization has not challenged the basic 
assumptions of neoliberal sustainable development. Instead, it has been habituated into 
the paradigm and seen as an expression of it. Chapter Six showed that China is seen, 
from the World Bank to WWF, to be a leader in implementing the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), specifically in relation to its development of ecological 
civilization and despite the environmental impacts of the BRI. Even as it is confirmed as 
the central ‘theme’ of major international talks to determine how global governance will 
adapt40 given its failure amid a sixth mass extinction, ecological civilization encourages 
business-as-usual in terms of our relations to nature. Rather than challenge it, ecological 
civilization emerges to re-legitimise the hegemonic order as it confronts a planet-wide 
failure by its own metrics.   
This research has engaged with the performativity of sustainability: the way 
consumer-subjects are aesthetically greened and radical activism co-opted by the 
commodification of its symbols and terminology, which is sold back to consumers as 
drivers of change and deliverers of a radical, liveable future. In place of a radical 
antagonism in the emergence of ecological civilization and the hope of a ‘harmony 
between humans and nature’ as a basis of a liveable future of pluralistic accounts of 
nature, these possibilities are foreclosed on by both neoliberal sustainable development 
and Chinese ecological civilization. In Gramsci’s terminology, each passivizes the 
revolution. On their own terms, however, they fail to achieve sufficient change: 
conditions worsen as the reach and intensity of discourse increases. This research has 
offered an explanation for a part of this contradiction: the environmental subject is, in 
Althusser’s expression, overdetermined. They are asked to occupy competing 
conceptions of the good consumer – one who consumes in greater quantities to drive 
growth, and one who does so to solve environmental degradation. A reconciliation of 
this is possible only as a fantasmatic logic, the insistence that market logics and 
exponential growth will absorb care for the environment.  
Though it has not been the focus of this study, the implications for the expansion 
of ecological civilization into new spaces and places will be substantial. Whereas some 
 
 
40 The post-Aichi framework from 2020 is to be developed in a context where the Aichi targets 
of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity have failed to be met, and species extinctions, 
habitat loss, and distribution loss have increased at the same time as greenhouse gas emissions.  
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have argued in favour of a fundamental shift in environmental governance potentially 
helping realise different developmental pathways (Foster 2017; Pan, 2016; Geall and Ely, 
2015), and reflect and represent a plurality of political ecologies, this analysis shows this 
is misguided in application to ecological civilization. By adopting a political ecological 
and ecogovernmentality lens, the study shows how the bringing into being of new 
environmental subjects has required the continued market-liberal dominance of 
epistemic access to nature. Whether under conditions of innovation-led sustainable 
development, or more authoritative management of consumer interactions, 
environmental citizenship remains reduced to allegedly sustainable consumer-subjects 
in state-led discourses. In sum, it is demonstrable that at the point of its failure, neoliberal 
sustainable development remains unchallenged by the global deployment of ecological 
civilization. Instead, each serve to legitimise the other while the radical potentialities of 
living in harmony with nature continue to be foreclosed by a marketised, 
Anthropocentric domination over nature.  
Overall, in the discourse of domestic ecological civilization, we see not so much 
an erasure of the Spectacle – the totalising and technocratic reign of the logics of market 
fundamentalism – but we do see small differences in articulations of the consumer. In 
this discourse the sustainable consumer subject is managed and manageable: their 
‘freedom’ is not sufficient to drive the innovation necessary for sustainability as in 
Western articulations. Instead, that role is reserved to the state which, nonetheless, 
continues the expansion of the free market in new domains of the environment. ‘Living 
in harmony with nature’ is not simply reduced to a consumer-consumed human-nature 
relationship – any identification of the self and nature is a consumption of available signs 
– but nature is brought inside the Spectacle. Harmony and nature are invested with 
different meanings, their value equivalenced to the market exchange of ecosystem 
services or brought under the regulation of cost-benefit analyses. It is these epistemic 
claims over nature that contribute to the occlusion of alternative, subaltern, local, and 
Indigenous knowledges, that also serve to foreclose the possibilities of future 
generations though their incorporation into present forms of governance  - what will be 
valued, needed, and available for the future consumer.  
Ultimately, international articulations of ecological civilization reinforce the 
power-knowledge structures of neoliberal sustainable development. They contribute to 
the same common sense that arises to link objective science with policy outcomes, 
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embedding market logics as fixes to the sustainability crisis. Environmental subjects 
become the sustainable consumers who consume in greater quantities the 
‘environmentally friendly’ and eco-labelled goods, increasingly transported through the 
conveyor belts of the Belt and Road Initiative, whose own articulations of the ecological 
civilization privilege and prioritise the myth of the sustainable consumer. Overall, the 
fantasmatic position of the sustainable consumer subject continues to be central to both 
established and emergent discourses of sustainability transitions. Both discourses 
contribute in fundamentally similar ways to foreclosing the possibilities of radical 
change to bring about a liveable future, and in suppressing local and Indigenous 
knowledges through the hegemonic imposition of the Spectacle’s epistemic claims over 
nature.   
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Annex I – Researcher Reflections 
 
 
Situating the Researcher 
This study has been a situated, interpretive study of discourses. As researcher, it is 
impossible to step outside of such discourses, to stand apart and investigate outwards 
as one might study a bacterium in a petri dish. Quite aside from this representing an 
unusual and radical approach, all social researchers, including positivistic Polanyian 
empiricists, are complicit in the outcome of their research. The difference is the extent of 
acknowledgement. This addendum seeks to make that acknowledgement explicit, and 
thus the ‘situation’ of the situated researcher more transparent. In the absence of an 
objective exploration of social realities this represents an imperfect but optimal device. 
This section therefore proceeds without substantial recourse to academic literature, but 
as an outline of my journey in conducting the research, an exploration of my 
presumptions and those biases I am aware of, and a location of where ‘I’ am in the 
research. Ultimately, I attempt to hold myself to account on the ethical and normative 
positions I adopt (though this is an ongoing process), whilst thanking those who have 
provided this from their perspectives.  
 
This was a fascinating, distracting, distressing time to do a PhD in political science from 
a critical, Left perspective (though I suspect any time might be). During this time: Brexit, 
the US elections, Xi Jinping’s ascension to official Thought, his consolidation of power, 
far-right victories from Orbán to Bolsonaro, worsening climate disruption and 
extinctions, the emergence and disarming of new movements, and a global pandemic. 
These have not so much layered on top of each other as emmeshed themselves in a 
complex web that invites and rejects explanation. Each of these are discourses to a 
discourse analyst. They have similar features: they Other, they legitimise and 
illegitimise, reveal and conceal. They create subjects; some of them are consumers, all of 
them are constituted by signs that take on and imbue meaning, congeal the aggregate 
sense into a message: red hats, blue flags, hourglass logos, clapping at 8pm. In a world 
of signs, the Spectacle is overwhelming.  
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This is not an abstract problem in the research journey. As someone sensitive to 
overexposure of stimuli, there is an element of irony in the acquiring of skills that tease 
out stimuli in the most mundane of messages. If everything is not an object but a 
temporary, even if long-term, alignment of meaning, stimuli have layers that amplify 
their presence: the simplest can indicate something substantial. This has had two direct 
repercussions for the research.  
 
First, discourse analysis has the comfort of well-worn clothes. For someone who has 
always read too deeply into stimuli, it is not a stretch to do so with a specific grammar.  
 
Second, the inescapable conclusion that there is no objectively-reachable and knowable 
‘environment’ that exists ‘out there’ collapses a familiar distinction between work and 
getting outside – for a walk, a hike, a run. In considering how ‘nature’ is socially 
constructed, the idea of accessing it to escape becomes problematic – it all resembles 
work with the process of thinking critically about my subjectivity. I was, in a sense, 
governed by the need to be self-critical, and the fact I have yet to learn where that off-
switch is.  
 
As such, I came to the research unaware of its wider significance in my everyday life, 
but with a clear preference for thinking about problems critically. One of the practical 
implications of this was picked up in the first year (2015-16) – the tendency to revert to 
theoretical language when asked about the research problem. I am thankful to those who 
pointed this out. Being encouraged to abandon that language and consider, in plain 
English, what the research problem was helped endlessly (the irony that discourse 
theory generally rejects the idea of an optimal language notwithstanding). Conscious of 
the ability for theory to obfuscate, and therefore exclude, I have attempted to foreground 
the ‘plain-English’ where possible in this thesis.    
  
 
Subjects and subjectivities 
The key theme that links the various threads of the research has been the sustainable 
consumer subject. It was not obvious, at the beginning, that this was the case. Sustainable 
consumerism became the ideal-type for investigating sustainable development – it 
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appeared that in every case, sustainable development was about the consumer. Whilst 
this was clear from the corpus of documents analysed, it was everywhere when I looked 
up from the page, too. The 3-minute walk between my flat and the university took in a 
large advert on a car-rental company located on St Nicholas Circle. The advert, around 
the size of a large car, is still visible in Leicester, and visible on Google Maps (Google 
Maps, n.d.): 
Image 2:  car rental advert; roadside in Leicester. Google Maps, 2020. 
 
This was the initial inspiration for active-positive language – that consumers are 
confronted with messaging that constructs them as able to make a positive impact on the 
environment. The car was not even hybrid or electric – the actual environmental 
credentials of the standard combustion-engine vehicles on offer is seemingly no greater 
than the same model anywhere else. The aesthetics are, crucially, different. 
 
Despite this critique, I would undeniably come under the category of the aesthetic 
sustainable consumer. When making buying decisions, the environment, together with 
other ethical considerations, has a determining impact on the outcome. My own conduct 
is, in this way, inseparable from the research. Whilst my exposure to life-cycle analyses 
likely instils a bleaker and more pessimistic narrative of the self, and always contained 
in the fact that green consumers are still consuming, it remains the case that being seen 
to be green is an increasingly important social marker.   
 
One key limitation of the research has been the dead end in giving voice to the subject 
position. This is not unheard of in political ecology. Agrawal’s highly influential 
Environmentality was a lesson in this, including for the author who noted that he  
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did not pay sufficient attention to the lives of people beyond what was necessary 
to make the argument in the book...to talk about people without really knowing 
them – a failure of nearly all social science research that claims to be about people 
– is quite unsatisfactory. (Agrawal quoted in Robbins, 2012: 218.) 
To the extent that this is a key lesson in the canon of political ecology, it is regrettable 
that this thesis has failed to give a voice to those about whom it theorises.  
 
Pathways and dead ends 
Had I known in September 2015 that I were to end up at this destination I would have 
taken a very different path. However, this would have ignored the contribution of those 
dead ends. In reality, it more resembled a maze in which getting lost in order learn the 
contours of the puzzle is a part of the journey. Like a puzzle, the pathway is obvious 
when you work backwards.  
 
This research began with an ambition to give direct voice to those it studied – an 
ambition well worth pursuing in future research. Inspired by a lecture by Erik 
Swyngedouw, in which he stated his desire to never again see a PhD that further detailed 
the problems of neoliberalism without contributing to a solution, I become hyperaware 
of the tendency of this research to do just that if it remained focused on the passive 
revolution of environmentalism. Given the concentration on China, literature on 
ecological civilization seemed the best way to investigate a discourse that seemed to 
challenge the neoliberal imaginary. As such, I decided to use Q Methodology to 
investigate what meanings people in China (specifically, the city of Shenyang where the 
paradox of the consumer and the sustainable citizen was so strong given its uniquely 
poor air quality, sluggish GDP growth (less than half China’s average), and the 
lightening-fast development of spaces of consumerism and car infrastructure). 
 
This was intended to provide a voice to the ‘subject position’, to humanise what would 
otherwise be no more than a cut out from the system of governance. This became, 
however, impractical: a gargantuan effort provided just 14 responses with no indication 
I had approached a point of data saturation. In addition, the tension in interviews was 
clear. More than once, an interviewee chased me down the hall to ask I scrub out my 
notes and not to use what they had provided. Despite clear assurances of anonymity, 
either the political risk was too high, or trust too low, or a combination. (All such requests 
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to be removed from the study were of course immediately acted on.) This set the project 
back – a particularly interesting line of inquiry about the contradictions in the rationale 
for closing local factories could not be pursued.  
 
My inexperience of fieldwork in China likely contributed to this false start. Over the 
months spent in China, I learned a great deal about social and cultural customs, nearly 
always due to the unfailing kindness of strangers there. Practically, the importance of 
guanxi was underestimated – an encompassing concept about the network of 
relationships and social connection with a passing similarity to ‘networking’ – in gaining 
access to interviews. Politically, the timing of the PhD with a crackdown on academic 
dissent was unfortunate, but equally a predictable risk.  
 
Nevertheless, the final thesis is a strong reflection of the development of my thinking 
with regards the consumer subject. After answering the research questions, it achieves 
the second most important thing research can do: it points to the development of future 
research.  
 
Out of the potential lines of inquiry developed, I believe there are two related but distinct 
paths for investigating in the near future. One of these is the particular spatialisations of 
ecological civilization; a place-based political ecology of new subjects of the Belt and 
Road Initiative. Areas within the Tibetan plateau, as well as ‘host countries’ of the BRI 
could be important sites for this where local and Indigenous political ecologies react with 
a new environmentality. The second is outlined in this thesis, though I lacked the space 
to develop it fully: the regulation of future subjects who are brought into being in the 
present. The ‘future generations’ narrative seems at once an essential moral framework 
and a deeply problematic one. There is clearly no ability for the future subject to 
democratically participate in their governance in the present, yet the conditions of their 
potentiality are regulated now. Sustainability transitions seem trapped into narrowing 
the horizon of possibility for future generations, whether in the construction of them as 
future consumers, or in predetermining what will arise as important and socially or 
culturally valued. This temporal extension is likely not unique to sustainability 
discourses; I am unaware of applications of discourse theory and depoliticisation to 
similar contexts. Marcuse insisted the imagination au pouvoir was essential for the 
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emancipation of the one-dimensional subject: less has been said of the importance of 
imagining for the emancipation of future subjects.  
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Annex II – Corpora of closely analysed texts 
Representing three corpora for each analytical chapter of the thesis: 4, 5, and 6. Corpora 
for Chapters 4 and 6 are each split into two  to reflect the different analytical stages and 
corresponding to the chapter format, whereas Chapter 5 is a single corpus. Each corpus 
is sorted alphabetically by author/origin. URLs were functional at the time of review 
though this may change over time. Those marked ‘online content’ could maintain the 
same URL even if the content is removed or updated. Where this has already occurred, 
an archived version of the content has been supplied. Documents, articles, and speeches 
are reachable via their full bibliographic record. 
 
105 texts total: 
Chapter 4 (41 texts total) 
Intergovernmental Organisations (27 texts). 
Advertising (global car brands) (14 texts). 
Chapter 5 (20 texts total) 
Chapter 6 (44 texts total) 
Ecological civilization in Chinese (non-BRI) external relations (20 texts). 
Ecological civilization in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (24 texts). 
Chapter 4 Corpus – Figures 10 and 11 
Intergovernmental Organisations (Figure 10). 
 
No. Text Date Author/origin Type URL if available 
1 Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions on the 
Sustainable Consumption and 
Production and Sustainable 
Industrial Policy Action Plan 
{SEC(2008) 2110} {SEC(2008) 
2111} 
2008 EU Published 
document 
https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELE
X:52008DC0397  
2 Sustainable Development: 
European Sustainable 
N.d. EU Online 
content 
https://ec.europa.eu/envir
onment/eussd/escp_en.ht
m  
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Consumption and Production 
Policies 
3 “Sustainable Development” N.d. EU Online 
content 
https://ec.europa.eu/envir
onment/eussd/  
4 Towards Green Growth  2011 OECD Published 
document 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9
789264111318-en  
5 Creating Incentives for Greener 
Products: A Policy Manual for 
Eastern Partnership Countries  
2015 OECD (Green 
Growth Studies) 
Published 
document 
https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/c
reating-incentives-for-
greener-
products_9789264244542
-en  
6 Towards Green Growth? 
Tracking Progress  
2015 OECD (Green 
Growth Studies) 
Published 
document 
https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/t
owards-green-
growth_9789264234437-
en  
7 Material Resources, Productivity 
and the Environment 
2015 OECD (Green 
Growth Studies) 
Published 
document 
https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/
material-resources-
productivity-and-the-
environment_9789264190
504-en  
8 Towards Green Growth? 2011 OECD (Green 
Growth Studies) 
Published 
document 
https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/environment/t
owards-green-
growth_9789264111318-
en  
9 Oslo Roundtable on Sustainable 
Production and Consumption 
1995 Oslo Symposium 
on Sustainable 
Consumption  
Published 
document 
https://enb.iisd.org/consu
me/oslo000.html  
10 UN General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/70/1 
2015 United Nations Published 
document 
https://www.un.org/ga/se
arch/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E  
11 UN General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/66/288 
2012 United Nations Published 
document 
https://www.un.org/ga/se
arch/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E  
12 Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and 
Development: Our Common 
Future 
1987 United Nations Published 
document 
http://www.un-
documents.net/our-
common-future.pdf  
13 Sustainable Development 
Knowledge Platform: 
Sustainable Development Goal 
12 
2017 United Nations Online 
content 
https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20180606100859/http
s://sustainabledevelopme
nt.un.org/sdg12  
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14 Sustainable Development 
Knowledge Platform: 
Sustainable consumption and 
production 
n.d. United Nations Online 
content 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/topics/susta
inableconsumptionandpro
duction  
15 2018 HLPF Review of SDGs 
implementation: SDG 12 -Ensure 
sustainable consumption and 
production patterns 
2018 United Nations Published 
document 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/196532018backg
roundnotesSDG12.pdf  
16 Sustainable tourism (SDG 
Knowledge Platform) 
2017 United Nations Online 
content 
(relating to 
A/RES/70/1
93) 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/topics/susta
inabletourism  
17 Transforming Our World: The 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development 
2015 United Nations  Published 
document 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/21252030%20Ag
enda%20for%20Sustainabl
e%20Development%20we
b.pdf  
18 High-Level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development. 2018 
Review of SDGs implementation: 
SDG 12 - Ensure Sustainable 
Consumption and Production 
Patterns 
2018 United Nations  Published 
document 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/196532018backg
roundnotesSDG12.pdf  
19 Sustainable Development Goal 
12: Ensure sustainable 
consumption and production 
patterns 
2015 United Nations 
(Department of 
Economic and 
Social Affairs) 
Online 
content 
https://sdgs.un.org/goals/
goal12  
20 One Plan for One Planet: 5 Year 
Strategy 2018-2022 
2017 United Nations / 
One Planet 
network 
Published 
document 
https://www.oneplanetne
twork.org/sites/default/fil
es/strategy_one_planet.p
df  
21 Triple Wins for Sustainable 
Development: Case Studies of 
Sustainable Development in 
Action 
2012 United Nations 
Development 
Programme  
Published 
document 
https://www.undp.org/co
ntent/dam/undp/library/C
ross-
Practice%20generic%20th
eme/Triple-Wins-for-
Sustainable-Development-
web.pdf  
22 Prosperity: Inclusive Sustainable 
Growth 
n.d. United Nations 
Development 
Programme  
Online 
content 
https://www.undp.org/co
ntent/undp/en/home/203
0-agenda-for-sustainable-
development/prosperity/d
evelopment-planning-and-
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inclusive-sustainable-
growth.html  
23 Progress report on the 10-year 
framework of programmes on 
sustainable consumption and 
production patterns (E/2018/60) 
2018 United Nations 
Economic and 
Social Council 
Published 
document 
https://undocs.org/E/2018
/60  
24 Sustainable Consumption and 
Production Indicators for the 
future SDGs: UNEP Discussion 
Paper 
2016 United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
Published 
document 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/2301SCP%20indi
cators.pdf  
25 International Year of Sustainable 
Tourism for Development, 2017 
(A/RES/70/193) 
2016 United Nations 
General 
Assembly 
Published 
document 
https://www.un.org/ga/se
arch/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=A/RES/70/193&Lang=E  
26 Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on 27 July 
2012 (A/RES/66/288*) 
2012 United Nations 
General 
Assembly 
Published 
document 
https://www.un.org/ga/se
arch/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=A/RES/66/288&Lang=E  
27 The 10 Year Framework of 
Programmes on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production 
Patterns (10YFP): Interim 
progress report  
2015 United Nations: 
10YFP 
Secretariat on 
behalf of the 
10YFP Board for 
the High-Level 
Political Forum 
Published 
document 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/1444HLPF_10YFP
2.pdf  
 
Advertising (global car brands) (Figure 11). 
 
No. Text Date Author/origin Type URL if available 
28 The revolutionary BMW electric 
vehicle 
2018 BMW Parklane, 
London 
Online 
content 
https://www.bmwparklan
e.com/news/2018/march/
the-bmw-i3-the-
revolutionary-bmw-
electric-car/  
29 Electric cars | Model types N.d. BMW UK Ltd. 
"BMW" 
Online 
content 
https://www.bmw.co.uk/
model-types/electric  
30 Sustainability and the 
Environment. Shaping the 
Future of BMW. 
N.d. BMW UK Ltd. 
"BMW" 
Online 
content 
(blog) 
https://discover.bmw.co.u
k/article/sustainability  
31 Nissan Electric Vehicles: Get on 
the Road to Success 
N.d. Nissan Motor 
GB Ltd. "Nissan" 
Online 
content 
https://www.nissan.co.uk/
range/electric-cars.html  
32 Simply amazing new Nissan leaf 
| 100% Electric Car 
N.d. Nissan Motor 
GB Ltd. "Nissan" 
Online 
content 
https://www.nissan.co.uk/
vehicles/new-
vehicles/leaf.html  
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33 Electrify the World  N.d. Nissan Motor 
GB Ltd. "Nissan" 
Online 
content 
https://www.nissan.co.uk/
experience-
nissan/electric-vehicle-
leadership/electrify-the-
world.html  
34 Nissan Leaf. The Tech Advanced, 
100% Electric Car 
N.d. Nissan Motor 
GB Ltd. "Nissan" 
Online 
content 
https://www.nissan.co.uk/
vehicles/new-
vehicles/leaf.html  
35 IMAGE: Toyota Mirai  2018 Toyota (Europe) 
Plc. 
Image 
hosted 
online 
https://t1-cms-
3.images.toyota-
europe.com/toyotaone/gb
en/toyota-mirai-2018-
exterior-tme-002-a-
full_tcm-3060-
1142852.jpg  
36 Toyota Sustainable Mobility N.d. Toyota (GB) Plc. 
"Toyota" 
Online 
content 
https://www.toyota.co.uk
/world-of-
toyota/environment/susta
inable-mobility  
37 Toyota Environmental Challenge 
2050 
N.d. Toyota (GB) Plc. 
"Toyota" 
Online 
content 
https://www.toyota.co.uk
/world-of-
toyota/environment/envir
onmental-challenge-2050  
38 Toyota Better Earth N.d. Toyota (GB) Plc. 
"Toyota" 
Online 
content 
https://www.toyota.co.uk
/world-of-
toyota/environment/bette
r-earth  
39 Toyota Hydrogen-Powered Mirai N.d. Toyota (GB) Plc. 
"Toyota" 
Online 
content 
https://www.toyota.co.uk
/new-cars/new-mirai/  
40 Toyota Mirai N.d. Toyota (GB) Plc. 
"Toyota" 
Online 
content 
https://www.toyota.co.uk
/new-cars/new-
mirai/meet-mirai#1  
41 IMAGE: 2002 Toyota Prius 
Advert 
2002 Toyota, cited in 
Dunn, 2010 (p.1) 
Published 
document 
https://www.maxdunn.co
m/storage/www.maxdunn
.com/PMBA:%20Presidio%
20MBA%20Home/Prius_M
arketing_Case_Study.pdf  
 
Chapter 5 Corpus – Figure 12 
 
No. Text Date Author/origin Type URL or source 
1 "New era, shared future" 2019 China Daily Online 
article 
https://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/a/201909/30/WS5d
915576a310cf3e3556e3f8
_2.html  
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2 "Everyone responsible for 
creating a healthy ecological 
civilization" 
2015 China Daily Online 
article  
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/opinion/2015-
05/07/content_20642952.
htm 
3 "Decoding Xi's Report" [at 19th 
CPC nat. cong.] 
2017 China Daily Online 
article/inte
ractive 
multimedia 
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/china/h5/decodingxi
sreport/index.html  
4 "Ecological civilization shapes 
nation's future" 
2015 China Daily Online 
article 
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/opinion/2015-
03/26/content_19912323.
htm 
5 "China's voices at Paris climate 
conference" 
2015 China.org.cn Online 
article  
http://www.china.org.cn/
environment/2015-
12/13/content_37303299.
htm  
6 The 13th Five-Year Plan for 
Economic and Social 
Development of the People’s 
Republic of China (2016-2020) 
2016 Communist 
Party of China  
Publication  Compilation and 
Translation Bureau, 
Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of 
China. Beijing: Central 
Compilation and 
Translation Press 
7 16th CPC National Congress: Full 
text of resolution on CPC Central 
Committee report (1) 
2002 Communist 
Party of China 
(hosted by 
CCTV) 
Publication 
hosted 
online 
http://www.cctv.com/engl
ish/special/STmeeting/SP1
0180102/2002111410051
6.shtml 
8 16th CPC National Congress: Full 
text of resolution on CPC Central 
Committee report (2) 
2002 Communist 
Party of China 
(hosted by 
CCTV) 
Publication 
hosted 
online 
http://www.cctv.com/engl
ish/special/STmeeting/SP1
0180102/2002111410051
8.shtml 
9 16th CPC National Congress: 
Jiang Zemin remarks 
2002 Communist 
Party of China 
(hosted by 
CCTV) 
Publication 
hosted 
online 
http://www.cctv.com/engl
ish/special/STmeeting/SP1
0180103/2002110810030
9.shtml 
10 {Third Plenary Session 18th Cen. 
Com. CPC) Decision of the 
Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on 
Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the 
Reform 
2014 Communist 
Party of China 
(hosted by 
China.org.cn 
Online 
publication 
www.china.org.cn/china/t
hird_plenary_session/201
4-
01/16/content_31212602.
htm  
11 Full text of resolution on 
amendment to CPC Constitution  
2017 Communist 
Party of China 
Online 
publication 
http://www.xinhuanet.co
m/english/2017-
10/24/c_136702726.htm  
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(hosted by 
Xinhuanet) 
12 Opinions of the CPC Central 
Committee and the State 
Council on Further Promoting 
the Development of Ecological 
Civilization 
2015 CPC Central 
Committee, 
hosted by Sino-
German 
Environmental 
Partnership 
Publication 
hosted 
online 
https://environmental-
partnership.org/wp-
content/uploads/downloa
d-folder/Eco-
Guidelines_rev_Eng.pdf  
13 “Evolution of an Ecological 
Civilization” 
2006 Pan Yue, (then) 
Vice Director of 
the State 
Environmental 
Protection 
Administration / 
Beijing Review  
(Expert) 
Online 
article  
http://www.bjreview.co
m.cn/expert/txt/2006-
12/15/content_50890_
2.htm  
14 "Stick to Karl Marx’s true path, Xi 
Jinping tells China’s communists 
in speech to mark 200th 
birthday of ‘greatest thinker of 
modern times'" 
2018 South China 
Morning Post 
Online 
article 
https://www.scmp.com/n
ews/china/policies-
politics/article/2144716/st
ick-karl-marxs-true-path-
xi-jinping-tells-chinas  
15 Full Text: Integrated Reform Plan 
for Promoting Ecological 
Progress  
2015 State Council of 
the PRC 
Online 
publication 
http://english.www.gov.cn
/policies/latest_releases/2
015/09/22/content_28147
5195492066.htm  
16 "The promising land with 
‘greenest’ blueprint" 
2016 State Council of 
the PRC 
Online 
publication 
http://english.www.gov.cn
/news/video/2016/04/18/
content_28147533014745
9.htm  
17 "China to establish ecological 
civilization demonstration zones 
in Jiangxi, Guizhou" 
2017 State Council of 
the PRC 
Online 
publication 
http://english.www.gov.cn
/policies/latest_releases/2
017/10/04/content_28147
5898093070.htm  
18 Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 
19th CPC National Congress 
2017 Xi Jinping 
(hosted by China 
Daily)  
Online 
publication 
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/china/19thcpcnation
alcongress/2017-
11/04/content_34115212.
htm 
19 Xi leads ecological civilization 2017 Xinhua / China 
Daily 
Online 
article 
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/china/2017-
03/22/content_28634915.
htm  
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20 "习近平：决胜全面建成小康
社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会
主义伟大胜利 ——在中国共产
党第十九次全国代表大会上的
报 告 " (Xi Jinping: Secure a 
Decisive Victory in Building a 
Moderately Prosperous Society 
in All Respects and Strive for the 
Great Success of Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a 
New Era) 
2017 Xinhuanet Online 
article  
http://www.xinhuanet.co
m/politics/19cpcnc/2017-
10/27/c_1121867529.htm  
 
Chapter 6 Corpus – Figures 13 and 14 
Ecological civilization in Chinese (non-BRI) external relations (Figure 13). 
 
No. Text Date Author/origin Type URL if available 
1 "China ready to deliver promises 
in full: top climate envoy" 
2017 China Climate 
Envoy 
comments at 
Xinhuanet 
Online 
article  
http://www.xinhuanet.co
m/english/2017-
11/17/c_136758666.htm  
2 "Ecological civilization shapes 
nation's future" 
2015 China Daily Online 
article  
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/opinion/2015-
03/26/content_19912323.
htm  
3 "Beijing expo to showcase 
China's ecological civilization 
progress" 
2019 China Daily Online 
article  
https://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/a/201904/23/WS5cb
ecaf0a3104842260b7d30.
html  
4 [Vice-president] "Wang sees 
multilateralism as 'inevitable'" 
2019 China Daily Online 
article  
https://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/a/201912/02/WS5de
44e3fa310cf3e3557b32b.h
tml  
5 "China's ecological renewal 
model an inspiration to the 
world: UNEP chief" 
2018 Eric Solheim 
(UNEP) 
comments in 
Xinhua 
Online 
article  
https://www.focac.org/en
g/zfgx_4/jmhz/t1561764.h
tm  
6 EU-China Joint Statement on 
Climate Change 
2015 EU and China / 
hosted 
European 
Council 
Online 
publication 
https://www.consilium.eu
ropa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2015/06/29/eu-
china-climate-statement/  
7 EU and China Partnership on 
Climate Change 
2005 European 
Commission  
Memo Memo/05/298. 
Brussels: EU 
Commission.  
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8 Press conference: Premier Li 
Keqiang: Nation plays important 
role in global affairs" 
2015 Li Keqiang Press 
Conference, 
China Daily 
Online 
article  
http://www.chinadaily.co
m.cn/china/2015twosessi
on/2015-
03/15/content_19815455.
htm 
9 Remarks by H. E. Wang Qishan 
Vice President of the People's 
Republic of China at the Second 
Paris Peace Forum 
2019 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
of the PRC 
Online 
publication 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn
/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1
715473.shtml  
10 Canada-China Joint Statement 
on Climate Change and Clean 
Growth 
2017 Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau 
and Premier Li 
Keqiang 
Online 
publication 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news
/statements/2017/12/04/
canada-china-joint-
statement-climate-
change-and-clean-growth  
11 "China-India Ties Beyond 
Bilateral, Have Far-Reaching 
Strategic Significance: Chinese 
Envoy Sun Weidong" 
2019 Sun Weidong 
(Chinese Envoy) 
comments in 
NDTV 
Online 
article  
https://www.ndtv.com/in
dia-news/china-india-ties-
beyond-bilateral-have-far-
reaching-strategic-
significance-chinese-
envoy-sun-weidong-
2119310  
12 Theme announced for landmark 
2020 UN Biodiversity 
Conference: "Ecological 
Civilization: Building a Shared 
Future for All Life on Earth" 
2019 UN Conference 
on Biological 
Diversity  
Online 
press 
release 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/
press/2019/pr-2019-09-
05-cop15-en.pdf  
13 Zero Draft of the Post-2020 
Global Biodiversity Framework 
2020 UN Conference 
on Biological 
Diversity: Open-
Ended Working 
Group on the 
post-2020 
Global 
Biodiversity 
Framework 
(note by co-
chairs) 
Online 
publication 
https://www.cbd.int/doc/
c/cf51/57c8/0908ef199af5
bfe2e236009e/wg2020-
02-03-en.pdf  
14 Outcomes From the UNEP FI 
2013 Global Roundtable. 
Financing the future we want: 
China Emerging Markets & the 
World Economy 
2013 UNEP Finance 
Initiative (Global 
Roundtable 
2013) 
Online 
publication 
https://www.unepfi.org/gr
t/2013/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/
GRT_Outcomes.pdf  
15 China’s Solution: Ecological 
Civilization and the Green 
Economy 
2013 UNEP Finance 
Initiative (Global 
Roundtable 
Online 
publication 
(agenda) 
https://www.unepfi.org/gr
t/2013/programmes/ecolo
gical-civilization-and-the-
green-economy/  
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2013: 
moderated 
session) 
16 Introduction to Green Economy: 
UNEP Governing Council 
Decision (27/8) 
2013 UNEP Governing 
Council  
Online 
publication 
https://europa.eu/capacit
y4dev/file/18081/downloa
d?token=86LbIv_w  
17 Building an ecological 
civilization: Theme for 2020 UN 
Biodiversity Conference 
announced  
2019 UNEP World 
Conservation 
Monitoring 
Centre 
Online 
article  
https://www.unep-
wcmc.org/news/building-
an-ecological-civilization--
theme-for-2020-un-
biodiversity-conference-
announced  
18 Remarks by H. E. Wang Qishan 
Vice President of the People's 
Republic of China At the Second 
Paris Peace Forum 
2019 Wang Qishan 
speech / text at 
PRC embassy, 
UK 
Online 
publication 
http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw
/t1715473.htm  
19 "China ready to deliver promises 
in full: top climate envoy" 
2017 Xhinuanet Online 
article  
http://www.xinhuanet.co
m/english/2017-
11/17/c_136758666.htm  
20 (Speech) Towards Win-Win 
Partnership for Sustainable 
Development 
2015 Xi Jinping 
(hosted at UN) 
Online 
publication 
https://sustainabledevelo
pment.un.org/content/do
cuments/20548china.pdf  
 
 
Ecological civilization in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Figure 14). 
 
No. Text Date Author/origin Type URL if available 
21 "Belt and Road Initiative can be 
win-win, says Australia's 
Northern Territory chief 
minister" 
2019 Chief Minister 
Northern 
Territories, 
Australia 
comments / 
Xinhuanet 
Online 
article  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2019-
10/15/c_138472704.htm  
22 Special Policy Study on Green 
Belt and Road and 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development 
2018 China Council 
for International 
Cooperation on 
Environment 
and 
Development 
Online 
discussion 
paper 
https://www.iisd.org/sites/d
efault/files/publications/CCI
CED/engagement/2018/gre
en-belt-and-road-and-2030-
agenda.pdf  
23 "EU's focus on cooperation not 
conflict" 
2019 China Daily Online 
article  
http://global.chinadaily.com
.cn/a/201910/11/WS5d9fcb
eca310cf3e3556fce4.html  
24 "UN chief praises Belt and Road 
Initiative" 
2018 China Daily Online 
article  
http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/a/201806/14/WS5b2281
51a310010f8f59d08c.html  
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25 Speech: Belt and Road Initiative: 
Strategies to Deliver in the Next 
Phase 
2018 Christine 
Lagarde, 
managing 
director IMF / 
IMF-PBC 
Conference, 
Beijing 
Online 
publication 
https://www.imf.org/en/Ne
ws/Articles/2018/04/11/sp0
41218-belt-and-road-
initiative-strategies-to-
deliver-in-the-next-phase  
26 Wang Yi Holds Talks with 
Minister of Foreign and 
European Affairs Miroslav Lajčák 
of Slovakia 
2019 Embassy of the 
People's 
Republic of 
China in the 
United Kingdom 
of Great Britain 
and Northern 
Ireland  
Online 
statement 
http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t
1680591.htm  
27 "China's Belt and Road initiative 
to spur green, resilient growth in 
Africa: expert" 
2017 Environment 
Working Group, 
EU Chamber of 
Commerce 
comments in 
Forum on China-
Africa 
Cooperation 
Online 
article  
https://www.focac.org/eng/
zfzs_1/t1518343.htm  
28 "Digital Silk Road on path to 
sustainable development: 
expert" 
2017 Expert interview 
with Forum on 
China-Africa 
Cooperation 
Online 
article  
https://www.focac.org/eng/
zfgx_4/jmhz/t1490785.htm  
29 "Interview: BRI leads global 
battle against environmental 
challenges: conservationist" 
2019 Interview: Jean-
Paul Paddack, 
Executive 
Director for 
Network 
Development at 
WWF / 
Xinhuanet 
Online 
article  
http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2019-
04/10/c_137965745.htm  
30 The Belt and Road Ecological and 
Environmental Cooperation Plan 
2017 Ministry of 
Ecology and 
Environment of 
the PRC 
Online 
publication 
http://english.mee.gov.cn/R
esources/Policies/policies/Fr
ameworkp1/201706/t20170
628_416869.shtml  
31 The Belt and Road Ecological and 
Environmental Cooperation Plan   
2017 Ministry of 
Ecology and 
Environment of 
the PRC 
Online 
publication 
http://english.mee.gov.cn/R
esources/Policies/policies/Fr
ameworkp1/201706/t20170
628_416869.shtml  
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32 B&R Initiative: Not a solo song, 
but a chorus  
2017 State Council of 
the PRC (English 
language site) 
Online 
multimedia 
http://english.www.gov.cn/
news/video/2017/05/08/co
ntent_281475648982893.ht
m  
33 Strengthening national policy 
capacity for jointly building the 
Belt and Road towards the 
Sustainable Development Goals 
2017 UN Department 
of Economic and 
Social Affairs 
(paid for by UN 
Peace and 
Development 
Trust Fund) 
Online 
publication 
https://www.un.org/develo
pment/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/p
ublication/2017_cdas_belta
ndroadb.pdf 
34 "China's Belt and Road initiatives 
not solo, but symphony" 
2015 Wang Yi, PRC 
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Appendix A  
Section IX of Xi Jinping’s address delivered at the 19th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017. 
Full text available at China Daily (2017)  
(URL: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-
11/04/content_34115212.htm) 
N.B. This is a direct reproduction – errors, formatting, and emphases are original 
  
 
IX. Speeding up Reform of the System for Developing an Ecological 
Civilization, and Building a Beautiful China 
Man and nature form a community of life; we, as human beings, must respect 
nature, follow its ways, and protect it. Only by observing the laws of nature can 
mankind avoid costly blunders in its exploitation. Any harm we inflict on 
nature will eventually return to haunt us. This is a reality we have to face.  
The modernization that we pursue is one characterized by harmonious 
coexistence between man and nature. In addition to creating more material and 
cultural wealth to meet people's ever-increasing needs for a better life, we need 
also to provide more quality ecological goods to meet people's ever-growing 
demands for a beautiful environment. We should, acting on the principles of 
prioritizing resource conservation and environmental protection and letting 
nature restore itself, develop spatial layouts, industrial structures, and ways of 
work and life that help conserve resources and protect the environment. With 
this, we can restore the serenity, harmony, and beauty of nature.  
1. Promoting green development  
We will step up efforts to establish a legal and policy framework that promotes 
green production and consumption, and promote a sound economic structure 
that facilitates green, low-carbon, and circular development. We will create a 
market-based system for green technology innovation, develop green finance, 
and spur the development of energy-saving and environmental protection 
industries as well as clean production and clean energy industries. We will 
promote a revolution in energy production and consumption, and build an 
energy sector that is clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient.  
We will encourage conservation across the board and promote recycling, take 
action to get everyone conserving water, cut consumption of energy and 
materials, and establish linkages between the circular use of resources and 
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materials in industrial production and in everyday life. We encourage simple, 
moderate, green, and low-carbon ways of life, and oppose extravagance and 
excessive consumption. We will launch initiatives to make Party and 
government offices do better when it comes to conservation, and develop eco-
friendly families, schools, communities, and transport services.  
2. Solving prominent environmental problems 
We will get everyone involved in improving the environment and address 
environmental issues at the root. We will continue our campaign to prevent and 
control air pollution to make our skies blue again. We will speed up prevention 
and control of water pollution, and take comprehensive measures to improve 
river basins and offshore areas. We will strengthen the control of soil pollution 
and the restoration of polluted soil, intensify the prevention and control of 
agricultural pollution from non-point sources, and take measures to improve 
rural living environments. We will improve the treatment of solid waste and 
garbage.  
We will enforce stricter pollutants discharge standards and see to it that 
polluters are held accountable. We will improve our systems for credibility 
assessment based on environmental protection performance, for mandatory 
release of environmental information, and for imposing severe punishment for 
environmental violations. We will establish an environmental governance 
system in which government takes the lead, enterprises assume main 
responsibility, and social organizations and the public also participate. We will 
get actively involved in global environmental governance and fulfill our 
commitments on emissions reduction.  
3. Intensifying the protection of ecosystems 
We will carry out major projects to protect and restore key ecosystems, improve 
the system of shields for ecological security, and develop ecological corridors 
and biodiversity protection networks, so as to strengthen the quality and 
stability of our ecosystems. We will complete work on drawing redlines for 
protecting the ecosystems, designating permanent basic cropland, and 
delineating boundaries for urban development.  
We will promote afforestation, take comprehensive steps to control 
desertification, stony deserts, and soil erosion, strengthen wetland conservation 
and restoration, and better prevent and control geological disasters. We will 
improve the system for protecting natural forests, and turn more marginal 
farmland into forests and grasslands. We will rigorously protect farmland and 
expand trials in crop rotation and keeping land fallow. We will improve 
systems for regeneration of croplands, grasslands, forests, rivers, and lakes, and 
set up diversified market-based mechanisms for ecological compensation. 
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4. Reforming the environmental regulation system 
We will strengthen overall planning, organization, and leadership for building 
an ecological civilization. We will establish regulatory agencies to manage state-
owned natural resource assets and monitor natural ecosystems, and improve 
environmental management systems. These agencies will, in a unified way, 
perform the duties of the owner of public-owned natural resource assets, the 
duties of regulating the use of all territorial space and protecting and restoring 
ecosystems, and the duties of monitoring the discharge of all pollutants in 
urban and rural areas and conducting administrative law enforcement.  
We will establish systems for developing and protecting territorial space, 
improve supporting policies on functional zones, and develop a nature reserves 
system composed mainly of national parks. We will take tough steps to stop 
and punish all activities that damage the environment.  
Comrades,  
What we are doing today to build an ecological civilization will benefit 
generations to come. We should have a strong commitment to socialist 
ecological civilization and work to develop a new model of modernization with 
humans developing in harmony with nature. We must do our generation's 
share to protect the environment.  
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Appendix B 
Full text of the Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved from 
Xinhua at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm   
 
N.B. This is a direct reproduction – errors, formatting, and emphases are original 
 
 
Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China 
on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China 
October 24, 2017 
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China deliberated on 
and unanimously adopted the revised Constitution of the Communist Party of 
China proposed by the 18th Party Central Committee and decided that it shall 
come into effect as of the date of adoption. 
The Congress notes that since the Party's 18th National Congress, Chinese 
Communists, with Comrade Xi Jinping as their chief representative, in response 
to contemporary developments and by integrating theory with practice, have 
systematically addressed the major question of our times-what kind of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics the new era requires us to uphold and 
develop and how we should uphold and develop it, thus giving shape to Xi 
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The 
Thought is a continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the 
Scientific Outlook on Development. It is the latest achievement in adapting 
Marxism to the Chinese context, a crystallization of the practical experience and 
collective wisdom of the Party and the people, an important component of the 
theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and a guide to 
action for the entire Party and all the Chinese people to strive for the great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and must be upheld long term and 
constantly developed. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism 
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, the Communist Party of China has 
led the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in a concerted effort to carry out a 
great struggle, develop a great project, advance a great cause, and realize a 
great dream, ushering in a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
The Congress unanimously agrees that, Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, in addition to Marxism-Leninism, Mao 
Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and 
the Scientific Outlook on Development, shall constitute the guides to action of 
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the Party in the Party Constitution. The Congress urges all Party members to 
use the Thought to achieve unity in thinking and action, be more purposeful 
and determined in studying and applying it, and put the Thought into action 
throughout the drive toward China's socialist modernization and in every 
dimension of Party building. 
The Congress affirms that the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics 
is a key part of socialism with Chinese characteristics and a powerful source of 
strength that inspires the entire Party and the Chinese people of all ethnic 
groups to forge ahead courageously. The Congress approves the incorporation 
of the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics into the Party 
Constitution, along with the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the 
theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the system of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. This addition will help all Party 
members deepen their understanding of socialism with Chinese characteristics 
and fully grasp its implications. The Congress stresses that all Party members 
must cherish deeply, uphold long term, and continue to develop this path, this 
theoretical system, this socialist system, and this culture, which the Party has 
developed through great hardship; hold high the great banner of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics; have firm confidence in the path, theory, system, and 
culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics; and implement the Party's 
basic theory, basic line, and basic policy. 
The Congress holds that national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of 
the Chinese people since modern times began, and that it is a solemn 
commitment our Party has made to our people and to history. The Congress 
endorses the inclusion of the two centenary goals and the Chinese Dream of 
national rejuvenation into the Party Constitution. 
The Congress holds that a major political conclusion is drawn in the political 
report to the 19th Party Congress that the principal contradiction facing Chinese 
society has evolved and is now that between the people's ever-growing needs 
for a better life and unbalanced and inadequate development; it reflects the 
realities of the development of Chinese society, and serves as an important basis 
on which we formulate major policies and long-term strategies for the Party 
and the country. The Party Constitution is revised accordingly to provide 
important guidance for us to better understand the new historic juncture in 
China's development and its particular features in the current stage and to 
further advance the cause of the Party and the country. 
The Congress holds that statements on our people-centered philosophy of 
development; on innovative, coordinated, green, and open development that is 
for everyone; on coordinated efforts to finish building a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects, comprehensively deepen reform, fully advance law-
based governance, and strengthen Party self-governance in every respect; and 
on all-out efforts to build a great modern socialist country, represent the 
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ultimate purpose, vision, overall strategy, and overarching goal of the Party in 
upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.  
Also incorporated into the Party Constitution are statements on the need to 
achieve better quality and more efficient, equitable, and sustainable 
development, to improve and develop the system of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, to modernize China's system and capacity for governance, and 
to pursue reform in a more systematic, holistic, and coordinated way. This will 
help all Party members closely follow, in both thinking and action, the well-
conceived assessment and strategic plans of the Central Committee, uphold and 
put into practice the new development philosophy, and continue to break new 
ground in reform and development. 
The Congress holds that since our 18th National Congress, the Party Central 
Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core has developed new ideas, new 
thinking, and new strategies for promoting economic, political, cultural, social, 
and ecological advancement. The Congress agrees to add to the Party 
Constitution the following statements: we shall give play to the decisive role of 
market forces in resource allocation and ensure the government plays its role 
better; advance supply-side structural reform; establish a system of socialist 
rule of law with Chinese characteristics; advance extensive, multilevel, and 
institutionalized development of consultative democracy; nurture and practice 
core socialist values; promote the creative evolution and development of fine 
traditional Chinese culture; carry forward our revolutionary culture; develop an 
advanced socialist culture; enhance our country's cultural soft power; hold 
firmly the leading position in ideological work; help our people gain an 
increasingly stronger sense of fulfillment; strengthen and develop new 
approaches to social governance; pursue a holistic approach to national 
security; and fully understand that lucid waters and lush mountains are 
invaluable assets. 
These statements are of great importance in helping all Party members more 
consciously and determinedly implement the Party's basic theory, basic line, 
and basic policy, and coordinate the implementation of the five-sphere 
integrated plan. 
The Congress notes that since the Party's 18th National Congress, Comrade Xi 
Jinping has set forth a series of important ideas and viewpoints on 
strengthening national defense and the armed forces, ethnic unity, "one 
country, two systems" and national reunification, the united front, and foreign 
affairs, charting the course for staying committed to the path of building strong 
armed forces with Chinese characteristics; for safeguarding and developing 
socialist ethnic relations featuring equality, unity, mutual assistance, and 
harmony; for promoting national reunification; and for building a community 
with a shared future for mankind. 
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The Congress agrees to include into the Party Constitution the following 
statements: The Communist Party of China shall uphold its absolute leadership 
over the People's Liberation Army and other people's armed forces; implement 
Xi Jinping's thinking on strengthening the military; strengthen the development 
of the People's Liberation Army by enhancing its political loyalty, strengthening 
it through reform and technology, and running it in accordance with the law; 
build people's forces that obey the Party's command, can fight and win, and 
maintain excellent conduct; ensure that the People's Liberation Army 
accomplishes its missions and tasks in the new era; foster a strong sense of 
community for the Chinese nation; uphold justice while pursuing shared 
interests; work to build a community with a shared future for mankind; follow 
the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration; 
and pursue the Belt and Road Initiative. 
The inclusion of these statements will help ensure the Party's absolute 
leadership over the people's armed forces, modernize national defense and the 
military, promote ethnic unity, and develop an open economy of higher 
standards. 
The Congress holds that since its 18th National Congress, the Party has made 
steady progress in exercising full and rigorous governance over the Party, taken 
all-around measures to explore the strengthening of Party building, and gained 
abundant successful experience and achieved major outcomes, which must be 
included into the Party Constitution in a timely manner and therefore become 
the common will and rule of the whole Party. 
It is affirmed at the Party's 19th National Congress that the Party must firmly 
exercise self-supervision and practice strict self-governance in every respect; 
strengthen the Party's long-term governance capacity and its advanced nature 
and purity; and take enhancing its political building as the overarching 
principle and make comprehensive efforts to ensure that the Party's political 
work is stressed, ideology is strengthened, organizations are consolidated, 
conduct is improved, discipline is maintained, institutional development is 
always emphasized, and the fight against corruption keeps going. The Congress 
agrees to add the above statements to the Party Constitution. 
Also included into the Party Constitution are: The Party must constantly 
strengthen its ability to purify, improve, reform, and excel itself; use Xi Jinping 
Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to achieve 
unity in thinking and action; keep firmly in mind the need to maintain political 
integrity, think in big-picture terms, uphold the leadership core, and keep in 
alignment, and firmly uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership 
of the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core; strengthen and 
regulate political activities within the Party; make intraparty political activities 
more politically oriented, up-to-date, principled, and effective; cultivate a 
positive and healthy intraparty political culture; and foster a sound political 
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ecosystem featuring honesty and integrity within the Party. Firmness in 
exercising strict self-supervision and self-governance is included into the Party 
Constitution as a fundamental requirement the Party must work with firm 
resolve to meet in building itself. 
The incorporation of these statements will ensure the Party has a clearer goal 
and a more complete plan for building itself. They will help the whole Party 
advance Party building with more well-conceived ways of thinking and more 
effective measures, so as to continuously improve the quality of Party building 
and ensure the Party is always full of vigor and vitality.  
The Congress holds that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the 
most essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the 
greatest strength of this system; the Party exercises overall leadership over all 
areas of endeavor in every part of the country. The Congress agrees to add this 
major political principle to the Party Constitution, which will help heighten the 
Party consciousness of every Party member, and ensure unity of thinking, 
political solidarity and concerted action of the whole Party. It will also help 
enhance the Party's ability to innovate, power to unite, and energy to fight; 
ensure the Party always provides overall leadership and coordinates the efforts 
of all involved; and offer the fundamental political guarantee for all areas of 
work of the Party and the country. 
The Congress notes that in view of the successful experience gained in Party 
work and Party building since the 18th Party Congress and in compliance with 
the revisions to the General Program, appropriate revisions to some articles of 
the Party Constitution are necessary. 
To conscientiously study Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era, to consciously observe the Party's political 
discipline and rules, to have the courage to reveal and correct any statements 
and actions violating the Party's principles, to lead the way in practicing core 
socialist values, and to advocate traditional virtues of the Chinese nation, are 
obligations of Party members. Upholding political integrity as the primary 
criterion is the major principle that must be adhered to in admitting new Party 
members. 
To ensure the full coverage of discipline inspection and carry out inspections at 
central, city (prefecture), and county levels is practical experience gained in the 
Party's discipline inspection work; it must be upheld and developed. 
To clarify that Chairperson of the Central Military Commission assumes overall 
responsibility over the work of the Commission and that the Central Military 
Commission is responsible for Party work and political work in the armed 
forces, complies with the realistic requirement to ensure the Central Military 
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Commission fulfills its responsibility for Party self-supervision and self-
governance after the military reform. 
To fully reflect the achievements of Party work and Party building since the 
18th Party Congress, revisions are made to: adjust the term of office of general 
Party branch committees and Party branch committees; regularize and 
institutionalize the requirement for all Party members to study the Party 
Constitution, Party regulations, and General Secretary Xi Jinping's major policy 
addresses and to meet Party standards; define the status and role of Party 
organizations in state-owned enterprises; elaborate on the functions and 
responsibilities of primary-level Party organizations in social organizations; 
explicate the responsibilities of primary-level Party organizations in offices of 
the Party or the state at every level; demonstrate the position and functions of 
Party branches; set out new criteria and requirements for selecting officials; and 
adjust and elaborate on provisions related to the Party discipline and Party 
organs for discipline inspection. 
These revisions will help all Party members grasp the guiding ideology of the 
Party and keep up with the times, align themselves with Xi Jinping Thought on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and use it to guide 
practice and advance work, see primary-level Party organizations become 
politically stronger, and move further forward with the full and rigorous 
governance over the Party. 
The Congress urges Party organizations at all levels and all Party members to, 
under the firm leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi 
Jinping at the core, hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, follow the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific 
Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era, and more purposefully study, observe, apply, 
and uphold the Party Constitution. The Congress urges the entire Party to 
uphold and strengthen the overall leadership of the Party, ensure the Party's 
strict self-supervision and strict self-governance in every respect, and keep 
working to secure a decisive victory in finishing building a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects, to strive for the great success of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics for a new era, to realize the Chinese Dream of 
national rejuvenation, and to see our people fulfill their aspirations for a better 
life.  
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Appendix C 
Concordance tables supplementing discourse analysis in Chapter Five.  
 
N.B. This is a direct reproduction – errors are original 
 
 
Fig. 15: Table to show concordance of key word ‘sustainable development’ in left/right 
context. Corpus: China’s 13th 5-Year Plan. Analysis by author. 
 
Left Key word(s) Right 
, and speed up transformation of the 
growth model to achieve higher quality, 
more efficient, more equitable, and more 
sustainable 
development 
. • Continue to deepen reform. Reform is 
a powerful force for development. In line 
with the chief objectives of improving 
years are as follows: • Maintain a 
medium-high rate of growth While 
working to achieve more balanced, 
inclusive, and 
sustainable 
development 
, we need to ensure that China's 2010 GDP 
and per capita personal income double by 
2020, that major economic indicators 
We need to uphold the fundamental state 
policy of conserving resources and 
protecting the environment as we pursue 
sustainable 
development 
, and keep to a civilized development path 
that ensures increased levels of 
production, better living standards, and 
society, coordinating development 
between rural and urban areas and 
between different regions, and bolstering 
sustainable 
development 
. We will launch investment programs that 
are of overall, strategic, and fundamental 
importance.  Section 3 New Export 
production zones; 3 strategic ecological 
security based on the two ecological 
shields and three ecological belts; 
sustainable 
development 
of maritime space. We will ensure an 
appropriate intensity of development of 
China's territorial space and increase 
 
Fig. 16: Table to show concordance of key word ‘consumer’ / ‘consumers’ in left/right 
context. Corpus: People’s Republic of China’s 13th 5-Year Plan, official English 
translation. Analysis by author. 
 
Left Key word Right 
. The value-added of the tertiary industry 
accounted for a larger share of GDP than that 
of the secondary industry.  
Consumer spending continued to rise. Disparity 
between rural and urban areas and 
between regions has been narrowing. By 
2015 
as well as the crowdsourcing of manufacturing 
operations and maintenance services, 
knowledge, content, and 
consumer services to give impetus to public 
participation in the division of labor in 
online production and distribution. We 
, we will work to improve the environment in 
which the potential of consumption is 
unleashed, better satisfy and create 
consumer demand through improved and innovative 
supply, and constantly strengthen the 
fundamental role that consumption 
the fundamental role that consumption plays in 
fueling [sic] economic growth. We will channel 
great energy into expanding 
consumer spending by increasing consumer buying 
power, improving consumer expectations, 
and tapping rural potential for 
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plays in fueling [sic] economic growth. We will 
channel great energy into expanding consumer 
spending by increasing 
consumer buying power, improving consumer 
expectations, and tapping rural potential for 
consumption. We will focus on 
. We will channel great energy into expanding 
consumer spending by increasing consumer 
buying power, improving 
consumer expectations, and tapping rural potential for 
consumption. We will focus on expanding 
consumption of services to 
new models of consumption, such as the 
integration of online and offline consumption. 
We will see that the quality of 
consumer goods is improved, strengthen the 
protection of consumer rights and interests, 
and give full play to the role of 
and offline consumption. We will see that the 
quality of consumer goods is improved, 
strengthen the protection of 
consumer rights and interests, and give full play to the 
role of consumer associations in order to 
create convenient, 
goods is improved, strengthen the protection 
of consumer rights and interests, and give full 
play to the role of 
consumer associations in order to create convenient, 
worry-free environments for consumption. 
We will actively work to 
behavior and for conduct oversight that 
genuinely protects the legitimate rights and 
interests of financial 
consumers , so as to achieve oversight that covers 
every aspect of financial risks. We will 
improve the management system for 
system. 5. Rule of law in the financial sector § 
Improve systems that protect the rights and 
interests of financial 
consumers ; § Put an end to implicit guaranties and 
inflexible yields, and deal with credit 
violators in accordance with the law; § 
protection, thereby helping key manufacturing 
sectors move into the medium-high end. We 
will improve the supply of 
consumer goods. We will encourage mergers and 
acquisitions of enterprises so as to put in 
place a highly concentrated, 
environment, so as to help producer services 
move both toward specialization and higher up 
the value chain, and help 
consumer services become more refined and increase 
in quality. Section 1 Specialization in 
Producer Services With the aim of 
more in line with international standards so as 
to increase their international competitiveness. 
Section 2 Better 
Consumer Services We will accelerate the 
development of service sectors such as 
education and training, health and elderly 
, working to ensure they become more 
specialized, scaled-up, and online-based. We 
will encourage integration in the 
consumer service sector and the growth of customized 
services to meet personalized demands. We 
will support service sector 
their levels of professionalization and 
specialization. We will put in place an action 
plan to ensure quality 
consumer services, spread the use of identifiers of 
quality service commitments along with 
systems for their management, and 
comprehensive improvements in water-saving 
equipment and technologies. We will tighten 
oversight over major water 
consumers , and encourage the reuse of water as well 
as the differentiated use of water according 
to its quality. We will establish 
industries; § Support the demonstration of 
comprehensive energy efficiency improvement 
efforts by 500 major energy 
consumers ; § Organize the implementation of projects, 
such as those to improve energy systems, 
upgrade the energy-efficient 
of seawater to meet the demand for water on 
islands; § Strengthen monitoring over the use 
of water by major water 
consumers . 3. Economical and intensive use of land 
designated for construction purposes § 
Improve inspection and evaluation 
the import structure by importing a greater 
amount of advanced technology, advanced 
equipment, and high quality 
consumer goods. We will actively respond to foreign 
technical barriers to trade, improve early 
warnings of possible trade 
income tax system based on both adjusted 
gross income and specific types of income. We 
will bring certain luxury 
consumer items and high-expenditure activities under 
the scope of excise tax. We will improve tax 
policies which encourage 
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